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THE
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY
[AND
EDUCATION

EDITED BY
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EDITORIAL.

Within recent years the religious phenomena centering in conversion have been studied by the comparative and objective methods of psychology which has presented them in a new light. From the standpoint of this science these changes are now regarded as marking the stage of crisis in the normal and very essential transition involved in the very nature of individual development from self-centered childhood to the altruism of maturity. They have been found to occur most frequently in adolescent years and are now correlated, not only with the confirmation ceremonies of many Christian and other religious sects, but also with the all but universal rites by which savage tribes formally induct their youth and maidens into the insights and duties of adult life. The religious value of these studies has found abundant recognition in all progressive churches and has given to many thoughtful and cultivated minds outside the pale of their influence augmented interest in, and a deepened sense of the reality of, religion. It also marks an extension of the domain of science within the field of man's higher nature and has helped to close the chasm, which has long been so calamitous for youth, between science and religion. Scrupulously refraining from interfering with any characterization of superhuman agencies or transcendental provisions for, or aims and results of, this change, psychology limits itself solely to the study of its phenomena in the human soul with a view to determining their chief forms, sequences and laws. What has been done here is probably only a beginning and the best is yet to be accomplished.

Meanwhile, although less popularly known as yet, similar researches have begun in the field of many other vital religious experiences in each

of which a small but precious and most promising literature is arising, and work of similar moment is either done or impends.

Religious pathology, a new and suggestive theme, seeks, in the aberrations of the religious instinct, to show both its power and its peculiar proneness to excess, and would already lay down a few lines, rough and provisional though they be, between what is normal and abnormal. That the religious nature has diseases both chronic and acute of its own not only its history but many of its contemporary manifestations abundantly show. It is also already plain that we can gain insight into the working of the factors of the healthful life of piety by observing them "writ large" in its distempers, just as sanity in general profits from the study of insanity. Some, again, are now seeking to vindicate or probabilize the fact of inspiration and some of the other functions of the Holy Spirit by a new scrutiny of not only genius but of ecstatic and hypnoid states in which the ordinary mental processes are quickened and exalted, and even think side lights to be cast upon this theme by the observation of so-called trance-mediumship, control, telepathy, etc. Certain it is that the doctrine, not only of inspiration, but even of revelation, needs a form of restatement that is more consonant with psychic facts. Again, confession has had, of late, a new and even clinical justification as a therapeutic process of extraditing the traumata of evil from the soul in a way which is most suggestive in explaining how sin may be forsaken and how pardon operates subjectively. Pity is no longer studied as only a part of æsthetics but in a way which shows that the story of the cross is its most consummate masterpiece and how, when rightly directed and sufficiently evoked, it has a power, Nietzsche to the contrary notwithstanding, of transforming life and which the modern world had forgotten. Faith is shown to be one of the supreme words in the vocabulary of the soul, the bearer of the unseen world of the morally ideal and the organ of that best part of history, which is not yet written because it has not yet occurred. Its ictus may be connected with something like sympathetic vibrations from the soul's immemorial past, and its phenomenon of irresistible conviction stands forth in a new way when illuminated by the higher evolution and anthropology. Scripture is coming to be slowly revealed as the chief practical textbook of the race in a large ethnic psychology that reaches to the depths and does not so scrupulously confine itself as do so many of its modern academic expositions to the surface phe-

nomena of psychic life. Prayer, too, is almost a category of the heart, not only a passion of many savages whose lives centre in it, but also of the devotees of even a religion like Buddhism which gives it no object and provides no place for it in its cult. Its high subjective function for man is established even if no prayer had ever been objectively answered. Biology has lately given the world a new conception of death and its function in the world, which teems with possibilities for religion which are only just beginning to be exploited. More perhaps than anything else, modern psychic study emphasizes sin and evil as the church grows euphemistic about them. These studies have already established points of connection, on the one hand with melancholia, and on the other with pessimism, while its roots in sex and its relations to heredity are being understood as never before until some bio-psychologists almost wish to take the pulpit to bring out aright the old anthems of Pauline conviction of sin and Socratic convictions of human ignorance. We cannot here characterize or perhaps even name all the old problems that are beginning to glow with a new light like the baby faces awaiting incarnation on the canvases of the old masters. Sacrifice, poverty, obedience, chastity, asceticism, renunciation and its motives and forms, creeds, dogma and doctrine, worship including sacraments, rites, ritual and ceremonies, priests and saints, the psycho-pedagogic aspect of miracles, especially those of healing, as related to mental states, the nature, value and limitations of personality, the feminine aspects and functions of religion and Mariolatry, the Sabbath as a philosophical institution and the uses of rest from fatigue of body and soul, the relation of religion to art and æsthetics, the place and form of symbols, vows and oaths, the psychology of sects, the relations of religious feeling and belief to morals and conduct:—all these and many more topics have anthropological sides which theology has too often failed adequately to recognize which are quite distinct from, and, to some extent, independent of, historical criticism or textual exegesis. To report the literature upon such topics as these, and, we hope, in some degree to contribute to their further development, will be the first object of this journal.

The philosophy of religion and the new departures in theology since Schleiermacher and much more since Ritschl, the work of whose school and pupils centres in Kant's theory of the practical reason, represents a standpoint quite distinct from the above, but has been the best propæ-

deutic to it because by this work attention has been so called to the fact that the laws of the human intellect, heart, and will underlie and are the key to all the verities of religion. Quickening as has been the attempt to rebase religious experience upon judgments of moral worths or values, the preservation of which is sometimes now called a law comparable to that of the conservation of energy in the physical world, psychology is now taking an inevitable next step. It takes its departure from the religious experience of the average individual whom it regards as worthy of all scientific honor, but whom philosophy has too often spurned. It studies even the nature and attributes of God, but less as the almighty creator of the world and maker of man, than as conditioned or projected by the human soul. It deals with regeneration not so much as planned in the eternal counsels of heaven as factualized in the processes of the human heart. The Trinity presents a challenging problem the metaphysical aspects of which belong to systematic divinity and only its relations to a tripartite division of man's nature, and some of even its comparative historical sub-departments pertain to psychology. Recognizing that all our views of man are now in a peculiarly mobile and transitional state, and that also our old mooring is progressively broken in a way that has suggested to some that man himself, as we now know him, is not a permanent type but an organism now in an almost acutely rapid stage of evolution toward some more settled form like animals, we believe it the function and duty of psychology to bear a hand in reformulating ancient dogma in showing a natural basis for, and preformation in, the soul of many a venerable tenet of theology and thus, in the main, in fulfilling and not destroying those bases on which Christian and other religious founders have built. Only thus can religion, which in many respects and in many places is now losing contact with human life, be made less alien, heteronomous and traditional, and brought into closer conformity to human nature and needs. Psychology, thus, has in it a promise and potency of rejustifying the ways of God to man in modes and degree now undreamed of.

Commonly accepted versions of many Christian truths are now inadequate, and their mediæval forms of statement must be modified, but with the utmost wisdom and all without offense. Our morality is slowly losing its religious basis, while the masses of workers whose whole lives are shadowed by the danger of a want which they have not merited, and goaded by the vulgar displays of wealth and the insolence of

its power, familiar as they are with the democratic platitudes of equality, are "predisposed to the sophistries of anarchy." It is a situation and not a theory that confronts us. Whether we shall go as far as a Canon Henson, preacher at both Oxford and Cambridge, and ask, "Is the faith of the church in the divine Christ living, present and active, really built on an empty tomb?" and who declares that inspiration can no longer certify to irrationalities, or at Sir Oliver Lodge who repudiates the belief "in an angry God appeased by the violent death of Christ" as "a survival from barbaric times:"—these are problems that may well give us pause. One thing, however, is certain, viz., if the most venerable and current orthodoxies are at any point clearly seen to be so opposed to the practical, social, religious and personal needs of the modern world that in choosing the one we must abandon the other, it is both unmanly and unchristian to hover or temporize, but we must make the choice if we would be dutiful or even honest. To this great and impending work of reconstruction, a psychology, itself emancipated from its ancient traditions and in closest touch with both the biologos, which like the divine logos has its own inspiration, and, with the present throbbing life of men, women and children, can do a work which if done aright will bring a true revival of a kind and degree that the Christian world has not known in recent centuries, and religion will resume its rightful sovereignty over the city of Mansoul.

On the pedagogic side this journal will try to keep account of all religious work that may be called educational, including the Sunday School now in a stage of metamorphosis. Much of the work here will be comparative, describing the modes of religious nurture and training in different religions, sects and lands. The pedagogic methods of Jesus, Paul, and great Christian and non-Christian teachers will be discussed. Homiletic methods and preaching will also be considered from the standpoint of modern educational doctrine. Special attention will be given from time to time to the methods of missionary work, which it is believed are in special need of reconstruction, not only in the fields of the lower and more primitive, but in those of each of the great ethnic religions.

Some space will also be devoted to the development of the religious ideas of children and young people and also to the systematic expositions of savage rites, beliefs and institutions. The great religions of the higher and even the lower non-Christian races will be treated more from an apologetic than from a critical standpoint.

Besides leading and minor articles, much attention will be given in each number to reviews and notes on the chief current publications in English and other languages that fall within the scope of religious psychology. Both books and important articles will be included in this survey. Publishers are invited to send us these for this purpose, and everything of whatever length, if it has any merit, will be, at least, given in title.

The new journal is thus especially addressed to professors and students of religion in seminaries and colleges, to pastors, to religious workers, Sunday School teachers, and those interested in mission work and in all those moral and social reforms based upon religious motives.

The editor, and each co-operator, as well as each contributor or reviewer, is responsible only for his own views, and all articles and all important reviews will be signed. Unanimity of standpoint or of opinion is neither expected or desired.

Each number will probably contain from seventy-five to one hundred pages, and at least three numbers will appear each year and will constitute a volume.

G. S. H.

STAGES OF RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT.

BY JEAN DU BUY, J. U. D., PH. D.,

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The following paper represents the last results of an extended study of four great non-Christian religions which I made for the purpose of arriving at the quintessence of these religions and of finding out, if I may, what practical value they possess for us. The four religions which I selected are Mohammedanism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and the Vedânta philosophy. I chose the Vedânta philosophy as the best representative of Brâhmanism whose highest consummation it is. In this paper I shall compare these four religions with one another as well as with the religion of Jesus. I shall do this by summarizing the results of my study, and by putting together what each of these five religions, inclusive of the religion of Jesus, has to say on such topics as God, prayer, life after death, morals and ethics, obedience and authority, love, tolerance, war, marriage, and so on. In the case of each of these topics I shall run through all five religions, as far as I have data, and shall always run through them in the same order. This order will be the following one: first, Mohammedanism; secondly, Confucianism; thirdly, the religion of Jesus; fourthly, Buddhism; and fifthly, the Vedânta philosophy. I put the religion of Jesus in the third place, between Confucianism and Buddhism, and put Buddhism and the Vedânta philosophy after the religion of Jesus. But this does not mean any reflection on the religion of Jesus, as will be seen from what follows. In particular, it does not mean that I put Buddhism and the Vedânta philosophy above the religion of Jesus. What I wish to point out by running through the five religions in the order mentioned will be understood best after I shall have finished my comparison.

1. The Central Idea.

I shall begin my comparison by setting forth the central idea of each of these five religions.

1. The two fundamental beliefs of Mohammedanism are the belief in the existence of one God, or in the unity of God, and the belief in the prophetic mission of Mohammed. The central idea of Mohammedanism is the existence of one God who demands from all men submission to His will and Mohammed's mission to proclaim God's will. We may describe Mohammedanism as being primarily theological and dogmatic, and as being far less moral than theological.

2. The central idea of Confucianism is the idea of a superior man: one ought to become a superior man by means of moral training. We may describe Kung-tsze's teaching as being a moral teaching and, in so far as the superior man of Confucianism prepares himself to become the head of a family and an official of the state, as being a social and a political teaching. It enjoins conventional morality, and is essentially of this world and non-spiritual.

3. Every one is familiar with the two commandments which Jesus quoted from the five books of Moses, and which he joined together: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength" and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."¹ Translating these two commandments into Jesus' own language, we may say the central idea of the religion of Jesus is that we ought to become children of our divine Father and brothers of our fellowmen. We may describe the religion of Jesus as being religious and ethical, its ethics containing both individual and social ethics.

4. The fundamental belief of Buddhism is the belief in the law of Karman, or in the law of righteousness, the belief that every act will have its natural consequences, that "whatever a man sows that shall he also reap." The central idea of Buddhism is that we ought to try to understand this law of Karman, and to order our life in accordance with it. We may describe Buddhism as being ethical and, in so far as it tries to understand the laws of the spiritual world, as being scientific. Its ethics are individual ethics exclusively. Buddhism is a religion of self-culture.

5. The central idea of the Vedânta philosophy is the belief in the identity of the Ātman and of the Brâhman, the belief in the substantial identity of the individual Self and of the Brâhman, or the belief in the

¹ Mark 12, 30 and 31.

eternal oneness of the innermost essence of man and of the Divine Essence; in other words, the belief in the Divinity of man. We may describe the Vedānta philosophy as being metaphysical and mystical. It practically has no ethics.

As we pass from the central idea of the first of these five religions to the central idea of the other four religions in the above order, from the dogmatic assertion of the existence of one God to the desire to become a superior man, thence to the ideal of becoming a child of our divine Father and a brother of our fellowmen, thence to the attempt to understand the laws of the spiritual world and to live in accordance with them, and, finally, to the belief in the substantial identity of the individual Self and of the Divine Essence, we are passing, it seems to me, through essentially the same stages of religious development through which the individual passes as he advances from childhood to boyhood, thence to adolescence, thence to manhood, and, finally, to old age. And when we consider that Mohammedanism is theological and little moral, Confucianism moral and of this world, the religion of Jesus religious and ethical, Buddhism ethical and scientific, and the Vedānta philosophy metaphysical and mystical, we are justified, it seems to me, in saying that Mohammedanism expresses the mind of the child, Confucianism the mind of the boy, the religion of Jesus the mind of the adolescent, Buddhism the mind of the mature man, and the Vedānta philosophy the mind of the old man. That this assertion is justified to a large extent, will appear, I think, from the following detailed comparison of the five religions.

2. *God.*

1. Mohammedanism teaches the existence of a personal God. It is monotheistic. Its God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent. He is the Creator of all things in heaven and on earth, and is thought of as a King who rules over every detail of our life, and whom it is our duty to obey. But the God of Mohammedanism is not of a high moral order. Love does not form an essential part of His character.

2. Kung-tsze's teaching is silent on the subject of a personal God. But the ancient Chinese before Kung-tsze worshipped a personal God, called Shang-te, the Supreme Ruler of heaven and earth. It almost seems as if the ancient Chinese were real monotheists at one time. And Shang-te has been worshipped in China to this day in spite of Kung-tsze's silence on the subject.

3. The religion of Jesus is based on the belief in a divine Father who is generally thought of as a personal God. Christians are monotheists. True Christians think of their God as of a loving Father and a Friend rather than as of a King. And their attitude towards their God is love rather than mere obedience.

4. Buddhism does not recognize a personal God. The impersonal law of Karman takes the place of a personal God in Buddhism. But Gotama's teaching is not atheistic or materialistic. Gotama simply stopped when he had come to the end of all that he could see of spiritual law.

5. The Vedānta philosophy is based on the belief in the Brāhman, on the belief in One Divine Essence. This Brāhman is the only thing that is, the only true reality, or the absolute reality. The Vedānta philosophy is monistic. The only attributes of the Brāhman are: that it is; that it knows; and that it is full of bliss. The Brāhman is designated, not as He, but as It. For the Brāhman is high above all conditions and limitations inherent in personality.

Now, if we bear in mind that the Mohammedan believes in a personal God who is a King, that the Confucianist has a faint belief in a Supreme Ruler, that the Christian believes in a divine Father, that the Buddhist worships impersonal law, and that the Vedāntist believes in One Divine Essence with which his real Self is identical in substance, we seem to be justified in the conclusion that the Mohammedan idea of God as a King whom it is our duty to obey suits the child, that the faint Confucianist belief in a Supreme Ruler suits the boy during the rather non-spiritual years of boyhood, that the Christian belief in a divine Father suits the adolescent, that the Buddhistic belief in the reign of law suits the mature man, and that the Vedānta belief in One Divine Essence suits the old man.

3. Inspiration.

1. Mohammed believed that he was the unerring mouthpiece of God. And the Koran lays claim to a verbal, literal, and mechanical inspiration of all its parts alike.

2. Kung-tsze was silent on the subject of a personal God. Yet he had the belief that he had a Heaven-sent mission.

3. Jesus declares that he is inspired in such words as these of the gospel of John: "My teaching is not mine, but his that sent me" and

"I do nothing of myself, but, as the Father taught me, I speak these things." The inspiration which Jesus claims is a spiritual inspiration.

4. Since Gotama did not recognize a God, he could not claim to be a prophet, a messenger from a God, or an inspired teacher.

5. The Vedānta philosophy is an independent system of philosophy. Yet it is entirely dependent on a book which was believed to be a revelation,—on the Veda.

4. Prayer.

1. Mohammed enjoined prayer as a duty.

2. Kung-tsze saw no need for prayer.

3. The religion of Jesus knows prayer as communion with a divine Father.

4. In strict Buddhism there is no prayer. Since Buddhists believe that the world is ruled by the law of Karman, they have no need for prayer. Its place is taken by meditation in Buddhism.

5. In the Vedānta philosophy the place of prayer is taken by meditation, by the attempt to realize our oneness with the Brāhman, with the One Divine Essence.

I wish to point out here that of the five religions under discussion two only recognize prayer, Mohammedanism and the religion of Jesus, and that with this difference that Mohammedanism enjoins prayer as a practical duty, while to true followers of Jesus prayer is a voluntary communion with their God rather than a duty, just as the child will pray because it is enjoined to do so, while the adolescent will pray because he feels the need for communion with the divine Father. I also wish to point out that, while Kung-tsze's teaching, strict Buddhism, and the Vedānta philosophy, all three, do not recognize prayer, they neglect to do so for very different reasons: Kung-tsze because he was of this world and non-spiritual, like a boy; Buddhism because its attitude is scientific, like that of a mature man; and the Vedānta philosophy because it is metaphysical and mystical, like many an old man.

5. Priesthood and Forms.

1. Mohammedanism, as instituted by Mohammed, had no sacrifices and no priests. It was animated by a deep hatred of all priestcraft, formalism, and idolatry. Mohammed overthrew sacrifices, religious

forms, and idolatry. And Mohammedanism is sternly opposed to idolatry to this day. It may be called a spiritual religion.

2. Kung-tsze was wrapped up in the observance of rites and ceremonies. And the emperor of China offers sacrifices to Kung-tsze to-day. Mandarins officiate on these occasions.

3. The religion of Jesus, in its original purity, knew no priests, and, as preached by Jesus, probably likewise no forms. It is a spiritual religion.

4. Strict Buddhism is a religion without a priesthood. The Buddhistic monks are no priests. Buddhism abhors all claiming of authority. And there are no ceremonies, rites, or forms in strict Buddhism.

5. The Vedânta philosophy rejects as useless for its adherents sacrifices and the observance of religious rites and ceremonies.

We thus see that four of the five religions under discussion, in their original purity, do not know either priests, or forms,—Mohammedanism, the religion of Jesus, Buddhism, and the Vedânta philosophy, but that Confucianism, which I have described as the religion of boyhood, is wrapped up in the observance of ceremonies. And observation teaches us that boys and girls in the years preceding adolescence, while not being very spiritual, are often greatly interested in the observance of religious ceremonies.

6. *Life after Death.*

1. Mohammedanism holds out to its followers the hope of everlasting life in a heaven. Its conception of heaven is sensual. Shady gardens and bubbling fountains play an important part in it. It is only in a few passages of the Koran that Mohammed dwells on the gross aspects of life after death.

2. Kung-tsze was exclusively interested in the earthly life of man. It is true, the Chinese have worshipped the spirits of their departed ancestors from time immemorial. But the idea of life after death, as we understand it, had not yet sprung up in China in Kung-tsze's time.

3. Christianity holds out the hope of life after death.

4. Buddhism holds out no hope of immortality in a heaven, but offers Nirvana in its place. And we may think that this Nirvana, or Great Peace, of Buddhism is eternal death.

5. Since the Vedânta philosophy believes that the individual Self

is identical with the eternal Bráhmaṇ, with the Divine Essence, it follows that the individual Self cannot be touched by death, but is without beginning and without end. But this belief does not mean personal immortality. According to the Vedānta philosophy, immortality may be realized in the present life by our gaining a knowledge of our oneness with the Bráhmaṇ, with the Divine Essence.

Now, it seems to me that the different attitude of these five religions towards the question of life after death suits the individual at different stages of his religious development: that the Mohammedan belief in a material heaven suits the child, that the Confucianist interest in the present life and the Confucianist worship of the spirits of departed ancestors suits the boy who is essentially worldly and whose greatest virtue is filial piety, that the strong Christian belief in life after death suits the adolescent who desires personal immortality for himself as well as for his friends, that the Buddhistic desire for Nirvana suits the weary man in middle life who longs for rest and peace, and that the mystical Vedānta belief in our eternal oneness with the One Divine Essence suits the old man.

7. *Morals and Ethics.*

1. The morals of Mohammedanism are very imperfect. Mohammedanism knows nothing of the virtues of humility, purity of heart, forgiveness of injuries, and self-sacrifice. The strong points in its morals are the preaching of the responsibility of man, the prohibition of drinking and of gambling, and the great stress laid on the duty of kindness to animals.

2. Kung-tse's teaching is distinguished by the purity and high order of its morality. Constant exhortations to sincerity, faithfulness, and loyalty are to be found on almost every page of the Confucian writings. Kung-tse laid down reciprocity as a rule of life: he stated Jesus' golden rule in a negative form. But his teaching does not emphasize the duty of forgiveness. He did not approve of the principle that injury should be recompensed with kindness, and called the man a coward who returned good for evil. The essential characteristics of Kung-tse's morals are the teaching of moral self-improvement: of the force of example; of sincerity; courage; benevolence; reverence, or respectfulness; faithfulness; loyalty; reciprocity; propriety; and filial

piety. Kung-tsze taught plain, matter of fact maxims of morality. His superior man practices the ordinary virtues.

3. The religion of Jesus is distinguished by its lofty ethics. Jesus requests us to love our enemies.

4. In Buddhism compassion, kindness, and sympathy are the highest virtues. And self-control is very great among Buddhists.

5. The Vedânta philosophy practically has no ethics.

Again, it seems to me that the difference in the morals, or ethics, of these five religions corresponds with the different stages in the moral development of the individual: that the imperfect morality of Mohammedanism, teaching responsibility and kindness to animals, and prohibiting drinking, suits the child; that the plain, matter of fact maxims of morality of Confucianism suits the boy; that Jesus' lofty ethics, inculcating even love of enemies, suits the idealistic adolescent; while the gentleness and self-control of Buddhism expresses the thoughtful mind of the mature man, and the absence of ethics in the Vedânta philosophy the mind of the old man, who has lost interest in life.

8. *Obedience and Authority.*

1. Since the God of Mohammedanism is a King whom it is our duty to obey, obedience plays a very important part in this religion. And the authority of Mohammed is very strong.

2. Kung-tsze considered filial piety, or obedience to one's parents, the greatest of all virtues. Discipline is the great thought of Confucianism. And Kung-tsze desired all his life to be placed into a position of authority.

3. Since the God of Jesus' religion is a Father, the attitude of true Christians towards their God is love rather than mere obedience. And the homage which they yield to Jesus is a voluntary homage.

4. Buddhism does not inculcate obedience. Each Buddhist is a free man and the ruler of his life. All true Buddhists abhor all semblance of authority.

5. The Vedânta philosophy rejects the authority of the Hindoo Scripture for its adherents. The latter enjoy religious freedom.

We see here that the element of obedience and authority plays a less and less important part in the first four of these religions as we pass from Mohammedanism through Confucianism and the religion of

Jesus to Buddhism, just as the element of obedience and authority normally plays a less and less important part in the life of the individual as he advances from childhood through boyhood and adolescence to manhood. The Vedānta philosophy is a champion for religious freedom, it is true. But Buddhism is far more uncompromising than the Vedānta philosophy, just as a man in middle life is more uncompromising than an old man.

9. *Love.*

1. Love is not an essential part of the morals of Mohammedanism.

2. Kung-tsze had a rather cold disposition. And there is little of the spirit of love in his teaching. His superior man hates certain people, for instance those who slander their superiors. The nearest approach to altruism in Kung-tsze's morals is his teaching of the duty of reciprocity. But Jesus stated the golden rule in a positive form, while Kung-tsze stated it in a negative form only when he said: "What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others!"

3. The religion of Jesus is a religion of altruism and of unselfish love. Jesus requests us to love our enemies. His great ethical command is "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

4. The spirit of Buddhism is one of love, sympathy, kindness, gentleness, tenderness, pity, compassion, and mercy. True Buddhists are distinguished by a compassion for all who are inferior, or weaker, than they. Buddhist love is more reflective than Christian love. In some respects, it may be called sentimental and morbid. It is less active than Christian love, and not productive of great deeds, or of acts of courage.

5. Sankara's Vedānta philosophy has nothing to say concerning love.

As we pass from the first of these five religions to the other four in succession we find that love is not an essential element of Mohammedanism, just as love in the full sense of the word is not an essential element of childhood; that reciprocity is the nearest approach to altruism in Confucianism, just as reciprocity is the highest ideal of boyhood; that unselfish love appears for the first time in the teaching of Jesus, just as true love appears for the first time in adolescence; that in Buddhism love, although very prominent, is made rather inactive by too much reflection, just as we often find the same phenomenon in mature man-

hood; and that the Vedānta philosophy has nothing to say concerning love, just as love is often absent from the life of the old man.

10. *Tolerance.*

1. Mohammedanism is intolerant in principle. The thought of toleration is unknown to this religion. It persecutes the adherents of other religions. Mohammed commanded his followers to fight against the infidels for the sake of his religion, to kill non-Mohammedans, and to use the sword as a means for the propagation of his religion.

2. Confucianism is tolerant of other religions. But, since Confucianism is non-spiritual, its tolerance may be properly described as one of religious indifference.

3. The religion of Jesus is tolerant in principle. But Christians have not always lived up to the principle of toleration.

4. Buddhism is extremely tolerant. Typical Buddhists do not interfere with any man's religion, or persecute the adherents of other religions. They regard religion as an affair of a man's own soul, and have love, sympathy, compassion, and pity for every living being.

5. The Vedānta philosophy is extremely tolerant of other forms of religion. "It has room for almost every religion; nay, it embraces them all," says Max Mueller. The reason of this tolerance is that the Brāhmins have recognized, without the slightest hesitation, that individuals, at different stages of life, require a different religion: for instance, that the religion of a child, the religion of a mature man, and the religion of an old man must, of necessity, be different from one another.

We notice here a constant increase in tolerance as we pass from the intolerance of Mohammedanism through the religious indifference of Confucianism to the tolerance of the religion of Jesus, and, finally, to the extreme tolerance of Buddhism and the Vedānta philosophy. And it seems to me that this increase in tolerance is paralleled by the normal development of the individual as we see him advance from the dogmatic intolerance of childhood through the religious indifference of boyhood to the altruistic tolerance of adolescence, and, finally, to the extreme tolerance of the reflective man in middle life and to the extreme tolerance of the metaphysically-minded old man when we find him at his best.

11. War.

1. Mohammedanism commands to wage war against disbelievers.
2. Kung-tsze was essentially a man of peace, and despised the art of war. He endeavored to check the disorder, warfare, anarchy, and violence of his time.

3. The spirit of the religion of Jesus condemns the waging of war. But Christians have waged many wars.

4. Buddhism is unconditionally opposed to war. Buddhists hold that it is positively terrible to destroy the lives of our fellowmen. They make no exception in favor of a patriot who is fighting for his country. Buddhism is not a religion for a soldier.

5. The Vedānta philosophy has nothing to say concerning war.

Here we find a constant increase in the opposition to war as we pass from Mohammedanism, which commands the waging of war, through Confucianism, which tries to check warfare, to the religion of Jesus, which condemns war, and, finally, to Buddhism, which is unconditionally opposed to war, and to the Vedānta philosophy, which has no thought of war. Again, it seems to me that the individual normally goes through the stages represented by these religions: that it is natural for the child to fight, that the boy's tendency towards anarchy has to be checked, that the idealistic adolescent condemns war, that the reflective man in middle life becomes more and more opposed to war, and that the old man has no thought of war.

12. Marriage.

1. Mohammedanism allows polygamy. Mohammed did not sweep it away, but modified the unbounded license of Oriental polygamy.

2. Confucianism likewise permits polygamy. But Kung-tsze repeatedly inveighs against indulgence in sensuality.

3. The religion of Jesus stands for monogamy.

4. Strict Buddhism stands for celibacy. Those who fully accept Gotama's teaching become monks, and are unmarried. The life of a monk is the ideal life of Buddhism.

5. The Vedānta philosophy has nothing to say concerning marriage.

Now, it seems to me that the different attitude of these five religions towards the question of marriage is extremely suggestive. For, as

the religion of Jesus, which emphasizes love so strongly, stands for monogamy, so is the adolescent in whom love is awaked strongly monogamic; as Buddhism, which is far more reflective than the religion of Jesus, stands for celibacy, so is the reflective man in middle life inclined to drift away from marriage; and as the Vedânta philosophy, which is one-sidedly metaphysical, has nothing to say concerning marriage, so is the old man not concerned about marriage. We may add that, as Mohammedans and Confucianists practice polygamy, so are children as well as boys and girls before adolescence not capable of understanding true love and monogamic marriage.

On the next four topics I have data particularly with regard to Mohammedanism and to Buddhism.

13. Responsibility.

While Mohammedanism, Confucianism, the religion of Jesus, and Buddhism, all four, emphasize the responsibility of man for his acts, there is the sharpest contrast with regard to this responsibility between Mohammedanism and Buddhism. For Mohammedanism teaches that each man is responsible to God from whom he deserves either reward, or punishment; Buddhism, on the other hand, teaches that each man is responsible to himself. And I suggest that, here again, the Mohammedan teaching suits the child, while the Buddhistic teaching suits the mature man. The religion of Jesus seems to stand half-way between these two extremes on the question of responsibility.

14. Drink.

Of the five religions under discussion the two which have always been sternly opposed to the use of intoxicating liquor are Mohammedanism and Buddhism. Drunkenness is a comparatively rare exception among the Mohammedan negroes of Africa; and the Burmese, who are Buddhists, were a nation of total abstainers a few years ago. And it seems to me that, when the Mohammedan refrains from drinking liquor, he does so because Mohammed forbade the use of intoxicating liquor, just as the child will refrain from drinking liquor on account of the prohibition of its elders, while, when the true Buddhist refrains from drinking liquor, he does so, like the thoughtful man in middle life, because he believes that it is not good for him to drink liquor.

15. Kindness to Animals.

While it is true that men show a real sympathy for their domestic animals everywhere in the Orient, it is also true that Mohammedanism and Buddhism are distinguished, above the other religions under discussion, by their great kindness to animals. Mohammed laid much stress on the duty of kindness to animals, and Buddhists treat animals with a perpetual care, kindness, tenderness, and sympathy. And, possibly, there is this difference between the Mohammedan and the Buddhist with regard to the cause of their kindness to animals: that the Mohammedan is kind to animals because Mohammed commanded him to be kind, just as the child will obey the command of its elders, while the Buddhist is kind to animals because, like the thoughtful and mature man, he has reasons of his own for being kind to them, the particular reason in the case of the Buddhist being that he regards all life as akin to man.

16. Death.

The attitude both of Mohammedanism and of Buddhism towards the question of death is peculiar. It is the same in so far as neither Mohammedans nor Buddhists have any fear of death. But it is very different in so far as true Mohammedans court death in battle with the ecstasy of martyrs, sure that eternal happiness awaits them in a heaven if they die in battle, while true Buddhists look at death as at something inevitable about which it is useless to grieve. And it seems to me that the Mohammedan confidence in everlasting life in a heaven suits the mind of the child, while the Buddhistic indifference to death expresses the mind of the mature, scientific man.

17. Courage.

With regard to the next topic, the question of courage, the greatest contrast lies between Mohammedanism and Confucianism, on the one hand, and Buddhism, on the other. Mohammedans are distinguished by courage and by a heroic enthusiasm in their wars, and courage plays a very prominent part among the component elements of virtue in Confucianism. On the other hand, Buddhists do not excel in courage because they do not care for it. And it seems to me that the courage, displayed by Mohammedans and enjoined by Confucianism, suits the

moral development of the child and of the boy, while the lack of courage of the Buddhist can often be found in the reflective man in middle life.

18. *Development of the Mind.*

With regard to the question as to the influence of the religions under discussion on the development of the mind, I have important data concerning both Mohammedanism and Confucianism. An almost immediate effect of accepting Mohammedanism on the negroes of Africa is that a real thirst for education and literature is created in their minds. But the thoughts of development and progress are unknown to Mohammedanism. Confucianism, on the other hand, emphasizes study, or learning, very strongly, and moral self-improvement as the object of study. Confucianists have always made much of education. In other words, Mohammedanism acts upon the mind as a powerful stimulus, but leads easily to arrested development, while Confucianism disciplines the mind to constant mental and moral progress. But there is no such thing as the exercise of independent thought in Confucianism. And, in so far as Mohammedanism stimulates the mind, while Confucianism disciplines it, Mohammedanism seems to me to be a good religion for the child, and Confucianism a good religion for the boy.

19. *The Character of the Five Religions.*

We may describe the character of the five religions under discussion in a few words in the following way:

1. Conversion to Mohammedanism stimulates the mind to activity. Mohammed's idea of God gives vigor to his religion. Mohammedanism possesses a latent vitality and energy, and even a latent fanaticism, which are very great, and which seem almost indestructible.

2. Confucianism disciplines the mind. Kung-tsze's teaching is distinguished by the emphasis put upon learning as well as by its practical wisdom.

3. The religion of Jesus inspires. It presents an elevating and inspiring ideal of life.

4. Buddhism is distinguished by a gentle and wise spirit. Its spirit is one of love, compassion, and sympathy.

5. The Vedānta philosophy is one-sidedly metaphysical.

I have said that, in so far as Mohammedanism stimulates the mind,

it seems to be a good religion for the child, and that, in so far as Confucianism disciplines the mind, it seems to be a good religion for the boy. I will add now that the religion of Jesus, inasmuch as it presents an elevating and inspiring ideal of life, may be called the ideal religion for the adolescent; that Buddhism, inasmuch as it is distinguished by a gentle and wise spirit, seems to suit the thoughtful man in middle life; and that the Vedānta philosophy, inasmuch as it is one-sidedly metaphysical, seems to suit the mind of the old man.

20. Religious Types.

The founders of the religions under discussion were very different men. A result of this fact is that the religions which they founded suit different kinds of people best.

1. Mohammed was the founder of a religion and a warrior in one. The God of Mohammedanism has pre-eminently been the God of battles. The early Mohammedans were inspired by the two strong passions of religious enthusiasm and of military zeal. Many half military and half religious geniuses have been produced by this religion. Mohammedanism is, in many respects, the ideal religion for a warrior.

2. Kung-tsze was an official and, finally, a cabinet minister. And Confucianism is, in many respects, the ideal religion for an official because it emphasizes the duties of respectfulness to superiors and of loyalty. It may even be called the ideal religion for the average man in so far as it inculcates the virtues of sincerity and faithfulness very strongly.

3. Jesus was, above everything else, an adolescent. And his religion will always be the ideal religion for those who remain adolescents in spirit all their life.

4. Gotama was a monk. The life of a monk is the ideal life of Buddhism. The Buddhist monk is apart from the world, and must take no interest in worldly affairs. And the essential features of Buddhism will always be highly attractive to men of a retiring disposition and of an inactive and reflective type of mind.

5. We cannot speak of a founder of the Vedānta philosophy. Many men contributed to the development of the Vedānta. These men were metaphysicians, and were old men, at the same time. And the Vedānta philosophy will always appeal to the metaphysician, and is, in many respects, a religion of old age.

I have finished my comparison of the five religions under discussion. And it will be clear by this time why I have run through them just in the order in which I have done it. What I have wished to point out is that, to my mind, Mohammedanism is, in many respects, the religion of childhood, Confucianism the religion of boyhood, the religion of Jesus that of adolescence, Buddhism the religion of the reflective man in middle life, and the Vedânta philosophy the religion of the metaphysically-minded old man. It is true that, throughout my comparison, I have put Buddhism and the Vedânta philosophy after the religion of Jesus. But, in doing this, I do not mean to put these two religions above the religion of Jesus. On the contrary, my comparative study of the five religions has led me to the conclusion that, as manhood and old age follow after adolescence, while adolescence is, in many respects, the height of life, so Buddhism, as the religion of reflective manhood, and the Vedânta philosophy, as the religion of old age, follow after the religion of Jesus, as that of adolescence, but that the religion of Jesus, because it is the religion of adolescence, is superior to both Buddhism and the Vedânta philosophy.

I may illustrate by the following two diagrams what, to my mind, seems to be the relation between Buddhism and the Vedânta philosophy, on the one hand, and the religion of Jesus, on the other.

Figure 1.





Figure 2.



I do not mean to put Buddhism and the Vedânta philosophy above the religion of Jesus, as in figure 1. I put these two religions after,

but below, the religion of Jesus, as in figure 2. What I mean by that is that, if there is nothing in our lives that will keep us young, we are apt to become Buddhists, or something very much like it, when we reach middle life, especially if we are of a reflective type of mind, and we are apt to become Vedāntists, or something very much like it, when we reach old age, especially if we are of a metaphysical, or mystical type of mind. But, while both Buddhism and the Vedānta philosophy contain some very admirable features, yet for Christians to become Buddhists in the full sense of that word would be a step downward, to my mind, since it would tend to make us inactive, and even sentimental and morbid; and for Christians to become Vedāntists in the full sense of that word would be a further step downward, it seems to me, since it would tend to make us lose interest in life and in life's ethical problems. What we need is a religion which will keep us young, which will keep us active and free from sentimentality and morbidity in middle life, and which will keep us interested in life and its ethical problems into old age. And it seems to be the peculiar mission of the religion of Jesus to keep people adolescents in spirit all their life. In this, to my mind, lies the superiority of the religion of Jesus from a psychological point of view.

Now, if it be true that Mohammedanism is, in many respects, the religion of childhood, Confucianism the religion of boyhood, and the religion of Jesus that of adolescence, this would be of the greatest practical value for religious and moral education. It would mean that we ought to teach Mohammedanism to our children, Confucianism to our boys and girls, and the religion of Jesus to our adolescents only. And it seems to me that this, or something very much like it, ought to be done. In saying this, I do not mean that our children should be converted to Mohammedanism, our boys and girls to Confucianism, and our adolescents, finally, to Christianity. What I mean is that certain elements stand out in each of these three religions, and that the elements which stand out in Mohammedanism ought to be emphasized in the training of our children, that those which stand out in Confucianism ought to be emphasized in the training of our boys and girls, and that those which stand out in the religion of Jesus ought to be emphasized in the training of our adolescents.

The elements which stand out in Mohammedanism are: the belief in the existence of one God who is the Creator of all things in heaven

and on earth, and a King whom it is our duty to obey; the belief in everlasting life in a material heaven; the duty of obedience and of submission to authority; the teaching of responsibility; the prohibition to drink liquor; and the duty of kindness to animals.

The elements which stand out in Confucianism are: the necessity of study, or of learning; the study of history as the most fruitful source of knowledge; moral self-improvement; the force of example; sincerity; courage, both physical and moral courage; benevolence; reverence, or respectfulness, to superiors; filial piety; faithfulness; friendship; loyalty; patriotism; reciprocity; and propriety.

Finally, the elements which stand out in the religion of Jesus are: the belief in a divine Father; love of God; the belief in life after death; altruism and unselfish love, even love of enemies; and idealism.

I said that the elements which stand out in each of these three religions ought to be emphasized in the training of our children, our boys and girls, and our adolescents, respectively. In so far as any of the elements of any of these religions can be found in some other religion, that other religion may be taught in the place of the one whose essential elements it contains. For instance, in so far as Judaism contains many of the essential elements of Mohammedanism, Judaism may be taught to our children in the place of Mohammedanism. But I know of no other religion which suits the adolescent as well as does the religion of Jesus, and I likewise know of no other religion but Confucianism in which just those elements stand out that ought to be taught to our boys and girls. It, therefore, seems to me that Mohammedanism, or certain parts of the Old Testament, ought to be taught to our children, that Confucianism, or something very much like it, ought to be taught to our boys and girls, and that the gospels ought to be taught to our adolescents, and hardly at all to younger children. And the best way either to verify, or to contradict, the conclusions stated here, would be to experiment in moral and religious education on the lines which have been suggested.

I have put my conclusions rather strongly because I should like to have the principle recognized, if it be a true one, that the elements which stand out in Mohammedanism, in Confucianism, and in the religion of Jesus ought to be emphasized in the training of our children, our boys and girls, and our adolescents, respectively. When it comes to the practical application of this principle, it goes without saying that

I do not advocate that our children should be brought up, in succession, in three different religions, first in Mohammedanism, then in Confucianism, and, finally, in the religion of Jesus. Christians will continue to use the Bible for the religious and moral education of their children. The practical question for Christians, therefore, is how to arrange the vast educational material contained in the Bible in such a way that we shall be able to give to the child, to the boy and girl, and to the adolescent the religious and moral food which they, respectively, require. To do this effectually would be, to my mind, the greatest benefit which any one could confer upon the rising generation and upon generations still unborn.

But, if it be true that Mohammedanism, or something very much like it, suits the individual at one stage of his moral and religious development, that Confucianism, or something very much like it, suits him at a later stage, and that the religion of Jesus suits him at still a later stage, this seems to be so because the individual apparently repeats, in many respects, the history of the human race. The more fundamental fact seems to be that Mohammedanism, or something very much like it, suits the human race at one stage of its moral and religious development, that Confucianism, or something very much like it, suits the race at a later stage of its development, and that the religion of Jesus suits it at still a later stage. Thus Mohammedanism is being eagerly accepted to-day by negro tribes of Africa, while the religion of Jesus has been accepted until now practically only by the Indo-Germanic race of Europe, by the progressive races of the Occident. It seems that the moral and religious condition of the races of Africa and of western Asia stands at present in the way of their accepting the religion of Jesus.

Mohammedanism has done much good among the people of western Asia and of Africa. It is a very simple and very intelligible religion. Its strongest point is its protest against every form of polytheism, its intense belief in the existence of one God. Some of the first effects of the acceptance of Mohammedanism on African negro tribes are that a crusade against idolatry begins, that polytheism disappears almost instantaneously, and that the negro converts acquire a sense of the dignity of human nature. Mohammedanism softens the savage heart, and elevates the savage mind. It raises its converts from fetichism and polytheism to an intense belief in the unity of God, and elevates them considerably

in their morals. We, therefore, seem to be justified in the conclusion that Mohammedanism, or something very much like it, is the best religion to be preached among fetich worshippers and polytheists. Mohammedanism is for them the next great step forward in their religious and moral development. It offers them, above everything else, two things which they need: first, an intense belief in the unity of God which alone will raise them above all fetichism, polytheism, and idolatry; and secondly, the relatively low idea of God as a King whom it is man's duty to obey rather than Jesus' lofty idea of God as a Father. And I venture to suggest that the Mohammedan and Old Testament idea of God as a King and the preaching of the duty of obedience may be a better religion at present for negroes generally than the New Testament idea of God as a Father and the preaching of love. But, however this may be with regard to American negroes, if our missionaries in Africa desire to elevate the natives of that continent, and to compete with the successful Mohammedan missionaries, they will have to offer something very much like Mohammedanism to the negroes of Africa. They will also have to learn of the Mohammedan missionaries to show a sympathetic respect for native customs and prejudices, and even for the more harmless native beliefs.

But, while something like Mohammedanism seems to be the best religion for the race at a certain stage of its development, a protracted influence of Mohammedanism over the minds of people tends to arrest their development, it seems to me. Mohammedans need two things, above everything else: first, a wearing off of the intensity of their belief in one God; and secondly, the preaching of a morality of a relatively high order. Now, Confucianism offers just what Mohammedans need: plain, matter of fact maxims of morality of a relatively high order. And Kung-tsze's silence on the subject of a personal God would tend to wear off the intensity of the Mohammedan belief in one God. It has not destroyed the far less intense Chinese belief in Shang-te, the Supreme Ruler of heaven and earth. But I am not advocating that our missionaries should try to convert Mohammedans to Confucianism. What I wish to suggest is that our missionaries, if they desire to elevate Mohammedans, will have to offer them something very much like Confucianism.

In dealing with Mohammedans, our missionaries ought constantly to consider that the followers of Mohammed believe in his prophetic mis-

sion very strongly. If our missionaries can honestly do so, they should, therefore, acknowledge that Mohammed was the Apostle of God. Otherwise they will have no influence with Mohammedans. Above everything else, our missionaries ought not to try to make the followers of Mohammed disloyal to their prophet. On the contrary, they ought to get accustomed to the idea that Mohammedans will continue to be his followers, even if they should become followers of Jesus.

More than that, Mohammedans will probably never accept any dogmatic form of Christianity in masses, especially not the Christian dogma of the Trinity. I do not wish to hurt any one's feelings. Whatever we may think of the doctrine of the Trinity, most Mohammedans cannot be made to understand that this doctrine means anything else but a belief in three gods, and, therefore, reject it as a form of polytheism.

But, while our missionaries may not be able to convert the followers of Mohammed to any dogmatic form of Christianity, they may still breathe into his religion the spirit of the religion of Jesus.

Again, while, to my mind, something like Confucianism would be a great step forward in the moral and religious development of Mohammedans, a protracted influence of Confucianism over the minds of people tends to arrest their development at this higher level, as the case of the Chinese seems to show. And yet it seems to me that it should be no harder to guide Confucianists into the religion of Jesus than it is to guide boys into adolescence. To my mind, the religion of Jesus is the next step beyond Confucianism. Our missionaries should be able to build upon Confucianism as a foundation with relative ease. Kung-tsze's morals are a good preparation for Jesus' lofty ethics; the ancient Chinese belief in Shang-te is a good preparation for the New Testament idea of God as a Father; and the Chinese belief in the spirits of departed ancestors is a good preparation for the Christian belief in life after death.

It is for these reasons that our missionaries ought to have more success among Confucianists than among any other people, it seems to me. But they will be successful only if they observe these two rules: first, if they do not attack the time-honored Chinese worship of the spirits of ancestors; and secondly, if they do not try to make the Confucianists disloyal to Kung-tsze, but if they frankly acknowledge that Kung-tsze was a great Sage.

While, if I am correct, the task of our missionaries among Confuci-

anists is to guide the people one step higher, the task of our missionaries among Buddhists, on the other hand, is a very different one, it seems to me. Buddhism is a reflective religion, and suits mature men best. But those nations that are Buddhists to-day are very young peoples, and have accepted Buddhism prematurely, it seems to me. If this be true, the task of our missionaries in Buddhistic countries would be to rejuvenate the people, to instill into them the spirit of the religion of adolescence. But our missionaries should never try to uproot Buddhism anywhere, or to make its adherents disloyal to their great teacher Gotama whose example and teaching have been to them of so much help.

Finally, as to the Vedânta philosophy, its adherents are probably relatively few in number. The great majority of the people of India are polytheists. And all that has been said concerning missionary activity among polytheists is as true of the Hindoos as of the negroes of Africa.

In order not to be misunderstood, I wish to repeat here once more that I do not mean that our missionaries should preach Mohammedanism to the fetich worshippers and polytheists of Africa and of India, and that they should teach Confucianism to Mohammedans. I merely suggest that, to my mind, they will have to preach something very much like Mohammedanism to fetich worshippers and polytheists, and something very much like Confucianism to Mohammedans, if they desire to elevate these people. Our missionaries will have to build upon the moral and religious condition of these people as a foundation. Instead of preaching the religion of Jesus to fetich worshippers and polytheists as well as to Mohammedans, our missionaries would better try first to inculcate such thoughts and sentiments of the Old Testament religion on these people as the latter are capable of assimilating, it seems to me. But they should, of course, do everything in the spirit of Jesus.

I shall close what I have to say concerning missions by making the following general remarks on the attitude which our future missionaries will have to assume towards the non-Christian religions.

1. They will treat all non-Christian religions with sympathy and with respect. They will sympathize with other religions in spite of their corruptions. Paul is a model of what a missionary ought to be.

2. They will thoroughly know the religion of the non-Christian country to which they go. If that religion possesses Sacred Books,

TABLE. A COMPARISON

TOPICS.	I. MOHAMMEDANISM.	II. CONFUCIANISM.
1. The central idea.	The existence of one God and Mohammed's mission.	The idea of a superior man.
2. God.	Theological and little moral. A personal God; the Creator and a King. Monotheistic.	Moral and of this world. A faint belief in a Supreme Ruler. Vaguely monotheistic.
3. Inspiration.	Mechanical inspiration.	Belief in a Heaven-sent mission.
4. Prayer.	Prayer a duty.	No prayer.
5. Priesthood and forms.	No priests; no sacrifices, forms, or idolatry.	Rites and ceremonies; mandarins officiate.
6. Life after death.	A material heaven.	Worship of the spirits of ancestors; no belief in life after death.
7. Morals and ethics.	Imperfect morals.	Matter of fact maxims of morality.
8. Obedience and authority.	Obedience and submission to authority enjoined.	Filial obedience enjoined; discipline.
9. Love.	No love.	Reciprocity.
10. Tolerance.	Intolerance.	Religious indifference.
11. War.	Religious wars enjoined.	Warfare checked.
12. Marriage.	Polygamy permitted.	Polygamy permitted.
13. Responsibility.	Responsibility to God.	
14. Drink.	The use of liquor forbidden.	
15. Kindness to animals.	Kindness to animals enjoined.	
16. Death.	Death in battle courted.	
17. Courage.	Heroic enthusiasm.	Courage enjoined.
18. Development of the mind.	The mind stimulated.	The mind disciplined.
19. Character of the Religions.	It gives vigor.	It disciplines.
20. Religious types.	For a warrior.	For an official and for the average man.

ON OF FIVE RELIGIONS.

III. THE RELIGION OF JESUS.	IV. BUDDHISM.	V. THE VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY.
To become children of our Father and brothers of our fellowmen. Religious and ethical.	To live in accordance with the law of Karman. Ethical and scientific.	The belief in the identity of the individual Self and of the Brāhman. Metaphysical and mystical.
A divine Father. Monotheistic.	The impersonal law of Karman. Not atheistic.	The Brāhman, One Divine Essence; above personality. Monistic.
Spiritual inspiration.	No inspiration.	Based on a revealed book.
Prayer a voluntary communion.	No prayer; meditation.	No prayer; meditation.
No priests, or forms.	No priests; no ceremonies, rites or forms.	No sacrifices, rites or ceremonies; no priests.
Belief in life after death.	Nirvana, a Great Peace.	Realization of our oneness with the Brāhman.
Lofty ethics.	Gentleness and self-control.	No ethics.
Voluntary obedience.	Obedience not inculcated; authority abhorred.	Religious freedom.
Altruism and unselfish love.	Reflective love.	No love.
Tolerance.	Extreme tolerance.	Intellectual tolerance.
Warfare condemned.	Unconditional opposition to war.	No thought of war.
Monogamy.	Celibacy. Responsibility to self. Voluntary abstinence from liquor. Voluntary kindness to animals. Indifference to death. No courage.	No thought of marriage.
It inspires. For the adolescent, for perennial youth.	It makes gentle and wise. For the reflective man.	It is metaphysical. For the metaphysician and for old age.

they will be familiar with these books, at least with a translation of them.

3. They will be accustomed to the idea that non-Christians may become followers of Jesus, and yet remain Mohammedans, Confucianists, or Buddhists, in all essentials.

4. They will not present any dogmatic form of Christianity to non-Christians, but will dwell much on the ethics of Jesus. They will hold up the character of Jesus as the highest ideal of life that the world has seen, and will try to breathe into the non-Christian religions his spirit.

It may be said that the best missionaries of to-day do all these things. That may be so. But I trust the time will soon come when such an attitude towards the non-Christian religions will be, not the exception, but the rule.

I have said that people may be Mohammedans, Confucianists, or Buddhists, and followers of Jesus at the same time. Indeed, the human soul is large enough to hold side by side the essentials of all of these and of many other religions. And we actually do hold the essentials of many religions side by side. Thus the thought of self-culture may possess our soul at one moment, as it possesses the soul of the Buddhist, while altruism and unselfish love may actuate our soul at another moment, as they actuate the soul of the true follower of Jesus. Again, at one moment we may worship a personal God who is a King, as does the Mohammedan and the Jew; at another moment we may strongly believe in the reign of law, as does the Buddhist; at still another moment we may as strongly believe in One Divine Essence, as does the Vedāntist; while, all the time, we believe in a divine Father, as does the true follower of Jesus. And yet we may still be nature worshippers, and even discover that we are fetich worshippers still to some extent.

THE JESUS OF HISTORY AND OF THE PASSION *VERSUS* THE JESUS OF THE RESURRECTION.

BY G. STANLEY HALL.

I. Jesus is most widely known as the man of the cross. In hundreds of the more ignorant and backward communities of Christendom, as Mr. Fielding Hall has shown with some detail, where very little is known of his teachings, his character, or the events of his life, the crucifix is found and revered. Men, women, and children who cannot read regard it with reverence and often ascribe to it supernal properties and magical efficiency. In Catholic lands fragments of the true cross are more widely disseminated than any other relic. In all Christian centuries the story of the cross has been the great theme of preaching, the centre of sacred ceremonies and the most effective propaedeutic in all the repertory of mission methods among pagans. This is thus the deepest and most widespread of all the impressions that Christendom has made upon the human heart. In no other religion has the death of the Founder had such prominence and efficiency. The natural, objective, sensuous impressions which each of the events of passion week was calculated to make upon the mind and heart of the observer have been wrought out with great detail in descriptive preaching, in narrative, tradition and art, every incident amplified and filled out so that the story of the last stages of Jesus' life constitutes the world's great masterpiece of pathos. It would be hard even for creative genius to add new elements to the story that could materially increase the mordant effects of this train of events which have so burned and eaten into the very soul of believers. Many causes have lately made us negligent or forgetful of this fact. Critical studies that enlist the intellect, philosophy which neglects sensuous facts for metaphysical meanings and interprets events as symbols, and perhaps, especially, theology which has always tended to volatilize the full humanity of Jesus and thus make the incarnation of none effect, the refinement of modern nerves that shrink from the contemplation of physical anguish, the perfervid zeal that can never wait to let humanity have its natural effects before

insisting that the man Jesus is also Very God of Very God, and thus giving the biography of Jesus an inexpugnable, docetic enervation:—all these have conspired to rob the story of his death of its pristine hold upon the heart and make it seem hollow and falsetto. Thus these influences tend to take away his Lord from the average Christian, and especially from the young, and to abate the original power of the plain record.

Neither Greek tragedy nor modern history or romance can parallel the "descending incongruity" of the decline of Jesus' fortunes from the three great achievements of his soul (the triple conviction that he was the Jewish Messiah, the Son of God, and the Founder of a new kingdom), to the anguish in his own and the utter despair in the hearts of his friends at his death and burial. The faltering, but finally resolute, determination to go to Jerusalem, the necessity of which may have loomed up in his soul like an apparition of fate, the prospect of death thrice foretold, the entrance into Jerusalem perhaps more ostentatiously than even his courageous heart really sanctioned, the conspiracy of the rulers, the supper at Bethany, the Passover, the treachery of Judas, the prayers in Gethsemane while thrice the disciples slept, the advent of the soldiers, the kiss of betrayal, the hearing before Caiphas, Peter's denial thrice, his muteness while he was buffeted, mocked, smitten and spat upon, Pilate's more judicial attitude of mind, his silence before Herod, the gorgeous and scarlet robe and crown of thorns with the reed, ironically suggesting a kingship neither of this world or any other, the release of Barrabas, the scourging, the invocation of his blood upon his accusers' heads, the death of Judas, the cowardly flight of every disciple, the cross-bearing with Simon, the woe of the daughters of Jerusalem, the vinegar and gall, the parting of the garments, the mocking inscriptions and taunts to come down and rule, the penitent thief, the mother, aunt and the two Marys, alone faithful to the end, which to a recent French writer suggests a pathetic romance never written, the agonizing cry of being forsaken as his supreme conviction of sonship seemed to be shaken, the earthquake, the spear, and finally the tomb, sealed and guarded:—all these events copiously amplified in detail, set in scene by the most realistic imagination, every item made a theme of meditation until it stood out with an almost scarifying and sometimes actually stigmatic effect in the psychophysiic organism of the believer, appeal as nothing else has ever done to the sentiments of sympathy and

pity, the foundations of which strike to the very roots of man's gregarious nature.

It would be an interesting, although perhaps too great to be a practical, task to mosaic together the history of the effects of which these events, regarded as purely historical and pragmatic, have wrought in the soul. Every station of the cross, and many apocryphal instances as well as everything told in the Gospels, has been focused on as a special theme of meditation, a basis of exhortation as typical of larger and back-lying meaning, and believers have sought closer unity with their Saviour by reiterated, prolonged, agonizing efforts intensified by fasting, vigils, and solitude remote from the haunts of men, etc., to actually visualize the facts as if they had been eye witnesses to it all, have sought to put themselves in Jesus' place at every stage and realize how the stripes, thorns, nails and spear would feel. Pious exercises have been developed and assigned peculiar saving efficacy, and fanatics have even sought to subject themselves to some of these tortures, even the cross itself, or to make single items in this train of suffering live again in their own person. Those who have felt themselves failures, been deserted, suffered from cumulative disasters, from insults, or have known the pangs of injustice, have brought their own experiences to bear to aid them in realizing the anguish of Jesus. Cults and sects have arisen to bring out in full relief special elements in this the world's most pathogenic train of events.

Perhaps only those who have made special studies in this field realize how effective every item of this galaxy of incitations to pathos still is in the young in whom it often becomes a highly specialized pity fetish. Some illustrate this propensity of sympathy to focus by regarding the betrayal by a kiss as the acme of the tragedy. Others feel a lump in the throat or sob at the prayer, "Father, forgive them." Others have physical symptoms at the thought of the flesh torn and bruised by the scourge. And so the commendation of his mother to the care of the beloved disciple, his meeting with her on the way to Calvary, the stripping of the garments, the three falls under the cross, the Veronica handkerchief, the silence and passivity of Jesus before Herod, the scarlet robe, the awful invocation by the Jews of his blood upon themselves and their posterity :—each of these may be, has been, and still is almost maddening or may bring tears, heart-ache, limpness, clenching of the hands, breaking of the voice, constriction in the chest, weakness of

knees, involuntary groaning or sighing, or even shrieking, the haunting and persistent sense of helplessness and depression, waves of flushing or chill, and other vasomotor effects. I have collected many instances of this potent contagion of emotion which may seem to some almost incredible,³ but the number and character of which places them beyond all doubt. A man, now forty, from the age of about fifteen used to find the place exactly in the centre of the palm of his own hand where the nails went in. He was later wounded very near this spot and this experience, in his own language, "brought him to Jesus." Others press nails against their own hands, though rarely deep enough to bring blood, in order to realize more acutely the pangs of the cross. Many developed very exact ideas of the kind of nails. They are, for instance, tenpenny nails, blunt at the point, square, sharp, or rusty. For some the very sound of the word nails seems cruel and causes a nervous shudder. A few cannot help thinking upon them so intently that they have subjective sensations in the hands. A few on seeing nails that look antique feel pains in the hands from the strength of their imagination and are on the way to stigmatization. Others muse on how they were driven in, the heads, for instance, hammered down a little into the flesh causing needless pain, and how the last blow broke the skin as it rolled over between the hammer and the nail and spattered the blood drops that oozed out. Other nervous children shudder in thinking how the first blows would squeach and creak before the nails would go through the flesh, or reflect on whether the larger nails that went into the feet would come out in front of the heel to help support the weight. Of all the items in my collections the nails lead in this kind of efficacy. The scourging, thorns, spear and other tactile or haptic sensations come next. The spear, for instance, is often vividly imaged as dull or blunt, with the haft a little larger than the head, or barbed so that the pain of withdrawal was greater than that of thrust. One, in church, presses her hand against the lower rib to feel more vividly the spot pierced by the spear sometimes till it hurts. Some conceive it thrust with such malice that it penetrated the body and went well into the wood of the cross. In the Ober-Ammergau Passion Play the most pathetic moment is usually when the spear seems to enter the side of Jesus. A tinselled point is really pushed back by a spring into the haft causing the red

³ See article on Pity. *Am. Jour. of Psy.*, July, 1900, Vol. 11, pp. 564-591.

ink used for blood to spurt out. One mature observer had seen this four times and had inspected the apparatus but loved to feel the sob rising and to wipe his eyes. We must reserve for publication elsewhere fuller details of this propensity of the youthful soul to sensualize the physical suffering of the Passion and to make it not merely a graphic or dramatic presentation but a personal experience. All this shows us again how perhaps nothing in any of the old dramatic unities is so calculated to bring out every strong and deep tone in all the shades and degrees of pity that can wring the heart. Were the whole story the creation of some sublime artistic genius, master in all the resources of æsthetics, or were it the slow evolution of the race soul, it would incite amazement and reverence for the faculties that could create such a masterpiece.

Pity fetiches seem to be as real as the love fetiches, now so well recognized, but their causation is quite different. The very young cannot pity intensely because they have not had sufficient experience in suffering or in fear. Defectives are lacking in sympathy partly, at least, because they are insensitive, analgesic, and more or less disvulnerable. In general the average man pities for pains he has felt himself or, in a secondary way, for those he fears. Thus, we come to pity in others evils which we have experienced, or to which we feel ourselves liable. It is, therefore, because we have suffered or feared in spots as it were that sympathy is not properly distributed but, like phobias, tends to focalization. Plato held that a good physician must have had experience with disease in his own person to know how it feels and to take his patient's point of view. Hence, the young, whose lives have been so sheltered, and the rich reared in luxury, who can so imperfectly pity the poor, cannot rightly distribute their sympathy. Hence, too, where it is felt it is prone to be over intense. Only genius, in which the highest powers of imagination are developed, is able, with little or no experience with woe, to feel what a recent writer makes its chief characteristic,—the pathos of resonance.

Sympathy, too, begins at home with a few friends or loved ones and irradiates to those remote in time, place or associations slowly and, in a sense, inversely as the square of the distance. It is intensified by physical beauty, by every personal charm and grace of disposition and every gift that provokes admiration. Perhaps this element was a part of the magnetism that drew the friends of Jesus to him. Instead of ema-

ciation and ugliness, which art has sometimes assumed for him and which the friends of Socrates doubtless magnified to bring out in stronger relief the beauties of his soul, his nature may have been at once so commanding and attractive as to give him that rare prestige which often comes from this source. Again, spring suggests life as autumn does death. With this the cult of Balder and of Apollo has always been very intimately merged. The heart expands and feels far more keenly. Again, Jesus was young and cut off in the height of his promise with a work of incalculable magnitude but just begun, so that we have here the keen pathos of unrealized hope. For the old, who have lived out a fully rounded life to the end, who have finished their work, who fortify themselves by thoughts of their good deeds, perhaps now even by Weissmannism which has sources of consolation not yet utilized, who have risen to the largest ideas and in so doing are deindividualizing themselves and dying the death of Platonic philosophers in whom the great Biologos has accomplished its work of involution, who have beat the masterly retreat that can make old age glorious, who are surrounded by friends - even under these circumstances death, with its horrid accompaniments of pallor, weakness, perhaps unconsciousness, the sweat, agony, rattle, and final cessation of breath, rigidity, coldness and decomposition, is the king of terrors for all who witness it. But for those cut off prematurely, with the gifts and possibilities of rich lives undeveloped, it is incalculably more ghastly and horrid. Again, innocence and non-resistance intensify the pathos of it. I have myself in my study of pity witnessed two hangings of criminals, both of whom had committed crimes so namelessly horrible that the indignation of communities was aroused to a high pitch. One managed to meet death with some repose and the other struggled insanely, but even here strong men fainted or grew sick and withdrew. Resentment for the moment, at least, seemed swallowed up in pity for those suffering what has always been for man his supreme dread. But for one with no fault or crime to die with every mental and physical torture which he might have escaped, and to accept it all with equanimity, and especially when his great sacrifice was for the weal of others, must have aroused in the faithful few that witnessed it emotions of a kind and intensity very rarely felt in the human soul and which art and literature are powerless to describe. Justice seemed dethroned, and the resentment against even the race that caused this tragedy has ever since been deep, persistent,

and widespread, blind and unreasoning as it is. All these considerations have been developed and dwelt upon in Christian cults that have in every way sought to magnify their great natural impressiveness on the theory that every man had sin enough in his own soul to merit all this agony himself and that, by vicariously following the way of the cross as far as imagination and tender-heartedness, goaded on by every provocative could go, the heart could be cleansed of sin, and because there was saving virtue in feeling anew all these wounds of Jesus.

In the story of the Passion, as interpreted in Christendom, Jesus is often placed in the attitude of craving sympathy. He made no sublime Promethean resistance against the will of heaven, attempted no heroics or even a Socratic apology, but bowed to the divine will, fate, or kismet with utter submission, with a passivity that was more feminine than masculine. He seems to have desired to excite compassion and would have his followers die with him and rehearse all his litany of woe to make their self-abandonment complete. Hartmann has given us a new and deeper, if also somewhat grotesque, glorification of pity in his theory that the absolute before all the worlds were, was suffering intolerable pain and that their creation was like an eruption that "ameliorated His negative eudaemonism" and insists that the highest of all motives to virtue is to pity divinity, and thus to hasten on by a new motivation to morals and good works his ultimate relief from transcendental pain and redemption.

On the other hand familiarity always tends to blunt the effects of this sentiment. Our returns abound in expressions of regret and self-reproach that the whole story of Jesus' sufferings is now heard with indifference. Many think they are growing hardened, grieving the spirit, fear they are losing belief or backsliding, growing stagnant, find they pity saints, contemporaries, characters in romance or even suffering animals, more than they can Jesus, or perhaps think this is all because their sympathy has been overdone, forced, or premature.

Moreover, there is much in modern life to discourage pity, the pleasure field has widened so rapidly with growing civilization and comfort and immunity to want. Aristotle must have had what seems to us a strange dread of the over-mastering power of pity for which he thought it necessary to find in the drama or in art a method of purgation by his well-known theory of catharsis or psychic vaccination, or setting a back fire. Spinoza thought it an unworthy sentiment wher-

ever it did not prompt action for relief. Story readers, who are so inebriated by woe that it becomes an obsession, who implore romancers not to let their heroes die or suffer, are, if this be true, marked with the stigmata of degeneration. Darwinism comforts us by the doctrine that, although the majority of known species and animals perish in pain, it is on the whole the best that survive. Nietzsche excoriates those who pity, and his Zarathustra denounces all who either crave or indulge in this sentiment as hysterical. For him, as for the stoics, the sage would blush to be pitied or to pity and he finds here a pathogenic element in Christianity and calls Jesus an amiable and neurotic degenerate.

Profundly as we dissent from this view, this is not the place to discuss the normality of the sentiment of pity, but only its power and wide prevalence. For Christendom it was a unique moment when the body of Jesus was wrapped in clean, fine linen with Nicodemus's "mixture of myrrh and aloes about a hundred pounds weight," placed in a new sepulchre hewn in a rock, sealed up with a stone and guarded by a watch. As to the state of mind of his friends and disciples during these three days, and especially on the Jewish Sabbath which intervened, we know nothing whatever, for the record is an utter blank. Peter, the rock, had shown himself a vociferous, triple perjurer, and the disciples seemed to have been skulking fugitives seeking their personal safety. Many must have felt their hero to be of clay, either an impostor or a foolish dreamer. That they thought that this was the end of him on this earth is plain, for when told that he was risen these "words seemed to them as idle tales and they believed them not." "As yet they knew not of the scripture that he must rise again from the dead." "And they, when they had heard that he was alive and been seen of her, believed not." The Jewish belief that righteousness was rewarded and evil punished here, which was so persistent in the minds of the disciples, must have wrought great disenchantment. When Rome, the hope of the world, was falling, we read that at the death of Otho, the Good, many slew themselves from sheer pity. The logic of pessimism or stoicism, must have made suicide the theme of every philosophic mind under those circumstances, for the last spark of hope had gone out in utter darkness. Only the lust of life in youth (Klein thinks the average age of the disciples was but little over twenty) must have sustained them. What if he had lain in the grave a month, year,

decade, century, and then arisen gloriously, or perhaps, when all who knew him were dead? The grief, humiliation, sleeplessness, must have made this a nadir of despair for them all. It is, of course, impossible to conjecture what would have occurred had there been no sequel. His followers had no possible source of hope or consolation in their anguish. Everything that had begun to germinate in their souls during the years of intercourse with their master must be left to die or be actively exterminated. The powers of darkness seemed to be at the helm. The world was a "City of Dreadful Night" and with the great Companion's shameful and miserable death a pall shrouded the earth and left his friends a prey to nameless fears. Grief at his loss, the pathos of his suffering, mortification at their own misguidance, struggled together in their souls, or perhaps left them stunned so that when they found their bearings they must strike out a new plan of life. It might be wisest to live for the day and hour, and worship the blind power of wrong or fate on the throne of an anti-moral universe. Thus, in their agony they, too, in a figurative sense, descended into hell, tasted all the spiritual torments it could inflict, and touched the profoundest depths of disphoria. Moreover, all their personal and racial ideas and beliefs in a transcendent world of rewards and punishments lay in ruins. If there had been anything in man really worth while that could survive death, he who was so solemnly pledged to do so must come back or, at least, give some sign of post mortem survival. This he failed to do and nothing remained of him but a corpse doomed to moulder and the aching recollections that clutched their hearts. This life must be the be-all and death the end-all and every man only awaits like the brutes the inevitable hour of total engulfment in the grave. Man is a fleeting pillar of dust thrown up by a rude whilwind. Even their bitter-sweet memories of him would soon be swallowed up in oblivion. Perhaps the thoughts of different individuals drifted in all these different ways. Some may have lapsed to resentment and indignation that their hopes and endeavors had been thus bankrupted. Such, at least, is the psychological appreciation of such an historic situation. There was no comfort from the psychic law that the healthy soul by its very nature cannot remain very long in a state of extreme depression but must react toward some more exalted state, so that the entire moral, social, religious world which was wrecked and reduced back to Chaos, for them must be built up again in some form or else they must succumb to the grim logic of miserabilism.

II. But now from this direst of extremities came the great reaction, the pivot of history for Christendom, which made the grave of the old world the cradle of a new one. Although there may have been watches and vigils, there is no recorded eye witness of the resurrection. The first news of the empty tomb was brought by Mary the Mother, Mary the Magdalene, who, it is often conjectured, had fallen in love with Jesus, or both of them, so that, as Renan says, the first promulgator, announcer, preacher of the gospel of glad tidings was woman who, in this office, followed the directions of an angel with fear and trembling. The news, according to the record, was, at least, received with every indication of incredulity and skepticism as "idle tales." The sight of the vacant tomb and even the first parusia were unconvincing. If it was not a hallucination or a theft of the body, a dream or a fiction, conviction, at any rate, began at a faint suggestive stage and we have few details of how it passed up the long scale of probabilities till it reached a cataleptic certainty. The epochful fact, however, is that the certainty of it soon became so intense and peculiar that it needed, if it did not create, faith as a new faculty. Thus the resurrection soon became the chief affirmation and source of power of Christendom, the key to the right understanding of the entire apostolic and even patristic period. "If Christ is not risen our faith is vain." Many other faiths had held to a future life, but all with far fainter certainty. It was better, thought Homer, to live the life of a common man than reign in the kingdom of the dead where all was pallid and unreal. Henceforth the belief in another life, of which the resurrection was the object lesson and proof, became the mainspring of activity. As faith became absolute Jesus was chiefly known as the death killer, the first fruits of them that slept, the one who had removed the sting of death and caused it to be swallowed up in victory. Although he came back weak and exhausted, it was as a conqueror, and death-exterminator was his chief epithet. Not only this, but he had raised others, and more yet, had gone to Hades and vanquished the ruler of death and sin. The power of the resurrection was the chief theme of the first preaching. He had bearded the king of terrors and burst the bars of the tomb. Tertullian compares him to a phoenix rising from his own ashes. Thomas had actually felt the body and its wounds and five hundred at once had seen it, and after the ascension the abode of the dead was upward. The present world is mean, life is short and squalid, and earth made per-

haps by a vicious demiurge, as the Marcian heresy later taught. Thus, it was not strange that the first book of the New Testament to be written was a revelation or apocalypse of a higher world order, describing a new Jerusalem in which were all the treasures which the heart held dear. Its architecture was elaborate and gorgeous, and slowly not only its details but those of Tartarus and Purgatory grew to Dantesque vividness. This world was eclipsed by the other. It would burn but all things worth saving were in the great beyond. Just as Alaric destroyed Rome and the hope of the world for man as a political animal, Augustine described the City of God, and the church inherited the forms and ambitions of the Roman state.

The world had been ruled by fear and the greatest of all the fears is that of death. To be relieved of this and all so suddenly (for it was barely fifty days from Calvary to Pentecost), caused, as was most natural, an outburst of unbounded enthusiasm that in some temperaments amounted almost to delirium. Men chanted, raved, spoke in unknown tongues, prophesied, gazed up into heaven all day, longed for vision, with a real parusiamania, straining to grasp the momentous fact that death was swallowed up in victory, that its incubus and awful inhibition was removed, so that every human faculty let itself go with abandon to excesses often riotous. Men babbled as if drunk with new wine, were erethic and beside themselves. There were new ideas of inspiration, and belief in possession, until they had to exhort each other to test spirits by every criterion. So widespread and intense was this tendency that it was necessary to make strenuous efforts and adopt stern measures to come back to sanity and reality and prove all spirits. The normative form of this outburst of enthusiasm was the doctrine of the Holy Ghost selectively evolved. Thus, to save the nascent church from inebriation from its great joy, it was necessary to turn attention to practical efforts: hence, preaching, proclaiming the good news and making propaganda was the first mundane direction of the new life.¹

The attitude towards spirits Weinel calls "the most essential possession of the innermost personal life of primitive Christendom," and shows how the ideas of the Holy Spirit developed out the intense multifarious spiritism that long ruled. Powers of evil had made themselves

¹ On this interesting development see the admirable work of Weinel: *Die Wirkungen des Geistes und der Geister im Nachapostolischen Zeitalter bis auf Irenaus*. Leipzig, 1899.

felt even in the temptation of Jesus. They inspired all evil and gave doubt. Thus, behind the world were mighty invisible personal influences well organized, leagued and graded, and Jesus had conquered the ministers of evil and brought the Holy Ghost which conquered hate, consoled, guided into truth, gave certainty and could make all truly pneumatic as well as denizens of the higher and only real world. Glossolalia, singing, praying, poetizing, convulsions, narrating words heard in ecstasy, inspiring authorship that noted the experiences of trance-like states, sometimes even cramps, symbols, acts all supernally motivated, were slowly subjected to a criticism which, if it limited the richness and variety of pneumatic life, slowly came to an increasingly normal direction and bestowed gifts essentially good. Pneumatophores were inspired to prophecy and virtue by spirits that came from God by baptism, laying on of hands, etc.¹

Thus the reality of a psychic far transcending that of a sarcous body in importance was slowly established, and all mainly by the resurrection. Faith was the organ of things unseen; virtue was other-world conduct. This life was mean and transitory. The other world had conquered this. All interests here paled in comparison with those of the next life. Thus it came to pass that at first believers in the new faith not only defied and challenged but often courted and prayed for death. They feared they were not worthy of martyrdom and the ten persecutions from A. D. 64 to 303 gave them abundant opportunity to bear witness in this supreme way. The testimony of Tacitus, Pliny, Suetonius, and Cæcilius shows that the Christians early made themselves detested as infected with a new malefic superstition aggravated by obstinacy and contumacy. They were hated not so much because they injured the business of astrologers, shrine makers, gladiators, and the rest as because their faith was not to them one of many, but so exclusive and supreme that they would gladly die to advance it. Thus, Jesus' followers soon came to defy, taunt and even woo death. They gloated over the details of the charnel-house and worms. They lived in tombs, and developed the catacombs, those of Rome having 400 miles of passages. Tertullian said all Christians should die the death of martyrs at the end. Those who died with Him would rise with Him. Martyr-

¹H. Gunkel, *Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes*, 2nd edition, Göttingen, 1899.

dom was a prize, a great treasure, an honor, a kind of diploma *summa cum laude*, and death was despised, fled to; it was the muse that inspired to great deeds. Its worst forms were no longer hated but preferred. It was no mere thanatopsis or dreamy contemplation of euthanasia, but to achieve a glorious death was the goal which many attained of whom we know nothing else. Often men and tender women agonized as to whether they were worthy of the honor of the most horrid forms of death. Thus, the newly discovered continent seemed infinitely fairer, more lasting, more charming, than the old hated world of sense and the great enemy was met no longer with stoic apathy but was coveted and craved. It was the essential part of man that survived, the only thing of moment, when the veil of the body was sloughed off. The soul was no longer regarded as a mere harmony, a vapor liable to be blown away if one died on a windy day, but as the very man himself. Besides the mortal part there was the spiritual body which went to the home of souls. Thus, the psychology of the early Christians was not without a soul. It was no mere parallelism but was instinct with futurity and so protensive withal that agnosticism had no place.

Just as sense is the organ of the physical world so faith is the inner sensory of the true soul world. It was indeed the very substance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen. The Holy Ghost, which was its supreme manifestation, was a new muse and organ of communication with the next world, and so superior to the lower faculties of sense and reason which were despised as filthy rags, just as the morality of this world was regarded from the standpoint of supermundane morals. Thus ideals became more real than facts; the visible church was plastic to, and moulded by, the invisible church. The laws of this world differ from that of the new and higher one now revealed. The two world orders collide, and what seems miraculous here is natural there because the lower must give way to the higher. This earth was given over to evil and to destruction. Worship was the purest other world conduct, the avocation of heaven. No real evil could, indeed, befall a good man, living or dead, if he is good in this sense.

No wonder, therefore, that this evangel of a new impending kingdom and dispensation was heralded by a kind of hurrah preaching. The church is the best image of heaven and suggestive of it. It is the anteroom through which all must pass to arrive there. Individuality

was given an intensification immeasurable, unprecedented, and of transcendent value. In this new dualism the Jehnseits was so superior to the Diesseits that all the scales of value were reversed, and all the troubles, disorders, and ruinations of the period impelled the soul to fly to, and live by, anticipation in its home above. Cyprian has some almost fulsome encomiums upon martyrdom which Cruttwell¹ blindly calls "a strange symptom of that unhappy age." It was really the most natural and inevitable result of a fixed and literal belief in the resurrection and all that it implied. The passionate thirst for martyrdom made it thought by many the very best gift they could render to God and they went far out of their way to provoke it. Men rushed to death with a cheer which to the Romans seemed a blind fanaticism because they could not understand it to be anything but sheer obstinacy that men would refuse to cry "Lord Caesar," or burn a grain of frankincense on the altar. Tertullian praises martyrdom as a second baptism in blood with very peculiar power to wash away post-baptismal guilt otherwise very hard to remove. He even lays down what might almost be called rules of etiquette for martyrs who must not shriek when wild beasts come upon them, etc. He exhorts men to be witnesses, thus praising those blessed ones who, crouching in gloomy prisons, await the martyr's crown. Even to Clement, who is a little more unsympathetic with this passion or mania, a martyr was a confessor.

III. Thus within the space of three days or at most some fifty days from Calvary to Pentecost, we have a great tide from the nadir of depression to the zenith of euphoria. The catabasis of humiliation, shame and suffering was followed by the anabasis of exaltation, glory and resurrection. Never was there such an ebb from the depths to the heights of human experience in its fluctuations between its two great poles of pleasure and pain. Even Jesus' earthly life had two sides, well illustrated by the two works of Wuensche,² in one of which he is described as suffering, solitary, misunderstood by his mother ever after his first visit to the temple, by his contemporaries and even his chosen disciples, and in the other as jubilant and triumphant. The soul is normally poised between these extremes and when the balance is lost in either direction tends to react toward the other. The high hopes of years

¹ *Literary History of Early Christianity*, pp. 606.

² See *Die Leiden des Messias*, 1870. Compare it with *Der Lebensfreudige Jesus*, 1876.

in the breasts of the disciples could not be permanently crushed by one series of calamities, however appalling, and any objective intimation of resurgence would be reinforced by this psychodynamic principle. Ever since Magnan's important studies in psychiatry, some fifteen years since, alienists are increasingly prone to lay stress upon depressive or melancholic as contrasted with exalted states of consciousness, as succeeding each other in the so-called cyclic forms of insanity into either one of which the patient, after losing the power of reacting to the other, may settle with relative permanence. Even moods of joy and sorrow have different mental horizons and may take the form of something almost like dual personality. The healthy soul, however, is marked by the power of resilience, and to explore the possibilities of human experience each way, both up and down, gives breadth, range, and in a word, humanism. The plastic soul of adolescence is peculiarly prone to oscillate from the pain field to the pleasure field and thereby strengthens and tempers itself and insures sanity and poise and makes recovery from the vicissitudes of fortune a habit or diathesis. No experience of the ordinary individual sounds such extremes of misery and rapture as is presented at this epoch. Thus to have fully realized the possibility of this great experience cadences the soul, gives it immunity against the danger of being overwhelmed by woe or enervated by joy. Having been thus seasoned, man is initiated into life and inoculated with saving heart-power against all the ills that may befall. For those with vitality to react, the greater the depression below the algedonic indifference point, the higher and the easier the ascent above it. To be helped by an external norm to this reaction gives temper to the soul, and to have suffered and rejoiced vicariously up to the full measure of its possibilities is thus the very best initiation into life and the best safeguard against arrest at either extreme point of the pendulum. It is thus that the soul expatiates over the widest ranges of human experience. The psychologist marvels at and applauds alike the affirmative vigor that kept Jesus' disciples from being so overwhelmed at his death that they could not accept and exult in his resurrection, and the temperance that restrained the exuberant and almost frenzied enthusiasm of Pentecost from the sibylline, mænadic frenzies that threatened it, formulated this exuberance into the doctrines of inspiration and the Holy Ghost, checked the impetuous zeal to bear witness by death, and diverted all this spring flood of energy to the practical work of preaching and organizing. Both ways lay danger.

Again, death is always hard to conceive of or even to accept as a fact. The personality of our friends is a very persistent force and, moreover, it is peculiarly difficult to conceive a negation. The reality of dead friends is a persistent presence, a momentum which if we close our eyes to their vacant places will bring them back. The best explanation we have of all kinds of funeral ceremonials is that they originated at least in large part as modes of bringing home to mourners the fact that their friends were really dead and would never be seen more. Ghosts haunt relatives if they have not been properly buried, so that the last sad rites are to lay spirits by acting upon the survivors' minds so strongly that neither waking nor asleep shall they fail to realize that they are no more. Presence at a death bed also impresses the same sad fact. The apostles were far away from the cross and the tomb. They knew none of them, probably, by sense but only by testimony of their Master's death and burial, so that it is less strange if he appeared to them on the ground of his power and triumph in Galilee and amid familiar scenes with which they were wont to associate him. They had not seen him dead or dying, and so lacked this corrective of old memories, this rectification of old associations.

Again, strong personalities, especially, die hard to their friends. They have filled so large a space in heart, head and will, and the soul so abhors this kind of vacuum made by death that it is almost a part of its *vis medicatrix naturae* to restore the wounded psychic tissue and reinstate the loved ones again to life. Those who polarize and give new directions to lives, who sustain hope, inspire courage, open vast mental vistas, have an inextinguishable post mortem existence for those about them, which, in these democratic days when impulse, knowledge, feeling are stirred by so many persons and are so rarely focused upon one life, we hear little of. Hegel and Baur have both insisted that the resurrection of Jesus existed essentially in this kind of faith and love of the members of his immediate circle.

Moreover love always predisposes the soul to doubt death. It is excited in almost direct proportion to the worth and perdurable reality of its object. Affection naturally chooses not the transient and ephemeral, but the abiding; and conversely when it is chosen it generates toward its object a sense of permanence and stability. Thus love conquers death.

Once more, mythopoeic forces preform and predetermine the direc-

tion of psychic activities in great crises. Myth abounds in the rescues of the souls of the dead from their abodes, and this general restitution motive is itself preformed by the change of seasons. As the Aryan races penetrated the colder regions, these myths became more real, and in Balder's death and attempted rescue we have the same ground motive with many identical psychic elements and effects. Balder was the god of summer, who dies in the fall and comes back in the spring, and not only the Easter season itself but many of the popular and even church ceremonies commemorative of Jesus' return are borrowed from pagan folk-lore and custom. If not in the narrative itself, still in the hold which this event has upon the heart of Christendom and in many of our reactions to it, there are abundant reverberations of psychoses that long antedate Christianity. The psychologist, too, must never forget that the human soul in its unconscious ranges, which are so much vaster than all that appears in the field of consciousness, often treasures uncomely beliefs as blindly as insects cherish their sometimes ugly larvæ dimly feeling their future racial utility. One of the marvels of Christianity is that some of its possessions now understood and glowing with light were so tenaciously clung to when they seem to us to have been only a mouthful of empty phrases, or senseless or absurd rites. Classical legends and ceremonials are far more comely. But the soul is far wiser and truer than it knows and clung to what concealed worth for itself through dark ages and persecutions in a way our philosophy is too small to explain and which should forever make us treat even superstition and the blindest and narrowest orthodoxies with sympathy and if possible with the hebamic art which Socrates praised.

Psychology does not discuss the historicity of the resurrection as an objective fact, but it magnifies the unquestioned belief in it which became ineluctable and the chief source of power in the early church. Of all the possible issues, while Jesus lay in the tomb that were above noted, only one was inevitable, and that was that the normal soul would react from despair and if it did not find would invent sources of consolation. Had the evidence of the resurrection been still less or a mere suggestion, there lies in the depths of human nature a power of affirmation that would have found some relief and might have given the body of faith to even a suggestion. The power of belief without sight or any evidence that would satisfy logical criteria was truly and wisely praised. This is by no means saying that the soul would have affirmed

the resurrection had it not occurred in fact, but it is asserting that the nature of both the individual and the folk-soul would strongly tend to reinforce any degree of belief in that direction, would find judicial impartiality difficult, and would make every hint and hope a little more tangible or emphatic. This view at least gives added dignity to the soul, gives it some share in the great crisis of Christendom, endows it with greater powers of appreciation of what occurred, and makes historic events more cognate with its own mythopoic powers, however wide the interval between the ability to sympathize with and to create. From this point of view, some new light is shed upon the way of salvation.

Our age has forgotten the power of pathos and of fear. Comfort makes selfish and individualism disintegrates the old solidarity of earlier primitive communities. In becoming cosmic our sympathy is diluted and volatilized and our scholarship has failed to lay due stress upon the facts that in early days both Christians and pagans shuddered, groaned, and fainted at, were convulsed and torn with inner anguish that racked the frame with intense physical symptoms as the story of the cross and all that led up to it was vividly depicted for the first time or rehearsed in solitary meditation. So, too, learning has been so occupied with the spade, with ancient codexes and attempts to reproduce objective facts, that we have forgotten those that were inward and temperamental. It is increasingly hard for us to put ourselves in the place of simple minds before the dawn of science, who were capable of believing literally and with such utter abandon that Jesus had arisen, that they could cast off all fear of death, who had to be restrained with difficulty from rushing precipitately into its arms with joy, and who truly and practically felt as even the believer to-day does not and cannot, that the next life was infinitely vaster, more real and surer than this. But the inner history of Christianity will continue to have a great and aching void until some work of psychic reconstruction can be effected here.

The effects of the belief in the resurrection must at once have given a new lustre to Jesus' life. Every word and incident must have been reinterpreted in the light of the new fame with which he was thus invested. It illuminated and transfigured all. Had he been a common, average man, everything about his personality would have glowed with new and hidden meanings and been invested with mystery and awe. Paul had one incalculable advantage over the disciples. His first impressions of Jesus were as one who had already arisen and even ascended, and from

the apperception point of his glory he studied his life and sayings. His own faith and teaching was conditioned upon the resurrection, without which all would have been vain. The disciples knew him in the plain, prosaic, everyday life of humanity. They had talked, walked and ate with him and had been his companions by day and night. The text shows the difficulty of readjustment of their own personal experiences with him to the conceptions of the risen and glorified one. To bring unity into their minds they must tend to more or less level down the post-mortem to the ante-mortem life, while in Paul the converse process of leveling up would occur. In him, faith was all; in them, sight dominated. Briggs¹ even says, illustrating a haunting tendency of modern conservatism to make the post and ante-mortem life intussuscept with each other, and on evidence that must forever be more or less conjectural. "We are justified, therefore, in the conclusion that we must assign no inconsiderable portion of the teaching of Jesus to His appearances after His resurrection. It is upon the experiences of these forty days, as much as upon the year and a half of the previous ministry of Jesus, that the faith and life of the Apostolic church was grounded." We must believe it to be in the highest interests of Christianity to admit that the sequel to Jesus' life stands in some very different relation to the religious consciousness from his career before death. It appeals to psychic registers, the difference between which is somewhat symbolized by those between the ideal and the real or between the soul and the body. Supremely precious as is the former and indispensable as it is to the soul of the Christian, it is more exalted, remote, aloof, superhuman, unincarnate, a middle term between his humanity and the pleroma of his fully diplomated divinity. To Paul it was all a vision and his own legitimacy was bound up in the differences between prosaic, common, sensuous experience and the ecstatic state. Both he and the disciples were very conscious of the differences between his soul facts and experiences and their sense memories. The risen Jesus is a hovering, iridescent reality, to be regarded a little more as we ought to regard the supremest and most inspired of all creations of art, and is not exalted but in danger of being a little besmirched by too much peering criticism as to times and places, which sometimes only vulgarize the purely ideal. This it ever was to Paul, because it came

¹New light on the life of Jesus, by Charles A. Briggs, D. D., Professor of Biblical Theology, Union Theological Seminary. New York, 1904. p. 124.

to him as a transcendental experience, and it must ever be to us a predominantly psychological fact, truer to the nature and needs of the soul than to the canons of historical research. Humanity has never dreamed of imitating or sympathizing with its risen Jesus as it has so intensely done with the Jesus of the passion. Tradition has done little to amplify the very scanty record between the resurrection and the ascension by apocraphy and myth, and it has never been a favorite theme of art. The risen Jesus did not attract even the disciples, and has always been a little uncanny, and repellant and heartless, as if he were coldly discharging a formal theological function, or were but a mere dogma galvanized into only the pallid tenuous life of which a dogma is capable.

One thing, however, is certain, viz., that every degree, even the slightest, of increased faith in a future eternal life of rewards and punishments for the soul, gives inestimable support to morality. It gives hedonism a wider range and makes selfishness transcendent, and in some sense intensified. The sage who is supremely bent upon saving his own soul, who is assured that this life is only a portal to the next, is not merely indifferent to wealth, fame, comfort and a merely worldly prudence, but regarding death as only disrobing, finds it far easier to die than to swerve from his convictions of right. The resurrection established the belief in the soul as infinitely more real than the body, not only surviving it but relieved and glorified by emancipation from it. Thus convinced, the motive of action to save life is reduced to its minimum, the supreme fear of death vanishes, and man can live out the impulses of his inner vocation for their own sake. Of course the lust for individual survival in the next world is not the highest motive of virtue. It is a utilitarian making the best of two worlds instead of one. There is a sublime autonomous sense of oughtness in the soul that points, like a magnet to the pole, to the destiny of the human race and which differs widely from even the highest form of transcendental selfishness. This Paul glimpsed when he said that under certain conditions he might almost wish himself accursed. But by bringing immortality to light, the soul stood forth revealed, and a utilitarianism for its larger life after death was an incalculable gain, the full benefit of which, ineffably as it has advanced all good causes in the Christian world, is yet far above the level of life which the race has yet attained. It gave the greatest transvaluation of all worths and reenforced every ethical motive

IV. What is belief in the resurrection or what does it involve and mean to psychology? The answer is, as questionnaire returns plainly show, that it means very different things to different believers whose lives seem equally devoted to the master and who have long used the same formula or symbol. It is a very complex belief involving often elements that are so flagrantly contradictory the one with the other that the least self examination of it brings immediate reconstruction with the mingled pain and gain so peculiar to religious progress. There are archaic but still persistent factors of this belief which popular Christianity often assumes but which no disciple of Jesus ancient or modern, no martyr, no candid professor of theology, or really religious soul ever did or can attain, and there are vulgar standards of orthodoxy so crassly material and self contradictory that no one, I will not say with mere learning or scholarship or with only emotional or rhetorical power, but no one who has power of thought or real psychological insight or the instinct to organize his own soul coherently or logically, or who keeps an intellectual conscience can possibly hold and be a truly honest man.

(a) The data of our returns may be roughly grouped as follows. Many think they believe in it as a literal fact because they have never candidly examined the nature of their affirmation of it. This few can do and still fewer do. Some fear disillusion or dread the labor of reconstruction. As Albertus Magnus and Aquinas carefully reserved certain dogma from the sphere of philosophic thought, so this psychic process is set apart as too sacred for investigation. (b) Many have some degree of faith in too crude a form of it to ever be able to attain the full conviction they crave and so are unhappy, halting and praying for more faith when they ought to reinterpret it into a form the mature modern mind demands. (c) Others think they find aid to their own faith by vociferous and dogmatic affirmation of some form of it, or find their own belief reenforced by censuring what they deem shortages or errors in the belief of others, on psychic laws akin to those which make young Mormons, suspected of doubt, reclaimed to faith by being sent on missions to preach their doctrines among heretics, and who by becoming advocates instead of judges convert themselves if no others. (d) Yet others with and surprisingly often without any knowledge of Kant's critique of the practical reason and its postulates hold to the conventional forms of belief because they think its effects on the conduct of thought, life, or both, are a higher criterion or sanction than

any which reason can supply. The highest truth is that which works supremely well. (e) Many hold to it aesthetically. Art has embodied it in so many forms that edify and give a true hedonic narcosis and so they have grown indifferent to historical validity. It is venerable, hallowed by association, and a consensus so wide as to be itself sublime, and moreover, poetry is often truer than fact. (f) Many think it essential for the young, and while they feel that it is outgrown in their own experience deem it vital, saving truth for children and youth, to the needs of which they subordinate not only their own lives but their convictions and find a pedagogic virtue in so doing that they reconcile with personal standards by often elaborate accommodation theories. (g) Finally a few devout souls, whose private lives are consecrated to the imitation of Jesus' life and who live for good works, distinctly and consciously reject all forms of resurrection. Of these, some, chiefly women, were shocked to first realize their unbelief and are more assiduous in practicing the Christian graces as if to atone for a defect while others, more often men, have found great satisfaction in their eclaireissement but believe they can do most good by conforming and working in the harness of conventionality, or perhaps think this an article of faith best left to lapse from the Christian consciousness quietly, as they believe it will do.

These are facts based, to be sure, as yet on only a few score of honest cases, most of them academic students and all of them more or less active church members who desire to lead Christian lives. More data are, of course, needed and would no doubt show many new varieties, and different statistical proportions. That they are typical of the present state of mind of thoughtful youth in the church, who are proverbially the best material for prophecy, there can be doubt. But very few if, indeed, any held to a belief in the resurrection that would satisfy the conventional standards of orthodoxy in the denomination to which they belonged. This shows a wide chasm between the latter and true facts of inner religious life. To make new, fresh, close and vital contact with the better again is, I believe, the most crying need of Christian thought to-day. A psychologist must be pardoned if he finds one chief cause of this ominous and widening chasm in the astonishing neglect to provide for any study of the soul in institutions the business of which is to train men for the work of saving it, and in the abstract, speculative and antiquated ways of teaching philosophic subjects in institutions for

higher education generally. Reserving fuller exposition for later articles let us finally glance in a preliminary way at the present status of opinion on the subject.

The passages in the New Testament touching the resurrection are individually and collectively, extremely unsatisfactory and contain many discrepancies and contradictions. First of all there were as every one knows and is, as mentioned above, no recorded eye witnesses of the process itself, as there were in the case of Lazarus. We have no account of how it occurred. The guards slept, the disciples and all fled even before the crucifixion, and the proofs, which appear chronologically first, differ in details, such as whether the angel sat, stood, was inside or outside of the tomb, etc. The number of parusia, the persons to whom he appeared and the places have always been difficult to harmonize. The quasi materiality of the risen body, the unforetold and unexpected event of his bodily presence, the tardiness of recognition all show us that we are now in a very different position with regard to historic reality from that afforded us by the record of the public ministry. Everything is hazy, falsetto, and at every point of course profoundly different from the kind of evidence that modern coroners or medical boards might furnish. For this reason alone, belief in the resurrection must forever remain a matter of faith or subjective conviction, and involve more or less of a *salto mortale* for the modern and especially for the scientific mind, and in view of the stupendous nature of the fact assumed it must always remain more or less incredible, and for every one who accepts it there will forever be a real, though perhaps unconscious handicap on the energy of conviction. That the disciples and immediate friends of Jesus were convinced that they had seen his resurrected personality in some form and that this was a source of great reassurance and one of the chief bases of their preaching, and gave it its chief momentum, there can be no doubt. It is, however, now quite competent to inquire upon what evidence this belief rested.

A. Elemental as are the considerations involved it will remove a great burden and reproach from modern Christian belief for some to recognize fully and honestly at the outset that the resurrection cannot mean for us to-day the reversal of all the processes of physical death. It is a suicidal materialization of religious faith to hold to all that this implies. Death means, according to various legal and physiological tests and criteria, the cessation of respiration and therefore of oxygena-

tion of the blood, and the complete arrest of the action of the heart. The nervous system, it is now believed, dies first: the cerebral preceding the sympathetic. Soon the glands and other tissues follow in an order, determined by the nature of the morbid or lethal process. Products of decomposition accumulate, the blood coagulates from half an hour to twelve, depending upon the degree of exhaustion: the muscle plasm hardens to cadaveric rigidity; and with the gradual relaxation of *rigor mortis* putrefaction sets in. Before the cooling of the body begins, very subtle changes occur in its protoplasm which is changed from an active state with many elements of its composition unknown to a dead state, the constitution of which is now pretty well made out. Recent neurological studies indicate momentous changes in the brain neurons. Reanimation of a grave corpse after three days would mean inversion of all this sequence of processes after they had advanced so far that death by every criterion must be pronounced complete. Modern definitions and conceptions of death make the idea of revivification indefinitely harder than it was before the development of modern physiology, especially its chemical section. Moreover the modern mind must ask what was the condition of the wounds, whether they had cicatrized, whether the spilled blood had been restored or there was still extreme anemia. Was the weight the same? From the record it appears that the risen body was no longer without spot or blemish, but was at least scarred. It is no pedantic intrusion but an irresistible query of every judicial and especially scientific mind to dwell upon the many details of this order, which are here suggested,

It is no revival of the Humean argument to urge that from the nature of both testimony and of miracle, such an one can never be really proven, to say that the belief in any such series of reversals of the order of nature must forever and by every mind, no matter how devout or impassioned the instinct of its belief, remain more or less superficially forced or formal. Pervid affirmation of such a faith is an act of will rather than of deliberate, deep, and poised intellectual conviction. Its satisfaction and even sublimity is psychologically akin to the *credo quia absurdum* by which practical faith sometimes loves to stop the mouth of reason. It is like the declaration of Mahomet's successor at the door of his tent soon after he breathed his last, that he was not dead, or the threat which his visors enforced to decapitate all who dared assert that the prophet was no more. Plato's imagination was crea-

tive and vivid enough to describe the reversal of the processes in nature's cycle when the universe in all its processes turned about with a shock and revolved the other way, when old men rose out of the dust gradually, grew young, and entered again their mothers' wombs; but Pliny's philosophy made it a matter of consolation to mourning friends that even the gods could never raise the dead. That faith in the resurrection has often taken this monstrous form in crass and literal minds there can be no doubt, but a large view of all the Paulean passages indicate that the sense in which he made the Christian faith vain if Christ be not raised is not this. Such a fact so unique and out of relations with everything we know must forever be no less antagonistic to the higher activities of faith than it is stultifying to science and common sense. Even if it has ever had any value, this has ceased to exist for modern culture, and it is not only no longer needed but is a grievous encumbrance to modern apologetics. An intelligent man who affirms that he holds this belief can hardly know what *intellectual* honesty means.

B. Another view not unknown in earlier times but favored by several of the most careful and conscientious modern christologists is that Jesus was not entirely dead, but was revived from some form of trance. Paulus suggested that the sponge applied to his lips may have contained a narcotic and intimates that when he bowed his head upon the cross, he fainted. Yung inclined to the same view. Schleiermacher favored the hypothesis of apparent death. Brehmke thought he revived and lived and worked for a quarter of a century later in obscurity. Pilate seemed astonished that he died so soon. Hengst imagines that he may have revived and prayed among the hills, where he led perhaps a kind of prolonged Mahatma life. His own rare healing powers, it has been said, may have been exercised upon himself. He was vigorous, endowed with rare vitality and in the prime of life, so that he naturally would not succumb easily to death. Moreover the body was perfumed, perhaps bandaged and possibly embalmed and treated according to the surgical arts of his day. Else why the 100 pounds of myrrh and aloes in John xix, 39. One tradition reports that his feet were not nailed, that the spear wound was low in the thigh, and therefore not necessarily fatal. Medical records, to say nothing of the traditions of Catholic saints, report cases of actual crucifixion, where both hands and feet were pierced from which recovery has been made. Modern resuscitation methods, particularly in the case of drowning and

the records of the gallows, present authentic cases where life has thus been snatched from the very jaws of death in rare ways. The purity and sinlessness of his life, it has been said, gave augmented vitality, and perhaps the earthquake shocked him back to life.

The history of human hibernation is a strange chapter but the reality of its main facts may be said to have now been proven. Respiration and heart action can be almost incredibly reduced beyond the reach of the usual methods of detection and subjects can be actually buried and aroused again after days and perhaps weeks of a high degree of suspended animation. In these cases the processes of dissolution, of course, do not supervene and there is no death, one factor in the very conception of which is the impossibility of restoration to life. Those familiar with the strange facts of modern hypnotism, which are accepted by the most conservative psychologists, know how far death is sometimes thus simulated by its brother sleep. Even the uncontrolled sporadic cases, where hysterical subjects have in imagination passed into and long remained in unconsciousness and perhaps cataleptic states, must be weighed if this view is to be seriously dealt with. The soul in this state may in vision have visited the abode of the dead and returned with strange and vivid dream pictures. All these phenomena are now more or less understood.

If this be the hypothesis here we could partially explain the changed appearance of Jesus after this exhausting experience. We should expect him to be feeble, anemic, pallid, hungered, a trifle dazed and mysterious to himself and others, instinctively seeking seclusion and rest for restoration. He would naturally, even though with great effort, endeavor to see his friends again, even though the effort might prove exhaustive beyond the power of nursing, so that he must lapse back again to death indeed. To intimate, as has been done, that death was simulated in order to be escaped is an extreme hypothesis which has little positive evidence to countenance it. It would, however, only be conformable to the promptings of the instinct of love to appear as well and strong as one's condition allowed in the presence of one's friends.

If any such hypothesis as this be accepted, it must not be forgotten that it is not resurrection in the sense which the church held of old. It would remain an illustration of marvellous vitality, but the superstitions of death have always been such that those, who it is believed thus broke away from its close embrace, have always been objects of wonder-

ing awe and curiosity rather more than of love, devotion and service. Such an event must be regarded as more or less accidental, as suggesting at best a being endowed with supernormal viability, able to resist causes of death which would effectively overwhelm most men, but it would not add any sanction of divine authority, would give no warrant of a general and real resurrection of others, but would distinctly rob the death on the cross of much of its impressiveness and power. It would be no real confirmation of any interpretation of his own prophetic intimations and is not a factor in the rôle of the Jewish Messiah. While this view, therefore, is not impossible and can never be absolutely disproven or proven, it has against it an enormous improbability, and has little power of edification.

C. From the early times of Celsus down to Weisse and even Keim, many have held the *parusia* to be of some higher and more subtletized form of corporeity. Each of the Christophanies is held to imply some degree of materialization. There was a real presence as the objective cause and at the *pointe de repère* of the vision. From the standpoint of this theory, which Venturini has elaborately exploited, the physical body is not needed and the grave might have remained either tenanted or empty. It is a heavenly or glorified body or form of objectivity, a soul disembodied "stooping to visibility," or in plain terms a ghost or spectre. This theory is not without consonance with some facts of the record like the passing through closed doors, sudden appearance and vanishing, appearances now in Jerusalem, now in Galilee, difficulty of recognition, etc., but hardly comports with eating, touching, speaking as Jesus did. Moreover it is a little easier since the work of the Psychic Research Society, and the hundreds of cases which Mr. Gurney has collected, to believe in the possibility of wraiths. Mr. Robert Dale Owen long ago described even the feel of ghost's clothes, which slowly melted away in his grasp. We find a few cases too of sensations of the breath of spirits from the graveyard upon the cheek. Eating, however, suggests a kind of reality more nearly approximating matter, while the ascension is hardly more difficult on this theory than levitation. What became of the *sarcous* body and why need it have been removed at all?

To many this view may have a certain new interest from the recent studies of apparitions which have convinced many cultivated minds that there may be phantasms of the living or dead, which are invested with some form or degree of objectivity and are not wholly subject to the

laws of matter. This view has been developed, especially in England, by a group of bold spirits whose views are far more definite than those of Seydel, Scholten, or Ewald, who held it and have made a future life seem more real and true to minds that claim no so-called "mediumistic" power, or indeed any supernormal faculty. A laborious colligation of experiences have erected what is thought to be a formidable presupposition in favor of a continuance of individual existence at least in an attenuated form, and we have been exhorted by Mr. Myers, the corypheus of this school, to have more resolute credulity toward the accumulated and systematically presented new evidence of a physical basis of immortality. Appeal is also made to a supernormal faculty of receiving personality suggestions, to some kind of rare sensitiveness which Mr. Podmore says must be either a vestige of some function of primordial organism or else a bud of some powers later to be unfolded. This faculty, we are told, may in some way, difficult to characterize because of the absence of mundane analogies, become exalted to a hallucinatory state, which, however, has a veridical and objective cause. This latter is not a common ghost nor an astral body, and indeed no physical process at present known can adequately explain its mode of action. Yet in some way the faltering soul of man may be thus brought into rapport with forms of individual existence which have survived death in a way which gives faith in a future life by actual communication with departed acquaintances, and which affords some kind of answer to the long and agonizing cry of the soul— if a man die shall he live again? If a future life has a high degree of reality and retains any reminiscence of its earthly experience, the presumption that it may find some mode of revealing its continued existence, weights every die, and where the air is murky with superstition and there are fabulists and those who strive and hunger for this evidence, it seems strange that at the very least in a few unique cases, this passion should not be gratified. The fact that this theory seems to modern science stupendous and revolutionary, that it is hardly susceptible of physical expression but may be wrought out in poetic metaphors and has never attained anything like true demonstration.

That those who have struggled to make it apprehensible by theories of ether, neuricity, eccentric projection toward some kind of objective correspondence, and even the wild intemperance of spiritualists of every age and clime, should not blind us to the possibility of some such truth

in a world as yet but imperfectly realized and where science is still in its infancy and man himself is only in an active developmental stage. For those whose minds are not encumbered by critical methods, some such hypothesis can readily be developed which affords a satisfaction very great and tranquilizing, and it seems indefinitely easier to explain the whole class of phenomena by it than to tediously enter upon the indirect long circuit methods of critical testing and historic research, which is now demanded in this field.

On the other hand there are some things which it is a virtue to doubt, and superstition has no ranker, grosser forms than those due to the attempts long ago described by Kant to explain the dreams of visionnaires by those of metaphysicians while it is impossible to enforce temperance of thought upon this subject in the popular religious mind, and while it would be the labors of Hercules over again to drive out from their cover in the many and vast fields of hypotheses opened by modern science all the traces and forms of these survivals, it is nevertheless necessary to say in no less unequivocal terms that here again the probabilities against a single isolated occurrence of this nature seem to the natural mind almost overwhelming. It is not at all impossible, from the fear ascribed to those who saw the risen Jesus and from the characteristics implied in these Christophanies, that some of the cited witnesses honestly believed that they saw his ghost. Indeed when we consider the frequency of such experiences, especially in the cases of great and beloved leaders, and the almost universal prevalence of a belief in spectres as objectively real, brought out in so admirable and scholarly a manner by H. Weil, it is highly probable that this was one of the important factors in the great and sudden change from extreme depression to extreme joy and confidence. Yet still more we must incline to the view that this interpretation of real experiences is more plausible for earlier appearances than the theory of subjective even if revelatory vision. To the belief that the ghost of Jesus had actually reappeared, Christianity probably owes perhaps no small part of its initial momentum. A credited apparition may have had something to do in giving to the early Christians and through them to the world, their God. Moreover even if we hold them to have been in error in this regard, we must hasten to say somewhat as Fairbairn said of the vision theory, that at least it worked supremely well. Men may have once believed on superstitious grounds on him, whom later the world is coming to adore as divine in a higher

sense than they could comprehend, so that we have here only an extreme illustration of the fact that from age to age the basis and emphasis of belief in Jesus has changed, and that he has always occupied in the souls of his disciples the highest place which every stage of culture could provide. That even superstition was thus made to praise him is no derogation of his merit, no stigma upon his character, and should cause no abatement of our own trust in him. It was not only necessary but inevitable that he should impress those about him with a sense of a reality and validity in his own teachings, sentiments and character that far transcended their narrow comprehension. One form which the conceptions of great men then took was that of the superiority, actuality, persistence, and power of survival generally of their souls. The ideal thus became real, the transcendent imminent, and the plastic, receptive power of mind, sense and feeling passed over into the passionate enthusiasm of will. The very energy of being which to-day makes a popular hero, a leader and compeller of souls, was then wont to be appreciated and interpreted as control of the powers beyond the grave. History cannot be written without recognizing at some of the most important crises in human events the power of belief in even the veridical nature of dreams.

While, therefore, for us the spectre theory has little of the power which Paul ascribes to the resurrection, it was by no means entirely devoid of it in ancient days. It is perhaps also well to reflect that for those who still hold any form of the hypothesis of spiritualism, credence in the resurrection of Jesus is an easy matter, for it becomes only a highly specialized and perhaps uniquely pre-eminent case under a general law. Just as the same natural phenomena are interpreted according to radically different theories in different ages, so we have here an illustration of the progressive reconstruction of the apperception organs in man.

D. Far more current now is the vision theory which is represented in different forms by Spinoza, Strauss, Renan, Seydel, Raville, Fichte, Geiger, Noack, Gratz, and others. For some the resurrection is a specially inspired vision sent by God. Some, like Fichte, distinguish between visions that can and those that cannot be explained, or attempt psychological distinctions between imagination, abnormal ecstacy and faith: hint at the possibility of dreaming either by night or by day: distinguish between visions that are self-generated, and those due to the

contagion of numbers, visions vivid enough to cause complete belief in their objective validity and those that bring only partial conviction; expatiate on Paul's diathesis, Peter's ecstatic experience or discuss the extent to which the visionary practices, which Noack suggests even Jesus cultivated and which the montanists afterwards unfolded, prevailed in the apostolic circle before and after Jesus' death. Renan calls Mary a visionary and intimates that in her person a woman became the first missionary. There is much consensus of opinion that Paul saw visions and if he did not rest his claims to the apostolate upon them, nevertheless regarded them as in some sense a commission directly from Jesus to preach the gospel.

The discrepancy among different writers in their conception of the psychology of vision and the disparity between the different Christophanies to Paul himself, and between him and those of others, has its root perhaps in the fact of the wide variety of experiences, which the term vision is used to include. For those who are visually minded, a clear belief of thought readily takes the form of an imagery with contours and even colors. In many perfectly sane persons there are entoptic experiences of visualization that may be so entirely independent of the stream of thought as to seem objective, while in other cases they give a concreteness to the processes of ideation, almost as vivid as pictorial illustration. Life at twilight and during the night is very different from that of the clear day in this respect. In darkness thoughts create and project objects that often attain a high degree of objective reality. Fechner has well characterized the influence of the night-side of life upon human conduct, and modern psychology abounds in cases where illusions and dream experiences have become definitely incorporated into the memory continuum as actually experienced.

Moreover, intense experiences involving great emotional stress always tend to shift the boundaries between the inner and the outer. The sensorium may be anemic or congested, and the perturbation of the souls of the disciples in those days has not inaptly been compared to the resolution of the world back to some primitive cosmic state from which it slowly cooled again. Even more frequent than visual is auditory hallucination and both may be entirely consonant with mental sanity and normality in other respects. Seeing visions has in many persons and in many ages been a passion and evolved a very definite cult. Many theories of inspiration have had recourse to vision theories. In

primitive ages there is no such distinction between illusion and perception as we often find in the early stages of neuro-psychic disease. Yet the old proverb that seeing is believing has a deep psychological truth. Helmholtz has well said that any illusion of sense that is persistently repeated is certain in the end to force itself upon the acceptance of the mind and with full and inexpugnable conviction. To have actually seen the risen Jesus made belief in his power over death and all that it implied irresistible, and when reenforced by all the hopes, desires and love of his friends would give this faith a momentum not inferior to the supreme cataleptic certainty of the stoics and would give their preaching the impetus of tons instead of pounds.

Mary's enthusiastic annunciation of the resurrection must have been the gladdest of all gospel good tidings. It was news that must be spread, and tongues grew aflame like Jove's chariot wheels under the impulse to spread the greatest and best news ever proclaimed. It was simply tidings of a momentous and unique message from the future home of all men, far higher and farther above all news-mongering than preaching is above gossip. Paul underwent a radical reconstruction of standpoint and life purpose under its influence, and the supreme duty of all who had been clairvoyant and clairaudent to the great parusia was to promulgate the great fact, to proclaim it from the housetop, to organize a world propaganda of it. The one great fact of the resurrection was the central event in all the universe to which everything important that had preceded led up, in which it focused, and from which all agencies for good in the world must henceforth irradiate. It made the man Jesus, the divine Christ. It gave to all his teachings a sanction direct from God. It was not only the great attest and credential, authorizing all his words and giving the most sublime possible climax to the tragedy of his life, but it marked a new era in the relations of this world to the supreme author of all being. Thus I opine it did not need, as Keim holds, any definite closing of the period of vision or any authorization to cease gazing into heaven, to recover self possession, and go to work. It was a spontaneous and inevitable passage from a state of convincing vision and passionate belief to enthusiastic will, a great psychosis under the influence of an unprecedented train of experiences and in an age dominated by psychic forces, was never and nowhere, before or since, aroused in any such kind and degree. The disciples, at least the dominant members of their group, had seen and that was enough to hence-

forth make them all missionaries, preaching that which had been actually seen and heard.

In fact, Paul's conception of Christ had very little to do with the earthly life of Jesus. So far as modern Christianity is Pauline, it is essentially unhistoric so far as both the words and the deeds of Jesus are concerned and, indeed, has little connection with the Jesus of the synoptic writers or even with the Johanne Jesus. Paul's mind was chiefly fixed upon the voluntary humiliation of the pre-existent Jesus in coming down to earth, taking on the form of man and submitting to crucifixion. By this supreme act of renunciation, obedience and love he merited and received the reward of resurrection and ascension and still greater exaltation at the Father's right hand than he had before. His daily life, walk, and example constituted an otherwise relatively insignificant episode in the transcendent being of a pre-existent and still more lofty post-existent state. Paul praises in many and diverse paradoxes the virtue of self-emptying of celestial glory and taking on the humiliation of flesh. In this sacrifice and self offering his consenting to death was involved.¹

Perhaps the world has mistaken a group of psychological experiences profound and of supreme historic significance for plain, bald, historic fact, but the mistake is of far less practical significance either way than

¹ See *Die Entstehung der Paulinischen Christologie* by Dr. M. Brückner, Strassburg, 1903, pp. 237, which expresses essentially the thought of the above paragraph and urges that Paul had from his youth a very definite idea of a supernatural Jewish Messiah and that his conversation consisted chiefly in the visual apparition of his ideal in a form so like the resurrection Jesus that the two concepts were instantly fused. At the same time his ideal was supplemented and enlarged by the kenotic idea of the episode of incarnation and higher post-ascensional glory. Thus the risen and ascended Jesus of Christendom is the highest idealization of the Jewish Messias of Paul's time which included conflict with, and victory over, demons and all the supernal powers of evil but now universalized and freed from Mosaic laws and Jewish limitation and given cosmic significance. Brückner does not state but very clearly leaves us to infer that had Paul known the historic Jesus it is doubtful if this identification with his earlier Messianic ideal would never have occurred. Thus Paul sought to convert Gentiles to the most exalted of Jewish ideals but the nature and work, which was essentially transcendental and connected with the historic Jesus only by a vision of identification later confirmed by Jewish metaphysical speculation. This noble ideal not only became an apparition but took the form of flesh and died to provide a Jewish atonement for Jewish law. This identification is the chief masterpiece of religious genius in the world, and has in many if not most respects worked supremely well, although there is as little intussusception between the historic Jesus and the racial ideal as between the parts of the image of Ezekiel's image.

has been thought. Textual criticism, laborious compilation of contemporaneous allusions, the possible discovery of new manuscripts or archeological inscriptions can never make the apologists of the historical school the chief authorities for the post mortem appearances of Jesus and their verdicts will always remain of limited effect upon the souls of believers. But if we insist that this is all at bottom psychology, we must candidly admit that we are here in the presence of soul-events, which have features that it is hard to parallel in all the records of the individual or the collective mind. Psychology with its special sections on illusions of perception, on the life of feeling and will, on the individual and the movements of groups and races of men, has yet much to learn and is still in its infancy, but it is already big with promise and potency of larger and more cogent explanations here, which so far from weakening faith will give it both a higher sanction and a larger scope with strict conformity to science.

How much of it all was due to vision and how much to other factors; whether some disciples dreamed while others thought of ghosts; especially how many parts of objective reality different individuals ascribed to their experiences, and just how Paul himself understood his own—we can never with certainty know. New books and theories in indefinite perspective will continue to trim the Christian ship by rolling the weight of one or all of these four ballast boxes to starboard or larboard, but if anywhere the frank confession of *ignoramus*, if not of *ignorabimus* is proper, it is here.

While, then, some forms of belief in the resurrection must be definitely abandoned as obstacles to faith, others, not one but several, far higher are not only possible but inevitable for every large and positive mind, instructed in the nature of the individual and racial soul. They neither can nor should yet be formulated with definiteness or finality enough to satisfy those who demand rigid dogma or apodeictic demonstration. The character and teaching of Jesus have a supreme and independent value of their own and his death will ever work its miracles of pathos. These, at least, will remain historic even if the resurrection were all dogma. If all the precious worths that have been made in the course of Christian centuries to depend upon the cruder statements of the latter as an assumed major premise for innumerable deductions be a little imperilled for a time, psychology has within itself possibilities of both re-statement of the premise and re-validation of all the values hitherto undreamed of, and of thus re-Christianizing Christianity.

While the Jesus of what we may call the resurrection dispensation is undergoing reconstruction, the historic Jesus remains as, at least, the super man, prophetic of what the members of our race may attain if it ever come to its full maturity, the first fruits not of those that die but the first and ideal representation of those who are to live in the larger and more glorious future that, if evolution is true, awaits it. If the resurrection Jesus is made so material and historic as to eclipse the spiritual Jesus, if he is made so local and temporal as to be a mere idol of the ever living and ever present Emmanuel, there is religious decadence and not progress. If He whom Paul saw as a vision the psychologist of the near future shall find to be more a creation than a mere object of faith, most sacred because the first, highest and purest production of the paraclete in the soul of man; if the risen Jesus was projected by this supreme muse solely to be as well as to make the pledge of its abiding presence guiding into all truth, then it would be revealed to our distracted age as the comforter indeed. For then not only the growing strain which the parusia put upon the Christian thought of our day would be wondrously eased and harmony in the record established, but the work of the Holy Spirit would be worthily inaugurated in the world as the great spiritualizer of life, and the Jesus of the resurrection as completely and entirely its first fruits would shine forth with a new light and with infinite promise and potency for all who strive to attain true sonship of the Father.

This imperfect and sketchy conflation of psychological view-points at least suggests something above textual or historical criticism and shows that these cannot be finalities. The latter have clearly shown that even the authors of our four gospels conflated and compiled, especially the unknown writer of John, and reverently sought to explain in the light of all the available sources, traditional and written, what Jesus meant quite as much if not more than what he literally said and did. Psychological criticism accepts all the records, somewhat as geology bases upon all outcrops, cuts, mines, etc., and evolves from a compilation of all data the sequence of strata and the development of living forms by collating all fossil with their most cognate living forms. So psychology demands a wider purview than the New Testament and the local and temporal events associated with it, and seeks to lay the foundations of a larger faith that rest on all that we know to-day of the facts and laws of nature and still more of the soul of man.

FAITH.

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If the playing of a capital rôle in the life of many a great leader of men is a sufficient reason for attracting attention, few human experiences have a better right to a careful investigation than the one called Faith.

It is in religious life and chiefly in Christianity that Faith comes to prominence, but it would be a mistake to suppose that it is found nowhere else. I shall, however, limit myself in this paper to the consideration of religious Faith.

The deepest difference between Greek ethics and the religious ethics of Christianity lies not in any disagreement as to the end of conduct, but in the means advocated to reach it. Socrates, Aristotle and their followers pointed to knowledge, the Christians to Faith and Love, as the condition of the fulfillment of the ethical ideal. The introduction of Faith by Christianity as a factor in the conduct of life was an innovation full of significance.

The Christian evangelists and, after them, their followers down to our own day, have made amazing claims for Faith. The Gospels affirm that Faith in Christ is Salvation: "He that believeth [hath Faith] in the Son hath everlasting life." The great Protestant creeds are united in assuring us that "we are justified by Faith alone, without any manner of virtue, or goodness of our own." If the Roman Church does not make of Faith the only condition of salvation, it looks upon it as at least necessary to it. From generation to generation this mighty word has filled the mouths of Christians; about this word endless discussions have raged, councils have decreed, creeds have been built up. Recently, it, or its equivalent, has become the watchword of the aggressive and vital movements known as Christian Science and

¹In my 'Studies in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena,' I have already dealt with the problem of Faith. See, in particular, pp. 337-349 and 357-364. *Amer. Jour. of Psy.* (1896), Vol. 7, No. 3.

Mind Cure. What psychological reality does this potent word designate?

There are people who find it more to their taste to dismiss this question with the significant word bosh! than to provisionally admit that the word Faith may cover something worth investigating. They prefer to believe that, in this case, it is all smoke and no fire. The Theologians are of another mind. They have unbounded reverence for whatever that puzzling term may represent but hardly more knowledge than the former. The obvious inadequacy, and the discrepancies of the utterances of theologians and philosophers of religion seem to indicate that they are not prepared to deal with this problem. Here are a few samples of the definitions of Faith to be found in valued treatises:—"The intuition of eternal verities;" "The organ for the supernatural and divine;" "A conviction of truth founded on testimony" (Hodge's *Systematic Theology*); "Bewusstsein der Versöhnung mit Gott" (J. E. Edman); Pope Leo XIII sent forth the following statement in his encyclical letter on the Unity of the Church, Faith is "that supernatural virtue by which through the help of God and through the assistance of His Grace, we believe what He has revealed to be true, not on account of the intrinsic truth perceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God Himself. (Conc. Vat. Sess iii, Cap 3). Anselm had said, "The mere idea does not make faith, although this cannot exist without an object; in order to true faith the right tendency of the will must be added, which grace imparts." The Ritschlian theologians use *Glaube* as synonymous with religious knowledge accepted by the pious soul. Here is, as a last instance, Professor Santayana's conception: "Faith and the higher reason of the metaphysicians are therefore forms of the imagination believed to be avenues to truth, not because their necessary correspondence to truth can be demonstrated, . . . but because a man dwelling on those intuitions is conscious of a certain moral transformation, of a certain warmth and energy of life." ("Poetry and Religion" p. 8.)

One of the results of the analysis which follows might almost be anticipated by a consideration of these and other definitions. If they fail to agree, it is because in some of them Faith is identified with a particularly firm belief, while in others a special attitude, a disposition, of the will towards its object is made the essence of Faith. That attitude is frequently described as one of self-commitment, of abandonment, and

therefore also of complete trust. The discrepancies rest, then, in part at least, upon a failure clearly to discriminate between what I shall call the *Faith-state*, a state involving the whole man, as emotions do, and the *Faith-belief* which is the result of the particular modification worked by the Faith-state upon the intellectual life. The characterization of Faith by means of its intellectual peculiarities only is a proceeding similar to making exclusive use of hallucinations in the description of fever although they are only one of the more superficial manifestations of that disorder.

It must be admitted that the use of the term Faith as involving merely, or essentially, a conviction of the truth of a Revelation or of other propositions, tends to disapper. Even the benighted students of a soulless theology might, it seems, refuse to admit that the wonders of Faith involve, on the part of the subject, nothing more than intellectual adhesion, however firm, to a system of dogmatic propositions.

My task in this paper will be to analyze the Faith experience, to single out its essential features, to compare it with related experiences and to account for its particular results. It will be shown that the Faith-state is a particular emotion (probably identical with asexual love), specifically distinct from other emotions or sentiments, but entirely like them in what is distinctive of that class of experience. From the point of view of development, Faith will appear as an *inner adaptation* by which is established a living sense of relationship, nay, a union, between the individual and ideal powers. By this inner adaptation man enters, to some extent, into possession of the virtues he conceives to inhere in the object of his Faith and which he needs in order to satisfy his higher cravings.

In a study of this sort the psychologist is limited for his data to records found in biographies, or secured by himself from living persons who have had the Faith-experience. He is to interpret them in the light of self-introspection and with the help of psychological science. Many records would not be needed, one would do if only it was exact and complete. But inasmuch as the investigator cannot pretend to know at the start what the experience consists in and also because he can hardly hope to secure perfect accounts, he must reach his end by means of the collation of as large a number of such cases as he may bring together.

I shall first put before the reader a few typical instances of Faith

that he may, in some measure at least, judge for himself of the legitimacy of my conclusions. In order to understand aright these records we shall have at times to penetrate beyond what is actually stated to that which is only implied because the traditional emphasis placed on assurance and the greater clearness of the intellectual contents of consciousness tend to obscure the deepest aspects of Faith.

I. At the age of 35 John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, a man in whose sincerity we may have confidence, after having served zealously and successfully in the ministry of the English Church for ten years and attained a high degree of holiness, repeatedly declares that he is not a Christian. For reasons only obscurely stated, he had come to the conclusion that to be a Christian was to be more than what he was: "But does all this give a claim to the holy, heavenly, divine, character of a Christian? By no means. . . . All these things, though when ennobled by faith in Christ, they are holy and just and good, yet without it are 'dung and dross.'" He concludes that he has "fallen short of the glory of God," and sets about finding the Faith which he lacks. A long period of increasing self-abasement follows, which, his biographer tells us, "must ever precede true, living Faith in the Son of God." The sense of self-righteousness slowly dies, and he is brought to the point where complete self-surrender becomes possible. Then, suddenly, at a meeting, while some one was reading the famous preface of Luther to the Epistle to the Romans, "about a quarter before nine, while he was describing the change which God works in the heart, through faith in Christ, I felt my heart strangely warmed, I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for Salvation; and an assurance was given me that He had taken away my sins, even mine, and had saved me from the law of sin and death." Notice the use of the word *feel* and observe that the transformation was no more due to intellectual information than a sudden turn in the condition of a patient depends upon the medical theories which he holds. An interesting remark may be made here concerning the influence of suggestion: it is as the change worked by God in the heart is being described that the very same transformation takes place in Wesley.¹ There are in this account five points to be kept in mind for comparison with the illustrations to follow. (1) Before the

¹This account is taken almost verbatim from my "Studies in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena, *Amer. Jour. of Psychology*, 7, p. 340. The quotations are from Wesley's Journal in Moore's "Biography of Wesley."

advent of Faith, Wesley was a righteous man—a perfect man, if judged by the ordinary Canons of Christian Morality. (2) He was not in doubt as to the truth of the Christian Doctrines; he had, as he puts it, “a rational conviction” of their truth. (3) Nevertheless, he was not satisfied; he yearned for a higher state. (4) The transformation brought him a joy and a vigor before unknown. (5) It was not transient, but continued, apparently, throughout his life.

II. The celebrated sacred orator, Lacordaire, described Faith as a readjustment of ideas, the sudden formation of a synthesis, an enlightenment. He makes it clear, however, that the transformation involved much more than that.

When a very young man, already singled out for pre-eminent distinction as a barrister, he wrote to a friend, “I experience each day that everything is vain. I do not wish my heart to wallow in that heap of mud.” This was not the unrestrained utterance of a moment of accidental gloom, it was rather a deliberate appreciation of ordinary life. A few years later he renounced the world, entered St. Sulpice and came to know Faith. Here is how he described its advent. “It is a sublime moment the one in which the final flash of light enters the soul and binds to a common centre the truths which had remained disconnected. There is always such an insuperable distance between the moment following and the moment preceding the flash, between what one was before and what one is after, that the word *grace* has been invented to express this magical stroke of lightning from Above.” Many years after, on his death bed, he said, speaking of the same moment, “He who has not had that experience has not known human life.”¹

III. This third illustration is taken from a pamphlet entitled “A Scientist’s Confession of Faith.” The author, a woman who had had the advantage of the higher education in the United States and in Germany, was, at the time of her ‘new birth,’ teaching botany in one of our leading universities.

Faith, or the object of Faith, is set forth by her as a source of blissful power. It provided her with what she most craved, the loving support of a constant and ideal friend, as may be gathered from this extract from one of her letters. “I wish I could give you some of that rich bless-

¹ From “Le R. P. Lacordaire par Le R. P. Checarne,” Paris, Paussegue and fils, 1866.

ing that makes my cup running over, the blessing of God's loving presence with me, the consciousness of it when I lie down to sleep and when I wake. A few years ago it was all incredible to me [she had had very definite agnostic and partly materialistic opinions]. When I look back to those years it seems to me no greater miracle ever happened than the change in my heart." She chanced one day, as her moral loneliness was weighing upon her, to enter a church. "The quiet restful place, the singing of the old hymns and the friendly greetings" pleased her and she came again. She wished that she might have "a pastor," although she recognized that her views of religion cut her off from that comfort. Some one greeted her one Sunday, as she was leaving church, with the words, "I think you are a stranger here?" This remark sank deep in a heart yearning for sympathy and fellowship. "All the afternoon I struggled over the conviction that I really was a stranger in the fold where I had so long slipped in and out." When the crisis came, it took the form of an unreserved commitment of herself to God. She was willing to do anything, go anywhere "under any conditions, only that Thou wilt never leave me, nor let me wander from Thee again." "The consciousness of the presence of the Father, of the touch of his hand, was as strong and real to me as that of any bodily presence."¹ "Faith, love, trust, hope, immortality, everything that I had spent so many years schooling myself against . . . came to me now in their true beauty and worth as my own birthright."²

What rôle did the intellect play in this case? No other rôle at bottom, than in the preceding instances. She believed that she had done no violence to her intelligence. The attentive reader of her Confession will, however, be able to follow the gradual side-tracking of intellectual arguments by the overpowering desire for what Christianity offered her. I know of no documents setting forth more clearly and more interestingly the struggle of desire against the intellect and the final subjection of the latter. But we are concerned only indirectly with that question.

IV. In this, as in instance number two, the Faith-belief comes to the fore. It is the experience of a theological student, twenty years old,

¹One cannot refrain from establishing a comparison between this surrender to the Divine Lover and the more common surrender of a woman to a human lover.

²"A Scientist's Confession of Faith," published by the Baptist Publication Society.

now a Christian minister. In the third year of his course he heard an essay on the Fourth Gospel in which the Johanne authorship was rejected. Years after the student still remembered the last sentence. "The Fourth Gospel is a great epic." I quote, "By this essay the floodgates were open upon me. . . . For three days the wild tide swept and surged past and around me. I felt I must give up the Gospel of John and, if so, my Christian faith also; and with this the universe would go. . . . I yielded myself to what I conceived to be Higher Guidance. . . . At the close of the period I found myself at one with all things. Peace, that was all. . . . When I looked at myself, I found that I was standing on the old ground, but cherishing a toleration of doubt and a sincere sympathy with doubters such as I had never known before. . . . I could take the logical standpoint and could see that they were quite convincing [the arguments], and yet my inward peace of belief was in no way disturbed."¹

What had taken place? Why this new and very particular kind of assurance? The Faith-state had supervened. The impossibility of being moved by arguments, recognized as logically valid, indicates a radical change in the relation existing between certain groups of ideas and the dominant Self. We may infer from the following passage that a similar psychic chemistry took place in Jonathan Edwards at some time during his early life. "From my childhood up, my mind has been full of objections against the doctrine of God's sovereignty in choosing whom He would to eternal life, and rejecting whom He pleased; leaving them eternally to perish and be everlastingly tormented in hell. It used to appear like a horrible doctrine to me. But I remember the time very well when I seemed to be convinced and fully satisfied as to this Sovereignty of God, and His justice in thus eternally disposing of men, according to His Sovereign pleasure. *But never could give an account how, or by what means I was thus convinced*, not in the least imagining at the time, nor a long time after, that there was any extraordinary influence of God's Spirit in it: but only that now I saw further, and my reason apprehended the justice and reasonableness of it."²

V. The preceding instances all describe the *advent* of Faith. It appears in them in its acute stage. Here is, as a last illustration, one

¹ Communicated by Professor William H. Burnham.

² From the "Conversion" of President Edwards. The italics are mine.

of Faith when it has become a mood, a chronic condition. To convey its full meaning the record would have to be given whole, as published in the *Monist* for July, 1901, pp. 558-560. I have space here for a part of it only.

The writer is a woman in the prime of life, living with her husband and one child on a "run down plantation," fighting poverty. The object of her Faith is not a personal God, but Nature or rather Life. "The most devotional life to me is to seek for the deeper meaning in every experience, to find the message in everything. . . . A mind continually open and ready to understand; the faith that all that comes to me is mine, to be understood and used; the belief that I am growing every day by being alive to Truth, these have superseded the childish gropings called prayer. I do not ask for anything because I know all I need will come to me. All the strength, power and wisdom of my life is within; growth is the life of my being. . . . I believe that all is Good—that is, all is ultimately Good. . . . Those for whom there is no religion but Truth, who are willing to receive any lesson unflinchingly in the faith that all is well, may be called the elect; they 'walk with God,' to use the traditional expression.

"I cannot answer your question concerning the most characteristically religious experience, as I know of no 'religious practice' but living—every-day living. The time of my life when I most fully realized that all is good was some months ago when death came for my beautiful, radiant, little daughter, the soul of my life and the joy of my heart. I knew all must be well on the 'other side' or she would not go there; that infinite goodness encompassed us both. I did not pray for her to be spared; it was better for her to go or she would have stayed with me. I have not prayed for years for I have no need to. Perhaps my nearest approach to religious experience was when I first realized that I was free, free from creed and doctrine and form and cant; free to grow and be all that is in my nature. Hardly a day passes that I do not think of this and feel happy.

"So vital is my mental life . . . that I cannot conceive of losing my identity. . . . I do not fear death. Where my child is gone, I believe I will go some time; my love tells me this. But if I should learn after a while that it cannot be, then I will know that it is better otherwise: a belief in immortality is not necessary to my happiness. . . . I trust the laws that govern my destiny."

“The view from my window, as I write, of fields and trees and sunshine, upturned soil that will soon give us another lesson in growth, thrills me with joy, so does a new thought, for instance, the consciousness that I am alive and growing.”

Other illustrations of the Faith-state and of the Faith-belief will be found in Professor Wm. James' “Varieties of Religious Experience,” in Professor Flournoy's “Observations” (Case III) in the *Annales de Psychologies*, Vol. 2, and in my papers on Mysticism,¹ but the above instances may be sufficient to give the meaning of the experience with which we are dealing. It will at any rate be evident that it cannot be adequately described as a belief, not even though one should insist upon its peculiar quality and the firmness with which it is held. The core of the Faith-state is a particular attitude and an increased efficiency of the will in consequence of which an ideal of life becomes realizable. It is a constructive response to a need; a specific emotion of the sthenic type, subserving, as emotions do, a particular end.²

Let us now, after this preliminary characterization of Faith, enter into a more detailed account of its antecedents, of its nature and of its effects.

Faith is apparently always preceded by a period, at times very long, of self-dissatisfaction causally related to a more or less enlightened yearning for an improved ‘spiritual’ condition. This is at any rate true of all the cases which have come to my notice. The instances here cited will serve to illustrate this fact. This prodromal stage is, doubtless, highly significant. It should not be identified with the depression often found to precede disease. Some persons might be tempted to conclude from the gloom and the aboulia preceding certain outbreaks of pathological love or of other more or less abnormal passions and of certain diseases, that the depression of the pre-Faith period is symptomatic of a coming break down and that, therefore, Faith is of the nature of a disease. This view would overlook an essential difference. The incubation period of Faith distinguishes itself clearly from any other prodromal period which might be correctly considered as the mark of disintegration by the fact that it is correlated

¹ *Revue Philosophique*, July and November, 1902.

² It may not be useless to remark, for the benefit of the reader not versed in technical psychology, that *emotion* is not synonymous with mere *excitement*.

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with a felt discrepancy between one's actual condition and another one considered superior. The dejection of the pre-Faith period is due to an inner warfare waged in the interest of a higher, and so far unattainable, mode of life, and the advent of Faith marks the psycho-physiological ascent to the desired plane. Depression and aboulia are then replaced by a pleasurable state varying in intensity from calm satisfaction to exuberant joy, and by a steadiness and efficiency of purpose in striking contrast with the preceding impotency of the will. The appearance of joy and activity is, of course, not to be considered as in itself distinctive of Faith. Joy and unusual activity may accompany a great many other psychic changes, for instance the exaltation phase of Circular Insanity. It is by the kind of tendencies and desires which it favors that Faith differentiates itself from other joyous states of increased motor activity. For, whereas the exaltation period of *Folie circulaire* does not transcend in the quality of its deeds the normal period, but is, instead, usually marked by a lower morality, the activity of Faith is in the service of a higher purpose, the purpose which, when unrealized, caused the prodromal depression. In the case of the theological student (IV) the advent of Faith meant the reenthronement, thanks to a very peculiar dynamic rearrangement, of those ethico-religious principles which alone made life worth living for him.

An affecto-motor change like the one with which we are dealing necessarily involves modifications in the intellectual life. It suffers (1) a decrease in extensity and (2) an increase in intensity. The narrowing of cognition and of ratiocination naturally follows upon the supremacy gained by a particular group of tendencies and desires: the ideas irrelevant to them tend to be thrown out of the train of mental connections. The increased intensity is, in part, due to the mental concentration just mentioned and, in part, to the general increase in psycho-physiological activity coming with the readjustment of forces. It bears chiefly, of course, upon those tendencies and ideas which have gained the ascendancy. This double result accounts for the surprising confidence felt in certain propositions in the face of logically valid arguments and also for the increased effectiveness of the ideas connected with the triumphant impulses and aspirations.

A reduction in the breadth of the mental life conjoined with an increase in its intensity are, from the dynamic point of view, the most important characteristics of the Faith-state. It means greater suggestibility to the circle of ideas the subject is intent upon realizing, and de-

liverance, if not from the presence, at least from the power, of those other tendential ideas against which he has been struggling.

The wonderful vitalizing effect of Faith is not, as many suppose, its exclusive property. Are not these two characteristics also those of every form of sthenic emotion, of anger, of jealousy, of love? It is in the very nature of sthenic emotions to localize energy and to increase it, at least during their active phase. One of the results of this is to relieve the individual in some degree from the bondage of reason and to increase his efficiency in certain directions.

Love is not only similar to Faith in the above particulars, but also in almost every other one belonging to Faith. May not love come upon us with the suddenness of a clap of thunder: may it not transport us to the seventh heaven: may it not, as it were, pool our energies into specific channels and thus enormously reinforce our reactions to the side of life upon which love shines and at the same time make us irresponsible to the other calls of life? May it not inspire us with a non-rational, boundless, confidence in the object of our love and in whatever notion may, in our mind, be attached to it? Observe also that love, like Faith, needs in order to break out but the slightest outward incentive or possibly none at all. Dante's spiritual flame was self generated and nurtured from within. The child, seven years old, barely glimpsed at when he himself was nine, was not as much to his love as the match to the explosive magazine. Love and Faith may burst out of the heart of man as spontaneously as out of the chrysalis comes the butterfly. Both are processes of inner growth, constructive responses to inward needs, sustaining only mediate relations to the outside world.

When Faith is once recognized for what it is—a specific emotion, identical with every other emotion in that which makes the class—many of the vexed questions connected with it become susceptible of a relatively easy solution. What is known of emotions in general need only be applied to Faith. The time honored puzzle of the relation of belief to Faith cannot, for instance, be solved until one considers it as an instance of the relation of belief to emotion in general. It is a difficult problem belonging not to the theologian as such but to the psychologist. As this is not the place for a full discussion of it, I shall content myself with a statement of the facts observable in the experience with which we are dealing.

1. The beliefs, *i. e.*, the ideas entertained and accepted, at the ad-

vent of Faith, vary very widely. They may be Christian, Buddhistic, Theistic and even Atheistic. The only necessary condition seems to be a particular intense desire for just such a life as becomes possible with it. The conceptual accompaniment of the emotion may therefore be anything whatsoever, provided it be thought by the subject consonant with his ideal. Similarly, and for the same reason, love may be called forth by any woman whatsoever, but never without the presence of those particular needs which find their satisfaction in love. A corresponding remark could also be made with reference to other emotions.

2. The facts show conclusively that the acceptance of those particular ideas supposed to be the prerequisite of Christian Faith, does not alone and in itself bring it into existence. The correct Christian beliefs are very frequently entertained long *before* Faith comes (J. Edwards, Wesley, etc.,) and they are not infrequently absent until *after* the advent of Faith. The corresponding remark is true of love; the recognition of the loveliness of a woman, for instance, does not necessarily bring love in its wake.

3. But, and this is one of the important points of the psychology of emotion to be borne in mind in a study of Faith, the ideas which are thought by the subject to be the cause or the condition of the emotion—whether they be so or not does not matter—receive, by its presence, an unusual vigor and effectiveness. Previously these ideas might have been mere *objects of knowledge*, unable to maintain themselves in consciousness against antagonistic ideas and therefore exercising but a trifling influence over conduct. Now, they have become *objects of Faith*—Faith-beliefs—and are thereby firmly established in consciousness. They are in addition more or less independent of reason and, so far, unimpeachable in logic. *It is Faith which invests the accepted ideas with the particular quality, the saving power, characteristic of the Faith-beliefs.* The Faith-assurance in the truth of certain propositions or system of opinion—in the truth of the Christian Revelation, for instance—is therefore non-rational. It may or it may not chance to be in agreement with the conclusions of reason. The Faith-belief is primarily the child of need, of desire, of the will to ascend. Efforts to verify its claims may either be made or not made. When made, their success will vary according to the temperament of the person. Rational conclusions may not be attainable because antagonistic streams of ideas may be excluded by the obstinate presence in the mind of what is relevant to Faith, or,

if logical truth be discovered, it may have no power over conduct and leave the Faith-belief in possession of the will, as in one of the cases instanced. These statements are as true of any other emotional belief as they are of the Faith-belief.

Certain remarks had better be made at this point to prevent possible misunderstandings and useless objections.

People in the habit of using Faith as meaning belief, acceptance of religious knowledge, may object to the sense in which it is used in this essay. The points at issue between these persons and myself are, (1) whether there is such an experience as the one I have described, (2) whether there is not found in that experience a particular kind of non-rational belief, (3) whether that particular kind of belief is not what they designate by the term Faith and (4) whether I am not justified, in view of the facts, in making a distinction between the Faith-state and the Faith-belief.

When describing an emotion one naturally portrays the fully developed state and not its larval forms and thus one draws a picture going at many points beyond many experiences which, nevertheless, belong to the class. I have chosen, for instance, instances in which the features of Faith are strongly marked: it may therefore happen that the reader will pass by more common instances of it without recognizing them.

It should be understood further that emotions are not always so sharply separated from each other that no confusion is ever possible. If, on the one hand, they fade in intensity until complete extinction; on the other, they change in quality until they stand midway between the well marked instances of different emotions. The initial freshness and vigor of Faith, for instance, is not necessarily, and not ordinarily maintained. Faith, as well as other emotions, has its paroxysms, its acute and its chronic stages. Exuberant Faith assumes with time somberer hues: it becomes a quiet mood and in that condition may remain a life time with, possibly, occasional recrudescence of the initial fervor. And, concerning its quality, Faith varies, within certain limits, together with its object and its dominant purpose. Its object may be an Anthropomorphic God or an impersonal absolute, and its dominant purpose may be deliverance from besetting sins, or fellowship with the Highest, or yet the accomplishment of a particular mission.

Another possible source of misunderstanding may arise from the fact

that emotions have an active or creative, and a passive or contemplative, form. In *Æsthetics*, for instance, there is the contemplative enjoyment in the presence of the beautiful and there is the delight of the creative impulse. These two attitudes are clearly distinct and yet both bring with them the so-called æsthetic sentiment or emotion. Faith, love and other emotions, have also their moments of quiescent pleasure and their moments of enthusiastic activity.

I have said above that love is the nearest relative of Faith. As the kinship of these two emotions appear to me of the highest interest I beg leave to draw the attention of the reader to the following facts. The harsh, dissociating, feelings are incompatible with Faith; the tender ones are its natural associates. No observant person, who has ever been interested in the problem of Faith, can have failed to notice the close association of Faith with love in Christian literature. In the New Testament they are not only frequently mentioned together, but, in many places, they seem to be interchangeable terms. As a matter of fact the presence of one of them implies that of the other: Faith in God is inseparable in the Christian mind of love to God and *vice versa*. One might go as far as to affirm that, in the sense in which these words are at times used in the New Testament, the measure of Faith in Christ is also the measure of love for him. In Christian Mysticism love predominates. Tauler, Suzo, Ruysbroeck, Molinos, St. Theresa, Mme. Guyon, St. Francis of Assisi, the Victors, have almost forgotten the word Faith, while love is forever in their mouth.

In Christian experience, when Faith appears, love is also present. The dry, self-righteousness of Wesley is turned by Faith into a genuine love of God.

The road to Faith is often through human love, as, for instance, in the cases of Gough,¹ of G.,² of the 'Scientist' whose transformation has been described here, etc.

In those instances of Faith in which the subject is not committed to any systematized form of religion, it becomes well nigh impossible to say which term is the fittest, Faith or love. The particular attitude of the woman whose case was recorded as number V might as well be called Faith in, as love of, what she conceived to be the essence of life.

¹"Studies in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena," p. 343.

²*Ibid.* Appendix, p. 376.

It is well known that human love will achieve transformations in all vital points similar to those characteristics of religious faith. Classical instances are not lacking. A striking recent one is to be found in the Autobiography entitled "My Mamie Rose," by Owen Kildare.

But love is of many varieties. Between the grossly carnal desire and the asexual love known commonly as Platonic love, there is room for a long gamut of experiences. If there are so many points of resemblance between Faith and ordinary love, what shall be said if Faith be compared with asexual love? What difference could there be between Faith as here described and the state of the Platonic lover in whom the love of things and of persons has been transformed into the love of the Beautiful, the Good and the True? I must admit that I do not see any sufficient ground of differentiation. The object of Christian Faith is, properly speaking, not an individual. God and Christ are rather the bearers of impersonal, divine, attributes. Faith and generalized, disindividualized love—the divine love of Plato—seem to me undistinguishable.¹ If these two terms are often used in Christian literature and elsewhere in clearly different senses, it is because they have more than one meaning. They are identical in one of them only. When the writer meant by Faith chiefly belief in the truth of the Revelation, he could not, of course, assimilate it with love for Christ. As to *love*, it covers in that literature, as everywhere else, a whole series of affective states going from sensuous passion for Christ or the Virgin seen in visions, to the most abstract love for an impersonal God.

The reader is now in a position to appreciate the consequences of the confusion by which Faith and belief are identified. Nothing could indicate more clearly than this identification how inadequate have been the prevalent conceptions of Faith. It must be said, however, that this deficiency in analytical insight on the part of the majority, has not prevented the greater of the Christian leaders from insisting upon the *attitude* of the subject in Faith. Warfield could, for instance, truly say² that "intellectual acceptance is not at all the biblical meaning." It is rather "a trustful appropriation of Christ and a surrender of self to His Salvation." This is true of none so completely as of

¹The meaning of Platonic love is not that for which it too often stands in common parlance—mere diffused sentimentality. It is a warm devotion not to individual things or person, but to abstract ideas or ideals.

²See article *Faith*, in Hasting's "Dictionary of the Bible."

Christ who strove first and last to bind men to himself by the bonds of that love which implies, or rather is, Faith in order to establish a closer, deeper relationship between man and himself standing as the embodiment of the ethico-religious ideal. The formation of a vital partnership with the representative of an ideal (or with the abstract ideal itself) by which life rises to greater intensity, more complete inner harmony and fuller self-realization, is, as we have seen, of the essence of Faith.

Concerning the self-surrender factor prominent both in the description of Faith and in the enumeration of its conditions, I cannot do more in this connection than refer the reader to a future paper. I have already drawn attention in the 'Studies' ¹ to the profound meaning and great practical importance of that experience in moral conversion. A clear and adequate reason may be given to explain why that psycho-physiological transformation and the advent of Faith should be conditioned, or at least greatly facilitated, by self-surrender understood in the sense of a relaxation of the deeper, the unconscious, will—that kind of giving up, of relaxation, which the Mind Curist, the Christian Scientist and the Hypnotizer, wisely attempt to bring about in their subjects by way of preparation. There is a fundamental likeness between the Christian self-surrender and the 'Gospel of relaxation' preached by the Mind Curist.

The two chief questions raised in Christian dogmatics concerning Faith are (1) whether Faith alone insures Salvation or whether works must be associated with it, and (2) if Faith is sufficient, how is its efficacy to be understood.

Protestant writers are, on the whole, agreed that although Salvation is by Faith alone, it is not *on account* of Faith (*propter fidem*), but *through* Faith (*per fidem*). The saving power of Faith resides, they say, in its object, *i. e.*, in Jesus Christ, the Saviour. Or, as Warfield puts it in the article already mentioned, "the saving power rests exclusively not in the act of Faith, or in the attitude of Faith, but in the object of Faith. Faith has a purely mediatory function. This is admitted even by those who hold, with Ménégoz, of Paris, that Salvation is by Faith independently of belief. The

¹ See in particular pp. 327-337; 366-370. Wm. James, in his "Varieties of Religious Experience," and Starbuck have also discussed self-surrender.

effects of Faith are thus not the immediate results of it, but of the power of God working through Faith.

The decision which must be rendered in this case by psychology is clear. It cannot look upon the Faith-state, or the Faith-belief, or the results of Faith, as being achieved by the transmission of a spiritual force from the object to the subject of Faith. The content and the outcome of Faith are to be considered as suggestively developed out of the possibilities of the subject. Psychology might thus reinforce a certain form of the Immanence doctrine of God. There is nothing either in the nature of Faith, as it appears in introspection, nor in its results, affording the slightest ground for providing it with an explanation not applicable to other emotions.

I have said at the beginning that Faith was not found exclusively in religious life. What are its chief other forms?

When, instead of aiming at the spiritual perfection of the self, it refers to the welfare of the nation, we have patriotic Faith; when it refers neither to the individual, nor to the nation, but to the beautiful, we have the Aesthetic Faith; when it refers to knowledge and truth, we have the noetic Faith.

It might, however, be preferable to reserve the word Faith for the religious variety, and to use another name to designate the species. But I do not intend to deal at present with the question of nomenclature, I merely desire to indicate a number of emotional experiences which seem to me to belong to the same class. It hardly need be added that not every kind of emotion which might be called patriotic, aesthetic or noetic, but only certain of them, could properly be placed side by side with religious Faith. As I have, in this paper, kept in view chiefly religious Faith I have at times used expressions which would not be altogether appropriate if applied to other forms.

In conclusion, I wish to offer two remarks suggested by the consideration of Faith from the point of view of human development.

Certain emotions have become, in the course of development, either useless or less effective than others in fulfilling a particular purpose. These outstripped emotions tend to disappear. There are, on the other hand, new forms of reactions in process of formation to meet the demands of new needs. Among these is the group of emotions to

which Faith belongs. Religious Faith and asexual love are hardly to be found in the lower civilizations. They are late products of human development, the existence of which is conditioned by high powers of generalization and a capacity for moral, æsthetic or intellectual appreciation found only in few of our contemporaries. "It is with true love as with ghosts: everybody speaks of it, but few have seen it." This opinion of La Rochefaucauld is concurred in by practically all those who have written on love. What is true of personal love, is truer yet of platonic love and of Faith. An unusually complete detachment from the individual and the particular and a capacity for responding with intensity to the calls of the Good, the Beautiful or the True, are the rare requisites to the appearance of these potent states.

Concerning the bearing of some of the facts brought out in the course of the present study upon the origin of variations, this deserves attention. Faith is an instance of what may be called *internal adaptation*, in contradistinction with the two sources of variations taken in consideration by the current theories: the Darwinian spontaneous, fortuitous, variation, and the Lamarckian adaptation of the organism to his surroundings under the influence of effort. In the advent of Faith the variation—if I may be allowed to apply that term to the appearance of a new emotion—is not fortuitous. It is, on the contrary, adapted to a special end, often only dimly understood, but nevertheless desired. It is not any more a response to the pressure of external circumstances; it is not called out by the demand of the physical world or of society. It arises, rather, in answer to an internal need, due to the subject's own constitution: Faith is an instance of purposive, internal, adaptation, similar to the one to which I have called attention in a recent paper on the State of Mystical Death.¹

¹ Commemorative number of the *Amer. Jour. of Psychology*.

LITERATURE.

Professor James H. Leuba has within the last few years published a number of interesting and important papers on religious psychology. These papers are carefully resumed in the few following pages, so that together with Dr. Leuba's article in this number they constitute a summary of his opinions in this field so far as he has yet published. It is hoped in later numbers to follow this plan in regard to other American and foreign writers in this field.

The State of Death: An Instance of Internal Adaptation: J. H. LEUBA, Am. J. Psych., Commemorative Number, July-Oct., 1900.¹

This is a consciousness of certain Christian mystics. The State of Death is a condition of transformed personality, usually trance-like and somnambulant. It is attained by suppression of all the impulses and desires of the Natural Man, and by a complete surrender to the highest "inner" motives. This stilling of natural impulses, therefore, implies a cessation as far as possible, of external adjustment.

Ethically it is the replacing of individual by universalized motives, of the private will by the larger will.

The method of attainment of this state, is through non-resistance, which, in psychological terms, means withdrawal of attention from one's desires and impulses, good as well as bad. It seems to be a denial of the efficacy of effort in the moral life. It glorifies the instinctive and the subconscious. The results are peace, release from the pain of conflicting desires. The soul is "owned by God."

The self-surrender aspect of this state is identified with that of Judaism, Islam and primitive Buddhism as well as of Christianity.

This inner adaptation or universalization of action is a logical and necessary product. Civilization as at present constituted cannot, however, guarantee it a survival value. With society changed through the transformation of many individuals in the same direction, the world will become increasingly habitable for those in whom self-resignation and absolute dependence on a universalized self, reigns supreme.

Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion. J. H. LEUBA, Monist, 11, pp. 195-225.

Those who have followed Professor Leuba's brilliant and consistent pioneer work in the psychology of religion, will be glad to find in this article an admirable survey and delimitation of the field.

E. B. Tylor's prophecy, of thirty years ago, that the ethnographical method applied to the study of religion, would prove fruitful and renovating, has been richly realized. But a knowledge of the evolution of religions does not and cannot answer the most urgent inquiries of men. The History of Religion may reveal the origin, the order of appearance and the various transformations of beliefs, rites, customs and ceremonials, as they are expressed in the social consciousness of a people, but it is beyond the scope of the History of Religion to seek the facts of the immediate religious experience of the individual. The Historical Method is concerned with Social Psychology. The Psychological Method is concerned with Individual Psychology. "The Psychology of Religion is concerned, for instance, with the actual feelings of sin, of repentance, of dependence, as you and I experience them; while the material of the various branches of the historical disciplines, is the generalized beliefs, or rather a statement of the beliefs, of a social group, on sin, on repentance, or dependence. Corporate religion finds its birth in the individual religious experiences. The Psychology of Religion deals, then, with the for-

¹This and the three following reviews are by Professor E. H. Lindley, of the University of Indiana.

mative or constituent elements, while the History of Religion deals with the complex products. It is not surprising that the complex products were the first objects of investigation here, as in chemistry. Hence the tardy appearance of the Psychological Method as applied to Religion.

The chief problems of the religious life are: (1) What are the motives of the religious activities? (2) The problem of the means by which religious impulses express themselves and through which the needs seek their satisfaction. ("Means" includes both practices and beliefs.) (3) The relation existing between the means used and the satisfaction they produce or are expected to produce.

The Psychological Method in pursuit of these inquiries implies a "return to nature," not to primitive beliefs, but a "return to nature in its present truth."

The formulas of the philosophers of religion are of little use in this inquiry. The definitions of religion are multiform and one-sided. These definitions fall into three main groups: 1. Those emphasizing the intellectual element. (Spencer, Martineau, Max Mueller, and others.) 2. The element of feeling is paramount (Schleiermacher, Herbart, and others). 3. The cravings, the desires, the impulses, the will, constitute the active principle (Feuerbach, Schopenhauer, Comte, Edward Caird, Brinton, and others).

Application of the reflex-arc concept reveals the inadequacy of all the above definitions. The reflex-arc, as the type of all activity, emphasizes receptivity, central modification and an efferent or motor discharge, as present altogether although in sequence. Everything culminates in action. Under the guidance of this conception, Schopenhauer, Wundt, and others, broke the Shackles of the prevailing intellectualistic psychology, and took their stand for Voluntarism. But the triple psychic character needs to be emphasized as essential. "In the sphere of religion, this doctrine means not only that every pulse of religious life includes ideas and feelings, but also that it finds its objective expression in action." "Sacrificing, praying, the thousand and one fashions of worship, are outwardly perceivable religious actions. But even where there is no apparent external activity, even in the most "spiritual" worship, when the coarser outward appeal to help is not to be detected, even there religious experience finds its unavoidable bodily expression in an activity which can properly be regarded as the residuum of inhibited movements." "In these subtle utterances of religious needs the final segment of the reflex-arc is just as surely, if not so obviously, present as in the offering of spotless lambs." These multiple activities are remnants of the once unrepressed and aggressive ways of men of lower civilization when asking assistance from the Divinity.

Religious acts, it is true, like other acts, when often repeated, may become habitual and hence may lose the content of thought and feeling that were there in the beginning.

So the data of the student of the psychology of religion, are complex psychological processes culminating actually or prospectively in certain classes of action called religious activities. He seeks to find the motive and the end of these actions, and finally, he must find the channels through which religious ends are realized.

The ends and impulses are not the exclusive possession of the religious life. They are impulses and ends of activities which are as well not religious. Only the channels, or the conception of the idea of causal characteristics of the religious agent differentiates religious from non-religious activities.

Hence, we see how the idea of a God, as merely infinite and omniscient, is not sufficient. But He must be a Supreme Satisfier of our needs, a Power whom we can use.

The Contents of Religious Consciousness: J. H. LEUBA, *Monist*, 11, pp. 536-573.

A critical examination of carefully selected materials collected by means of a questionnaire.

The cases cited all reflect Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. Dr. Leuba thinks they show that the attitude of man toward God has changed in this group, in recent times. "Freedom and equality" are now the keynote of man's relation to God. The duty motive of the Catechism is supplanted. "Action in obedience to God's command; is out of fashion; awe, reverence, worship, appear only dimly in the religious consciousness of the democratic Anglo-Saxon."

After presenting an affecto-motor classification of individuals according to their religious life, a classification which the author does not use, he passes to a detailed consideration of thirteen cases of the religious sort, followed by an interesting and convincing case of the non-religious variety.

For an example of superb mastery of the questionnaire method as applied to complex and stubborn problems, the reader is referred to the author's presentation. No condensation of these replies can be adequate. To pass them in rapid review and to hit off in "telegraphese," what appear to be the salient characteristics, is nevertheless a necessity.

Case I. A college and university bred woman, a communicant in the Presbyterian Church. "A very intelligent, rightly ambitious and proudly confident person." Her "religious" life seems little more than a passion for moral growth. There is little room in her consciousness for God; no conviction of sin or guilt, so essential in theoretical Christianity. "Awe and adoration hardly appear." Case II. A School Supervisor of twenty-four, belonging to an Episcopalian family. "With an intense passion for the good and the beautiful, she may not appear to many to know what religion means." "God, worship, adoration, are apparently not in her vocabulary." Her faith rests in common-sense experience, and is, to all appearances, in no need whatsoever of a supernatural sanction. She says "To me the term (religious practice) means the doing of what seems the best and noblest thing possible at the right time, under the guidance of noble motives." "All ennobling thoughts are to me, religious thoughts." Case III. A minister of the Quaker Church. He says, "I have strong religious needs, such as a hungering after righteousness, a desire to know God and His Will." "I satisfy them by prayer, helping others, reading the Bible and wholesome literature, mingling with religious people, singing, beholding nature and beauty in art." The difference between religious and non-religious emotions and thoughts, is illustrated by the difference between the enthusiasm aroused by a game of football and that by a good sermon. The religious emotion is uplifting. The religious attitude is one of self-helplessness, of utter dependence upon aid beyond self. Case IV. Reveals another motive. "Love absorbs everything, stifles action, and becomes an end itself. Ecstasy experienced. Intense reaction experiences. Case V. A practicing physician. Well balanced. Depends much on prayer. Important among other things, as "a preparation to live the day in piety." When asked if he believed God answered his prayers, replies: "I do not know, I sometimes believe that he does." Shows a tendency to ignore logic and reason in the interest of a belief which helps him to live at his best. The "will to believe," to trust instinct when the intellect falters, is a strong note in this testimony, as in several other cases given. Case VI. A Doctor of Philosophy, at the head of an educational institution of higher grade. Thanksgiving strongly marked in his attitude to God. Here, again, a belief that gives strength to live, overrides merely intellectual obstacles. Case VII. A woman married and fighting with poverty. "A remarkable instance of triumphant optimism." Worship of nature and trust in its laws. "There is religion but Truth,"—she writes. "To be an inspired mother is the highest state I know." "The most devotional life to me is to seek the deeper meaning in every experience, reading and work, to find the message in everything." Does not believe in the "Imitation of Christ" doctrine, because it is opposed to original thought. "For mental and spiritual development depend on original thought." Case VIII. A Methodist clergyman who mentions the orthodox motives and practices. Religious practice a duty. Dwells on his conversion. Case IX. A man of French birth. "A need, a sensation of emptiness of soul, of moral imperfections, of lack of power," prompt him to religious practices. When desire is satisfied, "a sensation of peace arises." He feels deeply the need of some great principle and of being in harmony with it. Deep consciousness also of inferiority to an inner ideal, a type pre-established in him. Enjoys communion with the Divine principle "Love goes up and love comes down multiplied richly." Case X, is that of a French clergyman. An echo of old-style Calvinism. A wrathful God to be appeased, Life sad and terrible rather than happy and beautiful.

The author then passes from the positive-religious cases to those in which the flames burn very low. One woman has had little that could be called religious feeling except "a gentle stirring of the soul by something in the stars and the night, something in the gold of the sun, something in the slow sad music, something in

the stillness." Amiel's craving and vogue anxiety at three in the afternoon is, according to the author, merely an incident of the ebb of psycho-physiological activity which usually takes place at this time of day. Another case reveals no craving, no heart panting after things unseen. "Life with its parental and social duties is enough to fill her heart and mind with stolid contentment." And now to turn to the non-religious cases. Such undoubtedly exist, in spite of the view that religion is in every man. A successful business man writes: "I do not perform religious exercises, public or private. To me such practices are incomprehensible, childish and absurd. 'I have no religious need. I am devoid of religious feeling.'" He even came to the verge of death without the development of such. The author adds "They are legion, the men in whose life, God, any Kind of God,— is a '*quantité négligable*;' they live without him, satisfied; they die without him, happy."

The above array of testimonies "shows how in the same community and among individuals of approximately the same intelligence and culture, differences sufficient to make of one a person to whom religion is the 'all of life,' and leave the other absolutely indifferent and impervious to it, however broadly it may be interpreted."

In conclusion, the end of religion is not the worship of God. He is frequently not present in moments called religious. And when present, he is not usually worshipped. The Protestant Anglo-Saxon "cares very little who God is, or even whether He is at all. But he uses Him instinctively, from habit, if not from a rational conviction of His existence, for the satisfaction of his better desires; and this he does ordinarily with the directness and the bluntness of the aggressive child of a domineering century, well-nigh stranger to the emotions of fear, of awe, and of reverence." "*God is not known, He is not understood; He is used.*" Not God but life; more life, a larger, richer, more satisfying life, is in last analysis, the end of religion. There is perhaps, at bottom, no specifically "religious" impulse; "the preservation and increase of life is the moving impulse as well of religious as of secular activity." The Intellectualists are wrong. They have confused the philosophic attitude with the religious attitude. These may alternate rapidly within the same individual, but they are of different species. "Philosophic consciousness wants to know; religious consciousness wants to be."

Religion: Its Impulses and Its Ends. J. H. LEUBA, Monist, 11, pp. 751-773.

An analysis of the religion of the North American Indian and of primitive Buddhism, with the result that the author finds no evidence of a religious impulse *per se*. "That the most conspicuous and substantial parts of the religious life of the non-civilized peoples are prompted by the love of life as it manifests itself in the fear of death, in the pain of hunger, in the lust of the flesh, and the love of power,—in a word, by the very impulses which actuate secular activities." No adoration, no communion of spirits, but a more or less gross egoistic utilitarianism prevails. To choose one of the simplest of the illustrations: Before going to war against the Pawnee, the pious Kausa addresses himself to the sun, thus: "I wish to kill a Pawnee! I long to pull down an enemy! I promise you a calico shirt and a robe. I will give you a blanket also, O! Wakanda, if you allow me to return in safety after killing a Pawnee."

Turning to primitive Buddhism, we find no theology and no speculation in the attitude of the founder. Buddha Gautama, suffering "moral nausea," develops a yearning for "Nirvana." This is not mere extinction. It has its positive aspect, bliss in this world and an eternity void of suffering. Cessation of suffering, quenching of desire, endless bliss, are then, the quest. Moral suffering plays a rôle here not to be found in the non-civilized.

The author has rendered a great service in bringing home the biological origin and character of religion; and therefore the intensely pragmatic nature of most beliefs and practices. It seems also true that most civilized men may linger on the lower levels of a crude utilitarian attitude to God.

Adoration, pure thankfulness, tranquil communion, thought of mystery, surely cannot develop where life is constantly stressful and precarious. These wait on reflection and the power to reflect and speculate, come with leaden feet. But when thoughts of the world and of the unseen *do* come to the barbarian, must they not react on the character of his worship? The present writer confesses, therefore, to

some misgivings, concerning the sharp separation of the philosophic and the religious attitudes, insisted upon by the author. Experience, reflection, modify instinct and conscious behavior elsewhere, why not here? And therefore it may well be that other Anglo-Saxon Protestants will be found in whose religious attitude, adoration and awe and dependence loom large.

All this, I imagine will be granted by the author. But in the struggle to vanquish the Intellectualists he seems to fail to do explicit justice to the modifying and transforming influence of reflection and knowledge.

In these studies, marked by genuine insight and scholarly mastery of materials, one feels the presence of a mind of unusual penetration and refinement of vision, fearless, and tenacious of aim, and gifted with the artist's power to marshal his thought in living words. "Epoch-making" is a sorely tattered word in these days. In considering all the contributions of this author, however, one seems justified in saying that in a real and high sense he is a Bahubhracher."

Fundamental Tendencies of the Christian Mystics, by J. H. LEUBA. Revue philosophique, juillet (pp. 1-36), et novembre, 1902. (pp. 441-487.)

We have here, in a French periodical, one of those important studies which American psychology for some years has devoted to religious phenomena. We are going to indicate the chief features of it; as to the details they are too abundant to be summed up.

Mysticism is one of the forms of the pursuit of happiness; but as all beings seek after happiness, we tell very little if we do not point out what kind of enjoyment the mystics seek and where they find it. Now it would be wrong to believe that the mystic endeavors only to be absorbed in God, to be lost in the enjoyment of the Divine Unity. It is one of his ruling tendencies, but opposed to it there is another tendency just as powerful which impels him towards a definite moral ideal which he strives after with a dogged and heroic energy—agreement with the Divine Will, polarization of good intentions, a more compact and homogeneous grouping of the divine tendencies, in a word Universalization of the Will. So that the Mystic is divided between Love and Holiness, between intense enjoyment and the striving after perfection. Leuba makes the very just remark that this second element, which is just as essential as the first, has been too much overlooked in the analysis of the mystical conscience. If this element is lacking, we have before us a dilettante, an enjoyer of Divine Love, and not a mystic. On the other side this pursuit of inmost joy relished in the depth of the conscience is just as characteristic. It includes, however, several elementary tendencies. 1st. The tendency to the organic enjoyment with a tinge of erotism and a transferring to the divine wish of unemployed sexual energies, while he is unaware himself of the nature of this physiological factor which permeates so strongly his enjoyment. 2d. Tendency to hushing thought: it is not so much the organizing of the thought into a system, which produces with the mystics this hush, as the reduction of the thought, the simplification of the contents of the conscience by various methods of meditation and prayer; the trance marks in a certain manner the highest pitch of the decrease of all multiple and deliberate thinking. 3d. The need of an affective support, the aspiration towards the consoler—to the one who penetrates the soul, who is with it in a continuous and deep sympathy. Voluptuousness, quietude, feeling strong while relying, such are the pleasurable feelings which gush out from these appeased and gratified tendencies and which joined to the noble and energetic peace, the result of the ethical tendency, make up the mystic happiness. Such are the fundamental tendencies which Leuba infers from a careful study (supported by autobiographies and other edifying books, generally full of personal disclosures) of an important group of mystics. Madame Guyon, St. François de Sales, St. Theresa, Ruysbroek, Tauler and Suso provide him with a sufficient number of concordant facts for applying his analysis to the mysticism in general. The mystic is accordingly before all a man who practices, who leads an affective and active life. What impels him—as the author says of religion in general in another study published elsewhere—is less the desire to know than the desire to be. The intellectual conceptions, if they appear at all—are in the background. The internal sensibility rules over the external sensibility. Unstable and oscillating between anaesthesia and hyperaesthesia, it holds and guides the conscience. On the contrary the objective observation which rests

on clearness of the sensation and of the mind, the generalization and all the intellectual acts which follow from it are weak in a mystic; he has hardly emerged in this point from the state of infancy. On the other side what need have they of knowing? The problem which their conscience, enamored at the same time of enjoyment and of perfection, puts to them is of a volitional and not of an intellectual order. What they seek is the strength to follow a road all laid out, and not the direction to follow; they ask of the mystic union the force which produces the action. The trance is for them the fountain head of the holy life and the holy life is the way to the trance. It is a purely affective and active circle which the intelligence scarcely can disturb.

The trance, the fundamental state of mysticism, is differentiated from analogous pathological states by two characters: 1st. The subject, in the mystic trance, enters into and remains in contact with God. 2d. The mystical trance is an amolous trance. The subject reaches this state only after trials and exercises (the case of St. Theresa is particularly instructive on this point): the field of the conscience becomes narrowed by concentrating the mental activity around an idea—God, Love and Holiness—whose contents becomes impoverished while the feeling of self, now the ruling one is lost in a more and more vague enjoyment and finally disappears altogether in unconsciousness. The hallucination may be joined to the trance, but as an accessory phenomenon. It becomes frequent probably only in complicated cases of hysteria.

In this state, when thought is weakened to the point of unconsciousness, the mystics pretend to obtain simultaneously with the union with God a superior revelation. And if God is, in fact, defined by the reason as the being about whom we can affirm nothing, the mystic trance is the state of consciousness which approaches the nearest to Him. The mystic deifies his unconsciousness and in his unconsciousness reaches the divine. The representation which on emerging from the trance he makes to himself of the unconsciousness of the trance—the Nothing which he thinks—takes existence and becomes the Nothing which is. In the same way the Revelation of the trance does not appeal to the Understanding; it is a feeling of intimacy obtained by the exaltation of the love or by the disappearance of hostile desires, an illusory illumination—similar to the one in sleep—based upon a feeling of ease and power; revelation which is protracted after emerging from the trance, by directing auditory and visual hallucination and by the clearer apprehension of the Divine Will.

We find thus in Leuba's paper a good analysis of the fundamental tendencies of mysticism and an excellent study of the trance—which in a certain way is the centre of the mystic life because the desire of enjoyment tends towards it in the different shapes which it assumes with the mystic, and because from it originates the powerful action, the life unified for the realization of the Divine Will. The mystic one becomes simplified and reduced in a certain way in order to penetrate into it and emerges from it in possession of the powerful unity which has become realized there. The mystic is not accordingly an enjoyer, or worshipper of diffuse sensuality accustomed to use religious images for the gratification of his passions. Neither is he a doubter, because very far from suffering from his powerlessness to systematize his ideas and his needs, he presents a too complete systematization of his tendencies in two opposite groups. Nor is it true that he isolates himself always; the active life is with him side by side with contemplative life. The passion which holds sway over his life is not a fixed idea, but a directing idea. There is no mystical or religious tendency *per se*; but in mysticism, as elsewhere, there are human tendencies which aspire to become gratified. Pursuit of spiritual voluptuousness, of the peace of the mind, of the sympathy and friendship, of the common and efficacious action are strong tendencies common to the whole humanity. Mysticism creates only new means for gratifying eternal tendencies.

In this short analysis we cannot give account of all the interesting points in Leuba's study; nor can we add a detailed criticism of it, as this would lead us too far. It will be enough to call attention to the fact that if it is true—as Leuba maintains—that mysticism consists of the combination of two tendencies of which one passes through the whole scale of deep pleasures which the subject relishes in the inmost depth of his conscience in a kind of hazy beatitude, the other is bent on action and on the efficacy, on the display of the unified and universalized will, it

may be, however, somewhat inexact to eliminate in the two tendencies of this fundamental cycle the intelligence and the intellectual tendencies. That mysticism is a desire to be is indeed true, but it is sometimes a desire to be through intelligence and in the intelligence. In other words some mystics aspire to a state of intensive and synthetic cognizance where all the truths become united and systematized. That it is not the case of all mystics, I admit. But there are speculative mystics with whom the trance takes for a brief instant almost the shape of apprehension of an entire logical system. But even with such mystics, I admit, this intellectual intention is profoundly mixed with affective states and it tends sometimes towards the haziness of the unconscious trance; in a profound trance there is evidently abolition of the intellectual multiplicity which does not prevent it, perhaps, from being an entirely intellectual, entirely philosophical contemplation which leads to the profound trance (Plotinus, Eckart), and that in this very trance while the subject remains conscious, it may be as well, perhaps, that the feeling of a certain logical unity of a certain unity of thought predominates. It is true that at this point all states tend to blend, and I do not want to insist upon more. Perhaps it will be necessary when the monographies and the studies of details shall be more numerous, to distinguish among the mystics different classes and different mental types.

I do not believe that the systems constructed by the mystics are nothing else but the intellectual projection of their internal experience. Their internal experience I would undertake to prove it in the case of Suso—profits by their theoretical views. Now these theories are very often not individualistic. They may be connected with a current of ideas, with a school, with a tradition. Through them the philosophical intelligence, the constructions of the mind, the systems penetrate into the inmost experience of the mystics and mould it in their turn.

Finally among the documents which Leuba uses there is one which I call in question and which ought to be excluded. Leuba quotes in detail and utilizes the document on the conversion of Tauler called the *Meisterbuch*. He is not unaware of the fact that certain critics pretend that the conversion related in the anonymous history of his life is not that of Tauler, but of another person. But if it is historical, adds he, it does not matter to whom it belongs. And in fact if it were historical, it would have been a document. But Father Denifle has proved (*Historisch-politische Blätter*, 1875 and 1879) that the *Meisterbuch* is not a history but a fiction written with a definite purpose, viz., to oppose to certain pharisaical masters of the time, whose life was in contradiction with their doctrine, a pious layman, not instructed but sustained by the grace which instructs and converts one of them.

These few reservations and those which we might have added do not diminish in any way the great value of this study.

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"*Studies in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena*," by J. H. LEUBA. *Amer. Jour. of Psy.*, 7 (1896), pp. 309-385.

This work of indisputable originality and of a high philosophic bearing aims at investigating that religious crisis to which is given the name of conversion. The author has put the question in its widest sense, and has made us clearly understand that conversion is not the special result of this or that religious teaching; it is a natural, if not a normal, phenomenon. The materials of the investigation come from different sources; some have been taken from confessions published by converts; others come from conversations with converts; others are answers to a questionnaire which the author circulated in the religious world.

All the answers are not given us, but only seventeen. All that are given contain personal details and are of the greatest interest. They have a striking stamp of uniformity; with all, the crisis has been almost the same. The accounts, in general, following the chronological order, begin with the picture of a disordered existence; the future converts accuse themselves of a great number of vices, the most frequent of which is drunkenness. They had not only the conviction that they were in sin, but also a deep consciousness of sin. With others there is no idea of demerit, of approaching condemnation, the desire for pardon or the fear of hell; these are more close to nature; they have only the feeling of their physical and moral misery, of their impotence, of the need of being aided, helped. God is not a Judge, but a Saviour. (We believe for our part, that this distinction depends not so much upon the religious education as upon the double ferment the religious con-

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seriousness, love and fear, and upon the preponderance of one of these forms according to the temperament of the individual.) The result of the investigation seems to be that the feeling of fear is not so frequent a cause of conversion as the feeling of love. After the description of the disorders, the correspondents express in different ways their efforts of will to change their existence, and their lack of success; for example, after a drinking bout, they have determined to drink no more; they have remained for several days without drinking, at times for weeks, then the passion for the vice has again taken the upper hand. There has been a long series of painful efforts which have come to nothing, and have convinced the unfortunate of his impotence, he has come to despair of himself, and to understand that, without the help of God, he cannot be saved. This series of emotions forms the first part of conversion; it is the period of depression, which ends in despair and in the feeling of impotence.

Conversion, properly so called, does not result, as one might believe at first sight, from a more energetic effort of the will, from which the convert might ascribe merit to himself. During conversion, he is entirely passive. It is God, it is the blood of Jesus Christ, it is the Holy Ghost,—in a word, it is a higher power which accomplishes the conversion; as for himself, he lets himself go, he abandons himself, he refrains from action, he becomes an instrument. This is the mental state which is described in all the observations, and the author has no trouble in showing that it is the state of grace. Thus it is formulated many times, and conceived of as a divine action without the co-operation of the individual. It is not at all the dynamic rule: "The Lord helps those who help themselves;" a rule which incites to action, which implies the idea of merit and of demerit and the existence of free will. The action of grace assumes, on the contrary, the helplessness of man to struggle against sin, the idea that God accords his grace to whom he will, according to his own good pleasure, and that in consequence the grace is no merit for him who receives it. It is very interesting to ascertain that this religious conception is not a fabric of the imagination, but rests upon a living reality; these are, in truth, just the feelings which form the psychology of conversion.

Conversion is not a slow and insensible action but a sudden one which surprises and astonishes; it may take place in solitude, often during the night, or, instead, during the day, in the midst of friends, of fellow workmen. At times, there is heard an admonishing voice, counselling, commanding to prayer, or repeating some verse of the Bible, there are also, but more rarely, visions; sometimes, also, physical sensations of an indefinite character. But what is never lacking, what really constitutes the crisis, is an emotional state of extraordinary violence, which shakes the whole body, makes the tears flow; it is above all a state of joyous exaltation, of overflowing love for God, with the feeling that there has been a complete transformation, and that a new life is commencing; and from this moment, in truth, the whole round of existence is modified; the life of disorder is suppressed, almost without exception. It is from this practical result that we can judge the intensity of the crisis. According to the country and the environment, conversion can bring about very different changes, but psychologically its effect is almost always the same. The intellect, no more than the efforts of will has share in the conversion; it is not through intellectual arguments that the transformation takes place; one has no thought of reasoning. Conversion comes from an internal affective act; one is converted because one feels otherwise than before being converted, and the arguments of sceptics make no impression on the believer because they do not touch him. The author is quite right in saying that as a psychological phenomenon, faith is quite distinct from belief or from conviction; faith is an emotional state, which does not take its point of departure from arguments and which can be neither broken down nor built up by them.

In concluding our analysis of this excellent work, we shall express the desire that similar investigations be attempted in different religious circles, and also in spiritualistic circles, which on so many sides approach the religious. A. BINET

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PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION IN FRANCE.

Psychology of religion is only beginning to be studied in French speaking countries, following in the trail of its twin-brother, the science of comparative religion,

which has been taught for a few years in the universities of Paris and of Toulouse, and which the "Museum Journal" of comparative religions has done so much to promote. But though, in the publications of the latter, and in biographies or books of piety, a large amount of material for psychology of religion is at hand, it is only in these last few years that such material is being used for truly psychological study.

One of the very first books in this line was the "*Maladies du sentiment religieux*," by Professor Murisier of Neuchâtel, which appeared as late as 1901 (Paris, Alcan publishers), and in the preface of which the author was justified in claiming to be one of the pioneers of a new science then scarcely known in France and in French speaking Switzerland. This valuable book, in which Professor Murisier deals with ecstasy, fanaticism, and contagiousness of religious feeling, has unhappily remained isolated, and it might seem as if the progress of religious psychology in France had disappointed the hopes which that first book had fostered. But the fire which for some time has given out but occasional sparks, is glowing under the ashes, and the prospects of religious psychology are in fact, now-a-days brighter than they ever were in French speaking countries. Three young university professors, all of them men of great ability, have in recent years taken up its study and are spreading interest in it among an ever increasing number of students. Two of these are in the university of Geneva. The one is Professor Flournoy, professor of experimental psychology in the faculty of science, who is well known as the author of the book "*From Tuidies to the planet Mars*," in which he carefully describes the case of a young woman, Miss Helen Smith, who was a remarkable instance of multiple personality, being now Marie Antoinette, then an inhabitant of the planet Mars, the language of which she pretended to speak, and lastly a Hindu as eg sometimes a few Sanskrit words. This book may be reckoned as a contribution to psychology of religion in so far as it touches the question of inspiration; for Miss Smith believed herself in communication with a spirit whom she called Leopold, who gave her warnings, taught her facts, or even suggested poetry which she would have been unable in her conscious state to write. Professor Flournoy, at the end of his book, points out that the difference between such cases and the inspiration of religious geniuses is in their moral value. Three years ago, Professor Flournoy had devoted a year's lectures to psychology of religion, which attracted very large audiences. The opening lecture has appeared in the "*Archives de Psychologie*," and was published apart with the title "*Principles of religious psychology*" (Geneva 1903). In it he emphasizes the fact that psychology can give no explanation of the origin of religious phenomena, but only describe them as they are. It is not within her limits either to attribute them to God or to deny divine action. We may regret that Professor Flournoy has not yet developed the outline which he presented in this pamphlet; this has to be attributed to Professor Flournoy's great admiration for American psychologists, from whom he professes to have borrowed the larger part of his teaching, a statement which is probably exaggerated, as all those who know him have been struck on the originality of his mind.

Beside Prof. Flournoy, the two professors, who have recently done most for psychology of religion are both,—strange as it may seem at first sight—professors of systematic theology, one in Geneva, and one in Montauban (Tarn-et-Garonne). This does not in the least diminish the value of their work, for their aim in studying psychology is not to distort facts in order to prove some particular system of theology, but to get psychological facts with which to square this system. In Geneva, Prof. Gaston Frommel has started in this line a few years ago. Some results of his studies, first given in lectures to students, have been published by the fortnightly magazine "*Foi et Vie*." They are studies of Christian conversions. These studies are not made in the American way of collecting hundreds of cases and cooking them together into (or reducing them into) figures and diagrams. The questionnaire method as applied to psychology of religion is scarcely known in France and has until now given but small results. In a recent book "*The religious feeling in France*" (Paris, 1903), Lucien Arréat has tried to use it, but the number of the answers he has received is so small that they have no representative value whatever, and, besides, the way in which he has worked them out does not seem to add very much to the interest of the answers themselves. The questionnaire method, though its name is French, is likely not to succeed so well in France as it does in Anglo-Saxon countries. Frenchmen are not wont to speak much about their religious impres-

sions; it seems to them, as a rule, a preparation of their inmost self, to write these impressions down for publication. The psychologists of religion in France have therefore began by carefully studying individuals who have overcome their natural dislike for publicity and left detailed enough autobiographies or *mémoires*. Such a study, though it does not as quickly lead to a fairly accurate view of religious feeling in a whole country, has, however, the advantage of preserving the individuality of each case, which is totally lost when a man is only a unit among many in a series.

This study of individual cases is also what Professor Henri Bois, of Montauban, has been doing as his contribution to psychology of religion. This has been systematically studied in Montauban for three years, both in lectures and in a seminary. In the first two years the lectures and the seminary have dealt with directly opposed parts of the field, the former taking up the loss of faith among Christians, and the second the study of Christian conversions through the ages. Edmond Scherer and Jouffroy, the first a Protestant professor of theology, the second a Catholic philosopher, were the most prominent men in the first group; Prof. Bois showed under what influence and through what crisis the former lost a real and deep Christian faith to become a cold thinking machine devoid of all religious feeling—and how the latter gradually got rid of beliefs which never had any very deep root in his consciousness, but which in later years he pretended and believed to have lost in a highly emotional crisis (which is recorded in Prof. James' varieties of religious experience). In this seminary, Prof. Bois studied for two years twenty-five or thirty conversions, beginning with that of Saint Paul and extending to those of the 19th century. That chronological survey made apparent how far theological beliefs would explain the experience of conversion. As an example it may be shown how the difference between Augustine's and Luther's conversion was due largely to their divergent views on baptism. The earlier, while little concerned with past sins, which he believed could be at any time blotted out through baptism, was mainly engrossed with the feeling of his weakness against his passions which he was afraid would induce him to the unpardonable act of sinning after baptism. In Luther's time the idea of baptism had changed; people were not so much afraid of sinning *after* having received it, as of dying *before*. Luther knew that if God would only accept him into his communion, he would be safe, but was concerned with past sins as he thought God would not accept into his communion so wretched a sinner as he was. So the ideas of baptism prevalent in their times completely altered their line of thought during conversion.

Prof. Bois has as yet published little of his studies in the psychology of religion, only a few articles in "*Foi et Vie*," and a discourse on Religious feeling (Paris, Fischbach, 1902), in which he endeavors to show that religious feeling could be represented as the "feeling of the infinite," which in itself has nothing religious, and suggests only such ideas as those of endless fall, of a black hole, or of nothing at all—but that religious feeling has to be assimilated to the intercourse between two persons, the one higher and purer than the other. Some of Prof. Bois' students have published researches of their own; among others may be quoted "Psychological notes on religious revival," by Georges Lauza (Montauban 1902), a valuable piece of work, but which betrays too great a desire of fixing rules and reaching conclusions before the whole ground has been covered.

It may be safely stated that the interest for psychology of religion will extend in France and in Switzerland to an ever increasing number of students, owing to the strong influence of the three able men of whom we have been speaking. Till now, none of the books in this line have been written by Americans, and there is a danger of generalizing their results as applicable to all countries of the world, and of describing as inherent in the religious feeling, or at least in Christianity, what is perhaps only true of religion in the United States. We hope, therefore, that French psychologists will help to prevent this generalization from being made by investigating more and more the field of study that they have around them, and this will happen if psychology of religion, which in French speaking countries is scarcely a thing of the past, or even of the present, is, as we do hope and believe, a thing of the future.

J. K.

Les maladies du sentiment religieux, par ERNEST MURISIER, Professeur de l'Académie de Neuchâtel, Paris, 1901.

M. Ernest Murisier was a young *savant* prematurely taken away by death last year in the very midst of his work. The precision of his method, the accuracy of his information, the ingenueness of his thought had already won for him the esteem of the scientific world. His book on the diseases of religious feeling appeared in 1901.

He believed that the science of religion and sociology in confining themselves to the studies of beliefs, myths, and rites neglected an essential element of religion, viz., the affective phenomena. He wished to apply the pathological method in order to find the laws of the religious emotion. This method consists in choosing extreme cases where the springs of the mentality are easier to find.

Now, the mysticism and the fanaticism which appear at every page of the history of the religions are the extreme forms of the religious feeling; the subject does not live or does not want to live except by the religious life; he becomes absorbed in this exclusive preoccupation. Such cases are particularly instructive. M. Murisier applies himself to the analysis and proceeds generally in the following manner: first comes the description of the facts with their characteristic details; then comes the interpretation, the discussion of the explanations proposed by different authors and the attempt to find a psychological explanation. Finally the indication of the inferences to be drawn from the adopted explanation.

Let us begin with the mystics. For them religion is an interior life whose highest pitch is the trance. In order to reach this stage the mystic becomes detached from the world. We witness in his case a gradual extinction of social feelings. At the final stage of this development he declares himself dead for created things. Even in the midst of the society he creates for himself an inferior solitude. Mysticism is accordingly the exaltation of the religious feeling under its individual form.

In what consists this essentially individual piety? Can it be reduced to the instincts by which the sociologists explain now-a-days the origin of religion? Not so. The wondering which becomes sometimes a fear, sometimes admiration and love, is the starting point of the religious evolution of the child. But it is otherwise in the case of the mystics. Their autobiographies reveal to us deep physiological and psychological troubles. They can neither co-ordinate their psychological states, nor adapt themselves to the changing world on account of the abrupt variations with them of the general sense of the body, the organic consciousness. It is a conflict not only between their ideal and the reality, but also between the elements of their psychological personality. The intellectual phenomenon is in their case secondary and is to be explained by the affective phenomenon.

Such is the origin of the religious need of the mystics. The biological theory of Krafft-Ebing which reduces the trance to the sexual instinct, is too simple and too coarse; the explanation by the feeling of fear or of love is too summary. What happens in the case of the mystics is something similar to that of the hypnotic subjects in the interval of the somnambulisms. The religious need in their case is the need of direction. The subject not being able to recover by his own strength his mental unity strives to submit to an influence which would effect in him what he is incapable of doing himself. On the other side, he is not satisfied with simply accepting the authority of a director of conscience.

He recovers his mental equilibrium and his unity by the triumph of a directing idea which takes the place of every exterior direction.

But this idea must be developed automatically, it must acquire the intensity and the objectivity of a sensation, it must take in his mind the shape of an extraneous authority. That is, the aim of the contemplative life is to unify the self while becoming simplified by the gradual elimination of the extraneous states considered profane. The trance is the mental unity obtained through the extinction of conflicting tendencies, and finally by the annihilation of the personality. The means of reaching this stage are either negative, as the asceticism which destroys the passions, or positive, as the various exercises whose object is to strengthen the religious idea and the corresponding feeling and to bring about the ecstatic monism. These processes are sometimes physiological, sometimes psychological, the contemplative life includes different degrees.

Coming back from the exaggerated cases to the normal state, we can say that

healthy piety admits, in a moderate degree, of the need of direction, of that of following a model, and of that of systematization or of the unification of the personality. But it is only one of the forms of religious feeling, its individual form. There exists also a social form of it; but just as there is an extreme case of the first form, mysticism, there is an extreme case of the second, fanaticism. Here, again, we notice an important gain in the psychology; the sociologists have paid attention only to the political fanaticism, the alienists give only observations of details or too general explanations, as the degenerescence, the depression, the exaltation, the education. Now what is the religious fanaticism?

M. Murisier quotes various examples of troubled souls who have in vain tried mysticism and recovered their peace only by getting back to the active life.

Examined at closer range, the need of action which the fanatic feels may be reduced to the need of adapting oneself to an environment, to a social group. The adaptation has a considerable influence on the stability of the mental life. The fanatic has a need of a social environment, real or imaginary, with which he becomes identified. This social character will be found in all the psychical manifestations of the fanaticism, in its hallucinations, in its automatisms, and its asceticism. Now one of the essential conditions of the adaptation for the weak beings who are deficient in elasticity, is the stability of the environment. Thence the need of unity, of uniformity in the group, be it the church or the sect. The psychosocial unity which the fanatic endeavors to realize by means of the religion is threefold; there is 1st, that of beliefs, 2d, that of acts and of conduct, 3rd, that of the feelings and the inmost dispositions of the members of the community.

"To sum up, the religious idea becomes a social force because the individual feels the need of remaining adapted to the environment where he is placed and where all the suggestions which he receives seem favorable and beneficial."

M. Murisier finds in this interpretation of the facts various advantages over those proposed up to the present time. To see in fanaticism a social regression, a return to the primitive indifferenciation of the masses amounts to returning to the famous biological theory which likens the society to an organism; but this theory is now-a-days well nigh exploded. It is simply an analogy and not an explanation. Even if the fanaticism were a social malady analogous to the organic degenerescence, we must, in order to understand it, to ascend to its fountain head, that is to say, to analyze the particular mental state whence it takes its origin. Among the sociologists who want to substitute the psychological interpretation to the biological interpretation of the social facts, Mr. Baldwin is the one with whom M. Murisier comes the nearest to an agreement. He quotes Mr. Baldwin's observations on the fundamentally conservative spirit of the average man and on the conservative rôle of the religion. But he tries to discover the psychological cause of these facts and finds it in the need felt by certain individuals to recover their mental equilibrium by a narrow adaptation to a social environment with which they identify themselves and whose permanency and stability becomes indispensable to them.

The exclusivism and the proselytism of the fanatics are due to this cause. There may be different ways of excluding the dissidents and of making proselytes, according to the particular conditions of the environment and the circumstances. Violent persecutions will take place mostly in the countries where the religious society forms one whole with the civil society. Where the two bodies are distinct the excommunication will be deemed sufficient; when the religious sect is powerless, the apocalyptic prophetism will make its appearance thus announcing the miraculous substitution of an ideal society to the society of the day. Finally the fanatic may create for himself an actual imaginary environment, and live hereafter only for the invisible world, whence comes his relish for and his seeking after martyrdom. M. Murisier shows that his hypothesis permits us to account for the principal manifestations of the fanaticism. Then he studies the processes of the spiritual conquest, that is to say of the contagion of the religious emotion. He quotes various epidemics of demonomania and of theomania, and he outlines the psychology of a Salvation Army gathering.

The propagation of the religious emotion is due to imitation, after a preparation which consists in increasing the suggestibility of the subject. The increase of the suggestibility is produced by the mortifications, the fasting, etc., . . . by the expectation of a miraculous event, by the excitation of the tendencies and desires

connected with the emotion which is to be aroused by the collective pressure of the mob, by the priests, by the individual action of the reader in the home. This being done, the contagion is produced by sympathy, in virtue of this psychological law that the sight of the exterior signs of the emotion induces us to reproduce these signs, and in consequence of it to feel this very emotion (Bain, Féré).

Returning from the morbid to the normal form of the religious life, M. Murisier concludes by saying with M. Delbos that the religion is the bond which unites in each soul all its spontaneous tendencies, which unites all the souls between themselves, which unites all the souls to the universe.

This remarkable work has produced a vivid interest in France and in Switzerland, and makes us regret so much more deeply the loss of the young *savant* so full of promise for the future.

M. MILLIOT D.

Professor in the University of Lausanne.

"*Les principes de la Psychologie Religieuse.*" Archives de Psychologie, Vol. 2, pp. 1-107.

"*Observations de Psychologie Religieuse.*" Archives de Psychologie, Vol. 2, pp. 127-166. BY PH. FLOURNAY.

M. Th. Flournay is *Professor extraordinaire* at the University of Geneva, Switzerland, where he established some years ago a psychological laboratory. He is assisted in his work by M. Ed. Claparé, Privat-Docent.

Prof. Flournay is one of the first European Psychologists and Philosophers to become acquainted with the work done in the Psychology of Religion and to contribute to it. The American Psychologists who are interested in that branch of knowledge may congratulate themselves upon having at Geneva an associate and an interpreter of the broad and deep culture and of the literary ability of Prof. Flournay.

The *Principes de la Psychologie de Religion* is substantially the introductory lecture of a course given at the University of Geneva in 1901-1902. The purpose of this first lecture is to indicate the standpoint and the principles of the Psychology of Religion as they appear in the investigations so far published. It is observed in passing that these investigations are few in number and almost all come from the United States. They constitute, in the opinion of the author, the foundation of a true (*Véritable*) psychology of religion because (1) they pass beyond the isolated facts to a generalized view of the subject by means of the questionnaire method, and comparisons of statistics; (2) they do not deal with the external and social products of religion, but with the inner, individual, experiences themselves; (3) they are inspired neither by religious zeal, nor by the desire to establish or to destroy theological or philosophical theses, but by scientific interest alone.

The principle upon which Prof. Flournay lays the greatest emphasis is that the Psychology of Religion does not concern itself with the objective truth of the religious beliefs. In this the new study separates itself sharply from the old study of religion whose chief effort has always been to establish the objective validity of Religion. Psychology, we are told, excludes the transcendental, not because it does not take into account the transcendental interpretations or 'experiences' of the pious souls, but that it "carefully refrains from condemning or approving them." They are considered as subjective facts pure and simple. It follows from this that "whatever be the degree of perfection Psychology may reach, it will remain forever silent upon the great, disquieting problems of life." The modern Psychology of Religion is independent of all metaphysics, it is nothing more than a study of a portion of human experience.

The chief characteristics of this branch of study are collectively designated as the *biological interpretation* of religious facts. We are to understand by this expression that the Psychology of Religion is

(1) Physiological, *i. e.*, that it seeks the physiological conditions and correlates of religious experience;

(2) that it is genetic or evolutionary;

(3) that it is comparative;

(4) that it is dynamic, *i. e.*, that it considers religious life as a very complex system of processes exhibiting in their unfolding the play of underlying forces.

One could not have put in clearer and more pleasing form the principles of the Psychology of Religion.

On one point only do I find matter for discussion. Does Prof. Flourney convey a correct idea of the relation of the investigations of which he speaks to the ultimate, metaphysical, problems of religion when he affirms that Psychology will never have anything to say concerning them? Even if it never add new solutions to the two fundamental metaphysical hypotheses which have been and are still open, will it not, in bringing new data to bear upon the old questions, favor one of the solutions at the expense of the other, or may it not transform the problems and, consequently the answers, so as to make them practically new? Witness, for instance, the recent attempt of Prof. James (*The Varieties of Religious Experience*) to find support in religious experience for a metaphysical opinion. He happens, as it seems to me, to have failed of his purpose,¹ but the attempt is by no means preposterous. Prof. Flourney has perhaps been led to make unguarded statements by his eagerness to reassure the good people who look askance at the invasion of the field of religious life by scientific psychology. It would, it seems to me, be truer, and diplomatically just as well, to claim for the Psychology of Religion a renovating and transforming power upon religious beliefs, not only upon the minor dogmas, but also upon the so called 'ultimate' religious conceptions.

The Observations of Religious Psychology contains six religious autobiographies (some written spontaneously, some at the request of the author, but none in answer to a set of questions) accompanied by comments.

The publication of these documents is to be welcomed as a valuable addition to the scant data upon which Psychology has to work.

These six observations are too different from each other to permit of general conclusions except concerning the relation of intellectual beliefs to the deeper phenomena of the effective and volitional order. As I have purposely used most of the space at my disposal in the consideration of the *Principles*, I shall have to limit myself to the reproduction of the only general conclusion. "This relation may be of any sort; it seems dependent upon the temperament or personal idiosyncrasies. There are persons for whom a fixed and well determined system of belief, brought from the outside and accepted whole, is felt to be the primordial condition of the religious life. There are others for whom, on the contrary, any such system, any dogmatic affirmata even whatsoever it may be, seems superfluous and useless, possibly even an unfortunate obstacle to the development of the inner life. The religious evolution of the latter consists essentially in ridding themselves of the intellectual shell clapped upon them by their *milieu*, or by their education, this not in order to build up another system but only to preserve the immediate, inner, experience alone, in its nakedness."

JAMES H. LEUBA.

Bryn Mawr College.

NOTE ON RELIGIOUS EVOLUTION IN JAPAN.

We have become accustomed to wonders in Japan. Doubtless they are not as marvellous as they appear; but rather the fruit of long evolution ripening under favorable conditions. The history of the race shows periods of marked plasticity, receptivity, power of assimilation, and progress. A thousand years ago, it absorbed Chinese civilization, philosophy, religion and language to the permanent arrest of development within its own, yet in such a manner as to render each a new product so transformed as to be no longer Chinese but vitally Japanese.

To-day, apparently, the same process is being repeated with the culture of the Anglo-Saxon, even to the adoption of the Roman alphabet parallel with the Chinese ideograph and the native syllabary. New Japan is experiencing a rapid growth attendant upon her new birth. Again she is most plastic and receptive; again she is assimilating and maturing with all the strain and stress of adolescence. Thoroughly Oriental, she is adopting and, what is more noteworthy, adapting a Occidental civilization, philosophy, religion and language (?). Of this her own leaders in all departments are quite conscious, not least so in the sphere of religion.

The body of Japanese who can by the most liberal estimate be judged even remotely associated with Christianity as a religious faith is less than 1% of the entire population; and yet, because of the growing influence of that 1%, and, even more

¹ See my criticism, "Prof. Wm. James' Interpretation of Religious Experience," *Intern. Jour. of Ethics*, April, 1904.

because of a peculiarly pervasive Christian atmosphere, the nation is experiencing a slow and as it were unconscious conversion during this adolescent period of maturing state-consciousness. The great branches of Buddhism, of which there are more diverse and antagonistic sects than in all protestantism, are experiencing a revival and a reformation at the hands of men trained in Western thought. One movement, thus far more philosophic than religious, is described by a leading Christian teacher as "an endeavor to bring Japanese Buddhism into harmony with modern scientific and philosophic thought, and to adapt it to the needs of modern life." Its methods are rationalistic and its conclusions radical. Faith is minimized and Gautama regarded merely a great religious teacher. Transmigration and the miraculous power of Buddhist rites are denied. Prof. K. Hukariya of the Soto-Shu Honzau Dai Gakuin, Tokyo, writes concerning New Buddhism: "There are a great many differences between the Old and the New Beliefs which are hardly reconcilable. They are contending with each other for supremacy and the Buddhist Society is now torn with dissensions. The new spirit which rapidly spreads itself among the rising generation is overthrowing old customs one after another. The yellow robe, the tonsure, the rosary, the alms-bowl, the staff and such things monastic, together with those beliefs which made them sacred, are swept away by the new tide. Time will come, we hope, when Buddhism will undergo a change, a change so great that a Japanese Rip Van Winkle will be at a loss to tell whether it is Buddhism or not."

A second movement, more spiritual in its nature and more truly religious, is that of the Shinshu. This sect has many doctrines similar to those of Christianity, but without having derived them from it. "Penance fasting, prescribed diet, pilgrimages, isolation from society, whether as hermits or in the cloister, and generally amulets and charms are all tabooed by this sect. Devout prayer, purity, earnestness of life, and trust in Buddha himself as the only worker of perfect righteousness, are insisted on. Morality is taught as more important than Orthodoxy." The Orthodox doctrines of Buddhism, that salvation is self-attained, is rejected; and salvation is held to be the reward of faith alone. This sect and others akin to it are frankly copying many methods employed by Christianity, quoting the teachings of Christian Scriptures, emphasizing many truths accepted by both religions, and admitting the value that Christianity has had in quickening their own life institutionally and spiritually. Able priests of Buddha publicly declare Christianity to have been a great blessing in stirring up Buddhists to more earnest work; and one in an address congratulating the Christians said, "Christianity has already been of great value in stirring up Buddhists to a better life, and whatever gains Christianity can make can only benefit us all."

Buddhism is conscious of having come to Japan from a foreign land and of having been received because it brought a blessing and satisfied a longing. It now recognizes that Christianity comes bringing a blessing and satisfying a longing, filling a place it has been powerless to occupy. That it may not pass away before an able servant of human needs, while the great mass of its myriad followers are in ignorance, superstition, and often in gross sin, its awakened leaders, conscious of at least partial failure, strive on the one hand to ally it with the truth of a supposed science, and on the other to develop those spiritual factors that are seen to be the strength of its great rival. How far the latter movement may extend none can tell; or whether, when the real essence of Christianity is recognized, it may elect to live by its spirit, saving its own life by losing it, giving to the consideration of religious workers in Japan, of students of religion throughout the world, the marvel of a converted Buddhism. Certain it is that in Japan may be observed a wide-spread conscious and unconscious religious evolution, in which truth adapted to human needs in Buddhism, in Christianity in the blending two, will be established. Even that agnosticism, which so characterizes cultured Japan, is the transitional stage in an evolution, wherein many stand for a time "between two worlds:—one dead, the other powerless to be born;" and may be recognized as the almost necessary psychic experience of thoughtfulness called upon so vitally to readjust themselves to a changed intellectual and spiritual environment.

Anthropologists, holding, however, diverse views of human origins in single or widely scattered areas, agree I think, in the opinion that the world races are drawing nearer each to each, and that the all-in, all-surviving will be formed of a blend

ing of all, that neither Occidental nor Oriental, neither fair-skinned nor dark stands *per se* for the dominant race of the future; but that the cosmopolitan will be one in whose blood flows the heredity of the world, and in whose life the aspirations of the world find realization. However this may be in the sphere of the physical, none doubt its truth in the sphere of mental and spiritual life. He who pre-figured the goal of humanities' evolution justifies the postulate of science.

So in questions of religion, of Christianity considered as the Supreme Universal Faith, the prophet, the sect, the man of God, revealing God to men and men unto themselves, recognizes that through the channels of every religious faith has flowed the revelation of God and the aspiration of man; that the ultimate is not yet, nor will be until those channels shall be led to a single stream in which the truth may have free course; that the world's true Christian is the man who, uniting in himself the life of humanity, finds full expression and satisfaction of all religious aspiration and needs under the guidance of the Universal Spirit of Truth whom the Master promised should come to others as to Himself. Religion must gather unto itself the soul of all religions:—that which in them is true and immortal, even as man must expand under the fullness of what is truly human. The Science of Religion, said Dr. Chas. Cuthbert Hall in the opening of his Barrows lectures 1903, is founded on three facts,—on the unity of man, a unity that is profound, existing in the spirit of humanity; on the co-operative evolution of the race, an evolution toward absolute truth to which all religions make their contribution; and on the origin of religion, which origin is in the perception of the Infinite, in the yearning of the soul after God.

In Japan to-day is taking place that which the world has never seen before,—two civilizations, diverse as the East is from the West, meeting under conditions honorable to each in such a manner that the processes of evolution may have free play; two religions, diverse as the civilizations with which they have grown, and whose life they have largely moulded, meeting as honorable contestants in the service of humanity, ready through their ablest leaders to recognize each the truth of the other, and eager to supplement that truth in a mutual struggle toward the Absolute Truth yet to be fully realized by men.

The life, thought, and spirit of the East, out of which has come every great religion, and of the West wherein has been developed the world's noblest ethics, have met; and from that meeting we may hope to see a blending of life, thought, and spirit, and, it may be, a cosmopolitan faith not less but more truly Christian in its realization of the Unity of Truth and of the myriad forms of adaptation to human needs.

FRANK A. LOMBARD.

Clark University, Feb. 15, 1904.

Evolution of the Japanese; social and psychic, by SIDNEY L. GULICK. Revell Co., New York, 1903. pp. 457.

Are the Japanese indifferent to religion? Confucius said, "Beware of gods." The statesman, Ito, in an oft quoted statement says religion is not necessary for natural life. All religion is superstition and therefore a source of weakness to a nation. Nor does he think atheism, which he says is almost universal in Japan, is a source of danger. "Wanted a religion" is the title of a missionary's description of Japan. This, Gulick denies and cites the countless gods, pious pilgrimages to eighty-eight sacred places, the god-shelves in every home, the 71,851 Buddhist temples and 190,803 officially registered shrines. They are joyous but suppress deeper feelings, but practice many rites with deep feeling, cultivate ecstasy. "The irreligion now so rampant in Japan is a recent phenomena." Shintoism has no moral code; Buddhism is decadent; Confucianism is moral, political and ceremonial. Christianity, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, numbered about one million, and protestation later promised to sweep the land till the great reaction in 1888. Religious traits, Gulick thinks, are not ethnic but social and easily changed. The Japanese pantheon has no supreme god and many converts of the more intelligent class have found their first satisfaction in finding monotheism because it first brought unity into their lives and into their idea of the world. Although there are myriads of gods, few of the educated classes are now polytheists but all are monists of some kind. The universe preceded the gods. Their language has no word for sin and few have the sense of it. The dead are very real and participate in the daily

life of the living and arouse deep gratitude. Phallicism was once highly developed and although suppressed many traces of it linger. For two hundred and fifty years, ending in 1872, Christianity was forbidden under pain of death. "A brand new religion" was established in all the schools in the ceremonial worship of the Mikado who is apotheosized. "The higher life of the nation readily took on in later times the religious characteristics of the Chinese, predominantly ethical, it is true, and only slightly religious as to forms of worship." This author thinks there is no race trait to prevent it and that Japan will be ultimately Christian, for their faith has no national coloring but is the white light of truth. The same man often worships at the shrine of different creeds. While there have been persecutions, the older religions were fractional and supplemental with no collisions in doctrine or morals. It is the liberty of indifference. Any religion as in ancient Rome, is tolerated, since 1888, that does not claim exclusiveness. They fear a religion that demands abandoning all others. Some think their gratitude to the dead has "evolved moral sentiments wholly unknown" in the West. Loyalty and filial piety are at the root of courage, fidelity, obedience, virtue and religion. Buddhists worship all who have attained nirvana. Their sentiments are represented in 190,000 Shinto shrines. Ready resignation to fate is one expression of it and this makes for submission rather than for self-assertion. Misfortune is a result of a previous life. Frequent bathing and horror of physical impurity is strong and can be built on, but to tell a man he is a sinner is an insult.

The late A. B. Davidson's results of forty years of thought on Old Testament prophecy, which have just appeared, mark an epoch in the theological prophecy comparable to Robertson Smith's "Prophets of Israel" in its history. The author urges that "the religious development of Israel is mainly development in the idea of God. When mysterious problems arise, either in national or individual life, the problem was immediately reflected back upon God and became one regarding his nature or action. The history of Israel is a history of prophecy. Men of prophetic rank and name stand at the great turning points of the people's life and direct the movements. The prophet could foresee, because to his mind the principal, or rather, the only actor in the drama was Jehovah himself, and his foresight of it is little else than his conception of Jehovah, of what he is and what his purposes are, flung into the wrestling mass of principles and forces which he perceived around him." As H. W. Robinson well remarks, there is another third line of approaching the illusive of the prophetic consciousness, viz., by way of anthropology which studies parallel developments of the Old Testament among other people. The need of a wider basis of induction is more deeply felt and "in the case of the prophetic consciousness our study must range from high intellectual products like the Koran to the mutterings of an African witch doctor." To understand here needs high gifts of ethical and spiritual insight and sympathy. The prophet was called the man of God, interpreter, seer, spyer, watchman, nabi and servant or messenger of Jehovah, and his prophetic state was one of high mentation and intuition. Hence, Davidson says, "Prophecy is the intuition of truth accompanied by the feeling that the truth was immediately communicated by Jehovah. I dislike any theory that would put any other source of revelation on the level with the mind of man. There was still a living fountain out of which there welled forth God's commands and which sent its waters down through every channel of the state beneath the crust of intuition. The prophet was the point at which God's revelation and will to Israel was still, so to speak, fluid and not congealed into institutions." Such a conviction of revelation a man who lives with God may have today. In olden time, the originality of personality was not highly conceived and the mind was thought to be moved by external stimuli. Thus there was a general sense of a telepathic relation between God and man but this connection was generally thought to be miraculous and therefore above definition. Only the prophet's mind could be defined. The author's position on typology is that the way of the Lord is always typified, the old dispensation being a body and soul, and the new, a disembodied soul. The latter makes no advance on the Old Testament idea of God, but in the new, instead of entering into relations with a race he reaches individuals. In prophecy we see the finished architecture and forget the very intricate scaffolding of variegated life, parties, interests, of the time in which it grew. Messiah is regarded as Jehovah's representative, word and truth incarnate. Later thought, systematized these utter-

ances around a single person. In prophetic perspective realities are seen foreshortened and, therefore, dates and times are unreliable. By "servant of God" Davidson means Israel as God meant it to be and abstraction elevated and ideals by the prophet distinguished from all individuals and in a sense prominent, a faithful nucleus throughout history.

Jesus als Erzieher, von PASTOR BRUCH. H. Anders, Bielefeld, 1903.

How inseparable is the pedagogic from the genetic standpoint, and how new they make old things seem, is strikingly illustrated in the life, character and teachings of Jesus. From this point of view, instead of scientific formulæ and finalities, the criterion of truth is adaptation and edification. By teaching that God was a Father we are justified in regarding revelation as pedagogic and this makes much that has been riddles clear. A father is necessarily a teacher. The story of creation becomes no longer a statement of scientific truth, but was a pedagogical masterpiece for teaching those it was addressed to that God made heaven and earth. God's decrees no longer conflict with freedom but stand only for the foreknowledge a parent has of how his child will act; and who would think of saying this interferes with the child's liberty? As pedagogic rather than judicial, the cross teaches how evil sin is and how eager God is to forgive it. The incarnation is an object lesson, answers to the desire to see God, or, if not that, to have an image of him that is his best possible representation, an idol for human beings. The manger birth teaches the vanity of pomp and luxury as nothing else perhaps could do. The temple scene shows objectively that the chief duty of this age is to struggle to God and to obey parents. The patience of passion week teaches to suffer to a martyr's death if need be, silently and without unseemly whining and complaint or vociferation, and with classic stoic repose outwardly. As a teacher, he focused on a few and sought to make them perfect when he might have organized the machinery of wide propaganda. The temptations were to sensationalism, self-advertisement, to win attention. He taught *non multa, sed multum*, and with no didactic materialism and would not satisfy idle curiosity or impart dead knowledge but addressed all to the will. While he once brought in a child to illustrate a point, he was chiefly an occasionalist and his parables show that he saw nature as a symbol. This method of making objects speak his language was concrete, made for review, and at the same time transfigured nature. The Eucharist and Baptism from this point of view are solely symbolic acts, impressive and sanctifying, eating and washing. His character was the chief object lesson for it was even more perfect than this teaching. Who else could say to those who knew him best and saw him oftenest, "Who hath seen me hath seen the Father," or "Learn of me?" His motive as an educator was love which was the highest and inspired all he did. His love was sympathetic and individualizing, made each pupil a special problem, as modern child study inculcates. He met choleric, sanguine, phlegmatic, melancholy and nervous temperaments but adjusted to all. When asked how to pray he answered by an example. His one command was love and then freedom was left the widest range.

The Mediæval Stage, by E. K. CHAMBERS. Vol. 1, pp. 419; Vol. 2, pp. 480. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1903.

In his chapter on "The Religion of the Folk," E. K. Chambers sheds interesting light on the introduction of Christianity into England. It supplanted the ludi and many sympathetic forms of magic, but most superstitious practices lingered. The baptism of the king or chief usually came first, and the people readily adopted an alien cult in an alien tongue, but old practices remained. Idols were destroyed and pagan temples reconsecrated with holy water and relicts. The missionaries effected a change in a few essentials with little interference with the great body of accidentals. Outward signs of the old religion became more secret and domestic. All rituals bound up with food, flocks, etc., were unchanged, and these were the heart of the old faiths, and both mimetic and sympathetic magic flourished. Dr. Frazer thinks this was primitive science rather than religion, but phyllo- and theriomorphic deities were connected with localities, industries, practical necessities, and often from a crowd of animistic spirits one was isolated as a god. As he grew in significance he usually had a female counterpart, and perhaps the plant god, revered by the women who were chiefly interested in the vegetable world, if not

often the chief agriculturists, became a dualistic counterpart of an animal god revered by the men. Objects of worship changed their functions with advancing civilization. If a race settled by the sea and became maritime, old inland gods protected sailors and cargoes. New industries were also given to their protection. Culture heroes arose who invested gifts of progressive advancement from the conservative older gods. Thus religious concepts were plastic, fused, sundered, and all these processes were reflected on the mediæval stage. This and religion in the middle ages are so intimately associated that neither can be understood without the other. Village festivals, the folk drama, May games, sword dances, the mummers' play, New Year's custom, the feast of fools, masks and misrules, and liturgical and parish plays, all these preceded the secularization of the drama, and guild plays, morality plays, puppet plays, interludes, pageants, etc., which followed, still reflected religious life and were more or less central in the long conflict between humanism and mediævalism that followed.

System des Religiösen Materialismus. Wissenschaft der Seele, von DR. TH. VON VELZEN. Leipzig, 1903. pp. 467.

The dominant psychology, premises this author, has deterred many from this subject on account of its abstractions and has also tended to give it a subordinate place among the sciences. Wundt conceives it as a mediator between the sciences of nature and of mind when, in fact, it is the first and most interesting of them all. Aristotle, too, assigned it the first place. It is also the most exalted science because it takes us behind the phenomena of the world to which all other sciences are bound down. Concepts have length, breadth and thickness, although we cannot measure these dimensions. Corporeity is the end of God's way. Soul is derived from an old root, *Shawola*, meaning space. The soul has magnitude. Much of our thinking is done in the visual sphere. Everything psychic is localized. Soul without body is inconceivable. This view frees men from the fear of death. The soul that made the body leaves it after death and may form for itself another body in another world. Matter and motion thus constitute all the universe. Like death they are concepts only, states of the ego. All concepts abide with the ego after death but in a latent state. Our present life starts movements that go on unfolding. While these are the general premises and conclusions, the body of the book is made up of discussions of senses, ideas, associations, feelings, judgment, and a description of the common topics and processes included in psychologies from the standpoint and in terms of his theory.

Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit, by AUGUSTE SABATIER. New York, 1904. pp. 410.

This posthumous work, translated by Louise Seymour Houghton, was finished in 1900, we are told by the author's widow, and laid aside for a revision it did not receive. It is a sequel to his *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion based upon Psychology and History*, published in 1897. Two systems of theology, we are told, still confront one another, that of authority and that of experience. Their methods are radically opposed. Animated not only by his own deep personal interest but also by the fact that, in France, religious questions have peculiar zest because they underlie so many political problems, Dean Sabatier seeks to find historic and philosophical mediation between the religion of the spirit which is from within outwards, and that of dogma which is from without inward. The three divisions of the book are devoted respectively to the Roman Catholic dogma of authority concerning the church, tradition, the episcopate and the papacy; the Protestant dogma of authority especially concerning the infallibility of the Bible; and the religion of the spirit founded by Jesus and of which the New Testament is the charter. The organization of Christian doctrine shows three stages, marked by three ways, in which man comes into association with his fellows or his Gods, viz., *interest*, which began with the Hebrew adoration of El, the strong one; *law*, represented by Jehovah; and *love*, which is of Jesus. The spirit of piety fuses with scientific inspiration but not with the method of observation or experiment. True science and religion both love truth supremely, but both have their narrowness, their bigots and fanatics. Those who feel that they must choose between the debased forms of the two are to be pitied. Once theology was supreme but now she sues humbly for any place in the sacred choir of modern sciences. The once fatal infirmity of theology that leads it to take

refuge behind a supernatural authority often cuts it off from all relation to the spirit of modern science. She was once the queen of science but must now undergo a re-creation, like that marked by Kepler, Bacon and Descartes in science in order to be admitted as an adopted sister into the family. Mysteries inaccessible to reason and experience can win no recognition. They are formulæ of vacuum, unverifiable, resting on purely verbal conceptions and established only by authority. The Trinity, *e. g.*, can be called intangible and indisputable only by an authority of the same order as that which in France to-day forbids the discussion of the republican form of government. It is politics and not science. Thus the Catholic church has separate universities as it separates the clergy from the laity, and discussion is so futile that it is set aside as mere preterition. It is unscientific, *e. g.*, to supplement the notoriously insufficient proofs of the authenticity of the fourth gospel by the suggestion that if it is not written by the beloved disciple Christianity will suffer. Again many would now deduce Christ's divinity from his pre-existence with which it has no connection, for pre-existence is often claimed for all men. Thus the historic study of a progressive dogma is cut short by a fiat because this is called the keystone of the Christian arch. Theology really can rest only on history and psychology, and history is the psychology of the past and psychology is history brought down to the present moment. Each must individualize in himself the faith of his fathers, as Goethe says reacquire what he inherits in order to possess it. Theology is not metaphysical or speculative but rests on history, psychology and sociology, for religion is no less social than language. Doctrines are expressions of common beliefs in a common society and it must be made both intelligible and respectable. To do this doctrine must rest on scripture, philosophy and science, and religious experience is the instinctive sense these create. The typical experience first occurred in Jesus.

Ueber den einfluss der Naturwissenschaften auf die Weltanschauung, von ALBERT LADENBURG. Veit & Comp, Leipzig. pp. 35.

This address of a professor of chemistry has been the centre of much discussion in Germany. He says the command, "Let there be light," will not be fulfilled until the Bible is seen to be man's work. The Greeks, in a sense even more than the Hebrews, were a chosen people. The Renaissance threw off classical incubus, and free thought must always throw off that of the Semites. We may feel the marvels of the universe but man can form no concept of creation. It is impossible to form any conception of a creator. Man is a parasite upon an insignificant satellite of one of the millions of suns. Description is no revelation but the combination of history, poetry and pedagogy. Gravity is a universal law which must be absolutely accepted, but concerning the force underlying which we can have no conception. The same is true of the laws of indestructible matter and the conservation of energy. Miracle is eternally impossible and the only concept man can form of God is as an embodiment of the laws of nature. If man is immortal we cannot deny that animals also are. We know no substratum to the soul. If even great men only are immortal the question arises whether their eternal state represents their childhood, their maturity or their drivelling old age. The wish is here the father of the thought. Finally, the idea of another life has always impoverished this. The best humanistic endeavors of modern times have originated with science and with the growing recognition that we must make the most and best of this life both for ourselves and others.

Religion und Naturwissenschaft. Eine Antwort an Professor Ladenburg. Von ARTHUR TITUS, Prof. der Theol. in Kiel. Tübingen, 1904. pp. 114.

We note this pamphlet as an instance of a method too often found in theologic polemic against the negative and frank, if often rather crude, pronouncements of men of science concerning religious questions. The author discusses first the two vast topics of the relation between natural science and the spiritual life and the Christian religion, and then seeks to make peace in the conflict he finds between piety and science. Scores of names old and new in all fields of thought are used as supporters or antagonists of views, but of their distinctive tenets we learn almost nothing. Many are well known as are their characteristic views, but the writer seems to carefully refrain from stating by implication what even the newer and obscurer ones hold about any of the very few venerable opinions he defends. This

makes an impression of vagueness, remoteness, and unreality, as if the names were mere counters. Arguments are answered by poetic quotations, facts by ancient and often well worn quotations and by sentiments. Biologists are refuted by philosophers, rhetoric and logic are strangely mixed and experiments are non-suited by authorities. The argument for immortality is confirmed by Benecke's opinion that idiots and senile demented, along with mental weakness, have "a constantly increasing strength of inner *seelenssein*." So far as we can follow the dying this is "not in the least diminished." Moreover there may be "eternal soul substance which may be assumed after the analogy of the conservation of energy." So Jesus' inspiration with divine power "enabled him to have the greatest kind of effect on the organism of the sick which must seem to those present and also to him as awakening from the dead." It was all a most unique act of a most unique personality. Other objectors to such miracles have brought other arguments against them, and this lack of agreement among men of science shows that their position is individual, capricious and discordant. Cannot religious apologists any longer think coherently and clearly without incessantly modulating from fact to fancy in sentiment and authority? This writer is liberal and sympathetic on the whole with science, often makes concessions that are fatal to his case, has read and pondered and is profoundly interested in his theme. The vice we think lies deep and is almost ineradicable from many a mind trained in the theology of tradition and authority, which flit amphibiously from the domain of nature to that of doctrine or revelation, allying facts, reasons, proof texts, as if they were all homogeneous links in a chain. Those who believe profoundly in a religion of science or a science of religion often use a double bookkeeping, but if this duality is valid the two methods should be used consistently so that the reader can distinguish between them.

Wissen und Glauben, von DR. C. GUETTLER. 2nd Ed. München, 1904. pp. 210.

These sixteen lectures were first given some ten years ago before a large university audience in Munich where the author is a professor. They attracted much attention and have now been somewhat amplified and brought into relation with some of the best among the very many pamphlet discussions of this and allied subjects with which Germany seems lately to have swarmed. Güttler seeks a middle course between the scholastic and positivistic way in a "believing skepticism." The goal of all knowledge is to know that we most believe:—*sciendo nescimus*. By analyzing life problems he would find what we can know and what not. "Tutorism," or the conclusion that it is better or less dangerous to believe than not to do so, does not suffice. Conviction must be individual. God would be only an idol if there was not a positive disposition to believe in God in the soul. But this "noblest production of the human soul" needs to be developed. The same is true of creation in time, the unity of the development of the cosmos, freedom and immortality. These are the problems chiefly discussed. Immortality, e. g., is established because it has inspired so much of the best literature and so many of the greatest deeds by its assumption that life is not the highest good. Theology, like philosophy, is progressive and that means is historical and does not deal in ultimates or finalities.

Ideen zu einer Jesuzentrischen Weltreligion, von KARL ANDRESEN. Lotus-Verlag, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 373.

This writer believes that Christian dogmatics is in a state of rather advanced decadence and must be quite radically reconstructed in conformity with the Zeitgeist in order to make the religion of Jesus the religion of the future. His philosophy is based largely on Hartmann, especially his theory of individuality of souls. Although, like Bruno, this philosophy was developed independently of Christianity he seeks to make harmony between them. The two chief ideas that he thinks, when restated, will be central are those of God and immortality; and to the latter he gives most attention, contrasting it with the Buddhistic doctrine of reincarnation, but insists that the religion of the future will be based upon the synthesis of Christian and Buddhist ideas of immortality. A brief creed is appended which gives in three somewhat philosophically phrased articles the new Christocentric religion which makes Jesus the ideal man whose will was brought into complete harmony with that of God. When we do this we shall have achieved immortality.

Die altarabische Mondreligion und die mosaische Ueberlieferung, von DITLEF NIELSEN, Karl J. Trübner, Strassburg, 1904. pp. 221.

In this very scholarly work we have a clear and luminous story told of the deepest and most widespread of all the religions of the moon. Its cult centered in southern Arabia and was as distinctive there in pre-Mohammedan days as solar worship was in Babylon. The latter country was agricultural and therefore stationary, whereas in the earliest times the Arabs were shepherds migrating constantly with their flocks and usually, owing to the heat, by night so that the moon became their time measurer. Here it was, he thinks, that our week and lunar month was developed. Perhaps the title of his book might as well have been "The Sabbath Question." In the second part, devoted to the Mosaic tradition, the writer shows how much Moses and the early Israelites were indebted to the Egyptians. Partly here, but more in the Arabian desert, they were also infected with the moon cult of which he gives very many illustrations from the Pentateuch. All this, however, was before their experiences at Sinai, and after this every trace of this cult and every allusion was sedulously eliminated.

Life and Teachings of Abbas Effendi, by MYRON H. PHELPS. With an Introduction by Edward G. Browne. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1903. pp. 259.

Mr. Phelps is a New York lawyer, who was fascinated by Babism or Behaism through reading the works of Professor E. G. Browne, and who spent the month of December, 1902, in Akka in making the acquaintance of Abbas Effendi, "easily the most remarkable man whom it has ever been my fortune to meet," and collecting material for his book. The biographical matter was furnished by Abbas' sister through the Countess Canavarro. Mr. Phelps worked diligently with the aid of an interpreter, took down everything, and has certainly written a fascinating book. Abbas, who, since the death of his father, Beha Ullah, whom Bab (=Gate) himself, executed in 1850, named as his successor, is third and last of the divine messengers by whom this dispensation is introduced. It has several million adherents in Persia, is rapidly increasing, and missionaries have planted the seed in many countries, even in this where it claims several thousand inhabitants. Mr. Phelps thinks that Akka is the most interesting spot on earth to-day for students of religion because we see at its youth, for it was founded only in 1844, the developmental stage of a religion destined to become one of the greatest. By familiarity with what can be seen here we can understand, he says, such lives as Confucius, Zoroaster, Buddha, Christ and Mohammed. It is said that more than ten thousand have suffered martyrdom in Persia alone. No Mohammedan sect has ever begun to make such advances. Babism has its own religious books but no canon and does not desire one; neither does it wish settled doctrine. The Babists have "no fixed or prominent idea of personal immortality or rewards in future life," and yet they meet martyrdom with equanimity and exultation. In 1852 one eminent leader was pierced with deep wounds in each of which was thrust a lighted wick but "he hastened as a bridegroom to his bride to the place of execution singing with exultation,

"Grasping in one hand the wine-cup, clinging to my darling's hair,
Dancing would I thus confront the scaffold in the square."

Another, at the place of execution, was smitten by the headsman from behind. The blow only wounded the old man's neck and cast his turban to the ground. He raised his head and exclaimed "Oh, happy that intoxicated lover who at the feet of his beloved knoweth not whether it be his head or his turban which he casteth."

Babism perhaps does not go so far as Mr. Phelps who says, "God and religion are but names and shadows to the western world," but it does assume that all the great religions tend to decay and are more or less advanced in the stages of decay so that a great witness of God is occasionally necessary, perhaps especially now. Babism recognizes every other religion as equally divine in origin with itself. No man is asked to desert his own faith but only to live up to its ideal. Indeed, it professes only to renew the message formerly given by other divine messengers which has become more or less forgotten. Throughout the world religion is stagnant and faith is dead. The Behas conform to Mohammedanism and do not entirely agree among themselves. In the struggle between two leaders we see a very similar conflict to that which took place in the early Christian church between Peter and Paul.

Babism, like Mohammedanism, knows no distinction of race or color. The negro is not debarr'd from intermarriage but is respected. Our missionaries, says Professor Browne, begin by attacking either explicitly or implicitly the inspiration of the Koran and the prophetic function of Mohammed. If he destroys these he destroys the recognition of Jewish and Christian dispensations which the Koran emphatically proclaims and really converts Moslems to atheism. If the Koran is a lie what value will those who have believed it attach to its powerful witness to the truth of Christ's mission? The Babist, however, denies nothing in the Koran except its finality and does not discredit its own witness. The western world needs a fresh, spiritual impulse to repel the barren systems of agnostics and mere humanitarians "who would give us rules to regulate a life which they have rendered meaningless." One thing is certain, that most Babists are converts and are not what they are by the mere circumstances of birth.

The philosophy, psychology and ethics of this movement are high, pure and inspiring. Love is at the root of it. It condemns gambling, slavery, opium, intoxication, theft, adultery, and discourages polygamy. It recognizes evolution. There can be, it teaches, no contention where there is true religion and high conceptions of truth. Tolerance impels us to say, in view of other religions, "How like my own." It would fill every old faith full of impulses of its best period. All great teachers of religion have been inspired of God. Buddha appeared to men of a higher culture than any other, Mohammed to those most barbaric. The countrymen of Jesus were intermediate. Babism does not claim that its leader is divine but only that it is a true and modern manifestation of God in the world. "God is to every human being as great as the individual, mental capacity permits one to see him." His preaching is to all men that they are not living up to the moral, educational or religious precepts which they themselves think they hold. They never exhort others to become Babists. Their missionaries must always teach the truth of the religion maintained by the people to whom they go. It is of little consequence what they call themselves. The great object of life is to build character. Every one must find his weaknesses and recognize that every act strengthens or weakens. Self knowledge is of course essential.

We have no space to epitomize the discourses and the various tablets reproduced in this interesting book. There is certainly nothing to jar the modern consciousness. Even reincarnation is set aside with a few incisive and convincing statements. To say that there is nothing in the life or teachings of the leader that jars on the Christian consciousness, unless it be the breadth of its toleration, is to say much.

Aus der Indischen Kulturwelt, von ARTHUR PFUNGST. Fr. Frommanns, Stuttgart, 1904. pp. 201.

Fausbell, in 1875, and Oskar Peschel, in his ethnographic studies about the same time, called special attention to the Jataka book, since translated into English by Richard Morris. This is the oldest collection of popular stories in the world and was written between 300 and 400 B. C. Here are found in their earliest form such tales as the judgment of Solomon, the pound of flesh in Shakespeare's "Merchant of Venice" and many others. Pfungst gives us some very interesting side lights not only upon this volume but upon many other interesting facts in new fields opened by East Indian studies. He holds that, for instance, all lands that very closely connect the hare with the moon are Buddhistic in their origin. He finds them among Mohammedans, Japanese, Siamese, Mongols and others. The hare, in the story, was one of Buddha's many incarnations. He made the jackal, the ape and the otter, kind and considerate, and when Indra came down and refused to accept the only food offering he could make, which was of grass, he prepared a pile of fagots and, shaking himself three times that the vermin in his pelt might be spared suffering, was about to leap in to roast himself for the palate of the goddess when he was prevented. To commemorate this deed Indra extracted all the juices of the mountain and with them painted a figure of the hare in the moon. Sometimes he is charged with a message to men, that as the moon dies and lives again so shall they. In other tales the king of the hares lives in the moon.

The Relation of the Young Men's Christian Association Movement to the Boy, pp. 1-25.
The Work of a Boys' Department in a Young Men's Christian Association, pp. 29-45.
 By GEORGE A. COE. The Secretarial Institute and Training School of Young Men's Christian Associations, Chicago, 1902.

In these two valuable addresses Professor Coe pleads that the church should do more for the religious nurture of children and youth, that there is a missing link between sentiment and action, that boys are often misunderstood, that maturity is no standard for boyhood. He inclines to agree with Bushnell that the child should grow up a Christian and never know himself to be otherwise. The unconscious factors in religious growth have not been sufficiently recognized and the boys' pre-suppositions must be captured.

In the second paper Professor Coe supports his plea by many forcible, practical suggestions from the field of both education and psychology and from certain fundamental traits of adolescence. The last section is practical, devoted to methods, and gives a bibliography.

Christian Training and the Revival as Methods of Converting Men, by HENRY CHURCHILL KING. The Secretarial Institute and Training School of Young Men's Christian Associations, Chicago, 1903. pp. 48.

This paper of President King has special interest as coming from the institution where Finney and Fairchilds gave revivalism such a high development. The views of Dr. King mark a very great and wholesome progress. He feels the estrangement that ultra-revivalism has sometimes wrought, its artificiality and past "crankiness," and boldly takes the ground that law, growth, a more ethical conception of Christianity, and emphasis upon external action, more scope for temperamental differences, must be recognized and that suddenness must not be held as too sure a mark of the divine working. Merely educational methods, however, do not satisfy. They appeal too much to the intellect, do not get a strong hold upon the feeling life, and are liable to lose the sense of God in it all. We are past the time when the church can demand one type of experience for all men. There is, after all, probably a real contribution which wise revivalism can make.

The Official Report of the Church Congress, held at Bristol, October 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th, 1903. Ed. by Rev. C. Dunkley. Bemrose & Sons, London, 1903. pp. 492.

The topics and discussions in this inter-denominational congress are of very different degrees and interest. Some represent great diversity in the point of view. These are, perhaps, most extreme in the discussions of the variations in the national church, in racial characteristics as affecting mission work, in the discussion of the aid science gives to a religious mind and the discussions on the more assured results of the higher criticism in the field both of the Old Testament and the Gospels. The discussion of the educational act and indeed most of the above problems was much enlivened by the presence of specialists. The best results which a congress of this kind can effect are not the contribution of new truth, indeed there was very little of this here, but the free interchange of opinions between conservatives and liberalists. This certainly was accomplished.

Archiv für Religionswissenschaft unter Mitredaktion, von H. USENER, H. OLDENBERG, C. BEZOLD, K. TH. PREUSZ. Herausgegeben von Albrecht Dieterich und Thomas Achelis. Siebenter Band Prospektheft. B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 80.

This prospectus number states more fully the purpose of this archive which seeks to give especially the results of philological and ethnological study so far as their bear upon the scientific study of religion. It has seemed to us that this review ought to do something in the way of giving book notes and even reviews of German literature in this field.

Die Entstehung der Paulinischen Christologie, by Martin Brückner. Heitz & Mündel, Strassburg, 1903. pp. 237.

This writer attempts to show that the Pauline conception of Christ is almost absolutely independent of his historical personality. This view the author did not himself set out to find and has been surprised that his studies have led him to this

conclusion. He is bold enough to admit that if he is right "the Christian religion is in its root independent of casual historical verities." The earthly life of Jesus which his personal disciples knew had no significance to Paul whose mind was fixed upon a totally disparate heavenly Christ.

Probleme des Apostolischen Zeitalters, von ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ. J. C. Hinrich, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 138.

This writer describes the development of the original Christian community, its relations to Judaism and heathenism and the gradual transition to Catholicism. He reached certain novel results which he compares to those obtained by Lachmann's New Testament text criticism. The author believes himself to be strictly evangelical, but it must be said that his conclusions are not remote from those of liberal Catholicism.

Grundprobleme der Religionsphilosophie, von A. DÖRNER. Schwetschke und Sohn, Berlin, 1903. pp. 132.

In these eight lectures are discussed, first, the methods of religious psychology and various views concerning the essence of religion, its development and diverse forms, subjective faith and the specific utterances of faith, offerings, vows, castigations, sacramental acts and objects, mantics, revelations, prayer, symbols and symbolic acts, religious art, presentations in words, doctrine, dogma and free knowledge, religious ethics and religious communities. He finally discusses its relation to worldly morality, science and art and pleads for a unitary vigor of faith embracing every domain of life.

The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers, by EDWARD CAIRD. James MacLehose & Sons, Glasgow, 1904. Vol. 1, pp. 382. Vol. 2, pp. 377.

These twenty-seven lectures have been carefully revised since they were given as Gifford Lectures, 1900-2, and are dedicated to the memory of William Wallace. The author's attitude towards the writers he treats of is expressed as follows: "A man's religion, if it is genuine, contains the summed-up and concentrated meaning of his whole life; and, indeed, it can have no value except in so far as it does so. And it is even more obvious that the theology of a philosopher is the ultimate outcome of his whole view of the universe, and particularly of his conception of the nature of man." Reflection only develops in the highest religion. Religion develops a theology often by alternating religious life and action with thought. The separation of life and philosophy has peculiar dangers. Plato is the father of theology in Greece, and the Protagoras is the turning point. In the growth of opinion to science, right opinion often seems an inspiration. Plato's opposition to individualism is seen in his socialistic state when the idea of the good became related to God. To Plato the universe was God's only begotten son. If Plato unified, Aristotle distinguished but found bliss in the contemplative life. This exaltation of theory is in sharp contrast with Kant's view of the primacy of the practical reason. Religion is really a consciousness that transcends the distinction between theory and practice. Professor Caird proceeds to trace the transition to practical problems made by the stoics and their unique synthesis of pantheism and individualism. They unified the will and reason and made good will supreme. Their doctrine of renunciation brought out the idea of mediation and the *logos*. Plotinus' negative way of ascent to the one, or the absolute, the consciousness of which excludes all other consciousness, was in a sense an apotheosis of Aristotle's contemplation. The influence of Greek thought upon Christian speculation was felt chiefly in the doctrine of the person of Christ, the Trinity and the church. The importance of this contribution the author regards as great but he is careful not to overestimate it.

L'Absolu, par L. DUGAS. Felix Alcan, Paris, 1904. pp. 181.

The author is an acute psychological thinker and a ripe and painstaking scholar. It is now ten years since he became first widely known by his volume on friendship as philosophically conceived and as represented in life and letters in antiquity. Then followed monographs on psittacism and symbolic thought, heredity, and laughter. The absolute as discussed in the present volume is the form which all serious thought, deep sentiment or high resolve of will tends naturally to assume. It gives dignity to life. How to fill a form so noble and rigid with the proper con-

tent is the question. It assumes an a priori character but is especially prone to three maladies: headlines of obstinacy, fanaticism, and asceticism. Thus it becomes a phantom to be exorcised. Only those who take things seriously and with great interest are in danger from it. It is an aspiration more often than a fact, and it can be characterized but perhaps hardly defined. It is seen in paroxysms of joy in privileged sensations. It consists in plunging into sentiment and becoming lost in it. It may express vacuity or plentitude, simplicity or amplification of our faculties. We touch bottom in our nature. While it gives elevation and conviction, it interferes with temperance, poise and adaptability. Modesty or chastity with its reserves at first passing on to the full function of love is the best type of the sentiments, all of which have their chastity. Applied to religion and morals this view suggests reserve from superlatives, a certain suspense and orientation in the stage of apprenticeship to life and then letting one's self go after all the data of experience have been utilized. All should develop and define, before they die, the forms in which the absolute appears to them. A little vessel may be as full as a great one.

The Atonement and the Modern Mind, by JAMES DENNY, D. D. Hodder & Houghton, London, 1903. pp. 117.

After defining his subject in a preliminary way the author considers sin and the divine reaction against it and then considers the work of Christ and man in the atonement. If the latter is anything at all it is everything. There can be no compromise. It is the specific truth of Christianity and should be so treated as to bring out its affinity for what is deepest in the nature of man and in human experience. It is, however, primarily, if not solely, a question of history and the real data for its study are New Testament texts. All is summed up in the statement, "Christ died for our sins and rose again." We are essentially passive not active in the process. Christ does not redeem us by making us redeemers. The modern mind wants everything based on experience and would have religion ethnically construed. It seeks analogies to atonement in human life and it must be seen in vital relations to a new life in which sin is overcome. Despite these legitimate demands there is something about the atonement that is unique, transcendent and inexplicable. The assumption that man can himself produce repentance and that this is all that is necessary for pardon and reconciliation is wrong, and Christ's death was not merely necessary for us but also for God. Thus it is all really God's work. Christ was not our substitute in any sense which involves transference of either guilt or penalty. Atonement was not a moral achievement in which physical suffering and death were irrelevant, but we die representatively to sin, with Christ, and rise sympathetically with him to a new life, and this his life and death made possible.

A New Theory of Organic Evolution, by JAMES W. BARCLAY. William Blackwood & Sons, London, 1903. pp. 174.

This author proposes to test by the common sense, what Huxley says is science, whether the Darwinian doctrine that the evolution of life on our planet was brought about by natural selection and other secondary causes accords with facts. His conclusion is negative. He also attempts to present a new theory based on design. Geological records and retrogression show that new races were not evolved from their predecessors by secondary causes. The differences between animals of the same species do not indicate a tendency to specific variation, but the development of type under selected breeding is limited by sterility or precocity. No new persistent type has ever been evolved by cross breeding and, in fact, has never appeared. Indeed, the Mosaic cosmogony has never been disproved and common sense will prefer to believe that nature was made by a master builder, and everything has been called into existence on a preconceived plan and will "continue to be reproduced and sustained by an Infinite Intelligence and Almighty Power."

The Law of Evolution: Its True Philosophic Basis, by I. SCOLLER. London, 1904. pp. 301.

This astonishing book is called a new theory of evolution "wherein all the facts adduced by Mr. Darwin and others in support of his theory find their appropriate places, while at the same time the materialistic error which renders that theory obnoxious to the highest intuitions of humanity is completely eliminated." Here is entire harmony of science and religion, "a result that has been the despair of phi-

osophy in all ages." The reader is told he will find much that is new and strange, but is exhorted to "preserve a calm and judicial attitude" and all things will stand out in a new light. The grand truths here revealed are that spirit is the origin of all matter, life is its activity and is one, evolution is an outward expression of the progressive life of the spirit, indicating noumenal evolution. Nature is one and sentient but containing a duality of male and female from which a trinity was made by the child, and man is to the macrocosm as a seed to a tree and the end of all cosmic processes was the creation of man in the divine image.

Essai sur le Développement Religieux des Apôtres pendant le ministère terrestre de Jésus, par MARCEL MONOD. A Comusland, Cahors, 1903. pp. 79.

This thesis, which attempts to describe the growth of the religious consciousness of the apostles during their association with Jesus, should be chiefly described as a pedagogic study. The disciples discovered Jesus as much as he revealed himself to them. The method of authority and finality is especially praised. In the progressive initiation of the disciples as they were apprenticed to idea after idea they showed real and great progress, and the fishermen of Galilee became preachers. The writer compares Jesus' influence to that of professors in theological schools upon their pupils. For these it should be the ideal although they fall now far short of it. Apt as the disciples were during all the stages of their apprenticeship there was much they failed to comprehend.

New Light on the Life of Jesus, by CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1904.

This modest volume does not attempt a new life of Jesus but is more in the nature of a chronological harmony. The essential questions from which the author starts are when Jesus began his ministry and where he was during the absence of the twelve. He attempts to fill up the chasms of the synoptists and the Gospel of John, and he now attempts to arrange the life of Jesus in a simple, orderly and chronological scheme. Although he fears he may be to some extent blinded by the new light he has discovered and expects the book to be subjected to the fires of criticism, his attitude is only that of the scholar seeking the truth. In the last chapter he conveniently sums up an outline of the life of Jesus according to this new light which certainly sets many things in a new and most interesting order. We hope to revert to this work by fuller criticism later.

Neitzsche, der "Antichrist," von PAUL SCHWARTZKOPF. W. Schäfer, Leipzig, 1903. pp. 67.

Of the scores of brochures of Neitzsche that have appeared within the last few years this seems rather to stand out as more clear cut than most. The writer of it, although profoundly in sympathy with religious conceptions and stating all Neitzsche's most drastic attacks is, nevertheless, in sympathy with him and holds that had Neitzsche been brought into contact with better, broader types of Christianity, the profound hunger of his soul for sympathy and love would have been made without this violent antagonism. Zarathustra and the super man, it is urged, do not differ, after all, very much from the ideal which Jesus brought into the world. Much of Neitzsche's hostility was no doubt due to his morbid state of nerves.

The Growth of the Soul, by AMORY H. BRADFORD. Andrew Melfrose, London, 1903. pp. 319.

This book is made up of what may have been developed in a series of edifying sermons, and discusses the ascent of the individual soul and the far off perfecting of humanity. Chapters are devoted to the awakening of the soul, first steps and hindrances in its upward life, the re-awakening, the place of Jesus Christ, nature and culture, is death the end, the goal, etc.

Naturbetrachtung und Naturerkenntnis im Altertum, von DR. FRANZ STRUNZ. Leopold Voss, Hamburg, 1904. pp. 168.

This admirable monograph in some sense supplements the valuable volumes of Biese, for the latter traced the ancient ideas of nature in literature; and this author confines himself chiefly to philosophy and also includes a brief account of the theoretical and practical views of nature in the orient. The value of this compilation for the student of religion is hardly less than to philosophy. Valuable tables at the end greatly facilitate insight into the work.

Die Religionen der Völker und Gelehrten Alles Ziehen, von ROBERT OLTOFF. Berlin, 1904. pp. 318.

This layman's breviary is divided into two parts. The first considers the great religions according to their geographical positions, with brief accounts of the mythologies of ten great religions; the second part, religion from a philosophic point of view, with many citations from writers. Possibly such a handbook might be useful as an introduction to the subject if it were taught in colleges.

Gott, Religion. VON A. ELEUTHEROPOLOS. Ernst Hofmann & Co., Berlin, 1903. pp. 138.

In this remarkable but not profound work the author attempts to briefly sum up and compare the story of Mohammedanism, Buddhism and Christianity to show that they all originate in myths of souls and dead ancestors. Even the "phantom God" is no exception to this rule. With progressive enlightenment all these conceptions vanish, and in the section on the future of religion we are told that it is doomed to gradual extinction.

Ziele, Richtpunkte und Methoden der Modernen Völkerkunde, von PROF. S. GÜNTHER. Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart, 1904. pp. 52.

This popular lecture is a plea that ethnology is now of age and should have an independent place in the body of sciences, and that great practical and theoretic advantages would flow from this course. Religious studies would be greatly aided as well as all sermons that deal with human nature.

Men of the Bible, with Students' Lesson Leaves, by W. H. DAVIS. International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations, New York, 1903. pp. 65.

Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker, von RUDOLF EUCKEN. 5th ed. Veit & Co., Leipzig, 1904. pp. 523

This is a history of the development of the problems of life from Plato to the present time. How have the great thinkers of the world conceived human existence? What have been their ideals concerning themselves? These two questions give the limitations of the author's field. Upon these subjects he gives a résumé of the views of about seventy thinkers and states the standpoint of certain movements such as romanticism, the ideals of social democracy, etc. Thus the work is not a history of philosophy in the large sense although it casts many interesting side lights upon correlated problems.

Die zweite Entstehung der Welt, das angebliche Paradies und die angebliche Sintflut, von JOHANN JEDLIČKA. F. Jasper, Vienna, 1903. pp. 460.

This very voluminous work, with no trace of an index of any kind, appears to the writer of this review to be a rather strained theory that before the flood there were giants, and phallic worship prevailed, and that antediluvian conditions in general represent the magnified traditions of a stage of the world's history essentially given over to animalism where the gigantic sons of God held high carnival until the world was cleared for a new generation who must not eat blood, offer human sacrifices, etc.

Was ist's mit der Sintflut? von THEODOR SCHNEIDER. H. Stadt, Weisbaden, 1903. pp. 26.

The writer shows that the account of the flood in the Old Testament is an outcrop of a very extended stratum of traditions which centre in the orient and are more developed as we approach regions of great activity, of volcanoes, earthquakes, etc. He believes that these traditions were originally based upon geological facts often amplified into cosmogonic myths.

Deutsche Götter- und Heldensagen, für Haus und Schule nach den besten Quellen, von ADOLF LANGE. 2d abr. edition. B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1903. pp. 403.

This is a capital book for German children. The illustrations are few but are strikingly impressionistic. Beginning with the primitive gods of the Edda, the Nibelungen heroes and events are characterized, and Beowulf and Gudrun end the volume.

The Duties of the Heart, by RABBI BACHYE. Translated with an introduction by E. Collins. Orient Press, London, 1904. pp. 48.

Harnack, Gerd., D. Strauss, and L. Feuerbach über das Wesen des Christentums, von ALBRECHT RAV. C. A. Walter, Delitzsch, 1903. pp. 49.

Edwin A. Abbott. *From Letter to Spirit*. An attempt to Reach Through Varying Voices the Abiding World. 1903. pp. 492.

Auguste Sabatier. *Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*. 1904. pp. 410.

K. C. Anderson. *The Large Faith*. Some Aspects of the New Theology. 1903. pp. 364.

Charles E. Osbourne. *The Life of Father Dolling*. 1903. pp. 324.

T. E. Slater. *The Higher Hinduism in Relation to Christianity*. Certain Aspects of Hindu Thought from the Christian Standpoint. 1903. pp. 291.

Clark University Studies in the Psychology of Religion. In answer to frequent inquiries we print below the studies of past and present members of Clark University upon religious psychology. We are glad to be able to present in this number by competent hands brief digests and reviews of the eight papers of one of them, Dr. J. H. Leuba, and we hope later to describe in a similar way the work of other associate editors of this journal as well as of other contemporary authors both American and foreign.

In Dr. Hall's new book on Adolescence one of the longest chapters is devoted to the relations between this stage of life and religion. Another chapter outlines the religion of nature as it spontaneously appears in children and youth. In several other chapters religious questions are discussed. See also; his: Moral and religious training of children. *Princeton Review*, Jan., 1882, Vol. 10, pp. 26-48. Also as "The Moral and religious training of children and adolescents." *Ped. Sem.*, June, 1891, Vol. 1, pp. 196-210. Some fundamental principles of Sunday School and Bible teaching. *Ped. Sem.*, Dec., 1901, Vol. 8, pp. 439-468.

Other published studies on this subject by Clark men are the following:

ARTHUR H. DANIELS. The new life: a study of regeneration. *Am. Jour. of Psy.*, Oct., 1893, Vol. 6, pp. 61-106.

COLIN A. SCOTT. Old age and death. *Am. Jour. of Psy.*, June, 1896, Vol. 8, pp. 67-122.

A. CASWELL ELLIS. Sunday School work and Bible study in the light of modern pedagogy. *Ped. Sem.*, June, 1896, Vol. 3, pp. 363-412.

ELLSWORTH G. LANCASTER. The psychology and pedagogy of adolescence. *Ped. Sem.*, July, 1897, Vol. 5, pp. 61-128.

EDWIN D. STARBUCK. Some aspects of religious growth. *Am. Jour. of Psy.*, Oct., 1897, Vol. 9, pp. 70-124.

EDWIN D. STARBUCK. A study of conversion. *Am. Jour. of Psy.*, Jan., 1898, Vol. 8, pp. 268-308.

EDWIN D. STARBUCK. The psychology of religion. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1899, pp. 423.

J. RICHARD SRIEFT. A genetic study of immortality. *Ped. Sem.*, Sept., 1899, Vol. 6, pp. 267-313.

GEORGE E. DAWSON. Science and religious education. *Biblical World for March and May*, 1904, pp. 19.

GEORGE E. DAWSON. Children's interest in the Bible. *Ped. Sem.*, July, 1900, Vol. 7, pp. 151-178.

JOHN P. HYLAN. Public Worship. Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1901, pp. 94.

G. HAROLD ELLIS. Fetichism in children. *Ped. Sem.*, June, 1902, Vol. 9, pp. 205-220.

SAMUEL P. HAYES. An historical study of the Edwardean revivals. *Am. Jour. of Psy.*, Oct., 1902, Vol. 13, pp. 550-574.

G. HAROLD ELLIS. The pedagogy of Jesus. *Ped. Sem.*, Dec., 1902, Vol. 9, pp. 441-459.

LONNA D. ARNETT. The soul—a study of past and present beliefs. *Am. Jour. of Psy.*, April, 1904, Vol. 15, pp. 121-200.

Besides these the following other topics have been begun and are represented by questionnaires or are under active investigation.

DR. HALL with REV. R. T. PEEDE. Hymns and sacred music.

" " with REV. A. R. SCOTT. The sermon.

" " with REV. G. H. WRIGHT. Religious development.

J. E. W. WALLIN. The status of primitive people and the methods of Christianizing them.

S. P. HAYES. Children's prayers.

E. P. ST. JOHN. Religious experiences subsequent to conversion.

DR. JEAN DU BUY. Stages of religious development.

J. N. RODEHEAVER. Young people's Christian organizations.

REV. F. A. LOMBARD. A study in the pedagogy of missions.

Papers completed but not yet published are the following:

S. P. HAYES. The prayers of North American Indians.

JOSIAH MOSES. Religious pathology.

JEAN DU BUY. The psychology of five great religions.

At least some of the above will appear in future numbers of this journal.

Clark Courses Religious topics are as follows:

DR. DU BUY

has prepared and delivered last year in the University a course of lectures upon the psychology of comparative religions.

The present year he is delivering a course upon the psychology of Protestant Christian denominations as follows: 1. John Calvin and Calvinism. 2. John Wesley and Methodism. 3. George Whitefield, Jonathan Edwards, Gilbert Tennent and the Evangelical Denominations. 4. The anabaptists and the Baptists. 5. Unitarianism. 6. Quakerism. 7. Christian Science and Mental Science. 8. Ethical Culture. 9. Conclusions.

DR. HALL's courses upon religion are now:

1. The psychology of nature religions grouped as follows: the religions based upon (a) sky, ether and the stars, (b) sun religions, (c) moon religions, (d) cloud, storm and lightning, (e) the wind, (f) sea, rivers, springs, etc., (g) rock and stone worship, (h) the soil and the religions of seedtime, crops, and harvest, (i) tree worship, (j) flowers, (k) animal worship including various species, (l) the worship of man.

2. The psychology of Jesus, including his birth, physical and natural personality, teachings, character, work, miracles, death, resurrection, ascension, the Holy Spirit, faith, etc.

3. The philosophy of religion, including a résumé of the chief recent writers and an outline of the psychology of religion.

4. Religious education, including the Sunday School, mission work, the latter being comparative, including the methods of Catholics and also non-Christian propagandas.

By vote of the Trustees of Clark University a special department for religious psychology has been established in the Library of the University. This institution with its resources of some twenty-three thousand dollars a year it is hoped will be able, in addition to what it already has upon this subject, to make a new department of special service to students, clergymen, and others interested in the subject.

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No. 2

NOTES UPON A STUDY IN THE PEDAGOGY OF MISSIONS.

BY FRANK ALANSON LOMBARD,

Fellow in Clark University.

"Or is God the God of Jews only? Is He not the God of Gentiles also? Yea, of Gentiles also; if so be that God is one."—PAUL.

"God sends His teachers unto every age,
To every clime, and every race of men,
With revelations fitted to their growth
And shape of mind, nor gives the realm of truth
Unto the selfish rule of one sole race:
Therefore each form of worship that hath swayed
The life of man, and given it to grasp
The master-key of knowledge, reverence,
Infolds some germs of goodness and of right;
Else never had the eager soul, which loathes
The slothful down of pampered ignorance,
Found in it even a moment's fitful rest."—LOWELL.

"I came not to destroy but to fulfill."—JESUS.

Among many features that have characterized the XIXth century, the movement of missions is conspicuous. At the dawn of a new century the movement continues, but with a need increasingly realized. During the last fifty years the beginnings of a new science have appeared; and to-day the science of comparative religion is taking shape

(Note: These notes are but the tentative presentation of what it is hoped may, with added material and further study, develop helpfully for those engaged in winning men unto Truth. Thanks are due to President G. Stanley Hall, of Clark University, for kind and sympathetic counsel, and to the many upon mission fields

to satisfy the demands of a healthful religious scholarship. Whereas, in the past the materials for such a science were non-existent, or at least inaccessible, recent years have, by the discoveries in history, archæology, and anthropology as well as by the contributions of missions, supplied abundant data for scientific classification. This classification has been attempted by many; but, so far as I know, pedagogical suggestions for the practical application of discovered principles have not been drawn. Of such suggestions, mission workers and especially those in preparation for mission work are in need.

He who would present his own religious faith to another most convincingly, or enrich his own from another's experience, must understand that other's religious conceptions sympathetically. He also needs to know the points of approach and contact where truth may meet truth for impartation and completion, the state of psychic development and religious experience of those whom he seeks to teach that he may correctly judge the truth suited to their needs and the fit method for its presentation. He needs to understand and appreciate the psychic basis of religion which, if it proves the same in all men as men, will within himself afford the key to every brother's soul. Something of this the successful missionary has gained more or less unconsciously by experience. The man in training needs it for his equipment; and the following study, in which only a beginning has been made, is undertaken with the purpose of affording some slight contribution toward a body of pedagogical suggestions for the help of those preparing for mission service.

To mission workers and native Christians in other lands is the credit due for any value there may be herein, for from their replies to a series of questions the suggestions are tentatively drawn.

A review of contributions to comparative religion reveals two types of mind that have been engaged in the study. In 1858 Hardwick pro-

who by their co-operation have provided material for the study. While a study of the broadest possible field is necessary for a complete deduction, these notes have reference more particularly to Japan, since from that field, material has thus far been more abundantly obtained.

The purpose of the endeavor is the better equipment of men, through a more sympathetic understanding of those with whom they are to work, to guide the upward development of individuals and faiths unto their stature in Jesus and his Revelation.)

duced his "Christ and Other Masters." His position was that of "Christian Advocate" in King's College, Cambridge; and as an advocate he wrote. In his preface he declares: "I hope that no assailant of Revealed Religion, with whom it is my duty to contend, will ever find his arguments misrepresented; and if in any case I manifest what seems to him a needless warmth of feeling, my apology must be the strong conviction which I entertain as to the sacredness of Christianity." On page 243 of the 1891 edition, when writing of the possible analogies to be found between Christian and non-Christian religions, he asks: "What is the general nature of these points of contact?" And answers: "They are for the most part discernible in the genuine dogmas of revealed religion, but in later depravations of it, not in Hebraism as founded on the ancient Scriptures and embodied in the temple service, not in Christianity as once for all delivered by the Lord and His Apostles to the keeping of the early church, but in some schools and systems, drawing their original life from these, yet leavened and corrupted by other elements of foreign or extrinsic growth. Nor will the bare existence of such resemblances be a matter of surprise to him who soberly reflects upon the way in which they are produced. As soon as ever the mind of man is anxious to break loose from what is supernaturally revealed; as soon as ever the authority within him is suffered to resist and overrule the authority without him, he at once relapses, in the same proportion, to a state of nature. The religious system he constructs is so far standing on a level with heathenism."

Mr. James S. Dennis (*Christian Missions and Social Progress*, 1897, Vol. 2, p. 3) says: "The fact has been perhaps sufficiently clear to us that non-Christian society, left to its own tendencies, uniformly and persistently goes the way of moral deterioration and sinks into decadence, with no hope of self-reformation." (p. 5) "Christianity must begin by making its own environment. It enters the precincts of heathenism alone, with no basis to work upon, and, entering, is at once surrounded by an unwelcome spirit and a hostile, and in many respects morally objectionable social system."

On the other hand, James Freeman Clarke in his *Ten Great Religions*, holding comparative theology to be in reality "The science of missions," declares that (p. 9) "we shall find them (ethnic religions) always feeling after God, often finding him. We shall see that in their origin they are not the work of priestcraft, but of human nature:

. in their doctrines true more frequently than false; in their moral tendency good rather than evil. And instead of degenerating toward something worse, they came to prepare the way for something better.”

Dr. Charles Cuthbert Hall, President of Union Theological Seminary, Barrows lecturer to India and Japan (1903), said in an address before the annual meeting of the American Board last Oct. (1903): “I believe that the appreciation of non-Christian religious experience must be far more generally conceded as an element in the future of missions if the problem of evangelizing the world is to be dealt with effectively. The foundations of this spirit of sympathetic appreciation are: The study of comparative religion; belief in the universal working of the Holy Spirit, and recognition of the many points of contact that occur in the religious experience of the world.”

A. H. Bradford, D.D. (Moderator), of the National Council of Congregational churches, writes in the *Booklover* of Dec., 1903: “Religion is the answer to the deepest longings of the human soul. It is the response which a rational being receives when he interrogates the Unseen. The savage asks the same from his fetich as the Christian from the Heavenly Father. The Buddhist priest praying in the interior of China, the Hindu as he meditates in the awful silences of the Himalayas, the Parsee who prostrates himself as the sun rises in his splendor, and the peasant kneeling before his crucifix by an Alpine roadside, are all inquiring what answer the Supernatural has to give to the world-wide aspiration of those who live on the earth. Few Christian students now fail to detect intimations of the message of Jesus in the older religions. Missionaries in these days are not sent out to condemn the non-Christian faiths. They teach that even if they are “broken lights” they are still true lights. The great missionaries, leaders of all schools of thought believe that Buddha, Mohammed, Zoroaster, like John the Baptist, were providentially raised up to prepare the way among their own people for clearer revelations of truth than they had before known. They recognize the common religious experience, and are endeavoring more widely to open the doors which true prophets of God in elder ages have unlocked.”

The Dean of a Christian Divinity School in a non-Christian land says: “I believe most heartily in a sympathetic approach of any religion. There are points of contact between any religion, no matter how

low in the scale it may stand, and Christianity. I do not think we have carried on our missionary work in any scientific manner. We have been sowers casting our seed broadcast rather than fishers of men. But, perhaps, the times were not ripe for any other kind of work. To-day they are."

These quotations have been made with special regard to the fact that they are from those who view their subject from an intensely practical standpoint, and as men personally interested in the spread of Truth which they believe to be most perfectly expressed in the Christian faith. We cannot doubt that to the sympathetic mind belongs the future. Such seem to imply that the day has come when the Christian missionary, "knowing the fact and having sympathy of heart, shall say to men of other faith, you are already on your way toward God, your religion came from him and was inspired by his Spirit; now he sends you something more and higher by his Son, who does not come to destroy but to fulfill, not to take away any good thing you have, but to add to it something better."

On the side of those not personally engaged in the spread of Christian truth, but interested in the problems of comparative religion from a more philosophic view point, the testimony is becoming increasingly emphatic not only that there are great universal facts in human nature which form the basis of varied beliefs and to which the teaching of any religious truth must be applied, but also that every religion developed in the experience of man, has emphasized elements of truth that fit in with others to make a well-rounded whole. Religion is seen to be a normal experience of man, based upon his very nature and answering to certain facts in his environment as a human being. As a human experience it is "more than any positive form under which it has appeared, and rests on broader and deeper authority than can ever be confined in a prescribed ideal."

Brinton in "Religions of Primitive Peoples," (p. 28) says: "There is no one belief or set of beliefs which constitute a religion. . . . There is, in fact, not any one item in any creed which is accepted by all religions; yet a common source, a common end in view, and the closest analogy of means to that end, bind all in one. . . . This inherent unity of all religious feeling and expression was perceived by St. Augustine. *Res ipsa, quae nunc religio Christiana nuncupatur, erat apud antiquos, nec deficit ab initio generis humani.*"

To intensify this opinion, the conclusions of modern science unite. Anthropology is uttering with renewed emphasis its dictum concerning the unity of man, the essential oneness of the race, and the solidarity of that society to which it is advancing. Psychology, even in the study of individual differences, rests upon the postulate of a normal psyche undifferentiatedly human. Evolution, however defined, demands the recognition of development that shall find place for all human experience in the sum total of man's attainments. All conspire to make man seek his heritage in the whole experience of the race, and recognize within himself the microcosm of human existence. The essentials of religion are all of the common stock of race possessions; and in the individual are often faintly recapitulated those forms whereby the race has sought to give them expression.

Dr. du Buy, in his study of Mohammedanism, Confucianism, Christianity, Buddhism and the Vedanta Philosophy, has suggested that in each may be found supremely emphasized certain elements appealing with especial power to varying stages of human development; and many, I believe, can detect within themselves those instincts that make men believers in one and all of these faiths; while the apologist may find in Christianity each of these elements of truth in its proper proportion.

The sense of God, whatever its origin, however defined or however undefined, is universal. Upon it rests all religious convictions, and to it must be addressed all religious appeals. In essence there is no eternal distinction between fetichism, idolatry and spiritual worship. They are gradations in man's religious progress. Nowhere and no-when did man worship a stock or stone or graven image, as such, apart from some strange power typified thereby; and the craving that finds satisfaction in objectifying its unseen, unseeable divinity, is no other than a cruder form of that which is nourished by the material symbols of a spiritual communion in the supper instituted by Jesus with his disciples, and reverently observed throughout Christendom to-day. Polytheism is a necessity in an unorganized world, as is monotheism in a universe. It is a natural step in the development of the race and of the individual, a propædæutic for a true monotheism that is more than monism, a unity in manifoldness. And back of all polytheism is an undefined Pantheism. God is one in many manifestations as many manifestations are of

one. So, too, the transcendence of monotheism and the immanence of Pantheism must now unite to satisfy man's mind filled with the ideas of unity and evolution, idealism evolutionally realized. In its nobler form Pantheism is essentially of the spirit. The constant fact, the one reality nominally known upon which rest all knowledge and the validity of all experience, our confidence in the most material object, the facts of science or of sense, is the unity including both self and non-self.

With the sense of God as spiritually one, the idea of human relationship to him is universally connected, and therein is the essence of religion. The universal prayer used at the opening of the sessions of the World's Parliament of Religions was acceptable to every race, religion and creed there gathered, since universally men's longings are addressed to a "Father who art in heaven."

In addition to the ideas of God as spiritual being, and of man's relation to him, nearly every belief that human experience has accredited as of enduring value finds its hold in the psychic nature of man. Revelation, culminating in an incarnation bringing within human comprehension what has become too transcendent, is an intuitive faith. The sense of sin, of needed sacrifice, of salvation through some atonement, rest on psychic needs and appeal to psychic conditions and, it may well be, correspond to some reality whose fullness includes the germ conception of every human faith.

All these considerations and many more lead the missionary to formulate anew the nature of the task before him, inasmuch as, contrary to the thought of Mr. Dennis, he finds a deep basis in human nature, a rich environment in religious experience, upon which and within which he is to plant and foster Christian truth. The problem before him is that of quickening the truth in the native religions as soil and stock for the sustenance of that which in his graft is of vital and universal value; of presenting such elements of Christianity as are not only essential but even more particularly adapted to recognized needs and conditions.

Says Edward A. Lawrence in his "Modern Missions in the East," when speaking of the missionary: "He needs to be one capable of seeing the deep meaning in the remark of Rothe, that there is nothing more changeable than Christianity, but that in this lies not its weakness but its strength. More than other men he needs to determine between the essential and the incidental, the transient, the historical, and the eternal in Christianity; more than others he needs to know the

true proportion of faith. Presenting it on the historic basis, and in the historic development which belongs to himself as a European, an American, a New Englander, perhaps, he must yet present it in such a way as not to fetter but to stimulate the native mind, so that from the start, being rightly founded, it may find its natural Asiatic development, according to the traits of the Chinese or Indian mind, rather than be forever bound to the one-sided peculiarities of occidental thinking."

We may, must, and should have strong and intense convictions as to what the true religion of the race may be; but with those convictions as to its essential nature, the worker for its realization must remember that the completion of unity is the enfolding of diversities, the development of harmonious parts.

To secure data for a more detailed study, the following syllabus was issued; and from returns to it the suggestions are drawn.

TOPICAL SYLLABUS. No. 12.

(Academic Year 1903-1904.)

A STUDY IN THE PEDAGOGY OF MISSIONS.

1. What characteristics of religious nature do you find in the people; and to what extent are they developed, (*a*) sense of dependence, (*b*) of obligation, (*c*) of fear or reverence, (*d*) of love, etc.?
2. What ideas have they (*a*) of deity, (*b*) of man, (*c*) of their relation, (*d*) of sin, (*e*) of salvation, (*f*) of future life, etc.?
3. What is their ethical sanction?
4. What fundamental features characterize their religion?
5. What influence have they upon character and life?
6. What features of their religion are growing stronger?
7. What features are becoming weaker, or less influential?
8. Are there any features that may be developed as a propædæutic for Christianity?
9. Have such any parallels in "Revealed Truth?" If so, where?
10. What points of approach or of contact has their religion for Christianity?
11. What points of widest separation from Christianity?
12. What features of Christianity appeal to the people most powerfully? Why?

13. What features repel most seriously? Why?
14. In presenting Christianity what features do you make most salient? Do you do this for their intrinsic worth or for pedagogical reasons?
15. What general methods of presentation have been most successfully employed by you and your associates, public preaching, private instruction, school training, distribution of literature, etc.?
16. What detailed methods—(a) form of homiletic, (b) of instruction, (c) of religious pedagogy? Is a system of pedagogy desirable?
17. What methods, general and particular, have most signally failed?
18. What features of Christianity do the most influential native workers emphasize?
19. What methods of presentation do they employ?
20. What classes of society are most impressionable?
21. What classes are least so?
22. At what age do the people most readily respond to the appeal of Christianity?
23. What may be noticed in the religious development of the children of native Christians?
24. Does the transition from the ancient religion to Christianity involve any moral danger? If so, what?
25. How may it be averted?
26. What influence has a liberal education upon the attitude of the people toward Christianity?
27. In how far is it a proper mission activity?
28. What place have medical missions in your field?
29. In your opinion what, for your general field, are a worker's requisites in order of importance?
30. Suggestions along lines not mentioned.

CLARK UNIVERSITY,

Worcester, Mass., U. S. A., Nov. 24, 1903.

So far as received from Japan the returns yield the following:

- (1). Obligation stands first as the most evident religious charac-

teristic. It is felt toward persons rather than principles. "The sense of what is suited to my position is strong," says one. This characteristic appears to have been fostered by the experience of feudalism. By many it is recognized as a point of contact for Christianity, and as containing that which may well be developed along natural lines.

(2). The ideas of deity are called "vague, indefinite, childlike, rather than debased." One states that "the ignorant have about the same attitude to the deity that is described to us in Homer." The cultured Japanese is classed as a monist, usually of the agnostic type, at least so far as described by Arnold's lines: "Standing between two worlds, one dead—the other powerless to be born."

The sense of divine personality is not clear either with the ignorant or cultured. The relations of man to the divine are equally vague and unrealized. "Sin," says one, "is a word that grows. It is in its childhood in Japan. The people have slight consciousness of it; and where felt it is thought of as the breaking of law, social or governmental. Salvation has a corresponding significance."

(3). Their ethical sanction is closely connected with their sense of obligation, but with it as felt to their own ideal. Public opinion in the wide sense is a mighty influence; but, above all, the will of the ruler is regarded sufficient. Here again the obligation is seen to be felt toward a person.

(4). Hero-worship, fatalism and loyalty seem the most fundamental features of their religion. Shintoism is systematic hero-worship, say some. Buddhism is fatalistic; and operates for good and for ill, crushing endeavor on the one side, but giving great persistence upon the other. Loyalty is apparently linked with hero-worship, but in a most concrete form.

(5). Those above middle life are restrained in a salutary way by their religious ideas. The young only slightly, except through the sentiment of loyalty. The fatalistic feeling is powerful and paralyzes endeavor, removing the sense of personal responsibility for things as they are. *Shi kata ga nai* (it can't be helped) is the most common of Japanese explanations. Yet this same fatalism leads to bravery and many noble virtues, and is recognized as akin to the Christian sense of omnipotence in harmony with the divine will.

(6-7). Both loyalty and individualism are strengthening, while general superstition and fatalism seem weakening.

(8). Ancestor and hero-worship were regarded by most as helpful approaches to Christianity. A Japanese declares Christianity to be the fulfillment of human longings that seek expression and satisfaction in ancestor worship. An American recognizes ancestor worship as a splendid preparatory stage to the worship of one Father of all. The Shinto world-view to a certain extent parallels the Hebrew, and even surpasses it in the thought of a divine father of land and people. By both American and Japanese, its communism is mentioned as a proper soil for the sane development and correction of Christian individualism.

(10-11). Points of approach to Christianity as such were not mentioned except in allusion to the Shin sect of Buddhism, the Tenrikyo, and the Bushido ideal. All of these have elements in common with distinctive Christianity: the first, in its doctrine of faith and salvation through a personal saviour; the second, in its tendency to monotheism, its recognition of sin as in the human heart and the cause of all evil, and in its ethical aim so that it is often associated by the common people with Christianity; the third, in its high ideal of manhood. The points of widest separation are found in the fatalistic passivity of Buddhism with its contempt of self and salvation through negation, in the separation of religion from morality, and the absence of the personal power of a divine life.

(12). All unite in declaring that the ethical elements of Christianity, love, kindness, heroism, have made the most powerful appeal. Secondly, its personal monotheism; thirdly, its universality. The beauty and grandeur of Christ's moral teachings, the connection of a loving heavenly Father, a sympathetic Saviour, the monogamous home, all make strong appeals because they are absent from native thought and satisfy a conscious need. The heroism of Christ makes a strong appeal, for the people are by nature hero-worshippers, and are hero-hungry, writes one. In general "the love of Christianity interpreted by life" exerts the greatest influence. To the scholarly, Christian monotheism appeals, since it identifies moral and scientific with religious truth.

(13). The features that repel are: the idea of sin, the miraculous element, the divinity of Jesus, and the revolutionizing tendency by some held to be inseparable from Christianity.

(14). The features made most salient in presenting Christianity are: the heavenly Father, his love, his revelation of character in Jesus,

the "acceptance of Christ as an antidote for sin," and the power and willingness of God to give strength to obey him, the heroic in Christ and his call to moral heroism, the superior moral teachings of Christ "as being universal, especially the fact that this ideal morality is workable, having motives unknown to other religions."

(15). Concerning successful methods of presentation, a striking unity of expression is found emphasizing the personal element. "The power of a consecrated life is what carries might" is the vital generalization of a woman. "The inner spirit shines out through the eyes, and the Japanese are sensitive to it. Better to be self-cheated in kindness than to repel by too much of the serpent" is the advice of a Japanese. Says another: "Great care should be exercised to use Japanese methods. Kindness, courtesy, and a deep sympathy with all that is good and true in the people, in their customs and in their religions, is desirable. Recognize the fact that being Orientals, the Japanese have the advantage of us Occidentals in the understanding and interpretation of our Bible, which is a thoroughly oriental book. In short, let the Christian worker orientalize, Japanize, himself; and then speak forth with the confidence of deep conviction the truths of which he has experiential knowledge, and his message will find acceptance." As might be expected, emphasis is placed upon work with children, and for general social betterment.

(16). Of detailed method little is said. Presentation should be illustrative, and not dogmatic or dictatorial. One, a Japanese, warns against the constant drawing of morals, believing that "facts take their own effects." Objective teaching is valued; and "such as pertains to life."

(17). Very few give instances of methods that fail, yet some are suggestive. "The endeavor to transplant Western churches as sects, to teach Western theological systems, to impose Western forms, are widely resisted." One notes failure in philosophic preaching which appeals to the intellect alone; and the verdict of Japanese replies is in the words of another that Christianity is too often presented from its intellectual side, as though "Christian ethics would result in life, as science results in application."

(18). The native workers for the most part emphasize the ethical side of Christian truth. Strictly theological topics are seldom treated. A Japanese mentioning well-known native preachers by name, charac-

terizes the preaching of one as based on the love of God, of another as on the practical value of Christianity, and of a third as on its power in conflict with evil. Of his own preaching, a leading minister says, not in reply to this question but in general, "The people readily understand if you say that God is creator or that heaven is order: but a God with a personality is an idea hard for them to grasp. Even among Christians, the number who really comprehend this personal quality of God is comparatively small. The conviction of a personal God and a sinful self is the key to unlock the ultimate secret of Christianity." At the annual meeting of the churches in the province of Shekoko, April 3-6, 1903, sermons on the following topics were delivered: The need of religion, Important elements of religion, Life the characteristic of true religion, Love the characteristic of a true Christian, The problem of evil.

(20). The most impressionable classes are (1), students from 14 to 21 years of age; (2), young men and women generally; (3), those who for business reasons have removed from the influence of their ancestral homes, they being usually the most wide-awake and open-minded; (4), men and women of the middle and upper class; and, says one, "a very large number of middle aged and elderly people outside of the churches are wonderfully impressed with Christian thought and ideals, and this class includes a large number of Buddhist priests."

(22). From the returns it is impossible to make any estimate of the age at which they are most impressed by Christian truth; but from indirect evidence it is clear that it falls within the period of adolescence; and this is the more significant as in Japan as in no other land, probably, the youth lead in all matters, public and private.

(23). In the children of native Christians a few notice "a marked advance in their power to grasp religious truth;" and a Japanese mentions "improved personal appearance, with a more happy, trustful and kindly disposition."

(24). Most hesitate to admit, some flatly deny any danger in the transition from the ancient religion to Christianity; yet, on the other hand, many advocate slow changes and the conservation of the old until the new spirit of itself seeks new forms.

(26). Liberal education is declared in all ways favorable to the reception of Christianity; and as a mission activity "absolutely essential to final success." "A mission school," says one, "which is not a good

school has no right to be." A Japanese evangelist who has also been a teacher writes thus: "I would begin school work with plain, simple grammar grade; and then would always have a few strong, lovable characters in each class. If my Christianity counts for anything, I ought to be able to impress it upon them, leading them to Christ. With good young men won, the future is ours. Every station ought to have one school at least; but I would not have it a mission school in the narrow sense, where it is thought sacrilegious unless the Bible is taught each day."

(28). Medical missions as such have slight reason for being in Japan, because of the marked ability of native physicians and surgeons.

(29). Workers' requisites as given may be grouped as follows: optimistic consecration, vigorous health, with calm nerves and great patience; a well-balanced, cultured mind, clear but not argumentative; breadth of sympathy, in matters theological and religious candid and conciliatory; tenderness of heart and devotion in service.

Though written of conditions in India, the lines of Kipling, somewhat adapted, appealed to one as no less applicable to Japan, for though the nation and people move rapidly, there is much in that very motion to try Western nerves and patience, and of all mission fields, Japan is most productive of nervous exhaustion.

Now it is not good for the Christian's health to hustle the native brown,
 For the Christian riles and the brown man smiles, and he weareth the
 Christian down;
 And the end of the fight is a tombstone white with the name of the
 late deceased,
 And the epitaph drear: "A fool lies here, who tried to hustle the
 East."

In addition, certain suggestions concerning the future character of Christianity in Japan are of interest. "The revitalization of Buddhism," says a Christian Japanese, "must be a help to Christian mission work, not immediately perhaps, but ultimately; because it means, the awakening of general religious consciousness and interest." All unite in the opinion that greater stress will be laid upon the ethical and less upon the metaphysical. "I believe," writes one, "that Japanese

Christianity will assume a less doctrinal and more practical, less ecclesiastical and more simple form than in the occident. Certain forms of ancestor reverence must be retained in future Japanese Christianity, so deeply is it rooted in the heart and life of the people. The Japanese rightly claim that they must apply their own philosophy to Christianity."

In connection with these expressions, it is of value to note the position taken by Dr. Edwin Hatch in his *Introduction to the Hibbert Lectures of 1888*. Raising the question: "Why an ethical sermon stood in the forefront of the teaching of Jesus Christ, and a metaphysical creed in the forefront of the Christianity of the 4th century," he says that "in investigating this problem, the first point that is obvious to an inquirer is, that the change in the centre of gravity from conduct to belief is coincident with the transference of Christianity from a Semitic to a Greek soil." He calls attention to two facts: (1) that religion is relative to and inseparable from the whole mental attitude and phenomena of a race; and (2) that no "permanent change takes place in the religious beliefs and usages of a race which is not rooted in the existing beliefs and usages of that race." "The truth which Aristotle annunciated that all intellectual teaching is based upon what is previously known to the person taught is applicable to a race as well as to an individual and to beliefs even more than to knowledge. A religious change is, like a physical change, of the nature of assimilation by and absorption into existing elements. The religion which our Lord preached was rooted in Judaism. It came not to destroy but to fulfill . . . In a similar way . . . the Greek Christianity of the 4th century was rooted in Hellenism."

With the same lofty and sympathetic spirit, writes an American missionary of what may be expected in Japan. "The base is different here. Just as Greek philosophy and Stoic ethics and Hebrew monotheism shaped the form of Christianity in Europe (and he might well have added Roman Law and Anglo-Saxon individualism) so in a similar way will monism and family ethics and ancestor worship and loyalty necessarily cause a free Christianity to take on new forms which ought to be an aid in making and illustrating a perfect Christianity,—all that is best in the world being gathered into one—the Kingdom of God on earth."

Jesus was himself the first great Christian missionary. Born a Jew, he was a missionary to his own people. He took their religion

and fulfilled its most exalted ideal. He destroyed not, but carried forward into completion. He revitalized that religion, and made it in a sense greater than ever a preparation for his own. He left no completed work, but the promise that the seed should grow. May we not reverently ask, whether all religions have not that within them which, so treated, may be made preparatory to their higher Christian form, if not along parallel lines, at least as converging radii drawing to the centre of a perfect sphere which not in any part, but in its wholeness, shall be seen to be worthy to bear the name of Him who came to fulfill?

In conclusion, the following may be at least tentatively suggested:

1. That the essentials of religion, upon the manward side, are inseparable from human nature, and find expression through every religion that for any length of time has held human allegiance.

2. That those essentials have developed according to the individual experience and environment of peoples.

3. That the objective fact to which they answer is universally the same.

4. That every normal religion is naturally propaedeutic to a higher development.

5. That the duty of a religious teacher is (1) to discover and sympathetically appreciate the experience of religion already possessed; (2) to develop that experience along lines native to it; (3) to supplement such by added elements, made conformable; (4) to expect and welcome a new growth, characteristic of the people.

6. That in Japan, the sense of obligation to persons rather than principles, the recognition of an ethical sanction in a personal ideal and a ruler's dictum, together with the conception of sin as broken law and a vague sense of divine personality, seem to call for the development of each with an emphasis upon the personality of God as a permanent basis of obligation, upon his sanction as that of a personal will, and upon his law as a criterion of righteousness.

That the essential lack of life and the separation of religion from ethics seems to call for emphasis upon the possibility of spiritual experience of a God who is Emmanuel in life, through the development of individual spiritual personality; and, on the other hand, to make most essential the present emphasis upon ethics even to the ignoring of dogma and doctrine.

STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRAYER.

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I. *An Introduction to the Study of Prayer.*

It was only eight years ago that Leuba in an article dealing with the psychology of conversion¹ drew the attention of investigators to one of the most interesting departments of mental life. Although since then a steady and increasing interest has been manifested in religious psychology, it is not a matter for surprise that many of the most elementary problems still await investigation. Some of the most important of these are suggested by the study of the phenomena known as prayer.

At the beginning of such a study many difficulties arise because of our ignorance concerning three fundamental problems. In the first place, what idea does the worshipper have of the being he would address? Strange as it may seem there is no scientific information concerning the ideas of God prevalent among people of our own civilization. Many questions suggest themselves the moment one thinks of the subject. What varieties and types of the idea of God are prevalent in Christian communities to-day? How do these types of ideas relate themselves to the varying conditions of the men who entertain them? What sort of men believe most fully in their conceptions, and why? What is the reason for the interest, which many men manifest in the idea of God, and for the power which it exercises over their lives? These and many other questions concerning the conception of God arise in the mind of the investigator when he approaches the subject of prayer.

The second problem concerns those characteristics which constitute man a religious being. What are the desires which lead men to communicate with God? What is the source of that marvellous energy

¹J. H. Leuba. A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena. *Am. Jour. Psych.*, Vol. 7, 1896.

and enthusiasm manifested in religious work? That is to say, what needs and instinctive tendencies underlie the religious life?

The third problem, which comes to the student of prayer, is in fact only a broader aspect of the problem of prayer itself. It is this: What is the relation of man to his conception of God; or, better, how does man react toward that conception? Obviously, the answer to this question involves a knowledge of the two preceding ones. We must first understand the idea of God and man's religious tendencies; and then we shall be prepared to understand why man reacts toward that conception as he does. As already intimated, prayer is one of these reactions; and to comprehend it fully, one would need to have obtained an answer for such questions as have been suggested in the previous paragraphs. But, since this is not possible, it will be necessary to start at the end and work toward the logical beginning of the subject. In doing so, some light may be thrown on these unsolved problems, for, at the same time that this study is pressing these problems upon the attention, it will bring to light many facts that will aid in an understanding of them. In prayer, as nowhere else, man reveals his conception of God and gives expression to those vague, half recognized cravings that characterize him as a religious being. Indeed, no richer source of material could be found for the study of such problems than is found in a collection of prayers like that of Mary Tileston.

It is necessary to state briefly the point of view which is adopted in this paper, and the class of facts to which attention will be directed. Excluding the work done by the anthropologists in the history of religion, one finds that the work done upon the psychology of the religious consciousness places the emphasis on facts more truly physiological than psychological. This is seen in the pains, which Starbuck has taken to show the relation of conversion to the period of adolescence, and in his statement that all his interpretations are professedly on the psychophysiological side.¹ In the present paper it is desired to discuss the facts of the religious life from a point of view somewhat different from that typified by Starbuck's work, and to approach the psychology of religion in the same way as the psychology of æsthetics and ethics are now studied: that is, through a study of the interests, desires, and tendencies. We wish to study the *interest* which belongs to certain

¹ E. D. Starbuck: *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 16. London, 1899.

religious conceptions, and to analyze it if possible into its most elementary constituents. We wish to analyze the nature of the religious man, to understand the needs and *desires* which make possible the appeal of the religious ideas. And finally, it will be profitable to observe how these interest-charged ideas and more vaguely defined desires and longings find expression; how they act as dominating factors in the mental processes, directing the stream of consciousness: and how they manifest themselves in movement either as the source of incipient *tendencies* or as powerful motives controlling conduct. It is believed that these questions are deserving of more careful consideration than they have yet received.

The psychology of prayer might be approached in either of two ways: one might study the phenomenon as a whole, gathering large numbers of prayers, translating the religious language in which they are expressed into psychological terms, classifying and analyzing them, and thus arriving at an understanding of prayer as such; or, putting aside for the present so extensive an investigation, one might take a certain group of prayers expressive of a definite religious experience, and study them with reference to that particular experience. Indirectly, such a study would throw much light on prayer itself; and after a number of such groups had been described, it would be possible to take a comprehensive view of the whole field, deduce some of the more general principles regarding prayer, and approach somewhat toward a solution of the three fundamental problems of religious psychology.

This second method of attacking the problem has been adopted by the writer, because the quantity of data accessible for such studies has seemed too great for the successful application of the first method. In the second part of this paper on prayer, therefore, instead of attempting an exhaustive treatment of that subject, we will confine our attention to that group of prayers which gives expression to the experience known as the "indwelling presence of God."

The material for study is very ample, and is readily accessible. There are many books, consisting in whole or in part of collections of prayers, which have been published for devotional use. A list of about fifty has been secured, and there are no doubt many others. As each of these collections contains from one hundred to one thousand prayers, there is plenty of material for classification and analysis. There is of course a very large amount of worthless material to be

found in these collections. Many of the prayers are mere repetitions of dogmas, and some others are quite unintelligible. But scattered among these are some — readily distinguishable from the rest — which portray religious experiences, and are of real value. Their simplicity, and freedom from all cant and affectation, make them superior to the answers elicited by a questionnaire. *The worshipper in talking with God often describes his religious life in detail, giving this description spontaneously in the midst of the experience to which it relates.* Scarcely any of these prayers are written by men of mediocre ability; they represent, indeed, the introspection of the choicest minds. Men like Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas à Kempis, have given account of their inner life in language, which is as precise and accurate as it is transparent and beautiful. The quotations which will be given later will furnish the reader an opportunity to judge of the value of this kind of material.

By way of forestalling an objection, it may be noticed here that some of the prayers are petitions for the bestowal of a particular religious experience, and not professedly descriptions of previous experiences. But in these cases it can be readily seen that the petitions are descriptions of past experiences, a repetition of which is desired. The details are too sharply defined, the confidence of the worshipper too great to admit of the assumption that the whole is a fiction of the imagination.

It would seem not altogether out of place, in closing these introductory remarks, to insist that no statements found in these studies are to be taken as bearing in any way whatever on the question of the ultimate validity of religious conceptions. The reader must carefully distinguish between the religious ideas, which are parts of the mental furniture, and, as such, are the proper subject matter of the psychologist, and the facts which are supposed to underlie these ideas — facts with which the psychologist has no concern. Hence, in these studies perfect freedom is exercised in writing of the idea of God. That idea is subject to the same laws as other ideas, and there is no reason why it should not be discussed. But the question of the actual existence and character of God is a question with which psychology has nothing to do. Such an investigation as the present can add no evidence either for or against the validity of religious truth.

II. The Experience Sometimes Called the "Indwelling Presence of God."

Little need be said concerning the method used in this investigation in addition to what has been pointed out in the introduction. The collection by Mary Tileston, "Prayers, Ancient and Modern," was studied with a view to determining what are the desires that most often find expression in prayer. At first, no method of classification was adopted; but interest was soon focused on those prayers which give expression to the purely aesthetic desire to contemplate the perfection of the deity. When these were brought together, it became evident that they give expression to a well-defined experience, which on further study was found to be identical with what is described in religious language as the "indwelling presence of God."

Description. This experience will be familiar to any one who has frequented prayer meetings or other places where the religious life is freely discussed. Here one often hears persons testify that they have felt God to be very near or even within, acting on the mind and heart. Under the influence of this presence they are led to choose what ordinarily does not appeal to them; they attempt what at other times would seem impossible undertakings; their thoughts are fixed more completely on things of a religious nature; and all this they attribute (and quite naturally) to the working of the divine mind upon their own. At these times, also, a profound peace takes the place of the usual unrest and discontent, which again is felt to indicate the presence of God.

This phenomenon may be better described if a few illustrations are given. From these illustrations it will appear that religious phraseology has no fixed term for its designation. It is expressed under different imaginative conceptions according to the temperament and beliefs of the individual, but everywhere it has the same characteristics — the feeling that God is acting directly on the mind, controlling the thoughts, directing the actions, and subduing the turmoil of conflicting desires. The best description of this experience that I have found is contained in a letter written by Jonathan Edwards.

"They say there is a young lady in New Haven who is beloved of that great Being who made and rules the world, and that there are certain seasons in which *this great Being, in some way or other invisible,*

comes to her and fills her mind with exceeding sweet delight, and that she hardly cares for anything except to meditate Him. . . . Therefore, if you present all the world before her, with the richest of its treasures, she disregards and cares not for it, and is unmindful of any pain or affliction. She has a strange sweetness in her mind, and singular purity in her affections; is most just and conscientious in all her conduct; and you could not persuade her to do anything wrong or sinful, if you would give her all the world, lest she should offend this great Being. She is of wonderful calmness, and universal benevolence of mind; especially after this great God has manifested Himself to her mind. She will sometimes go about from place to place singing sweetly; and seems to be always full of joy and pleasure, and no one knows for what. She loves to be alone, walking in the fields and groves and seems to have some one invisible always conversing with her." (Quoted in Yale Review 1891, p. 447.)

This extract, which gives a fairly complete description of the experience in question, came to the attention of the writer after the present paper was almost complete. It is especially valuable, therefore, as a confirmation of the results obtained from an entirely different source. All the observations which will be noted in this paper are at least implicitly contained in Edwards's description. Three of these may be mentioned here. This woman is conscious of the presence of God, who "in some way or other invisible, comes to her." Her attention is fixed in the adoration of God, so that "she hardly cares for anything except to meditate Him." A profound peace united with strong moral purpose characterizes her life.

This brief description will suffice for the present; but as we proceed with the analysis many illustrations will be cited, and the details of the description can best be made out from them. For this reason some of the prayers will be quoted entire. And while it will not be possible to discuss each fully—the emphasis always being placed on the point under immediate consideration—each should be regarded as a fairly complete account. From these prayers, each of which gives expression to a slightly different phase of the experience, it will be possible for the reader to form a truer conception than could be given by any single presentation.¹

¹In a lecture on "The Reality of the Unseen," William James has recorded several similar instances. William James: *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York, 1903.

Analysis. If we seek for the essential element in the phenomenon that has just been described, we shall find it in the unification of consciousness through æsthetic contemplation of God. By unification of consciousness we do not mean to imply that any momentary state of consciousness can be anything but a unit, but apply the term to the whole stream of consciousness. Ordinarily the complexes of ideas, which so rapidly succeed each other in the flow of mental life, vary from one another considerably in their constituent elements. Scarcely a second may be necessary for the whole stream to have changed its character both as to content and emotional tone. Now, by the unification of consciousness, we mean that this flux is relatively slow; that some idea, remaining almost unchanged, holds the attention for a considerable length of time, and so directs the mental processes that the thoughts with their emotional tone and motor tendencies are all in harmony with it. In the unified consciousness which is here described, the central, controlling idea is God: the prevailing emotional tone is that of adoration.

The term æsthetic contemplation is used when a more specific word than adoration is desired: it serves to convey the idea that the object of attention is one of intrinsic worth. Æsthetic contemplation of God involves forgetfulness of all possible blessings to be derived from Him, and the concentration of the attention upon Him as an object in itself supremely desirable.

That our explanation of this experience as the unification of consciousness through æsthetic contemplation of God is correct, is supported by two considerations. Fixation of attention on the great religious Ideal occupies a prominent place in almost every prayer relating to this experience. And what is equally important, it is possible to start from the act of adoration as the primary constituent and give a consistent psychological account of the whole phenomenon.

Any one who will take the trouble to read the collection of prayers by Mary Tileston, can satisfy himself that adoration is a constant factor in this phenomenon. Only a few illustrations may be given here. It will be remembered that the young lady whose experience is described by Edwards cared for nothing but to meditate about the great Being who came to her and filled her with a strange delight. This is well illustrated again in a prayer by Pusey. He is seeking that peace which he knows by experience is to be found only in God—the peace which we shall see is the necessary outcome of the indwelling presence.

“Let me not seek out of Thee what I can find only in Thee, O Lord, peace and rest and joy and bliss, which abide only in Thine abiding joy. Lift up my soul above the weary round of harassing thoughts to Thy eternal Presence. Lift up my soul to the pure, bright, serene, radiant atmosphere of Thy Presence, that there I may breathe freely, there repose in Thy love, there be at rest from myself and from all things that weary me; and thence return, arrayed with Thy peace, to do and bear what shall please Thee.”

This peace is secured when he has fixed his attention on God (lifted up his soul to God) until he feels the radiant atmosphere of the divine presence—phrases descriptive of his unified consciousness, which controlled by one great idea, has been set free from the “weary round of harassing thoughts.” Preparing for this same experience, Johann Arndt prays, “Forgetting all else, let me see and hear Thee.”

“Ah, Lord unto whom all hearts are open, Thou canst govern the vessel of my soul far better than I can. Arise, O Lord, and command the stormy wind and the troubled sea of my heart to be still, and at peace in Thee, *that I may look up to Thee undisturbed, and abide in union with Thee, my Lord. Let me not be carried hither and thither by wandering thoughts; but, forgetting all else, let me see and hear Thee.* Renew my spirit: kindle in me Thy light, that it may shine within me, and my heart may burn in love and adoration towards Thee. Let Thy Holy Spirit dwell in me continually, and make me Thy temple and sanctuary, and fill me with divine love and light and life, with devout and heavenly thoughts, with comfort and strength, with joy and peace.”

Thus, in several typical instances of this experience, we have seen that the æsthetic contemplation of God is an important factor. We may now ask what is the significance of this factor for an understanding of the complete experience. How is the unification of consciousness attained? In one of St. Anselm’s prayers there is a suggestion of the reason why the direction of the thoughts to God in loving adoration produces that marked effect upon consciousness which the worshipper attributes to the working of God, and which leads him to feel that God is very near.

“O God Thou art Life, Wisdom, Truth, Bounty, and Blessedness, the Eternal, the only true Good! My God and my Lord, Thou art my hope and my heart’s joy. I confess, with thanksgiving, that Thou hast made me Thine image, *that I may direct all my thoughts to Thee,*

and love Thee. Lord, make me to know Thee aright, that I may more and more love, and enjoy, and possess Thee."

The character of the idea of God indicated in this prayer explains its influence over the mind of the worshipper. God is the concrete expression of wisdom, truth, bounty, and blessedness, and of all that can be conceived as being good and desirable. For every aspiration of his own man has attributed to God a corresponding perfection. Or, as Feuerbach has expressed it, "The fundamental hypothesis of belief in God is man's wish to be God himself. Man, however, soon discovers to his sorrow that he is not God; and what he wishes to be thus becomes merely a conceived, a believed, an ideal being. Limited in his faculties, but unlimited in his wishes, man is therefore undivine in power, and unhuman in volition. God thus forms the other half that man lacks: what man imperfectly is, God is perfectly; what man can only desire to be, God actually is." This conception that God is a concrete expression of men's aspiration and a counterpart of their need, is so generally accepted that it needs no elaboration here; but a word may be said regarding its significance as an explanation of the religious consciousness.

If we accept the idea that the conception of God is the sum total of human desires, harmonized, unified, and concretely expressed, we must recognize that the impulsive and inhibitory power it possesses is very great. The conception of God possesses the interest, or dynamic quality, which belongs to the idea of perfect power: but to it belongs also the interest pertaining to virtue and to all the other perfections. Because of this, it is able to catch and hold the attention, direct the associational processes, and come at last to dominate consciousness.

Seldom, however, does the idea of God appeal to the worshipper with all its power, for in most religious exercises the attention is directed to some specific attribute of God rather than to God himself. In prayer, for instance, the man who is seeking moral strength sees in God the All Holy One, while he who seeks succor from physical distress sees in God an Omnipotent Being, each emphasizing that particular perfection which corresponds to his specific needs. This is the practical, self-seeking attitude toward God, in which attention is really fixed upon one's own needs rather than on God. While this is the usual and normal attitude of mind, it does not permit the idea of God to ex-

ercise such power as is exercised over the mind wrapped in æsthetic contemplation.

This æsthetic attitude characterizes the prayer by St. Anselm quoted above. For the moment only is Anselm conscious that God is Wisdom, Truth, Bounty and Blessedness; immediately these merge themselves into one—the only true Good. Without conscious reference to his own needs, he rejoices that he “may direct all his thoughts” to God, for no other purpose than that he “may more and more love, enjoy and possess Him.” The interest or dynamic quality of the idea of God so conceived is very great. While the attention is fixed upon one specific perfection, the idea of God can acquire no further value than is possessed by the attribute in question; but, when in a moment of æsthetic contemplation these attributes are all merged together into the conception of the only true Good, each contributes its own value to the whole, surcharging it with interest.

It is because of this unusual power, possessed by the idea of God under these circumstances, that it is able to hold the attention and remain the central idea in the stream of consciousness for a considerable length of time. So long as it maintains this central position, only those ideas related to it, and possessing an emotional tone in harmony with it, will rise into consciousness. The stream of mental life will change from moment to moment only as regards the phase of the central idea which is emphasized, and the ideas that are associated with it.

This narrowing of the stream of consciousness, this concentration of the attention on one idea, is the essential element in the experience of the indwelling presence and gives rise to two distinguishing marks of that experience, namely: peace of mind and firmness of will. The following paragraphs will serve to illustrate how this peace is produced. The influence of the idea of God on the will and conduct will be reserved for discussion in a future paper.

Maria Nare has given us a good analysis of the peace which follows this experience. “O Lord, this is all my desire—to walk along the path of life that Thou hast appointed me, even as Jesus my Lord would walk along it in steadfastness of faith, in meekness of spirit, in lowliness of heart, in gentleness of love. *And because outward events have so much power in scattering my thoughts and disturbing the inward peace in which alone the voice of Thy spirit is heard, do Thou, gracious Lord,*

calm and settle my soul by that subduing power which alone can bring all thoughts and desires of the heart into captivity to Thyself."

Thus we see that the idea of God, dominating consciousness and bringing "all thoughts and desires into captivity" to itself, is capable of giving a peculiar satisfaction. It gives rest to the mind worn out by conflicting desires, for in the presence of the only true Good, all other interests disappear and consciousness is for the moment unified. Where there are many antagonistic interests there is sure to be discontent and unrest; for, corresponding to each of these, there are motor tendencies, which are checked by the motor tendencies of other ideas, giving rise to disagreeable inhibitions. Now, in the place of the clashing of many equally strong desires, is substituted one supreme passion. No rival desire makes itself felt in consciousness; every innervation finds an open path: and the worshipper is at peace with himself. So, too, when failure has attended the pursuit of certain ambitions, the sting of defeat may be eased by merging one's self in God where these ambitions disappear. Physical pain and distressing circumstances of all sorts are forgotten in these moments of adoration, when all the powers of attention are absorbed in the contemplation of God. So wonderful does this "subduing power" seem to Maria Nare that she attributes it, not to a peculiar working of her own consciousness, but to the influence of the Divine Spirit.

Much the same idea is expressed by John Newman. He describes his usual state of mind as a state of "anarchy" in which each individual interest is struggling for supremacy, and contrasts it with the "fullness of God," a state of mind in which there is no place for other desires. "Teach me, O Lord, and enable me to live the life of saints and angels. *Take me out of the languor, the irritability, the sensitiveness, the anarchy, in which my soul lies, and fill it with Thy fullness, breathe on me with that breath which infuses energy and kindles fervor.* In asking for fervor, I ask for all that I can need, and all that Thou canst give. In asking for fervor, I am asking for faith, hope and charity, in their most heavenly exercise; I am asking for that loyal perception of duty, which follows on yearning affection; I am asking for sanctity, peace, and joy, all at once. Nothing would be a trouble to me, nothing a difficulty, had I but fervor of soul. *Lord, in asking for fervor, I am asking for Thyself, for nothing short of Thee, O my God. Enter my heart, and fill it with fervor by filling it with Thee.*

This same influence is described again in a prayer by Mary Carpenter, "*O Father, calm the turbulence of our passions; quiet the throbbing of our hopes; repress the waywardness of our wills; direct the motions of our affections; and sanctify the varieties of our lot.*"

So far we have considered the effect of the adoration of God as purely negative and inhibitory, giving peace and quiet by doing away with some of the distressing conditions of mental activity; but as we shall see, it also gives positive pleasure. The peace which comes to the mind in which the anarchy of many petty desires has been displaced by the tyranny of one great and beautiful idea, is not the only source of satisfaction which this experience affords. The contemplation of the ideal is in itself a source of satisfaction; and as we shall see, this is particularly true of the great religious ideal, which is God. The contemplation of the idea of God gives pleasure, just as the sight of a flower, or the thought of an heroic action, or any other experience which appeals to us as having intrinsic worth; but it also gives a satisfaction which none of these other experiences, appealing only in specific ways, can give. The idea of God, being a reflection of man's aspirations after ideal conditions, being in fact the conception of an ideal man under perfect surroundings, contains in itself that which can appeal to every longing aroused in man by the experiences of life. Since no desires are left unsatisfied, the pleasure so derived is free from any admixture of pain. It is therefore peculiarly satisfying to break away from the disappointments of actual existence and lose one's self in the adoration of God. These statements may be made clearer by quoting a prayer from Thomas à Kempis. Notice how clearly he differentiates in his account between the satisfaction of the several separate desires and the complete fulfillment of them all in the possession of God. "*Grant me, O most loving Lord, to rest in Thee above all creatures, above all health and beauty, above all glory and honor, above all power and dignity, above all knowledge and subtilty, above all riches and art,—and above all that is visible and invisible, and above all that Thou art not, O my God. It is too small and unsatisfying whatsoever Thou bestowest on me apart from Thee or revealest to me, or promisest, whilst Thou art not seen, and not fully obtained. For surely my heart cannot truly rest, nor be entirely contented, unless it rest in Thee.*"

Summary. In the description, given earlier in the paper, it was pointed out that one of the distinguishing marks of the phenomenon

was the peace which the worshipper enjoyed. Returning to Edwards's description we read: "She is unmindful of any pain or affliction. She has a strange sweetness in her mind, and is of wonderful calmness." It was this characteristic, which first attracted the writer's attention and which led him, in the hope of finding an explanation for it, to study this group of prayers in detail. To sum up the observations so far as they bear on this point, it should be recalled how strongly dynamic is the great religious Ideal, representing, as it does, the sum total of human longings, unified, and concretely expressed; it should be remembered that under proper conditions this idea may so control the mental processes as to bring itself and related ideas into ascendancy in consciousness exerting this power more strongly than the ordinary idea because of its much greater hold on the attention. It thus exercises what has been called a "dominating" influence, excluding all ideas except those readily associated with it. Where previously the mind was distressed by many conflicting tendencies, one passion is now supreme; and with this unification of consciousness comes a feeling of relief analogous to that felt when the fiat of the will puts an end to deliberation. We have seen this principle illustrated in a number of examples. Maria Nare has been quoted concerning "that subduing power which alone can bring all the thoughts and desires of the heart into captivity." Newman's prayer indicates how this experience—causing him to feel as if filled with the divine spirit—transforms the irritability and anarchy of his soul into a state of energy and fervor, clearly indicative of domination by a great idea.

But the experience involves more than the restful feeling arising from the unification of consciousness. The contemplation of God is a source of positive pleasure. This is the more evident when it is remembered that the idea of God is the counterpart of man's aspirations after the ideal. Because of this reciprocal relation between human desires and the conception of God, it is possible that the adoration of God should yield a pleasure which, on account of its purity, is quite unique.

It is not impossible that the explanation given here of the peace derived from this particular experience, might be extended to serve as a partial explanation of religious peace in general.

A word must be added concerning the imaginative conceptions which are attached to this experience. How does the worshipper come to attribute these reactions of his own mind to the influence of the

Divine Spirit? In the first place, the experience is somewhat extraordinary, and the worshipper is at a loss to account for it. For an unusual experience he expects an unusual cause; and since he finds himself thinking and acting as he believes God would have him think and act, and doing so seemingly without effort, as if impelled by some hidden power, he naturally believes that he is under the immediate influence of the Spirit of God. As did the lady of New Haven, he may feel that God has descended to earth and walks with him. Or, like Pusey, he may feel himself lifted into a new atmosphere, the "pure, bright, serene, radiant atmosphere of the Presence of God."

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SAUL'S CONVERSION.

BY CLARENCE D. ROYSE.

Of all the New Testament conversions perhaps none is of keener interest to us than the one which has been chosen as the subject of this article. This is the one case, which, more than any other, has been made the model or pattern of modern conversions. Its particular type has been much sought after and highly prized by religious workers. And conversions accompanied by experiences similar to those that accompanied Saul's conversion are without hesitation pronounced as unusually "clear." There can be no doubt of the high valuation rightly to be placed upon *conversions* like that of St. Paul; but peculiar phenomena attended the conversion, which phenomena are to be separated in our thought from the conversion itself. The conversion is the change in the man; the phenomena are the incidents in connection with that change. In the great gulf between Saul, the persecutor, and Paul, the Apostle, lies the fact of conversion; in the events of the Damascus-road experience is a series of facts, closely associated, on the one hand, with the great character change which began that day, and, on the other hand, with the previous life-history. It is with these events that we have principally to do. But not simply in their physical aspects do we consider them; rather do we wish to treat them in the two relations above indicated. The mental phenomena are of particular interest to us. What were the mental processes in Saul's mind during the transition-experience of that day? What did his past history contribute to these processes? How were they affected by the peculiar mental traits and environment of Saul? What bearing did these experiences have upon the later life? Or, in general, why did the conversion-experience assume the particular form that it did? and what, if anything, did the form of this experience contribute to the character of the conversion itself?

It is not presumed that these questions can be answered with mathematical exactness from the data at hand. But it is assumed that there is a sequence of mental processes, no less in a conversion than in other

experiences. Varieties in religious experience are not hap-hazard or due to chance, accident or divine whim. On the contrary, the laws of the spiritual are as certainly uniform as those of the physical world. And this idea no more rules God out of the one realm than out of the other.

In harmony with this view we have some very interesting and suggestive facts in the case of Saul, which clearly throw some light upon the questions under consideration. Saul was born of Jewish parents in Tarsus, a city of Cilicia in Asia Minor, early in the first decade of the Christian era. This city was the capital of a Roman province, one of the leading commercial centres, and the seat of one of the three greatest educational institutions of the day. Here the boy spent his childhood and was taught by his parents in accordance with the custom of the Jews. His outer environment was intensely Gentile, but, as the parents were Hebrews of the strictest type, it is reasonable to suppose that every possible effort was made to counteract the influence of this environment. Hence the home training was probably the more strictly Jewish. At an early age (tradition places it at 13) Saul was sent to Jerusalem, where, according to his own statement, he was "brought up at the feet of Gamaliel, and taught according to the perfect manner of the law of the fathers."

The next authenticated fact concerning Saul is his connection with the martyrdom of Stephen. Here we find him abetting the persecutors of the church. It is perfectly natural that he should share the anti-Christian sentiments of the conservative Jews. But he is a disciple of Gamaliel, who advocated the use of mild measures with the Christians, and hence, it is hardly to be expected that he would be an active persecutor. His attitude on this occasion is a middle position, somewhat of a compromise, but fairly consistent with both of these two contending influences.

This incident of the martyrdom of Stephen has been regarded almost universally as having an important bearing upon the conversion of Saul. We may accept the general statement, but the writer does not believe that there is sufficient ground for the theory that Saul's remorse for the part taken by him in this tragedy had any great part in the conversion. His desire to exterminate the Christians root and branch was only intensified. We find nowhere any indication of doubt in his mind as to the rightness of his course during the persecutions. He did not brood

over his sin in the death of Stephen. Psychologically the effect upon Saul's mind was identically that of a deed of violence upon an unreasoning mob, or the smell of blood upon a tiger. It only infuriated. Instead of remaining a passive observer of the persecutions we find Saul searching out the Christians and giving his vote against them; at last his zeal overleaps all ordinary bounds and, not content with persecuting in Jerusalem, he pushes the extermination into foreign cities until the climax of frenzy is reached in "breathing out threatening and slaughter." There is not one hint of wavering by reason of remorse. On the contrary his fury gathers momentum as it moves. It is true that there must have been the natural revulsion that any sensitive mind feels against the shedding of human blood, but this was completely overwhelmed by the stronger emotion: there was no conscious weakening until the crisis came.

Yet the influence of Stephen upon Paul is obvious, and Stephen's death no doubt had something to do with Saul's conversion. Stephen has been called the forerunner of Paul from the similarity of the two characters, and many believe that had he lived, he, and not Paul, would have been the great leader in the movement to give the gospel to the Gentiles without Jewish entanglements. When on the defensive both men use the method of appealing to history to secure attention. They next assert their allegiance to the true principles of Judaism. Their attitude under persecution is strikingly similar, as also their general trend of thought and their conception of Christianity. The agreement extends even to specific thoughts and almost to words as has been very ingeniously pointed out by Conybeare and Howson. Cf. Acts vii, 48-50 with Acts xvii, 24-25, Acts vii, 53 with Gal. iii, 19, Acts vii, 51 with Romans xi, 17-29.

The mental constitution of Saul will throw some light upon the relation between these two men and this relation will in turn illuminate some of the peculiar features of Saul's conversion-experience. But the analysis of a man's mind is a difficult problem even at close range and with intimate personal acquaintance: and the difficulties increase enormously as the point of view recedes. But in the case of Saul the data are unusually abundant considering the remoteness of his time. Yet we have not all of the facts, and if we had it would not be possible within the scope of this article to more than hint at some of the leading characteristics. It is evident that Paul was not weak in any mental

faculty. His intellect is weighty rather than sharp. For close reasoning and logical argument the Epistle to the Romans, the 15th chapter of First Corinthians and the Epistle to the Galatians are good examples. And yet his readiness with a keen response in emergencies and his ability to turn occasions to profit require that he be at least not classed as slow. His speech on Mars Hill, his manner and method of answer when arrested in Jerusalem, his reply to Agrippa, his appeal to Caesar are sufficient evidence of alertness of mind.

But Paul's emotions are exceptionally strong. Note the burning intensity of his nature as revealed on numerous occasions in word and action. Even his iron will seems to be more an expression of consuming zeal than calm, deliberate determination. The very intensity of the persecutions carried on by him and the expression "breathing out threatening and slaughter" do not indicate the man who has carefully reasoned out a proposition and arrived at a conclusion. The moving impulse in him is rather emotional than intellectual. His movements are of the whirlwind variety, impelled by passion and not the result of continuous deliberation. This same life was later controlled by a nobler purpose which drove it forward as a ship is driven before the wind. Whatever the struggle to install within him this new governing principle, when once installed his conduct in harmony with that principle is not a continuous volitional struggle, but falls automatically within the limits of the ruling motive. It becomes what Prof. James calls choice without effort. Note how emotion abounds in Paul's epistles, most of which were written at a much later period of life, when this quality might naturally be expected to be less prominent than at the time of his conversion. See with what vehemence he describes the battle in himself between the carnal and the spiritual, at last breaking forth in the cry, "O, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from this dead body?" And yet, intense as is his outburst of feeling, he is only relating an incident long since past. But so vivid is his imagination that it is to him as present experience. Though Paul's mind was intellectual far beyond the ordinary, it was not the stern, harsh, unsympathetic intellectuality. It was logical, but not coldly so. This is apparent from the variety and richness of the figurative language used by him. And his emotions are not mere animal excitement or physical exuberance; rather they are the normal expression of the rich and warm intellectual life. Paul's emotions indicate depth, not shallowness of

intellect. They are the emotions of the great mind, not of the small one. Back of all is the well-thought-out, logical and sufficient rational basis for all of his conduct. But the general principles of conduct being settled, the emotional nature is on the throne to direct the life in accordance with those principles. But the individual acts scarcely require individual volitions. We have, then, a life ruled by a governing passion. Back of this is a sufficient, satisfying reason for the conduct, but not every act is the direct result of reasoning. At one time this passion was antagonistic to Christianity; later a change occurred which turned the great flood of emotions to the building up of what Saul had formerly torn down. The change that occurred overturned the rational foundation for his previous conduct. The course that had formerly appeared perfectly reasonable and right, now appeared as clearly wrong. Saul changed his mind. This gave new direction to his emotions but did not vary their intensity.

We are now ready to consider directly the immediate events of the experience on the Damascus road out of which came this change of mind and this new direction to his emotions and to his life. All of our scriptural information concerning these events is contained in three accounts in the Acts of the Apostles, two of which purport to be in the language of Paul himself, and a few references in Paul's Epistles. In Acts ix, 1-19 is Luke's own account, but he was not present at the time of the conversion. Twice Paul refers to his conversion in speeches reported by Luke. The account in the speech before Agrippa (Acts xxvi, 12-19) could not have been heard by Luke. Both of these accounts, then, were written on information received by the writer from others. The account in Paul's speech at Jerusalem at the time of his arrest (Acts xxii, 6-21) might have been heard by Luke, but we have no information on the subject. The references in the epistles are meagre. Between the different accounts in the Acts there are some wide variations, but variations help us to determine what is fundamental. Luke's account mentions the vision of Ananias somewhat in detail, but makes no mention of any commission to Saul. The Jerusalem speech simply says, "And one Ananias, a devout man . . . came to me and standing by me said, Brother Saul, receive thy sight," and then follows in part Saul's commission to the Gentiles as coming through Ananias. But the same account represents this commission as given more in detail to Saul himself while in a trance in the

temple after his return to Jerusalem. The third account does not mention Ananias or the baptism of Saul, and the commission is received by Saul directly from Jesus during the appearance on the Damascus road. One account says that Saul heard a voice, another that those who journeyed with him heard the voice, but the other distinctly says that those who journeyed with him heard not the voice. One account says Saul fell to the earth, another that they all fell, but Luke's account especially mentions that Saul fell to the earth, that he arose from the earth, and that the others stood during the incident.

But taking all things together we are justified in three conclusions, viz.:

First, it is reasonably clear that Saul was overwhelmed by a blinding light, that he saw Jesus and talked with him, that he went into Damascus, talked with Ananias and was baptized, that he received a divine commission to carry the gospel to the Gentiles. Second, it is not clear just what Saul's companions saw and heard that day, and consequently we may conclude that this is of no great value. Third, it is certain that these companions did not experience just what Saul did on that day. Two of the three accounts clearly state the fact that Saul had some phases of experience that were not shared by his companions, and particular emphasis is placed upon this fact. If the companions saw any unusual light, a fact which is hard to determine, they did not see a blinding light, for they were able to guide Saul into the city. But he was blinded for a period of three days. If they heard any unusual sound they did not hear any voice as such nor comprehend any message, but Saul heard a voice which called him by name and carried on intelligent conversation with him. It is also clear that they saw no person. But Ananias mentions the fact that Saul saw Jesus on the way to Damascus; Barnabas makes this fact the basis of his confidence in the new convert; and Paul himself declares to the Corinthians that Jesus appeared to him after the resurrection as one born out of due time, and this is one of the strong arguments for his belief in the resurrection.

We conclude, therefore, that the peculiar experience of Saul on the Damascus road was not due to light-waves and sound-waves acting upon the organs of sight and sound, that a camera exposed upon the scene would not have shown any unusual light or the form of any person not belonging to the company, nor would a phonograph have re-

corded the voice that Saul heard. In other words, Saul's experience was subjective; it was an hallucination. This view receives some confirmation from the fact that Paul himself calls it a vision and that such experiences were somewhat common with him. On his return to Jerusalem he was in a trance in the temple; the experience at Troas where he saw the man of Macedonia was a night vision; at Corinth, it is stated, the Lord appeared to Paul in a vision and again at Jerusalem after his arrest. In Second Corinthians Paul declares that he was caught up into paradise and heard things unspeakable and not lawful for man to utter. During the shipwreck on the voyage to Rome he had another vision.

The mental characteristics of Paul are conducive to hallucinations. It may be, perhaps, generally thought that these experiences do not come to persons of unusually strong minds. But this is not true. The error possibly comes by reason of the fact that hallucinations usually come to highly emotional natures, and the popular mind is in the habit of associating a high degree of emotion with a low degree of intellect. But nearly every famous poet is a practical refutation of this latter misconception. History is full of what appear to be hallucinations occurring to men of more than ordinary intellect, as the *daimon* of Socrates, the blazing sword of Savonarola and the devil that appeared to Luther.

A strong intellect helps rather than hinders the hallucination if the emotional nature be present, because of the power to concentrate thought and exclude irrelevant matter. It is not absence of thought that is required, but absence of counteracting thought.

We have already shown that Paul had the highly emotional nature just indicated as essential to hallucinations, and it has been as clearly established that he had also the other faculty which is at least helpful to the production of hallucinations, a strong intellect. We have further given the experimental proof from the facts of record that this Damascus-road experience was hallucination. But we go still further. Not only does the fact of the hallucination appear to be clearly proved, but in certain facts of Saul's early life and training, his schooling under Gamaliel, his connection with the martyrdom of Stephen and the subsequent persecutions, facts already referred to, we are able to gather even some of the very elements that determined its character and content. The mental process by which these facts thus influenced this experience

is one the steps of which Saul was not always conscious of taking. We know that facts long since lost to consciousness often influence our dreams. Any fact of past experience, whether remembered or forgotten, belongs to the "stuff that dreams are made of," and we are frequently unable to account for or trace their connection with our dreams. But hallucinations are nothing more or less than dreams that come to us while we are awake but with the mind so absorbed as to render it oblivious to the distractions of ordinary impressions upon the senses. Hallucinations, being therefore only waking dreams, are made of the same "stuff" that other dreams are made of.

In Bible times all nations believed in gods who worked supernaturally and all nations produced the so-called supernatural in proof of their gods. The Hebrews believed in one God whose claim to divinity rested chiefly upon the fact that his supernatural works were far superior to those of other so-called gods. This was the object-lesson to Hebrews and Egyptians alike when Aaron's rod swallowed the rods of the sorcerers. God was known by the unusual and the extraordinary, and especially so among the Hebrews. Saul, a Hebrew of the Hebrews, would naturally expect proof of the claims of a divine messenger and revelations of divine truth to come in the form of marvellous manifestations of power. Saul believed he was doing God's will in the persecutions, and so believing himself to be a special messenger of God, might reasonably be supposed to stand in an attitude of general expectation of receiving some divine revelation. We know something of the power of expectation in determining both the fact and the quality of a religious experience.

We have shown somewhat the influence of Stephen's speech upon Paul's language. Likewise parts of Stephen's speech and some of the events in connection with his death appear to have given color to some of the incidents of Saul's conversion. The speech opens with the statement that God appeared to Abraham and talked with him, and called him to go into a foreign land. It tells of God's appearing to Moses in a flame of fire, and by the voice of God Moses was sent on a foreign mission. God is continually referred to as speaking directly to his people and manifesting himself by signs and wonders. Throughout the speech those that looked on Stephen saw his face as the face of an angel. And then in concluding he declared that he saw heaven opened and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God. Here we have

all of the elements that go to make up the recorded facts of Saul's hallucination. There is the glory and light, the sight of Jesus in heaven, the voice speaking out of heaven, the call to service and that service in foreign parts.

No doubt Saul's life among the Gentiles had something to do with the nature of his call. Every person's call to service is determined by the facts of his past experience so far as these facts bear upon adaptability and general qualifications. It is perhaps true that every possible effort was made during Saul's boyhood to counteract the influence of Gentile surroundings, but we know that the period he spent in Tarsus was the most impressionable part of his life. We know also that impressions are often made that lie dormant for years, sometimes gathering force to break out suddenly in later life, sometimes held as vague, indefinite half-thoughts that may or may not lose their haziness in after years, and sometimes such that during the dormant period the subject is hardly conscious of their existence at all. And yet even in the latter case the later life is often very decidedly influenced by these early events. At any rate we know that though Paul was thoroughly Jewish, yet he was decidedly cosmopolitan. The very fact that he pushes the persecution into Gentile cities strongly hints that his field of labor is not to be confined within the narrow limits of any single nation. The fact that he was even now approaching a Gentile city for the purpose of persecuting Christians would readily suggest that his call to establish the gospel should be no less extensive than his supposed call to tear it down.

The time of this experience was propitious for an hallucination to Saul, by reason of the excitement due to the establishing of the new religion with the persecutions incident thereto, and the near approach to the scene of further persecutions after the suspension of this work during the journey. The comparative solitude of the journey gave opportunity for reflection; the time of day was about the noon hour when reflection is especially likely to run into reverie. Any sudden shock or disturbance of the reverie would complete the chain of causes and could readily be expected to precipitate an hallucination that might be regarded as held in solution up to this time. And when we consider that Saul had a natural abhorrence of bloodshed and violence, and a general broadness of mind and spirit of tolerance, and that both of these qualities were held in check and even ruthlessly trampled under foot

up to this time by the counter-passion that had taken possession of him, it is not difficult to see how a shock might have come during his reflection and reverie upon these very matters. This mental reaction may have been aided or even produced by some disturbance of the elements, which disturbance, if any, would account for the experience of Saul's companions on that day.

This view does not leave God out of the transaction nor does the word "hallucination" imply the unreality of the experience. This word is used in its strictly scientific sense and means simply a mental impression without any objective stimulus. There was nothing there external to Saul to affect his organs of sense, or it would have affected the sense-organs of his companions as well. But the sensation was just as real and true as if it had been produced by an objective stimulus. It was no less real to Saul because it came only to him. And it is no less divinely influenced because it admits of psychological explanation. God is not a lawless being, the evidence of whose presence is to be found in uncaused events; rather is he the cause of causes, the first great cause, and the evidence of his presence lies in order and method rather than in lawlessness and chaos. He is in all the order and method of nature; the changing seasons, the march of time, the movements of the planets, life, growth, decay and death, all have God in them; but in a peculiar sense is he in those higher forces and influences that adjust men to the duties of the passing time, that make life noble and growth sublime, that give the soul victory over death and decay.

The presence of God, then, in this experience is shown by a natural and psychological sequence of events, rather than by a mass of unrelated and uncaused facts; but still more is He shown by the *manner* in which these events are related, with respect to their influence upon the character of Saul and the later history of the world. Saul needed exactly the lesson that came to him at this time. He disbelieved in Jesus largely because he was unable to ascribe divine powers to one who had not the power to save himself from the cross. He believed that Jesus was dead and that for the good of the people the heresy of belief in him ought to be stamped out. He needed to know that Jesus was not only greater than the cross, but that he had triumphed over death itself. He received this lesson on the road to Damascus. The whole direction of his life is changed. All of the power of his being is turned to the spread of the gospel. The resurrection becomes the keynote of his

message. Invincible in spirit, full of faith and of dauntless courage, he carries the gospel triumphantly into the uttermost parts of the then known world. It is of comparatively little importance just what form the vision should take in Saul's mind, but it is of vast importance what it leaves in his mind to affect the later life. Any vision or any other experience that would have conveyed the truth to his mind and dislodged the error that was there would have been equally effective. But God used the facts of his past history and the natural laws of the mind to communicate to Saul the needed lesson. The evidence of God's presence lies less in the fact of the light that Saul saw than in the use that was made of it; it lies less in the fact that he saw a form or heard a voice than that he learned the truth. The one important and absolutely indisputable evidence of the divine hand in Saul's conversion is the fact of the conversion itself.

The fact that the visions of Saul and Ananias are in substantial agreement does not weaken the argument that they yet follow the laws of mind, nor does it at all strengthen the argument for the divine presence in the event. As already indicated, the divine presence is not proved by lawlessness but rather the reverse. In the case of Peter and Cornelius we have concurrent visions which fit into each other perfectly and God's hand was evidently in them, and yet we have very good reason for believing that the vision of Peter, at least, is colored by suggestion from his physical condition and environment. Just as our dreams are thus colored, so also are our visions which are waking dreams. It is stated of Peter that he was very hungry and would have eaten, but while they made ready he fell into a trance. What would be more natural than that he would dream of food? And being in the house of a tanner, with the memory of the skins of animals fresh in his mind, is it not reasonable that he would dream of animals? The supreme proof of God in this event is not the fact that Peter saw animals, but rather that God used some means to drive the prejudice out of Peter's mind. The particular means is only of incidental importance. Even so conservative a commentator as Benson, writing on this very incident, says that the symbols used in these visions were determined by the state of the person himself. Stokes, in the *Expositor's Bible*, recognizes the same truth when he says, "To the devout believer in Christianity who knows that in His works in grace as well as in His works in nature the Lord leaves nothing to mere chance, but perfectly orders them all down

to the minutest detail, to such an one this human hunger of St. Peter appears as divinely planned. . . . St. Peter's hunger is . . . but a manifestation of that superhuman foresight which was directing the whole transaction from behind this visible scene . . . teaching us that nothing . . . is too minute for the divine love and care."

The evidence of God's special presence in an experience does not depend upon the fact of visions nor even upon their content, *per se*, but upon results worthy of God. People are sometimes genuinely converted in trances, but the conversion is proved not by the trance but by the life. The trance is explainable by known laws, but this surely does not argue that God is not in the conversion. Was it not worthy of God to work through what we now know to be the laws of mind to bring Saul to a knowledge of his error? And is not the marvellous transformation of the man and the use of the minutest peculiarities of temperament, training, and past experience to achieve this result sufficient proof that God's hand was in the work?

THE FIELD AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

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The division of the field of scientific inquiry into branches is to knowledge what the specialization of labor is to industry: a condition as well as a result of progress. The multiplication of special physical sciences in what was originally a common field is one of the striking developments of the past centuries. A similar disentanglement of material and of methods has taken place in the study of non-physical life: history, logic, ethics, psychology, metaphysics and their various subdivisions, have gradually emerged from the primitive 'Philosophy.' It may therefore be a matter for wonder that with regard to religious life the original chaos is only now beginning to break into clearly differentiated special sciences. The so-called 'Philosophies of Religion' are still too often unconscious attempts to weave into some sort of whole loose ethical, psychological, and metaphysical inquiries.

Of late, it has become fashionable in works on Religion, as well as elsewhere, to make a conspicuous use of the word psychology. An 'up-to-date' student of Religion cannot afford to leave it out of the title, or, at least, of the preface of his books, even though he should be an historian or a metaphysician and should know nothing of recent psychology.¹ This homage paid to psychology by ignorance is not without disadvantages to that much-talked-of science. Nearly everywhere a medley of common sense psychological remarks may still pass for psychological science. How could the historian feel hesitation in founding his 'philosophy,' on 'psychology,' or how could the theological student fed on Greek and Hebrew exegesis refrain from writing a 'psychological' dissertation on some phase of religious life, seeing that they ignore the existence, or, at least, the significance, of the large body of facts gathered

¹As an illustration of the confusion still reigning in the study of Religion I would point to the valuable work of Tiele, 'Elements of the Science of Religion,' the Gifford lectures of 1896.

and systematized during the past fifty years as the science of psychology?

Is it not usually the appreciation of the importance of 'psychology'—whatever that term may mean to those who use it—which is wanting, but a sufficiently clear idea of what it is and of its present resources. Pfleiderer expressed a wide-spread opinion when he wrote, "we may say, therefore, that the indispensable key to the understanding of the phenomena given in external historical experience . . . lies in the inner experience of subjective consciousness."¹ There are still, however, historians who hold that "one can study any particular religion in all its phases without entering the province of psychology." The clear recognition by Pfleiderer of the necessity of individual psychology as a prelude to the philosophy of Religion did not prevent him from writing a 'Philosophy of Religion,' even though he did not possess the "indispensable key."

In the following pages I shall undertake first to separate the province of the psychology, from that of the history, of Religion and then to give an outline of the problems with which a systematic psychological study of Religion would have to deal. Any one desirous of seeing a more general discussion of the relation of psychology to history will do well to go to the vigorous book of Professor Münsterberg, 'Psychology and Life.'

I. The Differentiation of the Psychology of Religion from the History of Religion.

How would the psychologist and the historian divide the field offered to their investigation by an ecclesiastical assembly? The facts usually entered on the minutes of the meeting—the hour, the place, the membership, the topics under discussion, the discussions themselves with their outcome, and other similar facts, make up the material of the historian. His task is to record and interpret the meaning of the actions of this particular group of men. He will treat a devotional meeting in the same way as a business session. *The deeds of men, as deeds and their appreciation*, are his province. If he attempts to explain actions,

¹"The Notion and Problem of the Philosophy of Religion," *Phil. Rev.*, Jan., 1893. Reprinted in the volume entitled "Evolution and Theology."

he will look for their cause either to other actions or to physical events; but he may not penetrate within the individual consciousness itself. As a matter of fact the historian commonly oversteps deliberately, or does not know, the boundaries of his profession. He likes to dabble in sociology and in psychology. It may be remarked, by the way, that this proneness to wander in other people's preserves is not always disadvantageous to his works. Had Taine been purely an historian, his 'History of English Literature' would have been little more than a skeleton of what it is.

But what, in that ecclesiastical assembly we have imagined, are the data belonging to the psychologist? They are the ideas, the feelings, the emotions, the desires and the volitions of its members when considered not in their outward issue, but *in themselves*, *i. e.*, as subjective experiences of an individual. The historian may take account of the heat and asperity of the debate; but it is reserved for the psychologist to describe, to compare and to analyze particular emotions. The *expression* of the will in action and in emotion, not the will and the emotion themselves, is historical material. When confronted, for instance, with the phenomenon of faith, the historian of Religion will take note of its presence, of the manner in which it makes itself felt, of its objects, of its antecedents. The psychologist, on the other hand, describes and analyzes faith as an experience of the subject. He discriminates, for instance, between the faith-states and the faith-beliefs. He observes the coincident increase of power in certain directions and attempts an explanation of it by reference to the relation existing between the desires and the emotions on the one side and the intellect on the other, etc. If, instead of being faith, the topic be sin, the historian records the sinful deed, the circumstances which lead to it, the judgment passed by society or by particular individuals, the punishment inflicted, and the like. The psychologist deals, instead, with the facts of moral consciousness, the feelings of guilt, of remorse, of repentance; with the ideas connected with these feelings; with their interpretation, etc.

Thus, though the historian and the psychologist may consider the same general object, *they are concerned with different data and therefore with different problems.*

It should be further noted touching the question of data that, except in biography, history deals with groups of men, with tribes, nations, sects, societies, corporations, and not with particular individuals, *i. e.*, with actions generalized in a process of social consolidation.

In Religion, for instance, it deals with beliefs, doctrines, modes of worship, institutions and the like. In so far as history concerns itself with these social products of individual life its data are still further removed from those of individual psychology. Though there may be some difficulty in separating the historical from the psychological data when history deals with separate individuals, no confusion is possible when it deals with social documents. The actual need of an all-sufficient Helper and the doctrine of God's omnipotence and goodness; the mystical ecstasy itself and the doctrine of the union of the soul with God; the faith-state itself and the doctrines of faith; the actual passing through the moral transformation called conversion and the doctrine of conversion; the spirit of prayer and adoration and the forms of worship, etc., are objects as different as can well be imagined.

The primary, fundamental, character of individual experience with regard to the social data of history is a fact the meaning of which has not yet been recognized, surely not by the students of Religion. The buildings dedicated to worship, the societies for religious purposes, the prayer books, the orthodoxies, the heresies, have a sort of reality patent to all and so it has happened that institutions, myths, legends, creeds, have filled the vision of the student of religion to the exclusion of individual experiences. The facts of the inner life of the millions who have made the buildings, organized the worship, formulated the doctrines, are more subtle. They have for the many the unsubstantiality of shadows. And so these inner manifestations of psychic life have been neglected albeit the historical data issue of necessity from them. Exhaustive historical treatises have, for instance, been written on the beliefs in spirits, the Grecian gods, the rites of atonement, the Christian heresies, etc., etc., but where are the works in which one may find set forth the individual psychological origin of these rites and these beliefs? Let it be once fully realized that in individual experience is the source of the historical data, and the psychology of Religion will have gained the place belonging to it by the side of the history.

Both history and psychology are explanatory, but each explains in a way impossible to the other because of the disparity of their respective material. What kind of explanation does history provide? History relates, for instance, how, when the army of Xerxes was threatening Attica, Demosthenes, moved by patriotism and ambition, sent word to the Persian monarch that the Greek galleys were about to make their

escape. This cunning tale led to the destruction of the Persian seapower. It may relate how a people groaning under oppression, and spurred on by famine, rose against their rulers and demanded, or themselves executed, reforms. It may treat of the progress of art and science and show how inventions have revolutionized the manner of life. If it be religious history it may, for instance, establish the chronology of the Greek Pantheon, trace the origin of a sect back to an individual founder and set forth his particular ideas together with the circumstances surrounding his life. Or it may determine the gradual modifications undergone by a particular doctrine and the historical circumstances to which are due these modifications. The reference to Demosthenes patriotism, ambition, foresight and cunning: to the oppression practiced upon a people: to the scientific spirit: to the peculiar desires, ideas and conduct of a person: to social circumstances, etc., constitute the historical explanation. Shall we rest satisfied with this kind of explanation? If we do, we shall remain completely in the dark as to what are after all the vital problems of religious life—to speak of religion only. Why did Augustine and his predecessors entertain startling opinions concerning Election and the Grace of God? Why did Luther proclaim Salvation by Faith and reject Salvation by Works? Why did George Fox go about preaching holiness and simplicity without regard either for the opinion of society or for his physical comfort? Shall we be done when we have said that these men thought they took their teaching from the Gospels? The historical explanation can satisfy those only who regard Religion merely as an external phenomenon. Those who believe that Religion is primarily and essentially an inner life, will turn to psychology and ask of it from what private, intimate experiences: from what impulses, desires and needs, from what ideas, arose the beliefs by which the leaders and founders of Religion lived and for which they were ready to die. History, cannot, like psychology, penetrate behind the manifestation of the will into consciousness wherein action is elaborated, and therefore it cannot be explanatory of inner religious life.

It follows, moreover, from the difference of data, that to psychology will fall the task of correlating psychic experiences with physiological processes. Psycho-physics and psycho-physiology have become theoretically important, and practically fruitful, branches of General Psychology. There is no reason whatsoever to prevent the psychologist from carrying within the field of religious and ethical experience the parallel

between psychic and physiological life, unless it be the difficulty of the task. Nothing more need be said here on this point provided it be understood that tracing a physiological parallel is neither attempting to solve the metaphysical question involved in the recognition of a parallelism between body and mind, nor betraying any opinion whatsoever touching that question.

The psychology of Religion thus separates itself from the history in two essential particulars. (1) It deals with the contents of consciousness themselves: impulses, desires, representations, ideas, volitions; whereas its sister science finds its data in the deeds of men and chiefly in the social resultants of the activities of individuals. (2) From the difference of material follows a difference in the problems.

For this double reason the entrance of the psychologist into the field of religious experience marks an epoch in religious study. Psychological science itself should also be the gainer for this extension of interest, for no portion of human life surpasses the religious in depth of feeling, in intensity of desire and in effort of the will. Nowhere else does the struggle for life uncover more unmercifully the hidden recesses of the human soul; nowhere else does the lust of life throw more completely out of joint certain fine mental adjustments antagonistic to the religious end. In the moments of intense religious experience man reverts to a simpler state and uncovers certain aboriginal aspects of himself never otherwise visible; or, and perhaps not less frequently, he rises in understanding and in purpose beyond his ordinary self. Let, therefore, the psychologist disregard the complaints that may come from unwitting enemies of knowledge and enter boldly into this new country.

Would it be of any use to add, before passing to the consideration of the problems, that what I have said does in no way aim to diminish or to belittle the scope of the history of Religion? I have merely tried to point out the place of *another* science.

II. *Outline of a Psychology of Religious Life.*

A systematic psychological study of religious life might properly begin with the consideration of *the needs and the desires* which it expresses, because religion is a mode of living, a species of purposive activity. It is logically proper, whatever be the part of life under consideration, to inquire first as to its purposes or its ends.

The investigation of *the intellectual constituents* of religious life, — ideas, beliefs, doctrines—would come next in order, for the business of the intellect is the understanding of life in order to provide means by which the needs and desires may be satisfied. The will, born blind, generates the intellect in order to have a guide. It is the intellect which interprets and organizes the chaos in which the will finds itself on awakening. In religion, for instance, the intellect spurred to its task by certain needs, creates divinities. There would be no theology if there were no religious needs and purposes. The creative freedom of the intellect is, of course, checked from several sides, chiefly perhaps by the logical claims made by the external world.

The third part of the psychology of Religion would deal with *the means* provided by intelligence and used by the will to obtain its ends. The discovery of the means is the contribution of the intellect to the business of living. Here would find place the study of worship (meditation, adoration, rites, ceremonies, etc.) and of the particular conditions in which the pious soul puts itself (the faith-state, ecstacy, etc.), for these are also means employed for religious satisfaction.

There would remain for a fourth and last part the critical consideration of the results secured by religion. This section would fall into three chapters dealing respectively with the following queries: What are the results? How far are they adequate responses to the religious demands? What is the *modus operandi*?

The four parts into which the psychology of Religion falls would then be:

- A. The study of the motives (impulses, desires, needs).
- B. The study of the concepts (doctrines, religious ideas, and beliefs).
- C. The study of the means (worship, rites; religious states).
- D. The study of the adequacy and efficacy of the means.

A. With regard to motives¹ the psychologist may undertake several more or less independent tasks. He may limit himself to the investigation of one religion at a particular moment and find out what its adherents want, hope, expect, from their religious objects. Or he may extend his survey, take the genetic point of view, go back to primi-

¹I use the word *motive* so as to include both impulse and desire.

tive man and, coming up to himself, write out a chapter of the psychological development of man: the genesis and growth of so-called religious instincts, needs and desires.

He may in this part, as well as elsewhere, attempt, where it seems least impossible, to trace the parallel development of the central nervous system. In the case, for instance, of the appearance of ethical desires, and more particularly of the Moral Imperative, he may venture to search for the correlated nervous organization.

Or, instead of dealing with racial, he may devote his attention to individual development; and then he may, leaving aside the larger aspects of the problem, consider the bearing of a multitude of circumstances upon the religious needs, in particular, of sex, of age, of knowledge.

B. The study of the intellectual contents of religious life has not been so completely neglected as the study of the motives and of the efficiency of the means. Thanks to the intellectualistic bias of the dominant philosophy, the beliefs connected with religious life have almost monopolized the attention of the students of Religion, many of whom have gone so far as to imagine that Religion *is* a system of ideas! And yet several of the vital problems of this section have so far been left well-nigh untouched, because they were neither within the province of the theologian nor in that of the metaphysician.

Religious ideas, so called, are before all else *ideas*. The study of religious conceptions and beliefs is therefore to be based upon the general psychology of the intellect, the more important chapter of which, to the would-be psychologist of religion, deals with the passage from mere apprehension to belief, *i. e.*, with the relation of knowledge to the feelings, the emotions and the will. Without acquaintance with that chapter it would be futile to proceed with this part of the work.

As preliminary work the psychologist would have to make here an inventory of the ideas entering into religious experience and ascertain how far the officially accepted ideas and dogma actually enter into the religious consciousness. He would find among other things that most of them are mere fossils, philosophical lucubrations, without any place in the life of ostensible believers. From these he would separate the real, living, beliefs and investigate their rôle in persons of diverse temperament and education. Here again he may go the way of phylogensis or, instead, of ontogenesis.

The conceptions of the religious objects themselves, be they called gods or otherwise, would, of course, be found to constitute the basal portion of the intellectual content of religious life. And one of the most important tasks of the psychologist would be to disentangle what is essential or generic in these, at times widely different, views. Natural phenomena, ghosts, spirits, anthropomorphic gods, the Absolute, Humanity, etc., may each, it seems, be object of worship and centre of a religion. In virtue of what property can they serve as such? In fulfilling this task the ground of the division of life into religious and secular would be brought to light, or, as I like to put it, the problem of the *religious channel* would be solved.

Then would follow, in this second part, the investigation of the origin of religious conceptions (spirit, God, soul immortality, Nirvana, etc.), and, finally, the explanation of the influence of these conceptions upon the conduct of life.

To the formation of the individual religious ideas—let it be remembered that out of individual ideas arise the doctrinal structure of religion—contribute on the one hand the needs, the desires, and, on the other, meshes of logically connected ideas born of observation and reasoning upon the world and one's self. The stock of ideas in hand is used both in the interpretation of the impulses and cravings and in the discovery of means by which they may be expressed and satisfied. The mass of ideas arising logically from sense data, are chiefly the outcome of scientific interest. In religion, the will is the predominant generator of ideas. It is so much so that there is no more consistent and constant corrupter of objective truth than Religion.

It should not be overlooked that the psychology of Religion provides a basis for a judgment as to the *pragmatic* truth of beliefs. I have elsewhere and in several instances¹ tried to indicate this function of the branch of psychology with which we are dealing. In an essay on the Christian Mystics² I tried to show, for instance, how two of their distinctive beliefs have either their source or their confirmation in the ecstatic experience. I may be permitted to repeat here in brief and by

¹ See, regarding the Grace of God and Faith, the "Studies in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena," *Amer. Jour. of Psy.*, Vol. 7, chiefly pp. 355-370; also, concerning Faith, the first number of this *Journal*.

² "Les tendances religieuses chez les mystiques chrétiens," *Revue Philosophique*, 1902, pp. 1-36 and 441-487, particularly the second paper.

way of a partial illustration of the preceding statement what was said there on that point. Religious meditation and, more completely still, religious ecstasy are, according to the Christian Mystics, a union of the soul with God, a synthesis of the individual spirit with the Absolute. God is conceived of as the simplest substance. Eckhart calls it *Grund*, *Boden*, *Wurzel*. It is neither this nor that, it is the Being without being (*das Wesen ohne wesen*), above all existence. Nothing may be predicated of Him because that to which a predicate may be attached is, in so far, determined and therefore is not yet God. Boehme, Suzo and Tauler agree substantially with Eckhart. Boehme, for instance, uses the term *Urygrund* to name the essence. He describes it as without form, absolutely indeterminate: it is unity and perfect identity; it is nothing; it is the abyss, the infinite.¹

Now, the condition of a person in a mystical trance comes very near this negative definition of God. For, as the ecstasy deepens, the intellectually apprehended distinctions lose their sharpness of outline and finally disappear in an undifferentiated homogeneity. The multiplicity of existences is replaced by a Great All, simple, without attribute, mysterious, infinite. We are, therefore, justified in asking ourselves how far the mystical conception of God is modeled upon the trance-state itself.

But we find ourselves here face to face with what seems a monstrous absurdity. In itself, the *completed* mystical trance is nothing since, in it, the loss of consciousness is entire. It is not even that substantial Nothing which in certain metaphysical jugglery is made into the Essence of Being, but a nothing which has no existence. How is this identification of non-existence with God, the giver of all good gifts, to be accounted for, through what magical art can enough reality be injected into it to make it synonymous with the fullness of the divinity? The entranced soul described by our Mystics, as naked, absolutely empty, etc., is for them, nevertheless, not the equivalent of non-existence. It is, after all, something more because of the following circumstance. When the soul, after its return to consciousness, thinks of the preceding moments it becomes aware of a break in its life, of a void, of a nothing. And this nothing is transformed into an existent something by the very fact that it has become an object of thought. It

¹See a chapter on Boehme in Boutroux's "Etudes d'histoire de la Philosophie."

is henceforth the non-existent which exists: the unconscious trance has come to enjoy that particular kind of reality given by the mind to all its objects. Only—and here is one of the errors of our Mystics—this nothing-thought-of is by no means the same thing as the absence of consciousness constituting the void.

But this is not yet the most potent of the reasons accounting for the apparent identification of a state of unconsciousness with the Divine Substance. An observant reader is struck, even in the most philosophical of the Mystics, with the anomalous presence in their definition of God of certain significant words. Eckhart, for instance, occasionally uses the expression *Eternal Silence* to designate the *Grund*. He speaks of the Eternal Silence reposing in himself, and Boehme affirms that the Urgrund is all silence, repose, eternal peace: more than that, it is free from suffering; yet more than that, it is “the Eternal Good, Eternal Sweetness, Eternal Love.” Here is, indeed, a Nothing sufficiently well filled with positive qualities to make of it an object of desire! If, therefore, the Mystics seek union with God, it is not in the least because He is the All of which nothing can be affirmed. Mystical philosophers are no fonder of emptiness than other men. If they woo the Absolute it is, after all, because their idea of Him gratifies some of the deepest human needs. For the Christian Mystic, God is, philosophical utterances to the contrary, at least peace bathed in love. And what is that but a love-trance? The Christian Mystics assimilate God with the most blessed experience with which they are acquainted; they make Him in the image of the divine moments which precede and follow the loss of consciousness in ecstasy.

When ideas have once been established, psychologically assimilated, they influence conduct in degrees varying widely according to their conative and affective value. The consideration of the motive power of ideas forms one of the important chapters of the technical studies incumbent upon the psychological student of Religion. Here would be met, for instance, the question of the relation of beliefs to the power that is in Faith and to the moral transformation known as Conversion. The elucidation of these problems would bring with it an answer to the question, how is an idea to be invested with the power of faith?

In order to keep this outline within admissible limits, I shall pass in silence the third part, the study of the means employed for the satis-

faction of religious needs and desires and, concerning the fourth and last section, I shall content myself with reminding the reader that it deals with the critical consideration of the results of religious practice. It falls, as already said, under three heads, (1) the results, (2) their adequacy, (3) the *modus operandi*.

The psychologist would have stopped where his task culminated were he to neglect the investigation of the causes or conditions of the power that is in religion, whether it shows itself in a so-called answer to prayer, in a mystical 'revelation,' in a conversion, or simply in the peace that 'passeth all understanding.' He will already have come face to face with these dynamic problems in part B, when dealing with the relation of ideas to the feelings and the will.

In conclusion, and without stepping outside of his field, the psychologist may venture suggestions for the more direct and efficient realization of the purposes of religious life as they are revealed in the Motives and thus he would reach the portal of the philosophy of Religion with a mass of information without which the flights of the Philosopher could be only the prelude to a fall.

What problems will remain for the philosophy of Religion to unravel when psychology and history shall have completed their tasks? There will be, if nothing more, at least the metaphysical question of the objective reality of the religious objects. As to the so-called 'essence' of Religion, its future, the laws of its development, the legitimacy—I mean the practical fitness and effectiveness—of the beliefs and practices and other similar topics, any one may, if he likes, treat of them under the same covers with a discussion of the metaphysical question and call the whole the philosophy of Religion. But it should not be forgotten that proper answers to these problems may come in the form of immediate generalizations and inductions from psychological and historical data and not from metaphysical speculations. They remain, therefore, within the field of scientific conclusions.

The psychologists who have written on Religion have been prompt to recognize that it is no business of theirs either to reject or to affirm the transcendental existence of God. They have even done so with alacrity. But in so doing they have by no means intended to deny to

¹For a possibly different view see Flournoy, *Archives de Psychologie* No. 5, Dec. 1902, p. 33-57.

psychology a share in the formation of metaphysical opinions.¹ Only recently, Professor James in his Gifford Lectures, "The Varieties of Religious Experience," attempted to find an empirical foundation in certain religious experiences for a form of Pluralistic Idealism. Although he seems to me to have failed in his special purpose, the attempt was certainly legitimate. We may well look to the psychology of Religion for weighty contributions to the data of general metaphysics and particularly to those upon which Theology should be founded.

THE FEELINGS AND THEIR PLACE IN RELIGION.

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One of the central problems in the study of religion since the time of Schleiermacher has been to determine where, among the normal mental processes, the religious impulse has its setting. Does it centre in a conscious recognition of the "Presence of a Higher Power or Powers" and a purposeful attempt at an adjustment between worshipper and Deity, or is it a more or less blind, instinctive response of the person to forces that are acting upon and through him? If the latter, from what does it draw: is it a feeling, an *affective* response to intimations of a higher reality, and if so, how may it establish the validity and trustworthiness of its utterances? Or is it a matter of instinct *reaction*, receiving its impulse from the dynamic character of life itself, its guidance from inherited race experiences and from a fine intuition of present and possible relations, and containing also a prophetic quality in the same way that all instincts are supposed to be teleological? And if so, are there any evidences, beyond the more or less problematical ones of "Psychic Research," that we are so constructed that our essentially religious reactions and conduct do represent a higher kind of spiritual adjustment?

The discussion which follows means to present a point of view of religious psychology and of general psychology, whose justification is that it is in line with many of the facts empirically adduced, that it fills up several ugly gaps in psychology, and that it brings into relation some of the not easily reconcilable departments of human interest. Taken, as it is, at the request of the editor of this *Journal*, out of a larger work that is now in progress, it must necessarily be more or less schematic, and appear dogmatic in its presentation. The question to which we shall confine ourselves is concerning the rôle the affective processes play in the rest of life and especially in religion. We shall prefer to speak of the affective life instead of feeling since it is more comprehensive. It will be understood to include the overtone from

all the organic reactions, sensory processes and higher mental activities, which are generally, according to the James-Lange theory of the emotions, considered to be their accompaniment and condition. It will be set for the most part in opposition to the cognitive processes, which deal with the concrete, definable elements of experience and their relations. The thesis is, in brief, that the affective life is a direct source of knowledge as truly as is the cognitive. This knowledge has to do, furthermore, with objective facts and relations, and also with the relation of the individual to his largest environment. Religion, art, and all forms of appreciation have their setting in the affective life. They draw directly from it and only indirectly, if at all, from the cognitive life. They plant themselves firmly and squarely in the midst of human experiences, and have a content and function of their own. They can never be justified or defined or successfully explained when described in the stilted and inapplicable technique of the cognitive processes.

The only fair way to test the truth of this point of view would be to examine, critically, the phenomena of religion as they issue in the lives of those who profess it. That is clearly out of the question in a brief article. It is worth noting, however, that intellectualism in religion has been almost entirely discredited in recent years. Among the empiricists in the study of religion, there is not one, so far as I know, who is able to find that the intellectual, ideational, rational, cognitive processes perform more than a mere by-play in the drama of the personal life. Whether this depreciation of the ideational functions in religion is a bias due to the general decline of intellectualism in psychology all along the line, or the result of an exact reading of the facts, might be a fair question. I am inclined to think it the result of both things, and therefore essentially right.

It will serve us best in a brief presentation to attempt the hazardous task of giving a definition of religion somewhat in line with the developments of the empirical study of religion, and then to inquire whether the conception that the affective life is the source from which it draws will explain its phenomena and tend to bring religion in satisfactory relation to the rest of life. I shall, therefore, point out what seem to me four of the basal characteristics of religion on which there might be a fair amount of agreement.

In the first place, religion is a *whole* experience. It tends to take in the entire self with all its affections, aspirations, thoughts and con-

duct. Its messages are always directed to the heart, and are a challenge to the will. Even when it directs itself toward specific observances or moral distinctions, it is heavy with an appeal which means to compass an attitude toward life, or toward some higher reality. We can accept Principal John Caird's "appeal to an objective standard"¹ as furnishing the "content" to religion, not because he has found in it the "intelligent basis of religion" but because that which is "discerned by the intelligence to be true" is an index at the surface of a vigorous and all embracing life response which one feels saturating every sentence, which is focalized and intensified by the intellect and which set apart the messages of Caird as having an inherent religious character as distinguished from those of a smaller mind. So with Cardinal Newman's "Science of God."² There is betrayed in every sentence of it an uprush of the whole life which breaks through and beyond his doctrines and objects of thought. Without this heart response Newman's "Theology or Science of God" would have no more worth religiously than the words of any carping theologian. Something akin to a religious experience at its best is set forth in Browning's *Abt Vogler*. The hands of the musician wandered over the keys until gradually deeps of life began to respond to deeps, and a temple of music arose, planting its base on the nether springs and towering skyward, and finally heaven and earth and artist were all blended into one.

Religion draws from deeper than we know and rises higher than we can conceive. That is, in the second place, there is a larger Reality—call it Truth or Love or God or Brahma or what we will—that is tending to break into this circumscribed space of life that I call myself. It may filter and trickle into our little spheres, like the coming of the dawn, so that we merely give a series of assents to its imperceptible widening and enriching; or it may break suddenly, as in Sir Rowan Hamilton's discovery of the quaternions, H. H. Jackson's conception of the plot of *Ramona*, or Paul's conversion.

In the third place, the person becomes more or less conscious of the existence of this larger Life or Truth or Reality, and hungers and thirsts after it. There is a variety of attitudes which religionists assume in the presence of this "trans-marginal" Reality. The Positivist is

¹ *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 174, quoted by James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 434.

² Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 437.

heartful, but is modest in his demands and guards against an overdose. The Mystic insists on having it all or none. The inhibition of the Agnostic has often within it a tentative affirmation. He is comparable with a boy when he starts fishing and makes a great point of his doubt whether there is anything worth catching in the whole creek—and half believes, all the while, that it is full of fine large fish. His caution and poise are commendable to many professing Christians, who sometimes scare the fish away by too much stalking and overconfidence. With all the shades of difference, the religious man is one who believes in his deepest heart in the immediate reality of the transcendent life. He is confident, too, that it is possible for it to deliver up its truth to him. Professor Harnack, in his "Essence of Christianity," has aptly said that Christianity is nothing more nor less than eternal life in the midst of time. Religion is that, certainly, and more. It is infinity attached by its nether extremity. It is boundless love projected beyond our common human loves. It is a little life breaking through at every point the barriers that shut it in, and, appreciating the limitations of thought and sense, sharing more and more the enveloping and infusing Divine Life.

Again, and lastly, the religious man is one who places himself in an *attitude to receive* the larger life. It has been the business of religion to cultivate in human beings certain persistent moods and attitudes, which place the individual in such a condition that the Divine Life may come in. It tries, on the one hand, to make men feel their insufficiency. It preaches down pride and vanity, and magnifies the degree of man's helplessness of himself to do anything. Its message is that of humility and dependence. On the other hand, it attempts to induce a state of obsession toward the Higher Life. Its keynote is *faith*. One must throw himself wholly in the direction of the Divine Life with confidence that it will be his. The affirmation of the heart in the direction of the Higher Truth involves a complete act of the will, and crystallizes into *belief*. Made as man is, with high resistance in his members, and a strong strain of negation in his heart, it is sometimes necessary for the worshipper simply to hold in check the impulses toward lesser expression, as in the case of many of the mystics and the Buddhist monks, until the Divine Life surges up of its own accord. Of the same kind, but more marked, is the need of a *surrender of the will* to God, whether it be in the persistent attitude of a Huxley toward the truth he is seek-

ing, or the supreme act of a perverse heart in entering upon the way of righteousness. A marked case in point is that of Bunyan, who must at last decide to surrender his soul to satan before God could take him. The dallying with, or winking at the Infinite of the Agnostic, referred to above, is somewhat of the same kind. But, in the midst of all the varieties, the type seems to be a person in full rapport with the God-life. He is responsive to it. He *loves* it, and so grows towards it, since the soul, like the body, grows by what it feeds upon. He feels in such close communion with it that he may commune with it in *prayer*, or in *song*, as friend with friend.

These are some of the characteristics of the religious life. It must be clear that throughout it is a *matter of the affective life*. The end of religion always and everywhere is to induce a heart and will response to the larger things of life that lead away towards unconditioned reality and boundless fulfillment. In the all inclusiveness of its states, religion allies itself with the affective life. Its appeal is always to those states of consciousness and attitudes toward life — faith, hope, love and service, which are directly opposed to the cognitive processes. Like music or poetry, although full of a sense of conviction and certainty, it is incapable of reduction to terms of ideation. Like the highest music, it is abused in all it stands for by attempts at concrete description and rational interpretation, and yet it can stand forth and utter its messages with the utmost assurance, and the generations that follow put their truth to the final test, and often a successful one, — that of fitness to the completest and most satisfying life. The appeal is almost always away from the cognitive-rational processes toward such wisdom as can come to babes and sucklings and the childlike and the pure in heart. Toward the supreme object of religion, the God-life, the reason must be in abeyance. He cannot be found out by searching. If one can comprehend Him, Augustine taught, it is not God. The great religions have hesitated to give Him specific attributes or even give Him a name, preferring to use an indefinite term as “I am that I am,” or merely “that” or “it,” or “om” as in some phases of Brahmanism. The proper attitude seems to be that of waiting or feeling or listening. “He that hath ears to hear, let him hear,” hearing being very closely related, as psychology has shown, with the deeper emotional life. Feeling after God is the condition of finding Him, and the success of the search is reported to the heart by a witness of the spirit. There is not

enough theology or ethics in the Sermon on the Mount to make a single modern sermon, and yet the world looks upon it as being the profoundest religious document the world has seen. It speaks directly to the heart.

So strong is the conviction of mankind that religion is a thing of the heart and not of the intellect that there has been constantly, in the history of religion, a confusion of non-rationality and irrationality. Men have been tempted to choose as fitting objects of religious expression the novel, the exceptional, the spectacular, and almost any phrase or dogma that smacks of anomaly or mystery. They have even been willing to say, "I believe because incredible." The conviction behind such an attitude is essentially right. The cure for the malady is in coming to appreciate not only that the verities of religion, like those of art, are not always capable of rational analysis, but that the truths projected in line with and in terms of the affective life are to be accepted (tentatively, of course, and within limits, and subject to criticism through rational methods) within their own sphere.

In an excerpt, such as this, there are certain to be many apparent distortions. Before going farther, one of these must be guarded against. The point of view is not, as might appear, that feeling is the basal thing in life and also in religion. On the contrary, in both it is a secondary and derived factor in development. The fundamental fact of life is, perhaps, a *tendency toward reaction* in the presence of manifold stimuli. The unit of consciousness is not a feeling or an idea or a volition. It is all of these bound up in a single fact—a stock of latent energy set to respond to the outside world for the sake of completer life adjustment and enlargement. One cannot observe the behavior of the simpler types of life or of the newborn without seeing that at first the reactions are more or less indiscriminate, in respect both to stimulus and to character of response. Out of the multiplicity of responses those are gradually selected that happen to fit some need of the organism. Those which are felt to subserve some useful life function are seized upon, emphasized through repetition, transmitted through blood and social heredity, until, being crystallized in habit, instinct and custom, they become a common possession of the species. This view, that a set of activities and reactions is the basal fact of life, is not a new one. It has been formulated in one way or another by several of our leading psychologists. It is ample to suggest Dewey's "organic circuit," James's

“native reactions,” Baldwin’s “excess of discharge,” Münsterberg’s “action theory of consciousness,” Loeb’s “tropisms” and Royce’s “mental initiative.”

The next consideration, however, will not be so readily conceded. The set of reactions which make up the stream of life go on, for the most part, without making any distinct report to consciousness; development has been chiefly concerned with differentiating *specialized means* of taking note of a larger number of the complex elements of life, which even in the most developed creatures flow on beneath the reach of consciousness. The means that have been set apart are two-fold—feeling and ideation, each with its separate mechanism. These have arisen out of conduct, and exist primarily and solely for conduct. Consciousness has thus a double hold upon its processes by way of estimating their fitness. Through the ideational powers it can re-present them, bring them into relation, hold them in check and forecast their outcome. Through the feelings,—of pleasure and pain, expansion and contraction, tension and recoil,—it receives a direct and non-mediated account of its own inner life, the consistency of its variety of processes among themselves, and of the adjustment of inner and outer relations. Both intellection and feeling, as Prof. James has said of the former, are secondary and derived products. They are both, as Prof. Dewey has fittingly called the latter (*Psych. Rev.* II: 15) “the internalizing of activity or will.” With all their differences in content, they subserve the same function in the animal economy, viz., to give to consciousness an account of its own inner life, a report upon the facts of the outside world, and an estimation of its adjustment or lack of adjustment to the sum of outer relations.

In this point of view, the feelings in religion are but surface hints of movements that are going on beneath, and these latter are the vital part of the experience. The essential thing in religion is not to cultivate a set of feelings, but, in the serious concern about the things that make for righteousness, to come to appreciate from the inside the meaning of the life movements of which the feelings are a criterion. The feelings are often made an end in religion, it must be admitted. But, when this occurs, it is analogous to the many instances in which a means to an end, as wealth, clothing, food or pleasure, can become an end in itself, and is usually a distortion. It is also true that by the intensity of religious experience the foam and spray that break at the

surface have served to obscure the currents beneath. So much is this the case that an occasional student of religion has believed "that feeling is the deeper source of religion." It is becoming impossible to get on psychologically without postulating that life throughout is somehow auto-dynamic, that the functioning of the organism is a primary fact, and that self-expression is both means and end in itself. So in religion, many of the central phenomena—worship, love, ritual, enthusiasm, missionary zeal, struggling after ideals even through difficulty and pain—are hardly comprehensible except that they are means of higher self-expression. I believe there is hardly a case among the many records of religious experience, however much saturated with emotion, that will not show, on further analysis, that the feelings are but indexes of life movements and adjustments that are working themselves out. In this view of the mental life it seems probable that conduct, activity and will are the deeper sources of religion, and that its chief end and function is as a means of *self-expression* in the higher reaches of developed life, just as are play and art on its lower planes.

Even if religion is at bottom a matter of spiritual dynamics, this fact does not weaken the part that feeling plays in it. If we include in feeling its groundwork in organic reactions, *i. e.*, the affective life, our claim is that religion, art and all forms of "appreciation" have their setting almost entirely in this sphere, as suggested above, just as logic, mathematics and science have theirs among the cognitive processes. The question then arises, have these departments of life any power to reach out beyond the limits of the self and take account of fact and truth of the external world, or are they a species of pure subjectivity? Both reason and feeling are the "internalizing of activity or will," and the power of the reason to grapple with the outer world is fully recognized; but have the feelings any such power? Recent developments in empirical psychology are undoubtedly pointing toward an affirmative answer to the question.

It is safe to affirm unreservedly that the affective life gives us as valid an account of external facts and relations, truth and reality, as does the cognitive. It exists essentially for that end, *viz.*, to take account of the outer world, its significance to the life of the organism and of the degree of adjustment of the organism to its fullest environment. It seizes upon the outer world at the points at which this touches the subjective life, and couches its reading always in terms of well or ill-being,

whether it is the amoeba selecting between yeast plant and harmful food substance, or the religionist wrestling with the problem of immortality. Furthermore, an affective response is the absolutely essential condition of appreciation of any kind, as well in science and logic as in art and religion. This is nothing more than to say that there is no intellectual attention without interest (James, *Psychology* I, 416) with which almost all psychologists are in agreement. But it is equivalent to asserting that throughout the mental life, in all its aspects, the final appeal is always to an affective response. A sense of "worth" or "values" which is the primary mode of judgment in religion, art and morals is also the seat of authority behind every intellectual act or affirmation. The ideational processes come in only in the presence of a complication or inhibition. Whenever the original sense of worth or fitness is reasonably satisfying, that is accepted as final.

The feelings are perhaps never purely subjective. There is present always somewhere in a succession of organic changes and reactions a set of external stimuli, and the animal invariably responds by some fitting act or adjustment, which shows respect for the external fact. Hunger and satiety are spoken of as being subjective experiences, but farther reflection must show them to be as far from it as are visual experiences or auditory. The organism takes definite note of an objective fact, the food; judges its qualities, as shown by its preference for special foods, hunger for some and repugnance against others; takes account of their relation to its well-being, keeping track of the relationships through a sense of hunger or satiety, exuberance or gloom, and acts accordingly through selection, rejection and assimilation. There is an exact analogy at every point between this "blind" sense and that of visual experiences: in both there are the specialized nerve endings; the stimuli; the chemical action on the nerves; the accompanying reflexes; the report to consciousness, partly clear and partly submerged, of an objective fact and of a subjective condition and of the relation between subject and object. The only *real* difference between the two is that the eye has data to work with that are somewhat discrete and quantitatively definable, while the instinct of hunger has, so far as the field of clear consciousness is concerned, only qualitative data which cannot be so easily objectified and localized, and so it can take note of them only in terms of feeling. So it is in enjoying or disliking a work of art. The elements that enter into it are such that consciousness has no

mechanism by which it can trace them out and define them. They play directly upon the vaso-motor and sympathetic nervous system responses, and these give to consciousness a non-mediated sense of satisfaction or displeasure. Consciousness may busy itself later in trying to pick out its characteristics for the sake of better representation of what it has found, in order to fix and repeat and communicate them; but in the nature of the case this can never be adequately done, and the message of the picture must remain a matter of "appreciation" or "worth," *i. e.*, of affective response.

The usual explanation of such matters is, of course, that the total experience is the outcome of the creaming off of a multiplicity of dim and half-forgotten *associations*. This view, in the history of the theories of art and religion, one must admit, has been extremely unsatisfactory: and in the light of the developments of experimental research on organic changes in the presence of stimuli is becoming entirely untenable. The vaso-motor reactions have been clearly shown, in voluminous experiments on the affective life since the early ones of Mosso, invariably to accompany all emotional states and intellectual processes. These changes are direct and immediate. The point to note is that they are as liable to precede as to accompany or follow the corresponding conscious elements, and that in many, if not in the most instances they arouse no conscious counterpart that the mind can lay hold upon and adequately cognize. Experiments upon sleeping reagents are suggestive in this connection. Every sound is responded to by circulatory changes, but arouses no mental process that can be recalled. The bearing of this on art and religion must be apparent. They are the spheres of experience in which mankind is in touch with truth and reality in such a way that its elements are not easily describable and cognizable, but must remain for the most part in terms of appreciation. They are essentially non-rational, and in the nature of the case must remain so. The dominance of intellectualism in psychology, and the persistence of the explanations of art in terms of subliminal associations, is due to the simple fact that, until recently, since empirical psychology has been unable to demonstrate more adequately how consciousness behaves, we have been, of necessity, ignorant of the fineness of the organic response to the outside world, and have imagined that the little peaks of experience that project into the sphere of cognition and ideation were everything, and that they were causal rather than epiphenomenal. Ig-

norant of the presence of those hidden sources of judgment, affection and action, we have supposed that our lives were controlled by clear perception and logical inference, which is not true, even in matters of science and invention. The history of science amply shows that the line of approach to discoveries is that, first, of happening upon a curious or surprising situation or occurrence, and then of tactful adjustment to the situation which leads to the discovery of the laws involved. The proverb, necessity is the mother of invention, expresses the exact way inventions have always been made. Professor Mach, of Vienna, who has earned the right to speak with authority, in his recent volume of *Popular Lectures*, describes the method of invention and discovery, and gives many illustrations to show that it is adjustment to "fortuitous circumstances." Huygens, for instance, says of the discovery of the telescope, that not only was it not discovered according to the laws of physics and geometry, but he would regard it as a superhuman mind that could explain it by these laws after it had been discovered. The condition behind discovery is a *sense or feeling* of harmony or discord among phenomena, and of adjustment or maladjustment between consciousness and its objects. The final test of all reasoning is a sort of intuition or feeling of worth or value, just as in the normative sciences. It will be for the health of science and philosophy to accept the fact that speculation, reflection and reasoning have their beginning and end in our intimations of truth that are not below the threshold of reason but above it; not only behind reason giving to it its impulse, but within it, at every step guiding its course and approving or rejecting its conclusions.

If the affective life is the ultimate tribunal in science and philosophy, even more marked is it such in morals, poetry, art, music and religion. In this latter group it is about the only appeal; and mankind will have to learn to trust its reports, just as they do, as a *practical* fact, until confronted with the demand for proof or demonstration. We try to build a science of poetry, for example, without recognizing what is probably true, that the only way to enter into the life of the poet that has at last crystallized into this particular poem, is to allow the play of the music, the cadence, the meter, the rhyme, and all, saturated with a message, to work upon the feelings until they blossom out into an obsession in the reader corresponding to that in the heart of the poet. The first important thing is to be able to respond organically to the multitudinous hints that are present in the poem, and that part of it nature has

largely taken care of herself in the sum of developed instinctive endowments. The secondary requisite is to be able to call up into definite appreciation and apprehension the presence and meaning to life of these reactions. The experiments of Feré¹ on musical and non musical reagents seem to demonstrate this truth. With reagents musically trained and others without musical tastes he re-established the fact that consonant tones heightened the bodily tone, as shown by an increased ability in muscular performance in the presence of the tones, and that dissonant tones produced a corresponding lowering of ability. The bodily response was the same with both groups of reagents, whether or not they could consciously recognize the consonances and dissonances. He draws the inference that the difference between musical cultivation and a lack of it is that "the most richly endowed have simply superior powers of penetrating the phenomena that take place within them."

Something like this is true, I believe, of all the specialized forms of appreciation. Religion is a *feeling adjustment* to the deeper things of life, and to the larger reality that encompasses the personal life. In this point of view many of the phenomena connected with religion seem to fall into place: the elimination of all sense experiences; the negation of everything specific from the field of consciousness, as with Buddhist seekers after Nirvana and the Christian mystics; contemplation, revery and fasting; the denunciation of "worldly" occupations and enjoyments; distrust of science and worldly wisdom; reliance on faith, hope, love, aspiration and prayer; the fullness and wholeness of its experiences when they come; the frequent accompaniments of these in weeping, swooning, groaning, trance, ecstasy, hallucinations and other marks of organic tension and somatic reaction. These are all marks of an attempt to break away from the dominance of the cognitive processes, and are indications that the affective have been given full sway. That religion is a matter of life and world adjustment is evidenced also by many of these phenomena, as well as by the fundamental place occupied by the sense of sin and need of salvation. This is doubtless the dominant note of most of the religions of the world,—a man out of tune, undone, with a heritage of imperfection and sin and consequently helpless and hopeless, in the presence of the possibility of sinlessness and divine perfection.

¹ Feré and Jaëll: *Revue Scientifique*, Dec. 20, 1902.


The reader who has followed the discussion so far will have wondered many times what this Truth or Reality is to which the individual is trying to adjust himself, and which religion proposes to reveal. If the significance of the foregoing has been gathered up, it must be clear on second thought that the question is not a pertinent one. A description such as this, would commit, in the act of answering it, the same folly of which theology and other forms of rationalism have been guilty all along. We must trust the reports of religion for that, as put to the test of individual and collective experience. What a description can do, and that is our next consideration, is to show more specifically, by the way consciousness behaves, that it is so constituted that it can reach out far beyond the range of its definable and consciously appreciable experiences, and interpret them and their bearing upon life.

In the first place, the individual life draws from a limitless past. What is known of blood heredity, instinct, imitation and social heredity, will render this sufficiently clear. The individual, in the truest sense, shares the wisdom of all the life that has gone before, with all its successes and failures, aspirations and tragedies. He comes into life guided, in a measure, by "that fine hereditary memory we call conscience," as Guyau has termed it. Religion, centering as it does in the affective life, is in the direct line of this heritage. Hence it is that its intimations and intuitions are sometimes wiser guides to life and conduct and to the interpretation of the things of life that touch it than are the ideational processes that gather their data from the tangled mesh of concrete data.

A second consideration is this, that the affective life can interpret the phenomena of the present in more delicate ways than we can possibly know, that is, than the bungling mechanism of the senses and intellectual activities can ascertain. However anomalous the statement may seem, it has been proven to be true by empirical psychology, in subjecting the facts of experience to experimental control. Professor Dexter has shown that such intangible factors as atmospheric conditions exert a consistent influence upon behavior.¹ Pierce and Jastrow have demonstrated that imperceptible differences in the degree of illumination of two surfaces will give rise in a majority of instances to a correct

¹School Department and the Weather. Monograph Supplement to the Psy. Rev. No. 10.

judgment of difference.¹ The degree of difference is made so slight and the time of exposure so short that they appear the same, but the guesses of difference pile up on the side of right judgments. A set of experiments which show a similar fact was devised by Dr. Singer.² Pairs of like and different figures were shown for an instantaneous time, requiring judgments of likeness and difference and, where different, the respect in which they differed. The correct judgments of difference were far in excess of the ability to point out the character of the difference. From experiments upon the Müller-Lyer figures for optical illusions it has been found that the projection of imperceptible shadows in the place of the slanting lines at the extremities of the equal lines *a* and *b* will produce a similar illusion.³ The projection of such lines is, perhaps, not necessary to demonstrate the



point. By any theory that has been advanced to explain the illusion, *imperceptible* eye movements or eye tensions or what not have tricked the judgment beyond the power of correction. A mass of evidences which point in the same direction arise from the studies of memory, association, hypnotism, suggestion and "unconscious cerebration." When taken in connection with the studies upon the extreme delicacy of the vaso-motor responses to internal and external stimuli, referred to above, they are sufficient to demonstrate beyond question that the world we take in and use and interpret is extended indefinitely beyond the limits of our conscious states. A crude psychology of the "five" senses and of a set of intellectual processes built upon them has been crumbling and must fall entirely. The mental life acts more like the plant which feeds, through leaves and roots, from air and soil, and blossoms out into flower and fruit, which are merely specialized parts of the entire life of the plant, and an outgrowth therefrom. The mere blossoming out of the mental life is the specific, conscious intellections, affections and volitions. Or it is like the floating iceberg with only a peak projecting above, while it is the part beneath that catches the currents and determines its movements.

¹ Published originally in *Mem. Nat. Acad. Sci.*, Washington, 1884. Quoted by Donaldson, *Growth of the Brain*, p. 292.

² General and specific judgments. *Psych. Rev.*, for about 1897.

³ See Stratton, *Experimental Psychology and Culture*, for a discussion of this and other experiments of a similar character.

It is the submerged nine-tenths of life with which psychology must reckon as well as with its projecting peaks. Of all the hints we gather from the world outside only a few are of so discrete and definable a nature that the "five" senses can handle them, and of such fixed relationships that the rational life can project upon them its stilted categories, or force them into its set molds. Still it must remain that these usable, thinkable, communicable facts that can be classified and tabulated and pigeon-holed, will possess a seemingly heightened significance over and above those which remain in the sphere of affective appreciation. It is well enough that they do, provided they be taken ever and always in their larger life setting. But if we pitch our tents about them as fixed and final, we and our little tents will meet a fatal shock when the larger currents of life sweep by, and we shall add one more to the wrecks that have strewn the course of history. It is the function of religion to help humanity keep its bark trimmed for the open sea. It is concerned chiefly with keeping men alive to the deeper streams of reality, out of which they are continually dragged by entanglement with the "objects" of consciousness in the form of definite ideas and specific feelings.

The extra-marginal or subliminal self is, as Professor James has shown in a large and true way, "the fountain head of much that feeds our religion." It will be a fortunate thing for religious psychology and philosophy if it can find a considerable descriptive background for the subconscious life and the part it plays in religion. It may save it from aimless wanderings and faulty generalizations, just as the introjection of a physiological description of the cognitive processes, has, without binding them to the finality of the terminology by which it spells out its facts, exerted, on the whole, a salubrious influence upon psychology. The foregoing discussion means to suggest, although in a hasty and imperfect way, some points in such a descriptive background.

Before specifying two or three of the particular correctives it may supply, I shall try to sum up, as concisely as possible, the view of the mental life herein set forth, or else implied.

The basal characteristic of life is its tendency to reaction. It is dynamic throughout. The moving force in practical life, science, art, religion, and everywhere, is the impulse to self expression and self-fulfillment. That which determines the course along which life moves is its sensitivity and its constant adjustments to the outer world. In the

simpler types of life and in babies, a feeling response is the only means of interpreting the successive situations into which they glide, and even in the most highly cultivated creatures, an affective response is their chief reliance. There have arisen, not parallel with, nor out of, but in the midst of the complicated set of reactions that are going on, two sets of specialized functions, the intellectual and the feeling processes. They are for the purpose of taking account of a certain fraction of the stock of reactions for the sake of fuller adjustment, although most of them remain out of the reach of conscious interference. Going parallel with both these specialized functions is a corresponding differentiation of physiological structure. The mechanism for the cognitive-intellectual group of activities consists of the senses in so far as they are able to dissect and define their data, the basal ganglia for the co-ordination of sensations, and for the further elaboration of these, the "association centres" in the cerebrum. The mechanism of the affective life consists of all the senses in so far as they respond to stimuli that do not admit of discrete handling, the nerve endings in skin, intestines, blood vessels, glands, muscles and joints, the sympathetic nervous system with all its ramifications, and perhaps, also, structures in the central nervous system corresponding to the "association centres." The affective life thus involves all the organic reactions in vaso-motor response, circulatory and glandular tone, vascular tension and the like, which experimentation is showing to be the immediate and ever present accompaniment of all sensation. These reactions are the selected and transmitted acquisitions of race experience, and so bear within them not only a fine intimation of the forces that are playing in the present environment, but also a strain of proven and tried wisdom from the past. The higher emotions and sentiments are but specialized aspects of the affective life, and in consequence are able not only to interpret the present in the light of the past, but also to project the future. Morals, art and religion, which have their setting in the affective life, are in the central stream of race development.

The point of view here suggested is thus consistent with the James-Lange theory of the emotions; but does not stop there. It says further that the feeling life draws *directly* from experience, and not through the mediation of the cognitive processes: that is, it is itself a direct source of knowledge. Furthermore, it is through the affective life, and through that alone, that we can interpret any objective facts or rela-

tions and their significance to life. The facts of descriptive psychology referred to above, and also the manifold proofs of experimental psychology of the way the conscious life is influenced by imperceptible stimuli, throw open the door for such a conception. An immediate organic response is the vital part, not only of every intellectual interest, but also of every sensation, not excluding those of sight which are capable of the exactest definition. Without an affective response an eye-brain process, if it could exist, would be but a blank. The anatomical and physiological evidences to corroborate or overthrow this conception, which is in line with the psychological evidences, are yet problematical; but they are not altogether wanting. Dr. Oppenheimer has published a considerable body of evidence that the sense organs are connected directly with the mechanism of organic response.¹

This view of the mental life has a direct bearing, in many ways, upon one's interpretation of religious phenomena. In conclusion, we can notice only a few of the more important implications. Its most direct outcome is to bring out into clearer perspective the claim that religious geniuses have made all along, that religion is essentially non-rational. It is a life, and not a system. Its reports of truth are direct and immediate, just as are the instincts that guide the brute or babe and the moral intuitions that prompt conduct; and the chances are that its wisdom will be blurred and distorted by an over-degree of rationality. A theology is no more a religion than a set of articulated bones are a human being. The content of religion usually leaks out through the cracks and joints of a rational scheme. While theologians are patching up one crevice, the pure waters of religion are flowing away through a dozen others, and soon their vessel of faith and love is left empty and dry. Theology can pick at religion, and the psychology of religion can probe a little into it, but the great affirmations of the spiritual life will continue to speak directly to the heart and to conduct regardless. And life will test them, as it has done in the past, by the ultimate test of larger living, and find them true.

We are in a position now, I think, to understand better the breach between science and religion, between art and practical life, why the mystics and other religionists have distrusted the senses and worldly wisdom, and appealed to a higher kind of wisdom, and why the indi-

¹Dr. Z. Oppenheimer: "*Bewusstsein-Gefühl*." Wiesbaden, 1903.

vidual life is liable to be torn between two contending worlds, that of the lower, external, and the inward, spiritual life. It is because we are made as we are. It is a cleavage that will persist as long, perhaps, as the sympathetic nervous system and the central nervous system each continues to do business, to some extent, on its own account. It is a breach that should not continue, because all phases of life have their legitimate function and tend to make a whole man. But with individual differences so great as they are, and temperaments varying as they do, there will always be, doubtless, a group of persons whose tastes prefer the merchandise of the intellect to the food of the spirit, and still others who instinctively rebel against anything that does not appeal directly to the spiritual tastes. The breach will heal as men gradually appreciate more fully the meanings and modes of the complicated life process, and that each is set apart to subserve some useful end in giving us a larger and truer world.

The most significant implication of the foregoing discussion, but one that, I fear, has not come out in the bold relief that it deserves, is that the reports of religion are to be trusted. Religion is in the direct line of development from the higher refinements of the affective life, which is the source, and guide and ultimate tribunal of any knowledge whatsoever. It utters only a few great verities, but it holds them up in defiance of sense and reason wherein they clash, and the heart of men responds to them just as it does to the music of Beethoven or Wagner or the poems of Browning, and grows by them without knowing how or why.

Although the kind of knowledge (or wisdom) that religion professes cannot be couched in the stilted terms of the intellect, it has nevertheless an *objective* content. We have seen how consciousness interprets rightly, not only the dreamy unnoticed facts that surround it, but also those that are entirely imperceptible. The affective life is, perhaps, the only means of appreciating the objective world.

As to the *nature* of the objective reality with which religion proposes to be in rapport, as has been said, it is, in the nature of the case, beside the mark to raise the question. There are hints, however, of what it may, or may not be, that are legitimate observations. We are able to see the way in which new insights, or inspirations or revelations come in. They are the organic reaction factors that enter into the subliminal self, which are the registration of responses to the influx of finer influences that play upon consciousness until they finally burst in the field

of clear consciousness. This does not eliminate the divine element in such experiences. It only tends to give us a God that is adequate to compass the whole of life. It gives glimpses of a divine life that not only infuses this little span of the personal life but a reality that extends infinitely beyond it after which the personal life is feeling. We can see in a fresh way the conclusion of Prof. James that the larger reality is continuous with the personal life and not at variance with it. It looks as if the conscious self were but the blossoming into *self* consciousness of the stuff of which the world is made.

We have here a tangible means of approach to the conception that religion is a species of social, racial and world adjustment. To the extent that one recognizes the sensitivity of consciousness to all the influences that are playing about, this truth takes on a tinge of reality. To this extent, too, do a "telepathic law" (of the wireless telegraphic sort) and the introjection of spirit communications, in explaining the phenomena of religion, become superfluous.

The point of view here outlined, finally, leans in the direction of monism or monotheism instead of a dualistic or pluralistic interpretation of the world. If it comes to be believed that the affective life is the real approach that mankind has ever made and must ever make, in arriving at truth, while a developed intellect is but its necessary and efficient tool, it is almost inevitable that the trend of faith will be in the direction of the world-old struggle toward monotheism. "The passion for unity," to which philosophy has been addicted, instead of being regarded as a possible self-deception in the interest of peace of mind and ultimate safety may with equal plausibility be considered as a sane intimation, an incursion through the affective door of a higher bit of world wisdom, which dominates the life of mankind in spite of the inevitable splitting and dissecting to which the intellect subjects all the stuff it handles.

LITERATURE.

The Beginnings of Christianity, by PAUL WERNLE. Tr. by G. A. Bienemann. Ed. w. introd. by W. D. Morrison. Vol. 1, *The Rise of the Religion*. (Theological Translation Library. Vol. 17.) G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1903, pp. 389. Vol. 2, *The Development of the Church*. 1904. pp. 376.

This is the most matured product of the scholarship of one of the most brilliant theologians of the younger generation. It is written with very unusual vivacity, insight, and charm, and addressed only to those who are prepared to accept the bolder results of New Testament criticism. The central idea is first to ascertain what the Gospel is as seen in the character and teachings of Jesus, and second to measure all the later expositions of the Gospel by the Gospel itself. If we would know what the latter really is we must free its eternal substance from its historical form. When we thus eliminate the supernatural birth, the Resurrection, the miracles, the limited conceptions of the antique world, the belief in hierarchies of thronging spirits, etc., we find that Jesus prepared the ground for a new religious community, but did not himself organize it nor did his early followers, largely on account of the belief of an impending end of things. His disciples could not liberate themselves from Judaism nor impress the Gentiles. Both these tasks were the great and transcendent work of St. Paul, to whose character and theology a large part of the work is devoted. It derived its character from the situation in which the apostle was placed. He must defend himself from both Jews and Gentiles and direct his apologetic now against one, now against the other. The work closes with an analysis of the writer of the Apocalypse, the oldest and only document springing out of early Christian enthusiasm. He believes it represents the general lay opinion of the primitive church. The world was rapidly coming to an end. Man's supreme duty was to seek salvation from the coming judgment by watchfulness and repentance. In this state men had no thought of setting up stable, ecclesiastical forms or institutions. But they had in them new life the chief feature of which was self-mastery, love of God and each other, such as the world had never seen before. They were conscious that this new life came direct and solely from the living spirit of the Redeemer. This new faith is the first momentous event that has ever entered human history and the manner in which it took place is presented to us in this volume with unusual light, sympathy, and power. The writer's mastery of expression is remarkable. His opinions, which seem sometimes a little too confident where men no less wise or liberal walk with doubt and fear, are always illuminating and suggestive, and we predict for these volumes an important and a salutary influence upon the Christian thought of the next few years. His insights into the consciousness of Jesus and his conception of the Messianic idea, his interpretation of the temptations, the essence of the kingdom, the relation of the disciples and of believers to the Master, show unusual psychic penetration. Perhaps no recent writer has combined such frank and hearty concessions to all that modern criticism has urged against everything supernatural and everything that belonged to Jesus' circle of thought, which modern science has condemned, with more penetrating insight into, and more enthusiastic appreciation of the value of the life and teachings of Jesus than this author. He makes here no attempt to go into the details of critical scholarship, but to draw the important conclusions from a wide field, so that his book may perhaps, without exaggeration, be compared in its value to the world with that of Harnack's "Essence of Christianity."

Die Entstehung des Christentums, von ALBERT KALTHOFF. Neue Beiträge zum Christusproblem. Eugen Diederichs, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 155.

The author quotes at the outset, with only slightly qualified approval, Professor Kahler's statement that "we possess no single certainly authentic word of Jesus," and a longer quotation from Professor Steck, another theologian in Bern, to the effect that the further we penetrate into the Gospels the more we find that subjec-

tivity predominates over history, that many of the parables seem to have originated in the minds of the early disciples rather than in that of Jesus. Kalthoff urges that Christianity is far more than has been hitherto suspected a product of social evolution rather than the work of an individual founder, that we can never agree as to the historical Jesus, the views of Franz Overbeck, professor of Basel, to the effect that Christian theology lacked Christianity and was unscientific. His book was published in 1873 at an unfavorable time. This book appears to have had an important influence, however, upon the views of our author, who, after a survey of the preliminary history of Christianity in Rome, Greece, Judea, and in philosophy, etc., reaches the general conclusion that its chief characteristic of old was autonomy of the individual, the church being heteronomous. The ethics of Jesus from his conceptions were probably very elastic and well adjusted to its time and place. As the portraits of Jesus have reflected the impressions he has made upon many minds and ages, so should the conceptions of Jesus' life and work be plastic. Jesus is more a type than a model which can be copied. Types of people and races constantly vary and develop. "Socially considered Christ was originally the type of the autonomous or divine man in the church communion. The Christ-type has been variously nationalized and the historic Jesus has been represented as a type of the patriot, the democrat, the obedient subject, a revolutionary leader. In a sense Nietzsche's Zarathustra is an important modernization of a highly personal type of man. A new Jesus type breaks old tables of value. Thus we must constantly change the type and prevent historical rigidity. Christianity has always been a prophetic religion and its most intimate power has been based upon a belief in the future. But future ideals constantly vary and differ essentially from the ideals of the past in their plasticity. Historical theology has only asked what was. The chief question of Christianity should always be what ought to be and what will be. Thus alone will it have a free course for a natural future development. The theological Christ must be unprogressive. Only the prophetic type can be a blessing for future races. It does not live by the bread of history alone. The secularized Christ as a type of autonomous man is a conception which should resurrect the old Christ type of the church, the schoolmaster, the theologian, and become the Christ of the people. Just as Jesus broke the bonds of Judaism, so his ideal goes marching on and should be always more ready to divest itself of everything local and temporal. It must no longer rest upon Jesuanism of the past, and every age, century, and race must have its own Christ.

Die Religion des Neuen Testaments, von BERNHARD WEISS. J. G. Cotta, Berlin, 1903. pp. 321.

When in 1852 this author published his habilitation thesis he discussed the relation of exegesis to Biblical theology. This then almost newly discovered science he has since represented in his well known text book of the Biblical theology of the New Testament, now in its seventh edition. He had also postulated a purely historical presentation of the many New Testament tropes and forms of teaching which should bring these manifold and broken lights into a fuller unity. It is this latter problem to which the author addresses himself in this volume, in which he seeks to show that the New Testament is a unique unity and not merely a group of disjointed phenomena in the shoreless sea of religious history. This is no system of theology, but the scripture is left to speak for itself. Thus, in the introduction he discusses the essence of Christianity and revelation, the Holy Scriptures, religion, and theology. In the first part on the pre-suppositions of salvation he treats the essence of God, the world, man, sin and its results, the divine government of the world, and the preparations for salvation. Under these captions he gathers the expressions of the Scriptures upon each of the four or five sub-divisions of these heads. In the next part, devoted to the salvation in Jesus, God as the son, the man, the life work of Jesus, the significance of his death, the exalted Christ and the Holy Spirit, the word, and the sacrament are discussed. Under the realization of salvation, calling, and election, the belief and status of salvation, regeneration, sanctification, the church, the Kingdom of God, and the last things are treated.

The Virgin Birth of Christ, by PAUL LOBSTEIN. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1903. pp. 138.

This famous monograph by the Professor of Dogmatics at the University of

Strasburg is here rendered into good English. It is a brilliant and masterful, although very concise discussion of its topic by a writer who, as the notes at the end show, commands all the ancient and modern literature. At the outset he proceeds vehemently against all such points of view as that set forth by Dr. B. W. Randolph in his "The Virgin Birth of Our Lord," who assumes that the alternative is either the literal truth of the record or the deliberate and conscious falsehood of the recorder. This alternative Lobstein declares to be antiquated in view of modern scholarship concerning myth and the popular consciousness generally. He shows with sufficient detail how the infancy stories of Luke and Matthew have no inherent connection with the rest of these Gospels, points out their contradictions one with the other, emphasizes the fact that the two genealogies which have but two names in commonate both of Joseph only and, therefore, if the record is true, have no genetic record with Jesus; that the genealogies were probably incorporated from other sources in a clumsy way, tells us how very little outside this infancy record the Gospels themselves make use of the virgin birth, shows why Paul in none of his writings makes the slightest allusion to it, but bases all his arguments for the divine nature of Jesus upon the resurrection, describes how developing as the story did under the influence of the dogmas of divinity and sinlessness or the dual nature of Jesus, it was soon found necessary to vent the same dogmatic tendency upon the mother in order that Jesus might be pure on both sides from the hereditary taint of sin, shows how this tendency cropping out first in the assumption of virginity passed to that of perpetual virginity, then into the Immaculate Conception of Mary herself, gives many illustrations of the extreme and grotesque efforts of many apocryphal writers to add details, often very noxious, by way of confirmation, and of metaphysical speculation to volatilize in many ways the plain story of the virgin birth, and, finally, postulates a theology that shall frankly drop this burden. He treats the whole topic with extreme delicacy and even reverence and recognizes fully that the edification value of the nativity story has from long association become very great. He would safeguard this reverence in every possible way by his own solution, which he admits will apply chiefly only to scholars, that these tales developed out of the supposed necessity to give Jesus a divine as well as a human nature.

The Virgin Birth, by ALLAN HOBEN. Chicago, 1903. pp. 87.

This writer undertakes to set forth the views of all the early Christian writers, about twenty in number, who touched the subject of the Immaculate Conception, from Ignatius down to the Council of Nice. The more important passages are given in the original with summaries and also with efforts to give the whole matter historic perspective. The author's presentation is almost entirely colorless as perhaps befits an historical monograph. It is plain, however, that his sympathies and convictions incline toward a liberal view. He distinguishes very sharply between the Logos theories and the records as contained in Matthew and Luke. The former, he believes, preceded and following both movements came as incidental to the polemic against Docetism efforts to prove that Jesus had a body and a human nature. The work is done with conscientious care and apparently with quite sufficient scholarship, and all students of the topic will acknowledge a debt of gratitude to the author.

The Recovery and Restatement of the Gospel, by LORAN D. OSBORN. Chicago, 1903. pp. 256.

This Chicago thesis treats of matters which perhaps are not readily suggested by its title. Very early in its history the Gospel was obscured and underwent both ecclesiastical and theological transformation. This is briefly outlined from Origen to the Reformation. In this change both the personal and the moral element of the Gospel suffered eclipse. The recovery of the Gospel began with Luther, and was, at first, very promising, but a post-reformation movement re-eclipsed it and Greek-Catholic dogmatics revived. New emphasis was placed upon theology, and the formal displaced the material principle of the reformation. The dogmatic system was read back again into the Bible, and that in new ways. In the present century the instinct of return to the Christian records is seen in what is called both the popular and the scientific reopening of the Bible. The results of this movement are summarized as the recovered Gospel of Jesus, as the mediator of salvation of which God

is the author, as laying down its conditions and as describing it under two leading forms, first, as the kingdom of God, and second, as eternal life. The author then proceeds to discover in four chapters the nature, value, right and need of theological restatement. He then rather boldly suggests the outlines of a new theological system with Jesus at its heart. His mission and his person mediate eternal life, of which God is the author and man the recipient. The nature, entrance, continuance, result and award of eternal life are next set forth, and finally comes the consummation of the complete kingdom. From the time when the historical Jesus was superseded by the Logos and the Heavenly Father was made a metaphysical idea, philosophical dominion has been too great, and as generation has followed generation, epicyle has been added to cycle in theology, but theology has always proved a failure. Instead of leading the church, it has lagged behind and become a burden. It is arid, acrimonious, weakening, and misrepresents the Gospel of Jesus. The author, therefore, proposes that instead of having the Gospels revolve about philosophical dogma, it make the latter revolve about the historic Jesus. This method will solve all difficulties. It is somewhat Copernican. The old authoritative theology is not found in the Bible at all. It became attached to it by slow historic process and has nothing divine about it. Thus theology has become divorced from the life of the church and has split the latter into parties. He believes in a great impending theological reformation which shall overthrow the oldest and most comprehensive of all heresies, viz., that of changing the Gospel of salvation into a system of metaphysical philosophy. This would leave the church free from the culture of an ancient world to enter modern life on a new career of conquest. The Gospels will resume their rightful jurisdiction over conscience and will. If another theology arises, it will always be as a means and never an end.

Liberal Christianity. Its Origin, Nature and Mission. by JEAN REVILLE. Tr. and ed. by Victor Leuliette. Crown Theological Library. Vol. 4. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1903. pp. 205.

These lectures are a very plain, simple statement of the position and programme of liberal Protestantism. They do not pretend to present anything new to those informed about the movement. They stand for inner freedom and spiritual unity among all men of good will in their struggle against sin, selfishness and injustice. This is the true moral Catholicity of humanity. Those really liberal must speak out and confess their broad views. They must see that their children have education at once religious and moral and in this way also not pretend to be orthodox when they are not so. The double mindedness is a great evil which can only thus be avoided. Religion must be distinguished from doctrines and rites, and does not perish if these are even repudiated. The great enemies of liberal Christians are those who pillory sincerity, and the dual minds with religion and life in two distinct compartments of their brain are like husband and wife who can neither agree nor divorce, and so live under the same roof but separately. We must no longer teach miracles even in schools. These play no part whatever in the religious life of the present which supernaturalism limits. So, too, external authority must be rejected. Religion and progress can thus be harmonized. Liberal Christians are now often regarded, as the early Christians were by the pagans of antiquity, as being deniers, but the future is theirs. The substance of Christ's Gospel is the fatherhood of God and the resulting brotherhood of man. These two doctrines are really one and the same, at least each implies the other. Religion is "a living relation between the human individual and the powers or power of which the universe is a manifest station." Liberal Protestantism is founded on religious, moral and social experience.

The Direct and Fundamental Proofs of the Christian Religion. By GEORGE WILLIAM KNOX. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1903. pp. 196.

These lectures are by the professor of philosophy and history of religion in the Union Theological Seminary, and consist of addresses given in 1903 before the Divinity School at Yale. The book, however, deals very little with either philosophy or the history of religion. The criticism would perhaps lie chiefly against the second chapter, entitled the "Modern View of the World," which to our thinking reveals a totally inadequate conception of what modernity means. Subsequent lectures treat of reality and proof, the definition, development, varieties and conflicts

of religion, Christianity as religion, its conflicts and proofs, and Christianity as the absolute religion. When we reflect on what might have been said upon this topic at the present day, these lectures must be set down as disappointing and arid.

Apologie des Christentums. Fester Band: Religion und Offenbarung. von HERMAN SCHELL. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, 1902. pp. 482.

This is the second edition of a work which has been recognized, since it first appeared in 1861, as a standard. The author denies that apologetics constitute a *Lebens-* science. The new age makes new demands on religious science, and men like Mommsen, von Hertling, Güttler, Lemmann and Lenz have opened almost a new era. The first part of this book is devoted to religious philosophy, which he treats by topics rather than by authors. The second part is on the philosophy of revelation. Under this he discusses the value of miracles and prophecy as criteria, with a final section on the secret of supernatural wisdom and holiness.

The Gospel and the Church. by ALFRED LOISY. Tr. by Christopher Home. Isbister & Company, Ltd., London, 1903. pp. 277.

This work is essentially a vigorous criticism of Harnack by an able Catholic writer. He discusses the following chief topics which he chooses from Harnack: the sources of the Gospels, the Kingdom of Heaven, the Son of God, the church, the Christian dogma, Catholic worship. His defence of the place of dogma and the function of worship and the nature of the church constitute the best part of this writer's work, and the impartial and careful reader will certainly be led, whatever his doctrinal point of view, to the conviction that Harnack's positions upon these topics need radical modification.

Geschichte der Logoside in der Christlichen Literatur. von ANATHON AALL. O. R. Reisland, Leipzig, 1899. pp. 493.

Although this work has been published some years it has just come to our notice. It is so thorough a piece of work, and treats of a subject of such importance to all students of historical philosophy, that we desire to briefly call the favorable attention of all readers of this journal to it. It begins with the very first logosophy of early Christendom as contained in the teachings of Jesus and Paul, and describes how Hellenistic effects are already manifest in the Epistles to the Colossians and Hebrews and in the Apocalypse. The next chapter traces the history of the form of the logos ideas as it appears in the fourth Gospel. The next describes its pervasive influence on the extracanonical Christian literature, first before and then in the great apologetists from Justine to Minucius Felix. The author then discusses the great role it played in the controversies with heretics in the early Catholic church and in the Alexandrian writers, Clement and Origen. The last chapter amplifies its treatment by Origen.

The New Testament in the Christian Church. Eight Lectures, by EDWARD CALDWELL MOORE. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1904. pp. 367.

These lectures discuss the authorities of the early Christian church, the witness of the earliest Christian literature to the New Testament, the New Testament at the end of the second century, the closing of the canon in the West and in the East, the Renaissance and the Reformation, canonization and the origin of church government, the beginnings of the history of doctrine, and the idea of authority in the Christian church.

The Eschatology of Jesus. by LEWIS A. MUIRHEAD. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York, 1904. pp. 224.

The standpoint of this work is sufficiently definite in the following sentence of the preface: "Jesus has revealed the supremacy of righteousness and holy love; but I am not aware that He has said or done anything, that makes it less absolutely true than it was before He came, that 'we know not what we shall be.' " These four lectures are entitled Presuppositions; the Main Features of Jewish Apocalypse considered in their Affinity to the Mind of Jesus; Jesus' Doctrine concerning the Consummation of the Kingdom, considered in relation to His Ethical Doctrine and His Messianic Consciousness, the Title "Son of Man." Jesus' age and the time immediately following were marked by a confident expectation of the speedy con-

summation of all things. This is found, although to a less degree, in many other ancient religions. Resurrection, parousia, judgment gave a futuristic tendency to all religious thought. The immediate successors in the work of Jesus were not only filled with yearning and fainting for the great consummation, but this made their work both intense and to some extent provisional. The kingdom was seen to be delivered up. God was the source and would be the goal of all. The dead would rise in due order. Christ would be subordinated to God. This impending close of history pervaded far ranged plans for the future but impelled to meet present exigencies rather than to think of the lasting church. The call to all to be ever ready raised moral life to a higher pitch than perhaps it had ever attained before. All gifts must be organized. The very purpose of creation was about to be revealed. The fall of Jerusalem was perhaps the beginning of the new train of events all of which had a transcendent and perhaps apocalyptic consummation described preferentially in terms of vision, light and glory. Happy he who lived to the parousia and so escaped death. Resurrection was the end and completion of personality. Perhaps the soul was to be clothed upon by a new body not entirely dissimilar from that which death had taken away. In some passages it seems uncertain whether the heavenly kingdom was to last forever or be temporal, whether it was mundane or transcendent, how far the *pneuma* would be changed. Perhaps everything in the transition from earthly to heavenly life depended upon the vigor of man's moral personality. The conception of Daniel played a very important role in all the figures and symbols of the great change and the new state.

With regard to the title "Son of God," Muirhead's conclusion is "that in a very real sense Jesus habitually placed His Messiahship outside the sphere of His ordinary human self-consciousness. If the fact of the Messiah in Jesus came as a revelation from the Father to His disciples, it does not seem to be saying anything more than is said in the story of His baptism to affirm that it was equally a revelation to Himself. It was a voice from heaven that said to Him—partly in the words of the 2nd Psalm—'Thou art My Son, the Beloved, in whom I am well pleased.' He had a vision of the Spirit of God descending upon Himself. His calling, therefore, did not proceed from a consciousness of powers born with Him and natural to His humanity. It came from a consciousness of special power lent to His human nature, and constituting, in the first instance, a temptation to it. In the crisis of the Temptation the power obtained the right place in His life." Jesus himself was, perhaps, so far as this title goes "ungestempelter Begriff." The Jewish apocalypse had provided many main ideas such as a final judgment, preliminary woes, wonderful advent, and some subsidiary ones like rewards and punishments in Hades, the principalities of evil spirits, and above all the conception of angels. Out of these views conceptions of pre-written history were sometimes framed. The apocalypses of the Old Testament are tracts for bad times, not born of, but in despair. The Book of Daniel originated in the times of the Syrian oppression; Psalms at the era of the first Roman invasion; the Similitudes of Enoch coincide with the massacres under Herod the Great. The assumption of Moses just preceded the fall of Jerusalem, and the revelations of Ezra and Baruch just followed it. Apocalypists generally predict that the evil will continue and perhaps become worse, but assume ultimate deliverance. They often assume the name of a bygone saint or prophet because the voice of prophecy was generally believed to have ceased. The mind of Jesus had some special affinity with the Book of Daniel. Apocalyptic literature, Muirhead claims, marks the beginning in Jewish history, and so in the religious history of the world of a new idea regarding God, world and life. It brought the power of the transcendent to bear. The kingdom of Jesus assumed a "futuristic aspect." The imminence of this kingdom was one of the most certain and positive contents of the mind of Jesus. It was a near mystery, suggested a new view of the world. It impelled what ought to be to be, summed up all the good things belonging to the supernatural life of God's children, and many felt that this generation should not pass before these things were realized, although Jesus intimated no date. He warned against false prophets to arise in these last days, was perhaps misunderstood by his disciples who certainly had no certificate of accuracy. The Gospels are more or less preachy throughout, and their certainty is to some extent a moral certainty. Yet the main teachings of our Lord stand out distinctly. His ethical conceptions must be always the standards of interpretation.

St Paul's Conception of the Last Things, by H. A. A. KENNEDY. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York, 1904. pp. 370.

This latest is also, as it ought to be, the best compendious exposition of its subject. After discussing the prominence of eschatology in all religious systems, the formative influences in Paul's conception of the last things are described. The influence of the Old Testament, especially the book of Daniel, the remarkable kinship of Paul with the prophetic spirit, the Old Testament teleology, the Day of the Lord and the parousia, the effect of Paul's Pharisaic training, the slow development of the Resurrection idea, the transformation of the old conception of Sheol, the divergent views as to the scope of the Resurrection, the effect of Paul's own experience on his doctrine, its relations to both the basis and the nature of future life, the Old Testament ideas of death as the absence and life as the presence of an indwelling, if not divine, spirit, the extraordinary prominence of the expectation of a speedy culmination of events, the scope of judgment from local to universal, the extemporized nature of much thought of organization due to the expected end of things, the Greek prejudice against the doctrine of Resurrection and Paul's interpretation of it, modern views of the spiritual body of an intermediate state, of the consummation of God's kingdom, and the relation of his views to Hellenism:—these topics present a wide range of themes for treatment. The author has with very great diligence utilized the authorities, so far mostly German, in this field, has taken pains, and has had the liberality to co-ordinate these views with a few modern psychological and philosophical conceptions, so that, while his own standpoint and conclusions are essentially conservative, his range of thought is wider than that of any one who has yet written upon the subject. It is refreshing to see the many diverse and often somewhat constrained, if not even fantastic, views which German savants have been led to take upon some of these matters and treated with so much common sense and scholarship combined that in most matters the author's views carry conviction.

Nevertheless, it seems to us this topic now needs, in addition to such masterly treatment as it finds here, a larger philosophical and also a subtler psychological discussion. This can only be made on a broad comparative basis which is here only hinted at but not at all attempted.

Die Offenbarung des Johannes, von JOHANNES WEISS. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1904. pp. 164. Preis, 4.80 m.

The author protests against the Tübingen alternative that either the Apocalypse or the Fourth Gospel could not have sprung from John, and holds that as a whole the Apocalypse did arise within the Johannine circle in which it was, in its early form at least, a sacred reading book. It took this form perhaps about A. D. 95 at the end of Domitian's reign, while the Gospel arose in the same circle ten or twenty years later. In local allusions and in many philological points the two resemble each other and certainly there was abundant room in the same mind for both the Apocalypse and the "imminent-mystic" view of the world. To explain how these two books could have arisen in the same circle so near each other the author turns to history. The Apocalypse had appeared, Domitian died, the prophecy was not fulfilled, and to the apocalyptic seer this was a hard blow. If Irenæus is right that John lived on to the time of Trajan, his death occurred a few years after the appearance of the Apocalypse. This was another hard blow to the Johannine circle who had expected their leader would live until the Lord's return. This prompted a change of mode and of view point. The eschatological ideas were changed, spiritualized, allegorized. After all these disillusionments it is now proclaimed that he who believes will not be judged, that he who does not is judged already. The great separation has already taken place. The dead already hear the voice. The Lord comes in the paraclete. He who sees Christ sees the Father. To be sure it was a great change from the impending parousia to impeny, but a normal one. Paul, too, marks the overcoming of eschatological ideas for piety in the present. This marked a new type of piety. Weiss thinks that the Asia Minor John wrote his Apocalypse before A. D. 70. Later he wrote his letter against the heresy in which he saw the coming of anti-Christ. When he wrote his Gospel he no longer awaited the second coming of the Lord. He survived all the witnesses of Jesus' work. Later his own work was re-edited. This may have been done in his own lifetime.

This rather startling theory is put forth with much modesty and is somewhat tentative by its author.

Die Ethik Jesu, von EDUARD GRIMM. Grefe & Tiedemann, Hamburg, 1903. pp. 293.

The writer first discusses the ethics of Jesus according to the verdict of modern contemporaries, scientific and social, Catholic and Evangelical, metaphysical and psychological. Here Nietzsche's view is given prominence, and a section is devoted to what is temporal and local and, therefore, by general consent modifiable. The chief captions are love of truth, the presupposition of all moral endeavor, the criteria of morality, the worth of personality, egoism and altruism, the relations of morals and religion, revenge and forgiveness, and the problem of redemption. These are the fundamental traits. Special problems and relations are differences between the early and the later teachings of Jesus, the conceptions of marriage, family, country, calling, possession, Kingdom of God, etc. The great need of our time, according to the author, is a more masculine Christianity. We must have that or else the lax, effeminate tone of Christianity will lapse towards the negative attitude of Buddhism. The old body of religion and virtue must be sloughed off and a new one made that fits the thought and feeling of our time better. No doubt it will bear the ear marks of our own time, but this will indeed be its practical merit if it has scientific defect. If this is done with fidelity to human nature and needs the great features of the ethics of Jesus will remain.

Die Tugendlehre des Christentums, von OTTO ZOCKLER. C Bertelsmann, Gütersloh, 1904. pp. 378.

This is not only a scholarly but an interesting sketch of the history of the various ethical views and systems which have been developed under the influence of Christianity, beginning with that of primitive Christianity, then taking up that of the pre-Augustine fathers of the Orient and the West, then the ethics of Augustine and his successors, tracing the history of the beginning of the charm of the number seven for sins and virtues. In the middle ages, the chief systems of both the Orient, and, especially, the West, are set forth from the pre-scholastic time down. An interesting section is devoted to the notion of virtue and vice in the life and art of the middle ages showing how they are set forth in sermons, pictures, poems, sacred dramas, etc. The Reformation time follows when the influence of the decalogue comes to the fore again in the Protestant ethics. Three types—the Lutheran, Melancthonian, and Calvinistic—are considered. Then follow the Venatorius, Huberius, and the Regius type. The concluding chapter on modern philosophic ethics is the briefest and most inadequate.

The Teachings of Jesus Concerning Wealth, by GERALD D. HEUVER. F. H. Revell Co., 1903. pp. 208.

This is a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Chicago Divinity School. It shows that Jesus was immensely interested in people's economic condition, that he sought to better it by making the people themselves better, and to do the latter through the agency of the church. Palestine in Jesus' day had certain economic advantages. The condition of the people was unhappy, and although the Old Testament taught humanitarian laws, the Jewish Church failed to improve the people's social condition. It is heartily granted that there are considerable variations concerning Jesus' teachings on wealth in the various gospels. These teachings, however, are summarized and held to be far more central to the purpose of Jesus' ministry than had hitherto been supposed. A chapter each is devoted to the teachings concerning the possession of property, to those devoted to the worship of Mammon, and to those on the accumulation and use of riches.

Die Abendmahlsfrage in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, von KARL GEROLD GOETZ. J. C. Hinrichs, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 311.

Herman Scholtz, in 1886, and Schweitzer, in 1901, are the only predecessors of Goetz in recent years who have attempted to sum up both the history and the present status of the problem of the Lord's Supper. From all three writers, and especially the last, it appears that the commemorative meal which Jesus instituted was very simple, that at the outset Jesus told the disciples of his departure and of an impending new basis of relation between them, and that after the close of the meal, or, at least, after thanks had been rendered, he gave the bread and cup under the simile of his flesh and blood in token that his own earthly life was to abide. He left no writings or monuments and this literal experience was intended to keep his

own memory and especially that of the truth he taught green. Almost immediately, however, Paul and Luke added to this the sacrificial idea of an offering. Perhaps, as many think, Jesus himself had in mind the covenant on Sinai, although this seems uncertain. The view often held that he meant it to symbolize his own death as a sacrifice, we are told, can no longer be held. Some have thought that the chief significance of this sacrament must be sought in the sacrifice of the elements as the ancients poured libations of wine and as vands were sacrificed to the gods. As the idea of this memorial festival gradually changed and it became an actual means of grace, it was perhaps natural that the conceptions of it should degenerate toward the doctrine of transubstantiation as underlying the Catholic mass. This view was developed by those utterly without historic sense but who sought by scholastic logic to show how reason should apprehend it. This was very different from the Paschal idea or from that of Zwingli who inclined to the view that a hearty meal would be itself the best commemoration. Instead of being a simple fact or interpreting the acts alone as they stand as more important than the words, it is now more commonly regarded in an allegorical, mystic sense. The mode of apprehension of its significance has undergone very many changes so that the attempt to go back to the historic fact was inevitable, although the latter can never be exactly restored. Perhaps, now, the interpretation of the sacrament of the eucharist is a kind of anthropometer testing the kind of faith, insight, ideals, etc., of believers. The stern logicist inclines to the offering idea, the rationalist would drop it all, the historian would go back to its primal form, the mystic revels in the depth of symbolism, etc.

Die eucharistische Wortgeschichte und das apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis, von AUGUST TRUEPELMANN. C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn, Berlin, 1901. pp. 395. Preis, 5.-m.

This work moves in a very modest, limited and conventional field. The author takes up the various phrases of the Apostle's Creed and discusses and vindicates each against what he understands to be the teachings of modern science and the tendencies of the modern age. It is a pattern of orthodoxy and unimpeachable in this respect. There are also without doubt many faltering souls whose steps through life may be steadied by it. It adds, however, nothing to modern scholarship, and from our American standpoint seems somewhat tedious and prolix. Its form is open to criticism in that it has no chapters, no table of content, no index, no summaries, and no other means of getting at its content without reading it entire. This we confess we have only done in parts, but we honestly doubt whether such a book as this will ever be read through from cover to cover by any one unless it be by the author's immediate friends.

Saint Paul and the Ante-Nicene Church, by STEWART MEANS. Adam & Charles Black, London, 1903. pp. 349.

The scope of this book is best indicated by the titles of its five chapters, which are St. Paul, The Apostolic Fathers and Justin Martyr, Irenaeus and the Catholic Church, The Alexandrines, Clement, and Origen, Tertullian and the Foundation of Latin Christianity.

Christian Faith in an Age of Science, by WILLIAM NORTH RICE. A. C. Armstrong and Son, New York, 1903. pp. 425.

The author is a Professor of Geology and here gives us his view of life in general. He discusses first the extension of the universe in time and space, the antiquity of man, Genesis and geology, the unity of the universe, the conservation of energy, evolution and its theological bearings. In the second part he passes to certain Christian doctrines, discussing especially the personality of man and God, law in nature, providence, prayer, miracle, revelation and the Bible, and sums up in a final chapter with a general statement of Christian evidences.

Die Apostolischen Väter, I. Teil, von DANIEL VÖLTER. E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1904. pp. 472.

This is only part of an attempt to investigate in detail all the questions connected with both the form and content of the writings of the apostolic fathers, the present volume being devoted to Clement, Hermas and Barnabas. The author concerns himself little with the biography of these writers but discusses the conditions

under which their writings appeared, their first form, literary character, the content, the sources used, etc. The work promises to be an admirable monument of German erudition.

Idealisten und Idealismus des Christentums, von K. H. PAHNCKE. J. C. B. Mohr, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 195. Preis, 2.80 M.

This is a collection of somewhat miscellaneous papers; first, thoughts and opinions from the letters and diaries of two idealists, viz., Albrecht Wolters and Willibald Beyschlag. In another chapter idealistic dreamery of art is involved at Raphael's grave. In another Paul Gerhardt is described as an idealistic of faith. Christian idealism and its culture in the present time is commended. A few deeds illustrating it are given.

The Tombs of the Popes, by FERDINAND GREGOROVICUS. Tr. fr. the 2nd and Enlarged Ger. ed. with a mem. of the author, by R. W. Seton-Watson. Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd., Westminster, 1903. pp. 174.

Although this volume was written some twenty years ago it appears now for the first time in translation, with the full page portraits of sixteen of the tombs of popes. The author is well known as the author of "The History of Rome in the Middle Ages," and his outspoken criticisms of many of the popes is somewhat remarkable.

The Apocryphal and Legendary Life of Christ, by JAMES DE QUINCEY DONEHO. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1903. pp. 531.

This work attempts to present the whole body of ancient canonical literature that pretends to tell at first hand anything of the life and words of Jesus. There are, no doubt, a few golden grains amidst a vast body of chaff. It is hard even to resolve this literature into its constituent elements. The writer has simply compiled, and attempted nothing in the way of critical editing. The value of the book lies in its comprehensiveness. The writer has followed the order of events in Jesus' life and has not attempted even a chronological arrangement of these apocrypha. Dreary and verbose as many of them are, they are not uninteresting reading for the historian or for the psychologist, for, at any rate, they show the effects of colossal events upon minds, some of which are simple, some subtle, and others probably very remote in time and place from the events which motivated all. Had all canonical writings perished and nothing but these remained the inference to a great personality and to epoch-making period and train of events would have been irresistible. This may be said even if everything in these writings were excluded which is in form or substance duplicated in the New Testament.

The Life of Saint Mary Magdalen, by VALENTINA HAWTREY. With an introduction by Vernon Lee. John Lane, London, 1904. pp. 286.

This is a translation of an unknown Italian writer of the fourteenth century, who tells the story of the relations of Jesus with the family of Lazarus, whose sister is here identified with the sinful but repentant Magdalen. The story makes a romance almost of the Aucassin and Nicolette type. The writer spins out her romance with great detail, constantly saying, "I think that we may believe," or "I love to think," or "it seems to me well to hold," or "they say," etc. The whole thing is charming and reverent and has the interest of a romance. The work is interspersed by fourteen full page cuts of the Magdalen by standard artists.

Confession and Absolution, by T. W. DRURY. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1903. pp. 300.

This painstaking book does not attempt to describe the practice of confession and absolution in the primitive, mediæval, or modern church in general, but is limited to the teachings of the church of England in the sixteenth century. It is a little unfortunate that these limitations are so severely observed. Certainly, these English reformers were men of deep piety, sound conviction, intellectual power and solid learning. They appealed to Scripture and to history concerning both the doctrine, practice, and sacrament of penance. Much depended upon their views of post-baptismal sin. They borrowed the idea of attrition from the scholastics, and this plus absolution they conceived as contrition. Absolution might be divine or human, absolute or ministerial. Of course it tended to grow private and personal.

Francis of Assisi, by ANNA M. STODDARD. E. P. Dutton and Co., New York, 1903. pp. 247.

This booklet is certainly a labor of love and admiration. Much of it was written under the influence of *Salvator*. It presents an excellent picture of the times and of the man and has a third and interesting part describing St. Francis in art.

Essays and Letters, by LEO TOLSTOY. Tr. by Aylmer Maude, Grant Richards, London, 1903. pp. 372.

This interesting and timely collection of the recent letters and papers of Tolstoy contains many an article of the twenty-six included, the publication of which in Russia was forbidden by the censor. Among the more striking is the defence of the views of Bonald that every one should perform some physical labor, this being the only medicine that can save mankind. The plea that humanity has been arrested by alcohol and nicotine, the supplementary and plainer discussion of the *Kreutzer Sonata* that a pampered, under worked, and an over fed race tends to over sexual sensitiveness. The first step of reform is diet and abstinence from much or any animal food. The essence of religion consists solely in an answer to the question "Why do I live, and what is my relation to the infinite universe about me?" Every answer worth considering involves the subordination of the individual to the needs of the race. His final definition of religion is that it is "a relation man sets up between himself and the endless and infinite universe or its sources and its cause." He execrates Huxley's conception "full of all kinds of jokes, verses, and general views on ancient religion and philosophy so florid and complicated that it is only with great effort that one is able to reach its fundamental thought," that the law of evolution runs counter to the moral law, and therefore renunciation is religious. The cosmic process must be checked and replaced by another higher ethical one. This could only make morality mechanical, and hence he suggests a second definition of religion as "a certain relation established by man between his separate personality and the infinite universe or its sources, and morality is the ever present guide to life which results from that relation. An article entitled "Shame" protests against flogging, especially in the army. Interesting, too, is his correspondence with Verigin, the Douklobov leader, and his letter on nonresistance. He believes Henry George's plan of single tax to be practicable, holds that science gives too much attention to trifles "instead of supplying men with correct religious, moral, social, or even hygiene ideals." Instead of studying merely what exists it ought to show people how to live. He reiterates his view that to call a man a patriot will sometime become an insult, that this feeling should not be cultivated because it limits the feeling of humanism which should include the whole race. Patriotism has reduced the Christian world to the brutality of war and put mutual enmity in place of love. The spirit of patriotism as opposed to Christianity had a striking illustration in the famous instructions of the Emperor to his soldiers when sent to China. He would not destroy governments, however, but would uproot their violence and apply the Golden Rule to statesmanship and international law. Dignified and pathetic is his reply to the synod's edict excommunicating him, and this leads to an exposition of his faith. He began by loving orthodoxy more than peace, then preferred Christianity to his church, and now loves truth more than anything else. This he holds to be Christianity. His enemies have followed Coleridge's precept which is the converse of this. They began by loving Christianity better than truth, proceeded to love their own sect or church better than Christianity, and in the end loved themselves best of all. In a later essay he gives yet another definition of religion as "a relation according to reason and knowledge which man establishes with the infinite life surrounding him and such as binds his life as that infinity and guides his conduct." He again sets forth his doctrine in the way of protest by his appeal to the clergy, where the popes, bishops, priests or pastors are addressed.

The History of Christian Preaching, by T. HARWOOD PATTISON. Amer. Bap. Pub. Soc., Phila., 1903. pp. 412.

This work is illustrated with a list of twenty full page portraits of famous preachers from Augustine to Spurgeon, Beecher, Brooks and Moody. The first chapter discusses the prophet and the synagogue and describes the origin of Chris-

tian preaching. The preaching of Jesus, the apostles, and preaching during the first four centuries occupy the next three chapters. Two others describe preaching from the fifth to the tenth and from the eleventh to the fourteenth century. The other chapters are devoted to more modern preachers, scores of whom are briefly characterized. The work is a labor of love and of erudition and cannot fail to both instruct and inspire. It is a book that should be in the library of every pastor and it is much of interest to all who practice public speaking.

Geschichte des deutschen evangelischen Kirchentiedes, von WILHELM NELLE. Gustav Schloessmann, Hamburg, 1904. pp. 234.

This author treats first of church tunes before the Reformation, then those of the Reformation period, of the thirty years' war, of the time of pietism ending in 1750, of the Aufklärung ending in 1800, and in a final chapter brings his survey down to the present time. The book is illustrated by a number of portraits, and presents in brief compass an admirable survey of this interesting field.

The History and Use of Hymns and Hymn-Tunes, by DAVID R. BREED. Fleming H. Revell Co., New York, 1903. pp. 364.

This book is the outgrowth of the author's own needs as a teacher of practical theology. It includes extended notice only of authors and composers of the first rank. He treats ancient Greek, Latin and German hymns, devotes a chapter to psalmody, others each to English hymnology, the best hymns, those of the first period from Ken and Watts to Toplady, hymns of the second period from Montgomery and Auber to Henry Kirk White, and those of the third, beginning with Keble down to the present.

Scientific Basis of Sabbath and Sunday, by ROBERT JOHN FLOODY. Cupples & Schoenhof, Boston. pp. 349.

We have here an interesting and scholarly study of what may be called the history of the Sabbath and also its psychology. There was first the seventh day of the heathen characterized by a feast, then the seventh day of the Hebrews characterized by rest, and lastly the seventh day of the Christians characterized by worship. The origin of it all was the four different shapes of the moon—the new, half, full, and the reversed moon, calling out special devotions on the particular days which these appear. All nations with whom the Hebrews came in contact observed this ancient custom. All these moon phases were celebrated by merry-making, and generally by the absence of work. Only late in the development of the priestly code was the Jewish Sabbath perfected as no longer man's day but God's. The word Sabbath means rest. It had no relation to the Babylonian Sabattum for that was a day to appease God's anger. It was only late that the moon was forgotten, and slowly the dominical Sabbath was developed. It was not a moral law but a memorial of God's rest day and when Christ arose the old Jewish Sabbath had finished its mission. For a time there was no special sacred day in the Christian church, at least not until much after the Council of Jerusalem when the necessity of a worship day arose. This had no relation to the Sabbath and was a new institution with a new spirit. The first law giving complete rest from ordinary labor dates from the Council of Orleans, A. D. 538, and soon other holy days followed. The real criterion now is whether it interferes with the favorable conditions of worship. The State has the right to enforce Sunday laws only to protect the rights of those who have religious convictions and for the general good of the State. Sunday will be needed until all days are Lord's days.

Grundzüge der Religionswissenschaft, von C. P. TIELE. J. C. B. Mohr, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 68. Preis, 2.50m.

In 1901 Professor Tiele published a booklet of brief paragraphs designed to be summary statements of his positions for the use of the pupils who heard his lectures. Since his death, on January 11, 1902, his friend, Pastor Gehrich, in accordance with a request made by the author, has published and somewhat amplified this outline. It now presents a pretty full schema of Tiele's views in all the fields of religion. The introduction treats of the progressive emancipation of religious science from the leading strings of philosophy, method, field, etc. In what is called the morphological part he treats the idea of development, its stages, the lower and higher natural

religions, of which he makes six stages, culminating in the anthropic or hemethic, which are succeeded by ethic religions. These themselves are classified. The laws of development, continuity, assimilation, concentration, and expansion are discussed. The other chief division falls into two great groups, the ontological and the psychological. First come the phenomenological ideas, then theology in the narrower sense, religious anthropology, soteriology, religious actions, and associations. The author nowhere gives a full definition of religion which he regards as by no means a simple thing. Indeed on many points the careful and scientific classifications of his views will no doubt prove somewhat disappointing to those who seek simplification.

Glaube und Wissen, von VIKTOR CATHIRLIN. S. J. Herder, Freiburg, 1903. pp. 245.

This is an orientation in several fundamental problems of religion. The author discusses the nature of knowledge and its relations to revelation, faith in general and human faith in particular, religious faith according to the Protestant and Catholic conceptions respectively, and the problems of faith and science, especially dignity, freedom, and the presuppositionless character of science.

Religion and Science: Some suggestions for the study of the relations between them, by P. N. WAGGETT. Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1904. pp. 174.

This book describes the place of difficulties in thought, the word 'monism,' popular books, methods of meeting difficulties and discussions, ideal critique, Christian Science, the search for religion in science, theism and natural selection, the word 'deist,' the Ring and the Book, heredity, society as an organism, bacteria, etc. There is little here for the man of science, and perhaps the best merit of the book is that it raises more questions than it settles.

Pascal and the Port Royalists, by WILLIAM CLARK. (The World's Epoch-Makers.) T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1902. pp. 235.

This appears to be one of the best books of the World's Epoch-Makers' Series. The story of Pascal's life is a sad one. The early loss of his mother, his amazing precocity in mathematics and scientific thought, then his conversion and his deep religious mysticism with its too potent influence on his system, vast powers which seem rather wasted in somewhat fruitless discussions of his day—all these are very lucidly described, with incidentally a good account of the provincial letters, and of Port Royalism, and his death at the age of twenty-nine. All this makes a somewhat pathetic impression upon the modern student. Able as he was, his mind was in a peculiar sense a victim of his age.

The Genesis of Methodism, by WILLIAM PITT MACVEY. Jennings and Pye, Cincinnati, 1903. pp. 326.

This little volume meets a real need not only within the Methodist Church, but it will prove a *rade mecum* for all students of comparative denominations. It is written by a competent hand, and is based on a new religious interpretation of society as a "consciousness of kind." Under the caption "the mind of Methodism," the writer discusses the traditional faith, articles, philosophy of life, anticipation of science, rapid and general acceptance, and fixity of type. He then proceeds to a concise statement of the genesis of the church and the ecclesiastical revolution which led to its evolution in formal worship, social survival, and dual principles. The development of government is then discussed with its geography, modifications, and democratic influences. That of administration is next taken up, from the episcopacy down to the local ministry. Then come the problems of membership, discipline, and social assembly. As parts of the greater church are discussed the church consciousness, the consolidations of benevolences, and organic union. The cultural issue is treated with reference to spiritual and then to intellectual problems. The place of the Methodist idea in the history of the world, the republication and interpretation of the record and its appropriation, conclude the volume. In general Methodism may be considered as a spiritual movement away from dogma into life. The ultimate world form, as expressed in the formulæ of the Christian prayer, is shown to be universal holiness of life or conformity to the divine will made possible by the consequences wrought by the incarnate Son and the Holy Spirit. The record that set forth these provisions, though long obscured, was rendered

accessible through the Renaissance and the Reformation. Further centuries have been marked by increasing insight into the contents of the record as consisting essentially in provisions for a holy life. Methodism must do more, however, and become a medium whereby the world can pass to its ultimate condition. It represents a third transition stage comparable to those mentioned above toward realizing the ultimate world form. Great as the triumphs of Methodism have been in the past, those which it may confidently expect in the future are greater yet.

The Early Relation and Separation of Baptists and Disciples, by ERRETT GATES. Chicago, 1904. pp. 124.

This interesting monograph begins with the outline of Thomas Campbell's life, who was born in 1763. It describes his personality, his sermons and debates, the Christian Baptist, the status of Alexander Campbell's fellowship, the spread of the ancient order of things among Baptists, and finally the mutual separation. All in all the story of this denomination as here set forth is somewhat pathetic. The almost strident reaffirmation of certain vital principles, the vehement and protracted controversies about topics which now have little interest, make on the whole a somewhat sad chapter. The work, however, was well worth doing for its own sake and will have value to every student of church history in this country.

The Congregationalists, by LEONARD W. BACON. (The Story of the Churches.) The Baker and Taylor Co., New York, 1904. pp. 280.

In this series the story of the Methodists has been told by J. A. Faulkner, that of the Baptists by H. C. Vedder, the Presbyterians by C. L. Thompson, with another volume on the creed of the Presbyterians by E. W. Smith.

Scientific Aspects of Mormonism. By NELS L. NELSON. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1904. pp. 347.

The very title of this book will surprise some. It discusses the claim of Mormonism to be the religion of Jesus Christ. Some of the most interesting chapters are those which discuss the Mormon conception of God and his personality, the place of religion in the economy of life, Mormonism as a transcendent system of evolution, and man's spiritual life regarded as a process of evolution, how God shapes the destiny of man the individual and rules among the nations, the scientific aspect of faith the identity of truth, education and repentance, the logical necessity of the latter and forgiveness as well as of baptism, what intelligent beings will do in the future, the philosophical difficulties in the concept of a personal God, Godhood as incarnated and its real meaning, the fullness of priesthood as Godhood, Mormonism destined to have the last word, its social aspects, proofs of pre-existence, etc. Another volume amplifying the social aspects of Mormonism and promising to discuss plural marriage "not, however, with any view to the recrudescence of the practice, but merely with a view to lifting the obloquy which now rests on the entire social system through a misunderstanding of this relatively insignificant feature," is to follow. It will certainly interest every philosophical mind to see this faith discussed in this large way. We only regret the slight traces of dogmatism and severity which sometimes appear, although neither of these traits are prominent.

Neue Bahnen. Der Unterricht in der christlichen Religion im Geiste der modernen Theologie, von O. BAUMGARTEN. J. C. B. Mohr, Leipzig, 1903. pp. 120.

This book caused a great sensation when its contents were first delivered as lectures. No less than one hundred and ninety-three Schlesweg-Holstein clergymen petitioned the minister that he depose the author from his university chair of theology, but in vain. The motivation of the book was the author's effort in 1900 to issue a new edition of Kaftan's explanation of the catechism. Greatly as he revered this theologian he found himself in diametrical opposition to his views on many pedagogical points. The author believes he has found new ways of religious instruction that differ radically from those of homiletics or the catechism. These, and perhaps especially the latter, do not consider the naiveté of children. The author protests vigorously against sermons which children have to attend, although they are far above their intelligence, and insists that much Protestant doctrine is anti-child-like. There is lack of concrete objectivity even in Bible history. Youthful souls are

made both prematurely old and mechanical in the Sunday School. Matter is either ungraded or improperly graded. There is a noxious precocity cult that produces spiritual impatience. High words that are understood injure the mind. The catechetical method he calls a curse, and compares other Sunday School methods with "soup diluted with water." We are in the age of a materialism of memory of things not understood. There are incessant lessons of untruthfulness. The child takes much literally that he at once sees that the teacher does not believe. The sense of truth is gravely important in the Sunday School with its antiquated methods, its mechanized matter, its insistence upon things which adults do not believe, the distinct theological ideas and methods, so that in its training of the young the church now represents the most extreme of all reactionary influences against new educational methods, and that in a field of the utmost importance. The intellectual honesty of the teacher often suffers. The sense of reality is weakened so that religion is no longer actual, but a falsetto thing. God is an autocrat, etc.

Positively the author would begin instruction of Christianity with the development or the assumption of a high moral ideal or a sense of honor and allow the children to realize how far below that ideal they fall, and point out to them at once the motives for living up to the best within them and show them sources of consolation when they fail. Children belong in the heavenly kingdom. Religion is not a matter solely between the soul and God, but the element of social and communal right and justice comes in. The vicarious element in Jesus' suffering really springs from a sense of solidarity. One cannot live one's own life out independently of this. Religious instruction should be Christocentric and, with older children, independent of the Resurrection. Much that we have thought history must be recognized as only parable. Self-denial must be always taught, etc.

After these general considerations addressed to the teacher, a methodic section follows. Everything must be adjusted to the age and the individual. Religion is teachable only somewhat in the sense in which music is. It rests for the young upon a sensual basis. A religious tone of mind perhaps influences children even before they are born. The child's soul is very active and the paragon of religion may easily be extirpated. There should be no devotional mechanism. Little children should accustom themselves to, at least, prayer and song in the church, and all instruction should have an element of mystery. The feeling and attitude of the parents toward religion is far more important than anything which they can teach, but every mother should teach religion at least at the bedside. The wonder stories should be told. If this has not been done the Sunday School is liable to lack foundations.

School training the writer divides into three stages. The lowest should begin with a continuation of the mother's method—free narratives of Bible stories, always with a spirit of intimate devotion with no reference to the critical standpoint even for miracles, but some attempt to enrich the religious memory. In the next stage, too, the tone of feeling is far more important than reflection or even the thought content. This is the age of curiosity which should be fed with the greatest amount of new Bible matter, but still with no critique of miracles. Concentration in general formulæ should be avoided and there should be no confessions of faith. There should be abundance of song. In the upper stage the history of the Testaments should be surveyed as wholes and perhaps prophetism should now be the central point. There should be a connected picture of Jesus' life, not as a vicarious sufferer. Miracles should be treated rather as parables and there should always be an attempt to sift out the religious kernel from the mythic shell. This should be the initiation into the critical method. It needs courage as well as foresight. Biblical readers are desirable, but without introductions. We should not make semitheologians and there should be no systematic instruction in either belief or morals.

In confirmation classes there must be great care to transcend all differences of sect and the communion service should be simple and memorial, confirmation, initiation to a religious association, but there should be no act of individual confession or vows or oaths. Here alone there might be a little catechism taught, but a devotional atmosphere should pervade all, and everything should have a subjective aspect. There should be no regimentation or inspection and no stated examinations, but the teacher should record some sense of the pupil's religious and moral

progress. For higher religious training there should be religious history, and something about that of dogma, and great care not to insist upon anything that the soul cannot accept with great heartiness. Often the stupidest teachers inculcate those things most abhorrent to the natural understanding, while the ideal condition would be that a teacher should impart matter that is foreign to the natural mind somewhat in proportion to his own talents. The Christian associations for young men and women are criticised. Growing sexuality needs great attention. In the training of adults there should be less appeal to feeling, to mood, and to femininity, and more to manliness, scholarship, common sense and intellect. Apologetic preaching and teaching should be far more direct and candid. The pulpit and religious teachers generally must not be too careful to spare the modes of belief of those who have grown old in conservative forms. They have duties to the young and to the future. It is the weak who rule in the church. The need of truth is far greater than the need of peace and quiet. What is wanted is a new, vigorous, and psychological apologetics as a mode of commending and enforcing religion upon adult minds.

Down in the Dark Continent, by JAMES STEWART. Fleming H. Revell Co., New York, 1903. pp. 400.

"Paganism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity are now competing for the Dark Continent," says this missionary, who desired broader views in his own field. Paganism springs from a natural and not an evil root, which can neither be eradicated nor condemned. Mohammedanism came out of Arabia as a protest against idolatry. Its successes in Africa have been great. It is difficult to realize the vigor and intensity of this religion. "Its truths are massive, simple, authoritative, difficult to disprove or discredit. The moral nature of man responds to them." Its frequent calls to prayer recognize the control of the visible by the invisible. The Koran "which is more to the Mohammedan than the Bible is to the Christian is the nearest approach to Christianity that has been presented to the nations of the east." Polytheism, sorcery and human sacrifices instantly give way to it. "A general moral elevation is very marked." "The natives begin for the first time in their history to dress, and that neatly. Squalid filth is replaced by scrupulous cleanliness; hospitality becomes a religious duty, drunkenness instead of being the rule becomes a comparatively rare exception; polygamy, though allowed by the Koran, is not a common practice, chastity is looked upon as one of the highest virtues; idleness is regarded as degrading and industry as the reverse; justice is secured by a written code." In addition to this quotation from Bosworth Smith, the author adds the following: "It is melancholy to contrast with these widespread and beneficent influences of Mohammedanism the little that has been done for Africa by the Christian nations." Stewart asks, "Why do not Christian missions produce among the pagan tribes like beneficial results. Mohammedanism has forty millions of adherents in Africa, Christianity less than one." He answers that Mohammedanism has been thirteen years at work in the east and eight hundred in the west, and the Christians barely a century, that Christianity produces all these effects, that it takes a greater change to make a Christian. But there was Christianity in Africa not long after the day of Pentecost, and here Augustine and many of the fathers lived. Stewart commends the Mohammedans from whom, he says, he has learned lessons in self denial, courage and devotion, has found many men in Islam who are better than their creed. Réclus thinks the spread of Mohammedanism "the most notable event in the history of Africa since the fall of Carthage. Its simple creed, its missionary zeal, its cohesion, and its numbers conquer where Christianity fails." The Christian missionary denies intermarriage; the Mohammedan approves it. In describing the different missions the writer commends the Hermannsburg communists, also the German missionaries, who are required to have a good knowledge of the vernacular before they were fully recognized.

In the last paragraph on the training of the missionary the writer advocates a radical new plan and wishes this chapter to be read "as the sad cry of a man whose missionary life is ending; whose life has been full of splendid opportunities which might have been better improved, and which has always been full of mistakes which might have been avoided." No stranger discovers by intuition the best ways of presenting the great message. The intending missionary must study comparative religions and the history, customs, and condition of the people where he is laboring,

and it possible begin the study of their language. Now he often goes abroad unable to distinguish with any accuracy the members of even the great religions one from the other, assuming all heathens to be in general alike. Customs, too, must be studied. Many go to this work "with a preparation that is simply deplorable. He often has to grope blindly in the darkness with the almost inevitable result that for the first few years he may hinder as well as help the great cause he serves." Rome does better at her propaganda. It is a bad beginning to attack customs essential to the native not essentially immoral. Even wife purchase and indulgence in native beers should not bar from church membership.

Above all this author postulates a new kind of missionary magazine, well edited, and not "in the self laudatory and narrow-minded style" now in vogue. Boards circulate missionary literature with undue anxiety for immediate results. Their reports are often anodyne. A general missionary year book of all the societies in Christendom is needed, a little on the plan of the statesman's year book.

The author thinks with C. H. Pearson that we may soon "see the globe girdled with a continuous zone of the black and yellow races no longer too weak for aggression or under tutelage, but independent or practically so in government, monopolizing the trade of their own region and circumscribing the industry of Europe." We must, at least, see to it that the African race with its enormous vitality is not further deteriorated by contact with civilization, and no longer be victims of mere missionary platitudes, so as to remove such reproaches as those of Miss Kingsley who says, "The Protestant English missionaries have had most to do with rendering the African useless. The missionary-made man is the curse of the west coast, etc." A new Africa is arising and it is to be a wonderful continent.

The Philippines and the Far East, by HOMER C. STUNTZ. Eaton & Mains, New York, 1904. pp. 514.

The author dwells through no less than ten chapters upon missionary work in the Philippines. He finds three peculiar hindrances—the tendency to formalism on the part of the people, the vicious example of "worldly and godless Americans," and the language barrier. "Form and ceremony have been the whole religion of the Christianized Filipinos so long that it is with the utmost difficulty that the essentially spiritual character of true religion is grasped by the Filipino mind. "The people are ready to be baptized, to read their Bibles, to unite with our Churches, and to comply with our outward requirements; but in too many cases they are not clearly converted as we understand that term. There is great need, he says, of spiritual regeneration and a sense of the conviction of sin. "Those Churches which are receiving members most rapidly are face to face with this difficulty in a grave form. Out of eight thousand Americans in Manila not more than five hundred can be found in the American congregation on Sunday, despite the excellent character of the preaching and music, the fine location, the wide advertisements. Again, there is a spirit of extreme worldliness. "Men who always went to church at home never go here. Those who were most scrupulous about the right observance of the Sabbath, here are found at the Sunday races, etc." "The society life of Manila seems given over to bridge whist, dancing, Sunday games and fetes." Again, "It will forever remain a mystery to the thoughtful why the military government admitted shiploads of liquor in the beginning." "One word from the military authorities would have made it impossible for liquor to land. But it was not spoken. The annual license was fixed at the utterly ridiculous figure of \$4. Saloons sprang up on every hand. Soldiers lay sodden drunk on the public roads. Our national honor was dragged in the very dirt of the streets." The civil government changed all this. In Manila saloons must now pay from six to eight hundred dollars for license, close at eleven, remain closed Sunday, and glass must be so set that the bar can be seen from the street. The American saloon has been introduced with all its attractiveness as a new factor in the life of the city. The natives had intoxicants of their own make, "but they are not an intemperate people. They are seldom seen drunk. The habit of drinking to intoxication is an American habit here." "Concubinage is a terribly common sin among Americans. The system of contract marriages which grew up under the excessive demands of the friars for marriage fees has lent itself to this evil." "Gambling is in the very atmosphere of the East. Our countrymen fall victims to it with fatal facility," and yet "the American is not

all bad. It is not true, as some say, that we are imparting all our vices and none of our virtues to the Filipinos; but there is enough truth in the statement to sadden every one who loves righteousness."

Das Zeitalter des Sonnengottes, von LEO FROBENIUS. Erster Band. George Reimer, Berlin, 1904. pp. 420.

This author has already published a book on the views of the world by primitive people, and in this work, which covers in part the field occupied by Eduard Stuckens, large treatises on astral myths he traces out the stadia of sun worship as found among many races in all the great divisions of the earth. He believes that until recently the effects of migrations have been somewhat limited and that many myths of similar form have had independent, indigenous origin. He is interested in the elementary thoughts of man, and that they do coincide in people widely separated bears testimony to the unity of the race. On the other hand it cannot be denied that some myths of local origin have pervaded nearly the whole earth. In an interesting group of chapters the writer finds that the sun god inhabited the body of a fish, especially a whale, and sometimes a crocodile. Very many forms of these myths among very many races are given. In another book he treats of the myth of the immaculate conception which he also associates with sun worship. This he finds in Oceanica, America, Asia, Africa and elsewhere. Some forms connect the angel and the maiden directly. Others connect the latter with a swan. An interesting section is devoted to solar love life or the world myths of heaven and earth, the former usually the father, and the latter the mother. Often the sun and moon are a married pair. In another variant of the same theme is found among the Pleiad myths. Another book is devoted to the natural history of ogres, and giants, and this often connects with crocodile dragon forms. The intersusception of mythic elements with each other is remarkable. The theft of fire, man eaters, orion, the eating of the soul, of stars and constellations, the sin flood, fate goddesses, the Orpheus legends—all are more or less bound up with each other. On the whole it would appear, if this author's theory is correct, that the sun in its course through the heavens has been one of the most potent and formative of all agencies in shaping the soul of man.

Naturbetrachtung und Naturerkenntnis im Altertum, von FRANZ STRENZ. Leopold Voss, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 168.

This writer follows in general in the wake of Biese. He adds, however, something on oriental views of nature, but he does not, like Biese, bring his views to the present time. He lays special stress upon the therapeutic basis of the views of nature by orientalists and upon their practical study of it. His emphasis, however, unlike Biese, is not laid upon literature but upon philosophy. He takes up the early Ionics, the Eleatics, Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the later schools, ending with Neoplatonism. The comparison of this work with Biese suggests the rather sombre reflection that the literary conceptions which Biese describes are really more suggestive than those of the philosophers.

Das Feuer in der Natur, im Kultus und Mythos, im Völkerteleben, von WILHELM WACHTER. A. Hartlebens, Vienna, 1904. pp. 166.

The writer first treats of fire and its general functions in nature. In the next part he traces it in cults, myths, religion and lastly in the life of people. He gives very vivid descriptions of the probable condition of man before the control of fire was understood, although he admits it is very doubtful whether to-day there is any savage race so low as not to understand it. He shows how after this control was attained man became far more independent of locality, could encamp almost where he chose, and especially was able to penetrate into the north. He describes many antique ceremonies of fire-worshippers, digests many quaint myths and ceremonials, makes the reader feel sympathetic with the attitude of fire-worshippers. The book is not encumbered by references although the author is very familiar with the very widely diffused literature bearing upon the subject. He is also very conscious of the atavistic propensity to revere fire in modern man. Naturally his view is rather poetic and genetic than scientific. It is quite remarkable how, if we compared a work like this with the study recently made by Browne and Hall on children's feelings towards fire, we have many a remarkable parallel thus brought out between the child and the race.

Politics and Religion in Ancient Israel, by J. C. TODD. The Macmillan Co., London, 1904. pp. 334.

The Bible was never more studied or less read than at the present day. This is especially true of the Old Testament. Modern researches have made it a collection of possibilities to the layman, while to the scholar it was never so rich a mine. Suppose, says this author, that at some future time, perhaps 5000 A. D., the literature of England became lost while that of Scotland survived and had been annotated for centuries, while England was known only by Scotch allusion. Suddenly the literature of England is unearthed by excavation and the learned world is rent in two. The new school declare that Scotland's true place is now known and is subordinate to England while the old school insist that Scotland's importance was its own and the discovery of ten Englands would affect nothing. Substitute now our Bible for Scotland and Assyria for England and we have the rival claims of Bible and Babel in Delitzsch's catchy phrase. Todd attempts to present the results of scholarship in this field in a popular way. No book has yet appeared that does this in so masterly and condensed a way. This book should be in the hands of every lay-student of the Old Testament, which is essentially the epos of the fall of Jerusalem, 586 B. C., the sad note of which rings through it from start to finish and is its key. Samaria, greater yet, had already fallen and would have been unknown, great as it was, had Jerusalem not caught up the tradition. The conquerors did not give culture, like the Greeks, or law, like the Romans, to their victims, but only reeked red ruin. It was a slow death lasting two hundred years. The best starting point, the author thinks, is lamentations for the fall of Zion, the city that was only the citizen's greater self.

In the beginning of Israel's history we see a wandering tribe driven by famine, settling on the borders of a great empire, and slowly made serfs, drudging on vast public works. About the fourteenth century B. C., they broke away to their old pneumatic life, wandering for a generation, with only the primal interest of war and religion. Slowly they conquered the Canaanite tribes and their little tribal god, Yahveh, grew as the tribe extended its organization. The earliest worship was sacrifice of two parts—the blood rite and the feast. Holiness was first essentially a taboo for other uses placed upon priests, knives, and basins used in these rites. Occasionally there were human sacrifices. In this worship harlots in the sacred places were also holy. Over against Yahveh, the tribal and war god, stood the nature religions of the Canaanites, who regarded God as the husband of the land and the father of its crops. Thus Baalim stood for separation of village from village, agriculture and the harvest home, wine, sex, and luxury, while Yahveh stood for unity of the league, excitement of battle, self-restraint, more nomadic life. As Israel overshadowed the Baal tribes its god became the God of the Covenant with them. Then came the kingdom of Saul and his successors, the Assyrian invasion, prophecy, exile, return, and the collection of literature, etc. But we cannot follow this pedagogic masterpiece in detail.

Zionism and Anti-Semitism, by MAX NORDAU and GUSTAV GOTTHEIL. Scott-Thaw Company, New York, 1904. pp. 76.

Nordau here very frankly meets the criticism and even the ridicule which his fellow Jews have poured out upon the Zion movement. He holds, however, that those who desire to do so should be encouraged to enter heart and soul into the movement and even to cultivate the soil in Palestine; that it would strengthen the Jewish self-respect and national consciousness, but that all should be done on a large scale.

The Ethics of the Greek Philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, by JAMES H. HYSLOP. Chas. M. Higgins & Co., New York, 1903. pp. 333. Pr. \$2.

This is a very remarkable book, for the form of which we presume the author himself is not responsible. Its core is a single lecture delivered by him which has doubtless been amplified. It is incisive and clear like all the writer's works, but the curious thing is the hundreds of pages of padding that precede and follow it, together with the many quaint old pictures of the philosophers, of the library of Columbia University, the house of Mrs. Ole Bull where some other lectures in the series were given. There are many extracts from Plato and Aristotle and some fifty pages are given to a life of Socrates.

Buddhism. Its History and Literature. By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. 2nd ed. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1904. pp. 230.

These six lectures discuss religious theories in India before Buddhism, an account of the authorities on which our knowledge of Buddhism is based, notes on the founder's life, his secret (the sign, the path, and the fetters), the wheel of life and Nirvana, and lastly some notes on the history of Buddhism. Anything this author writes in a field where he has such wide knowledge cannot fail to be interesting. This work adds something even to his own previous "History and Literature of Buddhism," but more in the first two lectures and the last than in the three devoted to the life and secrets of Buddhism. Only an expert can pronounce upon some of the points here discussed. Throughout the book there are certain rather painful notes—one, the repeated intimation that, because the literature of Buddhism is as yet so partially unearthed, our conclusions and, indeed, most previous and all early literature on the subject is probably misleading; second, the repeated invitation for funds to carry on the great work. These, no doubt, are one of the greatest needs of modern scholarship, but we think appeals of the kind here made are a little out of place in such a course of lectures. Thirdly, in the middle chapters there is a good deal of repetition of the author's previous work and very much material found in many other Buddhistic works accessible even in English, suggesting that the writer was turned aside from his work of editing and translating not without some reluctance on his part. Nevertheless, the author makes here a very important new contribution to the knowledge of all not experts in Sanskrit and Pali literature, and by whom his book is certain to be welcomed with thanks.

The Mystics, Ascetics and Saints of India, by JOHN CAMPBELL OMAN. T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1903. pp. 291.

All religious founders are ascetic. St. Theresa said, "My greatest desire is to suffer." Christianity developed penance as a penalty even for sins repented of. India abounds with the cenobites. The causes that have led to all these institutions are discussed in two of the most interesting chapters of this fascinating book. Some retire in mature years after having exhausted pleasure with a feeling of world weariness. Others, who are weak, seek protection and peace. Troublous times have sent many to the cell and desert. For many the burden of convention has grown too heavy and they follow the road of renunciation and resignation. Great calamities, of which India has had more than her share, tend to the same result. The drouths and famines have often made fasting almost a habit of mind, and well accustomed poverty robs the hermit life of some of its terrors. Again, a despotic government supplemented by excessive over crowding, the enormous limitation to individual ambition which arises from the caste system, the very early maturity of children which often brings morbid fatigue later in life, the deficient energy favored by the very climate and traditions of an un strenuous land, vegetarianism, the fact that the race is itself old and senescent—all these tend to dull stagnation which perhaps even had something to do with the facility of hypnotization which Esdale found here. Mendicancy and beggary in the Occident have a certain charm about them, and its rollicking and careless life is expressed in many a song and proverb.

These are some of the contributing causes that made asceticism such a passionate and national cult in India. The very gods often practiced self torture, and underlying all is the idea that by rigid practices of self immolation mortals can acquire supernatural power which is exactly in proportion to the severity of self-inflicted pain. Indeed the Christian church assumes that Christ's suffering and that of the martyrs laid up treasure, and monkish orders have distributed superfluous merit. Famous saints who have perhaps cut out, roasted and eaten bits of their own flesh gained power over the very gods who became jealous as they subjugated the three worlds. Brahma has been compelled to give great power. Often the power which the ascetic gains is selfish and sometimes vicious. Myths abound in legends of those who, by their austerities, have affected the course of the moon, been enabled to slay their enemies, steal children, compel even Vishnu to manifest himself to their minds, to hurl mortal curses, to create new gods, to ride on fire. Some of these ascetics have not been able to resist temptation and have fallen for a time, to renew the struggle, in some cases, for hundreds and even thousands of years. Although not only the New Testament, but the Old contains many

hints of this idea of power through penance, such as the contest between Moses and the Egyptian magicians, missionaries have great difficulty in understanding the immense scope and persistence of this principle which sometimes distinctly frees the devotee from ethical law.

Der Buddhismus und seine Bedeutung für unser Geistesleben, von ALFRED BERTHOFF. J. C. B. Mohr, Leipzig, 1901. pp. 65.

This professor of theology undertakes a very condensed characterization of Buddhism based largely upon Oldenberg, Hardy, and others, sifting out first the story of Buddha's life, then giving a succinct account of his doctrine, his followers, and coming down to the remarkable work of Bruno Freydkant entitled "Buddha und Christus," which is a Buddhistic apology, the point of which is summed up in the question, "When will the hour come in which Europe, the land of heathen, shall bow under the sign of the white lotus?" which assumes throughout that Buddhism is the religion of the future. He has scant praise for Theodore Schultze, the German Buddhist whom Arthur Pfungst has characterized, who would actually sacrifice the karma and the monastic idea of Buddhism on the one hand, and still less for theosophy or even for esoteric Buddhism on the other. In the second part of this work the writer takes up the salient features of Buddhism one after another, comparing them with Christianity to the latter's great advantage. It seems, indeed, a little singular that a professor of theology can be in the first half of his book so very sympathetic in exposition and so ruthlessly negative in appreciation in the last half of his work.

The History of Philosophy in Islam, by T. J. DE BOER. Tr., by Edward R. Jones, Luzac & Co., London, 1903. pp. 216.

This is the first attempt since that of Munk in 1859 to present a connected history of philosophy in Islam. Very many writers, of course, have covered portions of this field and these authorities have been well used by this author. He first describes ancient Arabia, then the Semitic, Persian, Indian, and especially the Greek influences which were predominant. Under Arab knowledge he discusses grammar, ethics, doctrine, literature and history. The Pythagorean theory and practice was very elaborately developed. So, too, were those of the neo-Platonists and Aristotelians. The latter part of the book is largely taken up with a special account of individuals: Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Maskawaih, Ibn Sina, of whom a new life has just appeared by Devaux, Gazeh, Ibn Roschd (Averroes), Avempace, Abubacer, and a few others. It is certainly a remarkable development from the wild, free, healthy life of the original Bedouin to the culmination of Mohammedan power in not only the political, but in the philosophical and scientific field. If one thing is brought home more plainly than any other to this reader it is, perhaps, the inexcusable neglect of most historians of philosophy in failing to do justice to the great men who figure here.

Muhammad and His Power, by P. DE LACY JOHNSONE. (The World's Epoch-Makers). T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1901. pp. 238.

"Mohammedism is compounded of an eternal truth and a necessary fiction," says Gibbon, viz., that there is only one God and that Mohammed is his prophet. The modern student of comparative religions would hardly be disposed to call the second of these affirmations an entire fiction. The present work describes first the awakening of Arabia before Israel, and, happily for the student, includes not only the story of Mohammed's own life but a general review of his system and a good account of the Quran, also a story of the spread of Islam after the prophet's death.

The Mysteries of Mithra, by FRANZ CUMONT. Tr. by Thomas J. McCormack. Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1903. pp. 239.

This is a condensed, comprehensive, and really fascinating discussion of the influence of Mazdaism on European thought. The religion of the Magi, which was the highest blossom of the genius of Iran, at three periods exerted an immense influence on oriental culture. The first was in Parseeism which left a very distinct impression on Judaism in its formative stage. Again, when the Romans conquered Asia Minor colonies of wise men from the region of Babylon moved west, welding their doctrines with those of the Greeks. The superiority of Mithraic religion over

the early forms of oriental faith was at once seen to be great. It was checked only when it came in contact with Christianity. Each then found with amazement very many similarities and their desperate duel was for the dominion of the world. Mithraism perished not only because it was too encumbered with antiquities, but because its liturgy and theology were too Asiatic in color to suit the Latin spirit. For the converse reason the same battle waged in Persia at the same time resulted in the defeat of Christianity. Manichæism was the third and last assault made by Persia upon the West and the most sanguinary of all. Thus, it appears that Iranian mysteries have at times threatened to almost submerge the Occident and wipe out all Greece and Rome had so laboriously wrought. The Avesta does not give an adequate picture of this faith decked out in all its imagery and liturgy. In an interesting map showing the dissemination of this faith it appears to have been most developed throughout western and southern Germany and in Italy, with some slight representations in Britain, Spain, and even Greece. In Carthage, of course, it thrived, and in general its course of development was westward from its original seat rather than east. Hymns, ceremonials, sacrifices, all symbolic of doctrine. Mythra, the god of help, never invoked in vain, always young and alert, requiring perfect purity, with repeated lustrations to wash away the stains of the soul, resistance to sense being one of the most vivid symbols of the dual conflict between good and evil. The initiates taught a kind of moral astronomy with which a highly developed eschatology was connected and a firm belief in the resurrection of the flesh, a highly elaborated doctrine of sacrifice, and altogether a strange union of polytheistic fable and philosophy, with unsurpassed incitement to prayer and veneration—these constituted the heart of this wondrous cult.

The Religion of the Universe, by J. ALLANSON PICTON. Macmillan & Co., London, 1904. pp. 380.

This ambitious but interesting book discusses faith and paradox, the unknowable as God, revelation, what may be known of God, evil, including pain, death and sin, the everlasting gospel, Christianity, experimental religion, eternal life, worship and the church. His book, instead of being written in the spirit of Herbert Spencer, to whose memory, as the first true reconciler of religion and science, it is dedicated, breathes the spirit of fervid religious life almost like that of the camp meeting. He urges that there is nothing essential in the Methodist experience which the Pantheist may not share. The latter has a wider universe, but his faith is not less. Emotion and sentiment must undergo transformation with that of creeds. Eternal life does not mean personal immortality. Man is not a lonesome mortal god. The divine in him is imperishable in part and whole, but continuous identity is not assured to the part. The soul as finite is only a succession of phenomena. There is no real unity between its activities or between the consciousness of the child and adult, but this unity is only in the manifestation of the everlasting within us. Man is otherwise a dual, multiplex, and merely phenomenal being. There are no individual rights against the universe, even those of justice. The amiable desire for compensation in another world would practically amount to a change of person. Unhealed sorrow is a very exceptional thing in the world, yet we do not wholly die, but meet when we merge in God. As to the church, it should not be abolished but further evolved. As loyalty to the whole of which we are parts, religion demands expression. Pantheism is not inconsistent with prayer, but here, too, we need reconstruction. The tone of pantheistic worship is Wordsworthian. We often can glimpse the infinite even through superstition. The Bible, thus, has worth even in its legends, and yet more valuable are the Psalms and Prophets, and God is the highest. Hence, the meaning and sense of sacraments, too, needs reconstruction in the impending rehabilitation of worship which is now in danger of impoverishing the life of the multitude and committing "frauds against the souls of children." We can never revive the old faith, but by the judicious liberty of prophesying can reinterpret its antiquated forms. The clergy are generally, although with exceptions, not sincere and have a cheap conception of honesty. This has made unreality invade religion so that truth cannot support morals. Thus we need a new cleansing of the temple. Everywhere, however, true spiritual reality survives destructive criticism of alleged outward facts. The appearance of man was not a definite event and brought no change in the laws of the world. The blessedness of perfection lies

not in any reward. There are limits to Christian resignation. The resurrection of Jesus is itself unhistorical, but will remain a telling story. Paul's conversion was a revelation of the subliminal self. He was fascinated with the idea of resurrection which symbolized his own change. Mohammedanism is the most unitarian of all faiths. The essence of the religion of the universe is found in all the great religions, but best in Christianity. Paul's strange transmutations of Pharisaic traditions into a new theology may be abandoned, but not loyalty to Paul's moral teaching. All inspirations tending to evolution are good. The Pantheist, in fine, retains all the spiritual inheritance of Catholic, Anglican or Methodist, and is in accord with the devoutest experimental religion.

The Goal of the Universe; or, The Travail of the World's Saviour. By S. W. KÖELLE. Elliot Stock, London, 1903. pp. 399.

The religion of the Bible is one of restoration, the central figure of which is the Creator become the Saviour. The restoration began immediately after the fall, but sin could only be removed by a divine act, persuading the will and affecting its recovery to right choices. The chief topics treated are the early promise of the Saviour, the God-man as a fact of history, the incarnation, Jesus' early life and public ministry, and the post-existence of the Son of Man, his descent into Hades, the resurrection, ascension, reign till the day of judgment, the universal extent and spiritual nature of this reign, the millennium, the continued work of the ascended prophet, priest and king; the day of judgment, the restitution of all things, Christ's resignation of the Christocratic Kingdom, and the final goal of the universe—God all-in-all. The author has availed himself, on the whole, but very little of the resources of modern scholarship in this field.

Evidence for a Future Life, by GABRIEL DELANNE. Tr. and ed. by H. A. Dallas. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1904. pp. 264.

This book, translated and condensed from a larger one in French, is sufficiently startling to furnish us with nothing less than a new proof of the immortality of the soul based upon magnetism, the witness of mediums and spirits to the existence of the perisprit, the double, psychic organization after death, spirit photography, primordial matter, materialization, etc. All matter may be in a liquid, gaseous, ethereal, or psychic state. The conclusion of the whole matter is summed up in the following articles: (1) Human beings possess a twofold mode of manifestation—the physical and the psychic body. (2) The latter when separated from the former reproduces the identical appearance of the physical organism. (3) The psychic manifestations are not dependent on the physical body. When the psyche is completely exteriorized the body is quite inert. (4) The apparition can produce various degrees of materialization, from a simple vision to that of a concrete object which walks, talks, and acts upon matter. (5) The ethereal body can be photographed. (6) It can leave impressions on soft substances and in moulds. (7) During earthly life the psychic organism can perceive sensations otherwise than by the physical organs of sense. (8) The psychic organism produces not only the external semblance of the physical body, but the internal also. (9) Death does not destroy the soul, which persists with all its faculties and which possesses an invisible, imponderable organism built upon biological laws as is the physical body.

Ueber die Letzte Dinge, von OTTO WEININGER. Wilhelm Braumüller, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 183.

OTTO Weininger was born April 3, 1880, and died October 4, 1903, by a shot in the breast from his own hand in the room where Beethoven died, where he had spent the night. He was precocious, tall, slender, and as he grew up developed epileptic symptoms. His interests early turned to philosophy and he most admired Kant and Plato. Without being a performer on any instrument he had most extraordinary susceptibility to music and also to nature. The key to his life and death was a unique and intense dualism such as perhaps no modern mind has developed. His view of the world may be roughly sketched as follows: Every man contains something on the one hand of nothing, chaos, devil, and on the other of the all, cosmos or God. The battle between these in the soul gives life all its meaning. Every negative makes possible a corresponding affirmative and every bit of cosmos in the soul involves danger of a corresponding chaos. God incarnated himself in man in order to

become conscious of himself in his battle against nothing. The two chief forms of nothing are crime and insanity over against goodness and wisdom. All knowledge is atonement for guilt. All real self knowledge is a spur to willing the good. Logic and ethics belong together.

More specifically those who feel inclined to insanity are chiefly drawn to problems of logic and epistemology. With the danger of insanity logical matters become problematical and even the simplest thought is doubted. The instinctive certainty and necessity of the sound mind is transformed into a cloud of thought possibilities. Thus, not to be swamped, such minds have to seek and invoke the most general principles. The greater the field of danger the more comprehensive the logical defences. Thus neurasthenics are absorbed in logical and epistemological problems which have no meaning to perfectly sane people. Wherever there is danger knowledge is necessary and this is even truer within than without. With mental instability everything becomes more and more problematic.

Just as thought becomes cloudy for those inclined to mental alienation so the feeling for worth and value is obscured and becomes problematical for the criminal, even the value of life and truth. For those who are not developed criminals but only feel inclinations to evil along with those to good, whose better ego seeks to affirm itself against temptation, the aphorism of which Weininger was most fond, namely, "every true problem is also true guilt," is truest. Where the battle between good and evil is hottest the highest illumination is necessary to prevent the obnubilation of a feeling of worth. Where everything is questioned there everything must be established and the ultimate source of morals sought out. The more darkness the greater light is necessary, so the saint is developed from the criminal or evil man. With base propensities higher ethical demands are made upon the soul, and such a dualist being will see evil where a more normal man does not.

The greater the danger of nothingness the more glorious the being that overcomes it. The greatest men are those who conquer the greatest enemy. Thus, genius is not a form of either insanity or crime, but the completest overcoming of one or the other or both. Perhaps Weininger was influenced by the biological law that toxins stimulate antitoxins which destroy them, and that disease, death or recovery are the expressions of the stages of this conflict. Under this analogy genius would have acquired the greatest degree of immunity for it would have overcome most. Where those predisposed to neuroticism and vice have also the highest moral impulses we can best see this process, and how, if the good wins, either the saint, the genius, or both emerge. One might almost say that as genius is converted lunacy so sainthood is converted criminality.

It is a little more difficult to understand his conception that everything that is interesting has an end in itself, as Kant's categorical and imperative would make conscience, or how he uses the term "functionalism" to answer the question how experience is possible. Functionalism within probably means the laws of consciousness and freedom.

Weininger's biographer states that he was in a high degree inclined to be a criminal, and yet had intense moral strivings. "He knew all evil well" and yet he had intense love of truth and an almost saintly goodness. He could never without pain tread upon grass in a meadow nor have others do so with him. If he gave to a beggar he took off his hat to him that he might not shame him. He wrote shortly before his death that if he conquered it would be the greatest victory that man ever won. His power and also the danger were great and he killed himself because he could no longer withstand, or "in order not to be obliged to kill another." Everything he wrote and did, therefore, he conceived to be a battle against nothing. He was very sensuous in his disposition, and after he had written his book he declared that it meant a sentence of death either to the book or its author. Ethics is never given man freely and good men have a very superficial ethics. Few people came nearer feeling that all evil in the world was his own guilt, or had a deeper conception of the near death of the soul. All pain is guilt, personal or assumed, and he divided men into those who either assumed guilt and suffered or those who threw it upon others. He found it hard to distinguish between hereditary and individual sin.

When his only book expressing these ideas was finished he declared there were three possibilities for him, either the gallows, suicide, or a future so brilliant that

he dared not think of it. The biographer mentions that rather curiously there was at Vienna a partial eclipse of the moon that ended just at the moment his body was put into the earth.

No account of this unique personality is complete without mention of his symbolism. A sunset was the fall into sin; fire meant evil and annihilation, a river the Apollonian and the sea the Dionysian principle. Everything visible was a symbol of an ether and psychic reality and full of ethical potents like a materialized idea. Animals are all symbols of criminality; plants neurasthenic phenomena. Thus everything visible reveals an invisible metaphysical world, light meaning virtue. The deep sea fauna were incarnations of evil. He did not justify his extreme anthropocentric view, but was content to assume that man is a microcosm and to give fancy free rein to interpret his most extraordinary sensitiveness to all natural phenomena. His dualism, thus, was somewhat different from the modern parallelism, for he was interested only in ethical dualism and most opposed to views like those of Reelsche for whom there is no good and evil arising from deep grounds, but only more or less evolution or causes that favor or hinder it.

Rational Religion, by H. THEODORE KNIGHT. Rivingtons, London, 1903. pp. 287.

This volume reprints addresses, mostly to men, in which the author attempts to exhibit something of the higher criticism. He treats of science in the Bible, miracles, socialism and the Paternoster, and advent doctrines. Death is regarded as a moral condition, judgment as a national fact, hell a spiritual atmosphere, and heaven as a civic reality. The appendixes are devoted to a critical analysis of the Hexateuch, nature and the supernatural, and modern criticism of the New Testament.

System des religiösen Materialismus. I. Wissenschaft der Seele, von H. THODES VAN VELZEN. O. R. Reisland, Leipzig, 1903. pp. 467.

After discussing the relations of psychology to other sciences the author discusses sense images and their influence, and ideas of feeling and their influence. A curious section is entitled, "Ideas which can be subordinated to consciousness," as distinct from ideas connected with thought and will. In the third part similarities and differences of psychic activities are discussed, and then follow in order: appearances in our activity and their origin, the soul and death. This volume is entitled "Psychology," and it will be interesting to know how these views are connected with religion, the treatment of which is to follow in another work.

Herders Theorie von der Religion und den religiösen Vorstellungen, von RUDOLF WIELANDT. C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn, Berlin, 1904. pp. 127.

This brochure is due to the reviving interest in Herder who contained so much that is modern. First his general characteristics are discussed, then the psychological presuppositions of his theory of religion, and then the theory in itself in its various aspects. Especially interesting is the section devoted to Herder's indebtedness to earlier thinkers from Leibnitz down, especially to the English moralists, to Rousseau, Hume, Kant, Semler, De Wette and Schleiermacher. The whole is appropriately published in connection with the anniversary of Herder's death, December 18, 1903.

The Higher Life. A Psychological Study, by MADAME DE MEISSNER. 1904. pp. 40.

This little work is published in behalf of the Red Cross Society of Russia and in memory of the author's son who was a soldier. The author illustrates an interesting and attractive type of mystic piety.

The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte, by EDWARD CAIRD. 2nd ed. James Maclehose & Sons, Glasgow, 1893. pp. 210.

The first chapter of this work gives a general account of Comte's philosophy and of his idea of a social system founded on the decay of theology. The second chapter is entitled "The negative side of Comte's philosophy." His view is opposed both to individualism and socialism. It is charged as a defect that Comte was unconscious of the categories that guided his thought. He recognized the need of substitutes for theology and metaphysics. He also found want of harmony between the intellect and the heart and would subject the former to the latter. This, of course, causes the direct antagonism of thinkers of the Hegelian type, and so Professor Caird involves Comte in many kinds of contradictions, inconsistencies, and

biguities, inadequacies, impossibilities, shortages here and surplusages there, seeks to show that his best ideas are in real agreement with those of modern metaphysics, etc. Thinkers like Comte and Caird represent almost opposite poles both of position and method. Comte was a genius with amazing insights and one of the most fertile and suggestive minds in the whole history of philosophy. Moreover, he has the great superiority of trying to make his system practical instead of priding himself, like most metaphysicians, in keeping as far aloof from common sense reality as possible. This book of Caird's does not attempt to give us what we so greatly need, a concise and abridged statement of all Comte's salient positions in the phrases of his school. Nor does it attempt any complete or general refutation of the system as a whole, but rather it selects here and there points which seem to collide either with those of Professor Caird or with the author and magnifies the opposition. Is this method and is this kind of book honest? Is it dignified? Does it comport with the new scientific method and spirit now entering this field?

Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History, by ANTONIO LABRIOLA. Tr. by Charles H. Kerr. Charles H. Kerr & Co., Chicago, 1904. pp. 246.

Feuerbach. The Roots of the Socialist Philosophy, by FREDERICK ENGELS. Tr. with critical introd. by Austin Lewis. Charles H. Kerr & Co., Chicago, 1903. pp. 133.

Labriola's book anticipates the jubilee of the Communist Manifesto of 1848 which marks the advent of this movement into history. The first part is entitled "The Materialistic Conception of History," and assumes that everywhere civilization is now developing a class antagonism between those who work and produce wealth and those who do not, so that each state comprises two nations in one. The ideals of the former working class of the reign of equality and happiness and the different forms which these ideals have taken in the minds of leading writers of the half century under review are stated. The economic factor of history explains most of it. The rest is largely verbiage and ideology. The conceptions of Engels and Marx that underlie economic structures of the whole need to be supplemented by understanding "those concrete and precise states of mind" which alone can make us really know the plebeians of Rome, the artisans of Florence, the peasants of France, the serf of Russia, and this would constitute social psychology and free us from mere phrase makers. To effect this emancipation is the historic mission of the modern proletariat. The author and his translator, Austin Lewis, agree in regarding Feuerbach's exaltation of humanitarianism as religion as one of the motives of the new socialism. He discovered the material foundations of the religious world and his theory would have led to a bourgeois society instead of to a new associated humanity. He failed to see that religious feeling is itself a product of society.

The Little Book of Life After Death, by GUSTAV THEODOR FECHNER. Tr. fr. the German by Mary C. Wadsworth. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1904. pp. 108.

The translation of this weird and charming little book is a matter of congratulation. Fechner left his mark upon the world not only by his work upon the famous psycho-physic law that bears his name, but in literature by certain half humorous, half philosophic essays, of which this is one, published more than half a century ago under the name of Dr. Mises. Here he gives his fancy free scope, somewhat as Plato, not only on myths but philosophy. Here he does not attempt to prove immortality, but assumes it and seeks to make it intelligible by many bold and original analogies. Professor William James writes a brief but characteristically interesting introduction.

Zur Psychologie der vorerilischen Prophetie in Israel, von ROBERT KURTZ. Bruno Feigenspan. pp. 102. Pr. 2m.

The scope of this work may be indicated as follows. First the author outlines the general spiritual life of Israel as seen in its moral and religious status and as represented by the predecessors of the prophets. He next describes the inner development of the latter, how they slowly matured to the consciousness of their calling and of having a revelation; the inner opposition between the prophets and the people and their sense of the purposiveness of their work. Then the religious idea is presented to us in its conflict with the spirit of the people. The popular activity of the prophets and the second legation and the *facit* prophecy are described.

The Religious Education Association. Proceedings of the Second Annual Convention, Philadelphia, March 24, 1904. Executive Office of the Association, Chicago, 1904. pp. 649.

The second meeting of this association was, we know, one of unusual interest. We here have a chance to glimpse the best that the religious leaders of this country think and feel about this great theme and those most nearly connected with it. The addresses are grouped as religious experience, education in the home, the Bible in education, including colleges as well as theological seminaries, churches and pastors, Sunday School, elementary, secondary, private, and normal schools, young people's societies, library, press, correspondence, summer assemblies, religious art and music. On all these topics there are addresses generally by those most competent to speak—addresses, however, probably often somewhat abridged.

Das Metakrit in der neueren Ethik mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Fr. Nietzsche, R. Wagner und L. Tolstoi, von WILLY GIESSLER. C. A. Kaemmerer & Co., Halle a. S., 1904. pp. 178.

It seems almost as if the Nietzsche literature had no end. Here we have first a description of the earliest philosophical studies of sympathy and pity by Spinoza, then by Hume, Adam Smith, Montaigne, Helvetius, La Rochefoucauld, Diderot, Rousseau, Wolff, Mendelssohn, Lessing, Kant, Fichte, Herbart, Schopenhauer, Wagner, Tolstoi, Feuerbach, Hartmann, Paulsen, and Wundt.

Naturwissenschaft und Ethik, von LEHMANN-HOHENBERG. Hermann Costenoble, Jena, 1904. pp. 160. Pr. 2m.

These essays are designed to promote the further development of religion, especially in its relations to what the author calls a new art of statesmanship. After describing the culture movements of the day and the Emperor's brief to Admirable Hollmann, the author proceeds to criticise the latter. In later essays he discusses the world riddle and its solution, social politics, the development history of thought in the present social physics, national popular education, and the further development of German law.

Beiträge zur religiösen Psychologie: Psychobiologie und Gefühl. Von G. VORBRÖDT. A. Deichert, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 173.

The motto is "All (also natural science) is yours and you are Christ's." The writer first discusses psychobiology in theology and the eternal life as the centre of Christianity. This has two forms—religious and biological. He then passes to the discussion of the psychology of religious feeling. Its methods are genetic and descriptive. Especially interesting is his account of the Fides Historica and of the feeling of assensus and fiducia. The style and, indeed, the content of the book is rambling and incoherent, but it is pervaded by many keen insights.

The Supremacy of Jesus, by JOSEPH HENRY CROOKER. American Antiquarian Association, Boston, 1904. pp. 186.

This volume is incisively written and treats of five topics: the historical position of Jesus, Jesus and Gospel criticism; a new appreciation of Jesus; a master of inner life, the authenticity of Jesus. The author is evidently more thinker than scholar. His suggestive pages often shine with light, but the marvel is that the writer has so often thought his way independently to conclusions that more technical scholars have reached by more exacting and belabored methods, while other results of the latter, which would come precisely in our author's line, are ignored.

The Simple Life, by CHARLES WAGNER. Tr. fr the French by Mary Louise Hendee. McClure, Phillips & Co., New York, 1904. pp. 193.

This charming little book which has been of late given such great prominence and vogue by President Roosevelt is most timely and opportune. Our life is too complex. We need to revert from the mercenary spirit, from notoriety and the inglorious good to simple thoughts, speech, duties, needs, pleasures and beauty. We need this in the life of the home and of the world, in education and in the intercourse of men. All this is here told simply and effectively.

The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Study of the Growth of Religious Consciousness. By EDWIN DILLER STARBUCK, Ph. D. London, 1899. pp. xx-423.

That most conversions occur in early life when the mind is plastic has long been known. Some of the characteristic differences in respect to religious life between childhood, youth, and maturity have also been commonplaces of every day observation. But what particular year or period of years is most favorable to conversion, and why should there be any specially favorable time at all? What common elements exist in religious growth of different types? What place do adolescent religious phenomena in general occupy in the total progress of the child-mind and the child-body toward maturity? These are the chief questions that Starbuck's "Psychology of Religion" undertakes to answer, though a multitude of subordinate questions gathers about the study. The aim is the important one of tracing the line of normal religious growth in the individual from infancy to maturity so as to show the actual place of religion among the facts and forces of individual human life. The purpose is wider than to study adolescence as such; adolescence is chosen as the viewpoint because, as the transition-period between infancy and maturity, its facts look in both directions. This breadth of aim, no doubt, gave rise to the exceedingly inclusive title of the work, a title obviously too broad for a book that has nothing to say of the origin, nature, content and relations of the religious consciousness in general.

The data consist of auto-biographical material collected chiefly by means of question-list circulars. Unintentional selection is thus introduced in several ways. Not only are the data confined almost exclusively to American Protestants of the evangelical type, but it is evident that within these churches certain types of mind and of experience would respond to question-circulars touching the inner life much more readily than others. How far these returns may safely be taken as representing universal tendencies is therefore a question of first importance. The author clearly recognizes the fact of selection, yet one may raise the query whether he has given it sufficient weight as a constant in all his material. To this question I shall return after giving an outline of the conclusions of the book. Of the author's industry, ingenuity in the analysis of his returns, and general caution in making deductions therefrom, too much can scarcely be said.

The main thread of the thought is as follows: Conversions occur most frequently between the ages of 10 and 20, but they are distributed very unevenly through this period. The single age of greatest frequency is 16, but the largest volume of conversions of females comes at 12 to 14. At this earlier period there is also a perceptible increase in the conversions of males, and for both sexes the curve rises again at 18 or 19. Here is an obvious correlation of religious experience with mental growth, particularly the decline of sensory elements in consciousness and the rise of rational insight, and also with physiological development. The deep significance of these experiences is further evident from the fact that they arise only partly through external influences; there is a distinct internal propulsion toward them, which manifests itself in a largely spontaneous sense of sin, helplessness, depression, in anxieties, fears, doubts; and they are accompanied by various bodily affections. The deliberate and conscious element is only one of a long series of factors that extends deep into the subliminal region of the mind. In short, adolescent conversions are something more than mere accidents in the growth of the individual.

That we are here dealing, in fact, with a general law of development becomes increasingly clear through the fact that, even in the absence of the abrupt transformation called conversion, religious growth traverses essentially the same path by slower stages, and comes out at the same place. There are periods of increased or lessened religious interest, of doubts, and of the same emotions as those that precede, accompany, and follow conversion; and at these occur periods closely corresponding to those of the conversion type. The organic character of these phenomena is still further revealed by the fact, very interestingly brought out, that the characteristic mental differences of the sexes here come to the surface with great regularity and definiteness.

What then is, essentially, this phenomenon of adolescent religious change, and what law of development does it reveal? The change, whether rapid or slow, is a

kind of un-selling followed by a re-selling. It is the sloughing off of the child-self and emergence into a larger and more social world. Physiologically this points to the development of a new set of association fibres, or at least to the rapid maturing of function of some such set. Psychologically it reminds us that there are forces within and without that tend to break the unity and harmony of the child-consciousness, and so to create a demand for the re-integration of a divided self. Many persons do, indeed, grow in religion from childhood to maturity without being aware of any definite transitions, but the author believes, not only that growth does not often come in this way, but that, in the nature of the case, adolescent disturbances of one kind or another are to be expected. He points to the rapidity of the change from childhood to adult life, the complexity of the factors, the discontinuity of physiological growth itself, and the fact that the surrender of self here involved is an essentially painful process.

Looking forward from the adolescent transition to its fruition in adult life, the author finds that, whereas childhood religion is still predominantly an external interest, and in adolescence an internal interest, in maturity it becomes once more objective. Yet not merely that, for maturity brings a clearer realization of religion as a life within. This apparent paradox is solved by the fact that maturity, at the same time that it tends to be objectively ethical and social, tends also to recognize the presence of God in the whole movement of life, external and internal. Hence it is characterized by increased sense of dependence and trust as well as ethical objectivity.

For the sake of emphasizing the central contribution which this treatise makes to genetic psychology and to the science of religion, I omit all reference to a large mass of interesting details and sidelights. This contribution is of decided significance. From Tertullian until now, Christianity, for apologetic purposes, has insisted upon the *anima naturaliter christiana*, but not until now have we realized how completely the religious impulse is intertwined and, so to speak, fused with general physical and mental factors. In a broad way Starbuck has proved the unity of human development in the individual even at the point where such unity has seemed to be contradicted by the presence of cataclysmal outbursts.

Doubts will arise, however, as to the specific filling-in that Starbuck gives to this broad outline. That his method is capable of yielding adequate data as to dates and ages, and probable information as to the general drift of thought and emotion at a particular growth-period, no one need question. But what of the interplay of the mental elements among themselves, the relation of mental to bodily affections, and the relative effectiveness of various external influences? On all such points, question-list returns are far from being authoritative. Even on such points the author has frankly classified his data, in most cases, in accordance with the words of the respondents, thus taking at par value, no one knows how many memory illusions and mistaken self-analyses. At very few points, in my opinion, does this difficulty tend to invalidate the main line of argument, but it renders the author's tables of "motives and forces leading to conversion," "the relative prominence of various mental and bodily affections," and so on, of slight numerical value.

There is still room, moreover, for differences of view as to how far the phenomena of a troubled youth are due to incidental influences rather than to any necessity of mental or physical growth. Larger recognition, it seems to me, might have been given to the effect of modern conditions of life upon the growing organism, and to the forces of suggestion contained in the teachings of the church and of the home. Certainly a large part of adolescent "storm and stress" can be traced unerringly to these two sources. Our city life, our over-loaded school curriculums, the enormously multiplied stimuli of sense, of emotion, and of intellectual interest that fairly bombard the child in our complex civilization put an altogether extraordinary burden upon the growing nervous system. The result is the characteristic nerve fatigue of adolescence, which I fear we are in danger of attributing to mother nature instead of to preventable conditions. Traditional evangelical teachings regarding sin and salvation, the natural and the spiritual, reason and authority, coming to youth already fatigued with the burdens of modern life, simply interpret the already existing strain in theological terms, and by suggestion evoke religious experiences which, however natural they may be under the circumstances, are not an index of normal development. There is nothing in the evidence to preclude the hypoth-

esis that, under normal conditions, the adolescent transition would be gentle and joyous, like the coming of morning rather than the gathering of clouds. The reasons why biographies of this gentle and joyous kind are so rare in Starbuck's collection are not far to seek. The conditions that lead to mental stresses would have their most marked effect upon suggestible and emotional persons, and these are the ones who are most ready to respond to question-circulars. Further, the very absence of high lights and deep shadows in one's religious life makes that life difficult of description, and tends to prevent one from answering questions.

No doubt, as Starbuck points out, temperamental differences like those just mentioned will always produce contrasts in the religious development of different individuals. From this he infers that religious pedagogy should be plastic, adapting itself to all the chief types of adolescent experience before adolescence arrives. But if some of these types, as I hold, are not so much natural as induced, religious education should, after all, be preventive. If strains and stresses arise, they should be treated as incidental rather than as essential, and the aim should be to promote a continuously joyous development.

The purpose of these remarks concerning the debatable border-line between the normal and the abnormal is not to bring Starbuck's main conclusions into doubt, but rather to free them from misconstructions that tend to obscure their real importance. Of the general soundness of his conclusions there is no reason to doubt. Soon after the two articles out of which the present volume arose were published (See the *American Journal of Psychology*, VIII, 2, and IX, 1), I undertook to test Starbuck's work by gathering new data and submitting them to fresh analysis. In only a few minor points did my results contradict his. On the main questions the correspondence was of the close, sun-clear kind that leaves no room for doubt that one is dealing with a law of nature and not with deciduous circumstances. I believe that anyone who will take similar trouble to examine at first hand the facts of personal religious development will conclude that "The Psychology of Religion" has carried out its programme of ascertaining the general line of religious growth from infancy to maturity, together with the chief organic and mental conditions that determine it.

The educational value of such a work is not slight. Indeed, within the seven years since its first publication, it has entered as a conscious factor into the thinking of a large proportion of those who give intelligent attention to the religious training of youths in the churches, Christian associations, and schools. In a few cases the trend of its teachings has been misconstrued. Because Starbuck has shown that conversion occurs as a part of a natural growth, some religionists have inferred that a conversion is to be expected or sought in the case of everybody. What Starbuck proved is that the conversion cases, the gradual growth cases, and those that show development without conscious transitions, all fall under a single principle of development. In general the influence of the book is obviously on the side of a reconstructed method of training, a method that shall replace our present discontinuity by a connected plan which, varying the material to suit the stages of growth, shall wisely anticipate each new stage so as to make the change to it easy and natural. Such a plan cannot be invented; it can only be matured through much observation and experiment. Meantime, the great fact stands out that the period of youth is really beginning to be understood.

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THE PATHOLOGY OF RELIGIONS.¹

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Pathology of Religions. The very title is sufficient to produce a variety of reactions in the different individuals who will read or hear it, and as in the case of so many titles and phrases we may expect it soon to be roundly abused by all parties. Those atheistically inclined will perhaps hail it with delight, and apply it indiscriminately to everything in all religions; the religious will recoil from it, but those who belong to no sect or party, and who are, therefore, unprejudiced will draw no hasty conclusions, but will calmly seek for its true scope and meaning, and, we hope, be rewarded in some measure for their pains. Certainly the last is the only proper attitude to assume in the study of this subject, as it is in all others.

The mine, here opened up with crude implements, is not altogether a new one. At least two other pioneers have dug in it and brought forth much valuable ore. One of these was M. Ernest Murisier, a young French *savant* whose early death was a great loss to the scientific world. His work² is a little masterpiece of psychological analysis, but its scope is limited to three chapters: Mysticism, Fanaticism, and Emotional Contagion. The other is Prof. Wm. James, whose more ambi-

¹The writer gladly takes this opportunity to acknowledge his great indebtedness to Pres. G. Stanley Hall who first suggested the subject to him, and without whose continued help, encouragement, and inspiration the study could not have been completed.

²Les Maladies du Sentiment Religieux, Paris, 1901.

tious production¹ is already familiar to every one. The value of his labor is unfortunately minimized because he considered all his curious specimens pure ore and failed to see that the majority of them contained much dross and but little of the pure metal. Had he named his work "Varieties of Abnormal Religious Experience," and studied his materials from that point of view, it would have been undoubtedly the best so far produced on the subject. As it is, the work is confusing, distorted, and objectionable to a large class of readers who prefer to consider many if not most of the experiences he has collected and analyzed distinctly pathological rather than mere exaggerations of normal religious experiences. There is an important difference between disease and excessive strength or weakness.

Besides these two there have been many alienists who have noted religious aberrations of various sorts among their patients, and anthropologists who have carefully described scattered cases of pathological religious beliefs, rites, ceremonies, customs, etc., among primitive, ancient, and modern peoples, but no attempt has been made to collect, analyze, and classify these cases psychologically.

The present study modestly undertakes to do this. Its author has drawn all his materials, and many of his explanations from the works of alienists, anthropologists, missionaries, historians, and biographers; has studied these as impartially and classified them as best he could. He makes no claim to originality, except perhaps in method of treatment, and is conscious of its very many lacunæ and deficiencies. He has only sorted the crude ore leaving to more expert hands to do the smelting and refining.

The work is intended to parallel and complement in some measure the labors of Leuba, Starbuck, Coe, and others who have done so much to tell us the true psychological meaning of many of the normal religious experiences. For while dealing altogether with pathological religious experiences it throws considerable light indirectly upon those normal experiences of which they are the degenerations, and furnishes us a better and more complete picture of the birth, development, and decay of religion in the race and in the individual than the former could alone. It is also hoped that this study will be of service to religious pedagogues, in that it endeavors to mark with buoys the hidden rocks

¹ Varieties of Religious Experience.

and reefs on which so many religious ships in the past have foundered.

In no department of education are the need and importance of sound pedagogical principles so great as in religion, for no other has a subject which touches deeply so many sides and interests of human life. Religion is perhaps the oldest product of human feeling and thought, so old at any rate that many consider it one of the fundamental instincts. Its influence on the evolution of the race and on the life of the individual is simply incalculable, and therefore any error made in the inculcation of its principles is fraught with untold consequences. One poorly trained in mathematics, physics, languages, etc., is not nearly so dangerous a member of society as one poorly trained in religion, for the former are recent, accessory acquirements which do not begin to shape the character and conduct of the individual to the degree and extent that the latter does. A study of this sort should therefore be full of suggestions to those to whom the religious training of the young is intrusted. Its aim throughout is not to destroy but to fulfill, and the thought so well expressed by Dean Farrar has been constantly in the mind of its author: "We study the past not to denounce it, not to set ourselves above it, not to dis sever ourselves from its continuity, but to learn from it, and to avoid its failures. It has much to teach us by way of solemn warning. If we shall have to dwell upon its mistakes it is only that we may have grace to avoid them, and to be on our guard against similar tendencies."¹

It is the opinion of the writer that the future will not be non-religious, as an ever-increasing number of scholars predict it will, but will possess a religion which will appropriate and assimilate the good of all the religions of the past and present, and will harmonize with its stage of development and satisfy the peculiar needs which only a religion of some sort can satisfy. It is already a platitude that each age has the religion which it deserves, but during transition periods it happens that progress is made along some lines much more rapidly than along others, and the difficulty of making proper adjustments is so great that impatient spirits grow restless and strive to force the adjustment even if they have to eliminate one or two important factors entirely. If old religion and the new science cannot immediately come to terms

¹Hist. of Interpretation, p. 14.

the enthusiastic but short-sighted partisans of the latter are ready to sacrifice the former, while the religious enthusiasts are equally eager to disparage and even annihilate all science. Fortunately, these individuals are few and their power relatively small. The race moves slowly and cautiously regardless of the goading of the few, and instinctively refuses to lose anything that may be of value to it.

That of all things it will not leave Religion, the grandest legacy of the ages, behind, no one who is conversant with Volk-psychology and the trend of the present age will deny. Science is already halting in its mad and disappointing rush, and beginning to suspect that the promised land it was so eagerly "making for" is but a mirage or the phantom of an overwrought brain. Philosophy is bending all her energies to reconcile Science and Religion knowing that the alliance will be extremely beneficial to both in that it will save them from pessimism, despair, and deterioration.

Clifford's Cosmic Consciousness, the Panpsychism of Fechner, Stout, Strong, and others, the Pure Experiences of James, the new Humanism of Schiller, and the Pragmatism of the Chicago School, are all efforts I take it to bring about this reconciliation, that is, they are tendencies away from materialism and the crude conception of law which were the offspring of an immature science toward a new idealism which is always the closest ally of religion. Mysticism seems just now to be the ground on which both Science and Religion will meet, and if the present study will in any way hasten the day by removing the debris which lie scattered over the religious road, it will not have been in vain.

DEFINITION.

It is evident that just as in medicine, psychiatry, art, and ethics we must know physical and mental health, beauty, and goodness, in order to clearly understand disease, ugliness, and evil; so too in religion, a knowledge of its healthy normal condition, is a prerequisite to a knowledge of its abnormal, pathological condition. The one is as important as the other, and both must be kept constantly in countenance of each other, in order that each may shed light upon the other. In order, therefore, to determine what pathological religion is we must first determine what normal religion is.

What is religion? The history of the different answers that have

been made to this question, in the shape of definitions, forms a long and tedious chapter in the history of human thought. Almost every writer on religion from the earliest times down to the present has offered a different definition, and no one, it seems, is wholly satisfied with those proposed by the others. Nowhere does the old adage, "*Quot homines tot sententie*" hold more true than here. A classification and exposition of some of these definitions may not be without interest.

1. A great many writers, both ancient and modern, have looked upon religion of any kind as sheer madness, a symptom of a diseased brain. Thus Empedocles, in the fifth cent. B. C. declared it to be "a sickness of the mind," and Feuerbach of the last cent. characterized it as "the most pernicious malady of humanity." Likewise, Prof. Sergi, in a book just published,¹ offers many ingenious but non-valid arguments to prove that all religions, the highest as well as the lowest are absurd, pathological, and harmful to progress.²

2. A similar view, quite prevalent in all ages is that religion is a fraudulent invention of crafty priests and rulers; accepted by the ignorant and superstitious masses, and believed to be the highest truth. During the French Revolution this view reached its highest culmination. Hobbes defines religion as "superstition sanctioned by the State," and the poet Shelley conceived it to be one of his missions "to unveil the religious frauds by which nations have been deluded into submission." These are definitions offered by non-religious and irreligious individuals; definitions against, rather than of religion, and have therefore no scientific value.

3. There is another large group of writers and thinkers who define religion as 'revelation:' the product of something mysteriously and suddenly implanted in the soul of man by God—a faculty perhaps, but far superior to the other faculties and independent of them. Religion is therefore, not like language, art, science, government, etc., the product of centuries of human thought and action, but it is something which, Minerva-like springs into the soul full-grown and mature. The laws of evolution do not hold in religion.

4. Again, there are the views of narrow-minded sectarians who hold that the only religion worthy of the name is their own; all others

¹ *Origine des Phenomenes Psychiques*, Jan., 1904.

² Others hold that religion is a collection of superstitious beliefs and superstitious forms of worship which accord with them.

are base superstitions and idolatries. This view has received its best expression in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, and is not uncommon in some parts even to-day.

Of the definitions which are more philosophical and scientific, Prof. Leuba has given us a valuable collection which he classifies as follows:¹

In the first group, which may be called the Noetic group, "a specific intellectual element is given as the essence, or as the distinguishing mark of religion." Thus, Martineau defines religion as, "a belief in an Ever-living God, that is, in a Divine mind and will ruling the universe and holding moral relations with mankind."

Romanes: "Religion is a department of thought having for its objects a self-conscious and intelligent Being."

D'Alviella: Religion is, "The belief in the existence of superhuman beings who interfere in a mysterious fashion in the destiny of man."

Hegel: Religion is, "The knowledge possessed by the finite mind of its nature as absolute mind."

In the second, or Feeling and Æsthetic group, "it is one or several specific feelings which are singled out as the Religious Differentia."

Schliermacher: "Religion cannot and will not originate in the pure impulse to know It is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling." Later he wrote: "Religion is a feeling of absolute dependence."

Herbart: "Sympathy with the universal dependence of men is the essential natural principle of all religion."

Goethe, in *Faust*:

"Nenn's Glück! Herz! Liebe! Gott!
Ich habe keinen Namen
Dafür, Gefühl ist alles."

A. Sabatier: "That which we call religion in a man is the sentiment of the relation in which he stands and wants to stand to the universal principle upon which he knows himself to be dependent, and to the universe itself of which he finds himself a part."

Upton: "It is the felt relationship in which the finite self-consciousness stands to the immanent and universal ground of all being, which constitutes religion."

¹Intro. to a Psychological Study of Religion, *Monist*, Jan., 1901.

In the third, or Volitional and Ethical group, "the active principle, the cravings, the desires, the impulses, the will, take the place occupied by the intellect or the feelings in the other classes."

Bradley: "Religion is the attempt to express the complete reality of goodness through every aspect of our being."

Feuerbach: "The origin, nay the essence of religion is desire: if man possessed no needs, no desires, he would possess no gods."

Marshall: "The restraint of individualistic impulses to racial ones (the suppression of our wills to a higher will) seems to me to be of the very essence of religion: the belief in the Deity, as usually found, being from the psychological point of view an attachment to, rather than the essence of, the religious feeling."

The Golden Rule, which is the motto of so many religions, may be cited here as emphasizing this element to the exclusion of almost all the others. Likewise, the Apostle Paul: "What doth it profit though a man say he hath faith, and have not works? can faith save him?" Right willing and doing is for him the essence of religion, rather than beliefs and theological dogmas.

That these definitions are all more or less one sided need hardly be pointed out. Each one as we should expect, finds in religion that which is predominant in his own soul. Goethe could not have possibly been true to himself and said anything else than, "Name it what you will, for me it is all feeling." Spencer, Romanes, and other investigators were by their natures compelled to define it in terms of the intellect, and likewise the men of action like Paul and Bondaref were compelled to define it in terms of will and conduct. Such definitions are valuable more for the light they shed on individual psychology, than for their aid in the solution of the question 'What is religion?' The other writers whom we have quoted, deluded by the fatal faculty psychology endeavored, either by analyzing and comparing the different historical religions to arrive at the origin, the seed from which they all sprang, or, by eliminating all that is characteristic of the different species, to discover the one quality or essence common to all; a '*summum genus*' from which as a starting point they might construct a religious tree a la Haeckel.

All the various theories concerning the origin of religion are nothing more than mere idle guesses in the dark. Its roots lie so deeply and intricately imbedded and enmeshed in the past of the race that it has

now become almost an instinct, which in its proper time, and under normal conditions, sprouts forth spontaneously from the dark and impenetrable regions of the individual's sub-consciousness. To say that religion was born of the emotions, or the intellect, or the will, is to arbitrarily partition the soul into three air-tight compartments, a procedure which flagrantly violates the truth and for which there is absolutely no justification. The soul is an organic unity of inseparable parts, which develop, ripen, and decay concomitantly and covariantly. When in its gradual evolution it finally reached the mature chrysalis state and was beginning to emerge into a beautiful butterfly, *i. e.*, when our simian ancestors were becoming more human than ape, then many wonderful changes must have taken place and new conditions pregnant with future possibilities were born. It was then that the veil was lifted from the eyes of our ancestors; they beheld the wonders and mysteries of the starry heavens, and the forces of nature playing about them; they caught a glimpse of God, were filled with wonder, admiration, awe, curiosity, and fear, the bud unfolded itself, and the beautiful flower, religion, was born in the world. This, figurative and fanciful as it is, is probably the most that can be said concerning its birth. The Dutch botanist, Hugo de Vries, maintains that new types can arise suddenly. Great variations, not small, as Darwin thought, are, according to him the condition of evolution through the struggle for life. If religion be the product of some such sudden mental variation, the futility of trying to trace it back to an instinct, or feeling, or will-act, would be all the more manifest.

Of the essence of religion we can likewise make no dogmatic statement. There are no two religions, we venture to say, whose essences are precisely the same; indeed, we may go even further and say that as many men so many religions. We should more accurately speak of religions than of religion, which exists only as an abstract term or idea. Instead of vainly endeavoring to discover the origin or essence of religion several recent writers have wisely undertaken to ascertain the meaning of the religions which the different peoples, primitive, and civilized, now possess and the influence they exert upon their lives. Here we may mention among others the following definitions:

Eliza Ritchie: "When we speak of a religious man or race, we have in view a certain temper of mind, a certain way of conceiving the facts of existence, a doctrine of some sort. But we also know that a

doctrine itself, however elaborate it may be, does not constitute a religion. When the doctrine affects the whole tone and color of the individual's emotional life, and has a determining influence upon his conduct, then the individual may be said to be religious . . . Whether the creed be low or lofty, simple or complex, it must be *felt*: whether its outer expression consist in ceremony or ritual, moral precepts or ethical principles, philanthropic work or fanatical persecutions, some effect it must have on the emotional and practical life: if either of these factors be wholly absent, the phenomenon is not that of religion."¹

Ed. Caird: "Without as yet attempting to define religion . . . we may go as far as to say that a man's religion is the expression of his ultimate attitude to the Universe, the summed-up meaning and purport of his whole consciousness of things."

Pfleiderer: "In the religious consciousness, all sides of the whole personality participate."

Tolstoi: "True religion is a relation, accordant with reason and knowledge, which man establishes with the infinite life surrounding him, and it is such as binds his life to that infinity, and guides his conduct."²

As definitions, there are obvious objections to be raised against each of these, but the point which they emphasize, namely, that religion is an experience which involves all the activities of the psyche,—beliefs, emotional responses, and volitional acts of various kinds, and shapes in large measure the lives and conduct of men, evinces a deeper and broader insight of the true nature of religion and its relation to life than any of the definitions we have quoted above. We shall never, perhaps, have a perfectly adequate and satisfactory definition of religion, and it is doubtful whether such a definition is at all necessary. The above facts taken in connection with the vague, mystical, intellectual and emotional aura of which each one is more or less cognizant when in the religious mood are sufficient both to differentiate religious experiences from the secular experiences of life, and to define the nature of religion. It is, however, incumbent upon a writer on the subject to state as clearly and concisely as possible his own conception of religion in order that the reader may be better able to follow him and under-

¹The Essentials of Religion, Phil. Rev., Jan., 1901.

²Essays and Letters, p. 295.

stand his conclusions. The following should be taken, therefore, not as a standard definition of religion, but as the writer's attempt to state in as few words as possible his conception of the meaning of the term. Religion is a whole-souled or rather a psychophysical reaction to one or more preternatural objects or beings, or to ideals which are believed to be somehow constantly and seriously related to the individual and the race. We employ the term preternatural rather than supernatural because it is hardly fitting to characterize the gods and idols of some primitive peoples as supernatural. Indeed, many of them did not themselves consider their gods as such, and yet they were not what can be properly called natural, they were in every case something other than natural, *i. e.*, preternatural.

Now that we have stated as best we can what we mean by normal religion we can more readily explain what we mean by pathological religion. In an off-hand fashion, it may be said that that religious experience which is not a well-rounded, well-balanced reaction of the whole soul is pathological; but in saying this it must be remembered that not all people react with the same fullness or force, nor in the same way. There are all stages of religious development in the individual as well as in the race, and the reaction which is normal to one stage of development is different from that which is normal to another. Indeed, what is normal for one may be pathological for the other. We cannot, therefore, have a hard and fixed standard of measurement for all religions, but must employ a different standard for each religion. The child and savage cannot be expected to have as lofty and abstract religious conceptions as have the Buddhists, for example, or the modern Christians, but they are justly expected to have the religious conceptions and experiences which are normal to their stage of development; anything short of that is an evidence of arrested development or degeneration. In the field of morals we are told that the individual should act in accordance with the idea of his kind or his type,¹ and the same rule applies to religion as well. In judging, therefore, of an individual's or race's religious normality we must compare them not with individuals belonging to another race, but with those of their own, with their ancestors and neighbors who grew up with them in the same envi-

¹See Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, p. 236; Leslie Stephen: *Science of Ethics*, p. 397.

tionment and under similar conditions. And within this compass we shall meet with all degrees of growth and decay, *i. e.*, among Christians, Jews, Mohammedans, Buddhists, etc., there are sects and denominations who hold religious views and perform religious rites which are abnormal to the stage of development of their respective religions.

Unfortunately, however, our knowledge of the life-history of the different tribes and races, especially the primitive ones: the conditions of their social, intellectual, and natural environments, is in many cases too fragmentary and uncertain to enable us to determine whether their religious development has kept pace with their moral, social, and intellectual development, or whether it has been arrested or degenerated. Of the religions of certain peoples who are our neighbors and contemporaries, such for instance as the Holy Orthodox Greek Church of Russia with its numerous sects and fifteen millions of schismatics, and in our own country the Christian Catholic Church, or Dowieism, Christian Scientists, the Society of the Holy Ghost and Us, and many others, there is certain and almost complete knowledge, and therefore we have no hesitancy in stigmatizing them as more or less pathological. Of the religions of many primitive peoples, however, we can make no such definite statement. It is difficult to understand the people and get into sympathetic rapport with their religions, and besides our knowledge of them is largely derived from the reports of tourists and missionaries, whose observations were unscientific, to say the least. There is one criterion, however, of which we are sure, namely, the effects of the religions upon their adherents. Religion like government is of, for, and by the people, and like government it is of positive value only when it serves the needs of the people, makes life more moral and joyful, and aids them in their normal development. But just as there are autocratic and tyrannical forms of government which militate against the mental and material welfare and progress of the subjects, so too are there religions which, instead of being subservient to their votaries have terrorized and enslaved them, inoculated them with the virus of pessimism, made death a boon, and hindered their normal development in countless different ways. Such religions cannot but be considered pathological.

"Insanity," writes E. Stanley Abbot, "is a morbid condition of the mind which renders it impossible for the conscious individual to think, feel, or act, *in relation to his environment, in accordance with the*

standards of his bringing up,'¹ and Dr. Brinton speaking of racial insanity, says: "A pathological condition of the ethnic mind is present when it is chronically incapable of directing the activities of the group correctly toward self-preservation and development."² Basing our criterion on these facts we shall hold that whenever the religious experiences or practices *injure* the psychical or physical condition of the individual or group, or retard their growth so that they cannot think, act, or feel in relation to their environments, in accordance with the standards normal to their stages of development, they are positively pathological.

With this criterion constantly in mind, and remembering that the religious state is a *combined effect* of many, if not all psychic experiences and activities, and not a *compound* composed of separable units we shall analyze some of the religions of primitive, ancient, medieval, and modern peoples into their emotional, intellectual, and volitional elements, for the same reason that psychologists analyze consciousness into sensation, perception, conception, memory, imagination, emotion, will, reasoning, association, etc., and endeavor to show that an excessive exaggeration or elimination of any one of the elements produces a disharmonious relationship between them, so to speak, and leads to degeneration of the whole state.

THE EMOTIONAL ELEMENT IN RELIGION.

Love.

That love plays a large rôle in the religious experiences of all peoples will readily be admitted by every one, but that love itself is an irradiation of the sexual instinct some perhaps will be inclined to doubt. Biologists, anthropologists, and alienists, however, are almost unanimous on this point, and philology renders the same verdict. The English word 'love,' the German *lieben*, the Danish *lieven*, Russian 'lioblyu,' and Latin 'lubeo,' are all derived from the Sanscrit root-word 'lobh,' which means desire, lust, passion. The same is true of the Hebrew word for 'love.' That the instinct which attracts the sexes for the purpose of re-creation is the root from which all love has grown

¹ Am. Jour. Insanity, July, 1902.

² The Basis of Social Relations, p 84.

is an established fact, and now that we understand better and more truly the evolution of the race, the rôle of sexual selection, the meaning of reproduction in the plant and animal series, we need no longer be ashamed of the parentage of our noblest emotion. There is a natural dynamic relationship between religion and sex; the two are inextricably interwoven, so to speak, and influence each other at every turn. In the biographies and autobiographies of saints, both male and female, of monks, nuns, and enthusiastic religionists in general we find that sexual disturbances irradiate and produce marked religious disturbances such as erotic trances, visions, hallucinations, mystic experiences, etc. Unable to express itself naturally the sexual impulse finds an outlet in a more or less sensuous love of God, Christ, or the Virgin Mary.

A single example must suffice: "I wish the divine love," cried Mme. Guyon, whose married life was loveless and most unhappy, "the love which chills the soul with ineffable shivers, the love which puts me in a swoon." And later when she had experienced the mystic union with God, she wrote, "O! my God, if you should make the most sensual persons feel what I feel, they would soon leave their false pleasures to enjoy one so true." In the writings of Ruysbroeck, Fenelon, St. Theresa, Catherine of Sienna, St. Gertrude, and numerous others, especially the mystics, similar expressions are to be found.

Alienists have found numerous evidences of this close relationship in their patients. Schroeder van der Kolk writes, "I venture to express my conviction that we should rarely err, if in a case of religious melancholy we assumed the sexual apparatus to be implicated." Likewise Krafft-Ebing, "It suffices to recall how intense sexuality makes itself manifest in the clinical history of many religious maniacs: the motley mixture of religious and sexual delusions that is so frequently observed in psychoses (*e. g.* in maniacal women who think they are or will be the mother of God), but particularly in masturbatic insanity; and finally, the sexual, cruel self-punishment, injuries, self-castrations, and even self-crucifixions resulting from abnormal religio-sexual feeling."¹ Esquirol, Friedreich, Regis, Berthier, Conolly Norman, Ball, Brouardel, Morselli, C. H. Hughes, Vallon and Marie, Spitzka, Jos. Workman, and others are all agreed on this point.

A study of these and other facts, such as the remarkable synchron-

¹ *Psychopathia Sexualis*, p. 5.

ism of the ages of religion, *i. e.*, pubescence and senescence, and that of sexual maturity and impotence, the fact that adolescent insanity is to a large extent due to disorders of the reproductive function, and that in many cases the insanity expresses itself in religious exaltation, the many interesting and suggestive parallelisms between love and religion¹ have led writers like Wier,² Howard,³ Forlong,⁴ Westropp,⁵ and others to find in the sexual instinct the one root of all religions. We cannot agree with these extremists, nor on the other hand with Prof. Wm. James⁶ who sees no relationship whatever between religion and sex, but prefer to say with Brinton that it is the sexual instinct "which in some of its forms, rude or refined, is at the root of half the expressions of the religious sentiment. We may trace it from crude and coarse beginnings in the geneaic cults of primitive peoples, through ever nobler and more delicate expressions, up through the celibate sacrifices of both sexes; spouses of God, until in its complete expansion it reaches the perfect agape, where the union of the human with the divine in the life eternal, here on earth, or beyond, one and the same, is believed to have been reached."⁷ The sexual instinct exerts a great influence on art, morality, thought, in fact on all life. Is it possible that it has no connection with one of the oldest and most fundamental of all human experiences?

We believe that in its widest possible sense it is true that "He that loveth not, knoweth not God for God is love."

Among primitive peoples this dynamic relationship appears, as we should expect, more clearly than among more advanced races. The mysteries of procreation and reproduction impressed the naïve and childish mind of primitive man as much, perhaps, as the celestial bodies, and the mysterious was always deified. Phallicism, or phallo-ktenism was universal among all early races and still obtains among the savages of to-day. Everything about them, the celestial bodies, mountains and

¹ Pres. Hall: *Adolescence*, Vol. 2, pp. 295-301 contains the best collection of these.

² *Religion and Lust*, Louisville, Ky., 1897.

³ *Sex Worship*, Washington, D. C., 1897.

⁴ *Rivers of Life*, London.

⁵ *Primitive Symbolism*, London, 1885.

⁶ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 11 foot note.

⁷ *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, p. 170. Cf. Baring-Gould, *Freaks of Fanaticism*, p. 268, and Havelock Ellis, *Psych. of Sex*, Vol. 2. Appendix C.

ivers, stocks and stones, trees and plants as well as the animals and themselves possessed sex and other mysterious attributes: hence, their countless male, female, and androgynous divinities and demons. Later, when they reached the symbolic stage it was but natural that they should select their own sexual organs as fitting symbols of the hidden powers that were constantly creating life. There was nothing pathological in this, nor even superstitious, in the true sense of the word: it was all perfectly normal to their stage of development. But just so soon as the symbolic nature of their phallic emblems and idols was forgotten, and the organs or their representations were worshipped as divinities themselves, or when the people continued to perform phallic ceremonies after they had outgrown the cult, then the religion and its practices became degenerate and pathological. "Indecent rites," says Constant, "may be practiced by a religious people with the greatest purity of heart. But when incredulity has gained a footing amongst these peoples, these rites become then the cause and pretext of the most revolting corruption."¹ Likewise Voltaire: "Our ideas of propriety lead us to suppose that a ceremony which appears to us infamous could only be invented by licentiousness; but it is impossible to believe that licentiousness and depravity of manners would ever have led among any people to the establishment of religious ceremonies; profligacy may have crept in in the lapse of time, but the original institution was always innocent and free from it: the early agape, in which girls and boys kissed one another modestly on the mouth, degenerated at last into secret meetings and licentiousness. It is, therefore, probable that this custom was first introduced in times of simplicity, that the first thought was to honor the Deity in the symbol of life which it has given us."

It is not necessary to enter into disgusting details to prove that these simple and innocent customs did too frequently degenerate into licentious orgies which were injurious to the mental, moral, and physical health of the participants, and were therefore pathological. The mere names of some of the rites and festivals will suffice. Among the ancient Chaldeans, Babylonians, Corinthians, Armenians and others the women frequently united themselves with strangers in the Temples. Similar customs prevailed among the different North and South American Indian tribes. In Mendes the women submitted themselves nude

¹ Human Polytheism.

and openly to the embraces of the sacred goat, which represented the incarnation of the procreative deity. The Kauchilaus performed shameful religious ceremonies in which all family ties were completely obliterated. Among all the ancients delubral hetarism, the prelibation and *jus primæ noctis* rites were quite common. Many Greek and Roman temples were dedicated to the phallus and filled with hetaræ. In the scathing satires of Juvenal who tells us in one place that every temple in Rome was practically a licensed brothel, in the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, the writings of Suetonius, Tacitus, Seneca, St. Augustine and Gibbon we learn to what depths of moral degradation and licentiousness the Romans had fallen in their religious ceremonies and festivals, such as that of Venus, the Bacchanalia, Florolia, Saturnalia, Liberalia and others. These practices were common throughout Europe during the Middle Ages, and have not yet entirely disappeared.

Again, the worship of certain animals such as the serpent, bull, goat, cock, tortoise, and others; the worship of trees, such as the pine, fir, oak, fig, palm, etc.; the worship of plants, vegetables, and cereals such as the lotus, onion, rice, maize, turnip, sweet potato, etc.; the worship of mounds, rocks, stone pillars, —all have more or less phallic significance and are degenerations of purer and more primitive forms of natural religion.

The above excesses are paralleled in many religions by excesses even more injurious in the opposite direction. In every age and clime there have been those who imagined that their deities were best served when all sexual affairs were abstained from, when the sexual nature was completely abnegated. Mere continence or celibacy was deemed insufficient, the sexual organs had to be extirpated. The ceremony of castration formed a part of the annual celebration of the festival of Attis and Cybele, and is still practiced by the Skoptsy, a religious sect in Russia. Masculine hetarism also still obtains among many primitive peoples, and is distinctly a religious rite.¹ One of the motives which lie behind these practices is a strong desire to please and propitiate the deity by sacrificing the greatest of human blessings and pleasures in accordance with the ancient and widespread belief that God is always best pleased when his creatures are most miserable, and hence the greater the sacrifice, the greater the pleasure afforded him. Again, the desire to stifle

¹ Letourneau: La Religion, p. 62.

the promptings of the carnal nature, to renounce all worldly affairs, and to wrap themselves entirely in God were the motives which prompted the struggles of the early Christian Fathers, and the many devotees who followed in their footsteps almost to the present day. Among primitive peoples the practice was probably of accidental origin and was perpetuated because it rendered the subjects peculiar and gained for them the respect and reverence of their fellows who considered them as somehow or other divine.

Hate.

The opposite of love is hate, and like the opposite sides of a shield they are always together. The good lover is also a good hater, and *vice versa*. "In the love of Christ and his maid-mother," declared Queen Isabella, "I have caused great misery, and have depopulated towns and districts, provinces and kingdoms." Jonathan Edwards and Andrew Welwood delighted to picture to themselves the sufferings of the wicked. "I am overjoyed," wrote the latter, "in hearing the everlasting howlings of the haters of the Almighty. What a pleasant melody they are in mine ears! O, Eternal hallelujahs to Jehovah and the Lamb! O, sweet! sweet! My heart is satisfied. We committed our cause to Thee that judgeth righteously, and behold Thou hast fully pleaded our cause, and shall make the smoke of their torment forever and ever to ascend in our sight." Even the great Preacher Himself, He who preached to the world the Gospel of Love declared, "If any one come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters yea, and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple." These injunctions were too literally obeyed by very many ascetics and fanatics of succeeding generations. St. Jerome, exulting in his own atrophied and diseased feelings, tells Heliodorus whom he exhorts to leave his family and become a hermit, "Though your little nephew twine his arms around your neck: though your mother with dishevelled hair and tearing her robe asunder, point to the breast with which she suckled you; though your father fall down on the threshold before you, pass on over your father's body. Fly with tearless eyes to the banner of the cross. In this matter cruelty is the only piety. . . . Your widowed sister may throw her gentle arms around you. . . . Your father may implore you to wait but a short time to bury those near to

you, who will soon be no more: your weeping mother may recall your childish days, and may point to her shrunken breast and to her wrinkled brow. Those around you may tell you that all the household rests upon you. Such chains as these, the love of God and the fear of hell can easily break. You say that Scripture orders you to obey your parents, but he who loves them more than Christ loses his soul, etc.' The Lives of the Saints are full of accounts of the cruelties of their subjects to their parents and nearest kin. Indeed it seems that the Christianity of the Middle Ages was a religion of hate and not of love as its Founder and His disciples intended it to be. 'To outrage the affections of the nearest and dearest relations,' writes Mr. Lecky, 'was usually regarded not only as innocent, but proposed as the highest virtue. 'A young man,' it was acutely said, 'who has learnt to despise a mother's grief, will easily bear any other labor that is imposed upon him.' ''¹

To tell the story of religious hate, the rôle it has played in the history of man, would necessitate a recounting of all the religious wars, massacres, holocausts, inquisitions, persecutions, witchcraft trials, etc., the perusal of which sickens the soul and makes passionate men cry out against religion itself. Suffice it to say that while love is the keynote of almost all religious teachings, both oral and written, hate has so far played the leading rôle in religious history and made it one long tragedy.

Mention should here be made of a peculiar religion which seems to have been born entirely of hate and cruelty. It is called Thugism and was discovered in India by the English in the early part of the nineteenth century. The devotees of this religion were murderers who committed their crimes according to rigidly prescribed forms; only after the performance of special religious rites, and always scrupulously divided their spoils with their cruel goddess. The instruments of murder and burial were held by them in the highest veneration. An oath taken by the pick-axe was as binding to them as the Koran is to the Mohammedan, or the Bible to the Christian. They did not consider themselves murderers, but merely pious agents working out the will of their goddess. They held their profession in the highest esteem.

¹ Hist. of European Morals, Vol. 2, p. 142.

Pity.

It would be difficult indeed to overestimate the rôle that pity has played not only in the religious life, but in the secular life as well. Pres. Hall,¹ in one of his searching articles, has shown what a large and important part it plays in the lives of children and adults; and Herbart, as we have already seen, considered it the essential principle of religion. In both the Old and New Testaments God is called a merciful and pitying God, and want of pity is considered an unpardonable sin. "For three transgressions of Edom, and for four (saith the Lord), I will not turn away the punishment thereof; because he did pursue his brother with the sword, and did cast off all pity, and his anger did tear perpetually, and he kept his wrath forever."² Some writers have spoken of pity as the essential teaching of Christianity. It certainly takes rank next to love. "The sentiment of pity," writes Pres. Hall, "has played a rôle of supreme importance in the spread of Christianity. Hundreds of returns specify particularly all the experiences of Passion week. Some are most completely melted at the desertion of Christ by his disciples, others at the betrayal, others by his struggles of soul with himself and with the Father in Gethsemane, but most prominent of all in this galaxy of incitations to pathos is the crucifixion itself and the incidents connected with it. The stations of the Cross are often mentioned: Christ commending his mother to the care of the beloved disciple: the prayer, 'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do': Christ met by his mother on the way to Calvary: taken from the Cross and laid upon the bosom of the mother of sorrows: the scene where Christ is stripped of his garments, his flesh bruised and torn from the scourging: the long journey up the hill with the heavy Cross and the three falls under its weight: Mary at the foot of the Cross seeing the Divine Son suffer and unable to even wipe the blood from his face."³

But these incidents do not bring tears to the eyes of all. God on the Cross would not excite pity in Nietzsche, for instance; he would turn away from such a spectacle with shame and scorn. The 'Übermensch' he tells us, "maketh his law to be ashamed in the presence of all that suffereth." And again, "Thus the devil once said unto me:

¹ Savoyards and Hall: 'Pity,' *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 11, July, 1900.

² Amos, ch. 1, vs. 11.

³ See especially 'The Passion as The Resurrection,' *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 11, May, 1900.

'Even God hath his own hell: that is his love unto men.'
 'And recently I heard the word said: 'God is dead; he hath died of his pity for man.' '' Zeno and Spinoza regard pity bad in itself, and Darwin in his theory of the 'survival of the fittest' has little or no room for it. But the 'survival of the fittest' law is unfit for civilized men, as indeed it is for all the higher animals. Were this the supreme and inviolable law of nature the higher forms of life could not have evolved. The higher the animal is in the scale of life the fewer are its offspring, and the greater and longer are their periods of helplessness. Had not nature therefore evolved love, and pity, and sympathy, these offspring would, according to the above law, be either devoured or left to perish. But nature has implanted the tender instincts in the hearts of parents, and as a consequence we find them instinctively violating Darwin's law and risking their lives for the survival of the weak and the unfit. M. Kropotkin, in his recent masterly work, *Mutual Aid*, shows convincingly that the severe 'struggle for survival,' of which so much has been made since Darwin, is more or less a myth. Mutual aid rather than mutual destruction is according to him, the reigning law in the animal world. From love and pity of one's own progeny, these emotions irradiate and cover the progeny of others of the same species, and finally to everything that is powerless and helpless, the young and old alike. In man these emotions are sometimes so highly developed as to be entirely divorced from reason. Man loves and pities he knows not why, and not infrequently when he knows he should not. From this to a pathological development of pity is but a short step.

The true pedagogy of pity is, as Pres. Hall has shown, not to eradicate it entirely from the soul, nor, on the other hand, to lavish it promiscuously and indiscriminately upon 'the undervitalized poor, the moribund sick, defectives, and criminals, because by aiding such to survive, the process of wholesome natural selection by which all that is best has hitherto been developed, will be interfered with. Pity needs new ideals. Its work is no longer the salvage of the wreckage of humanity, but if Jesus came to our biological age he would be crucified afresh in the thwarted ambitions and blighted ideals of those most noble, yet most often crushed by circumstances over which they have no control. Pity has as its highest office then, in removing handicaps from those most able to help man to higher levels,—the leaders on more exalted plains who can be of most aid in ushering in the kingdom of the

superman." In other words we must learn not to cease to pity but to pity aright.

Like the other emotions, pity has, at times, been unduly focused upon and led to many morbid excesses. Pity and sympathy are the nearest approaches we have to suffering and pain, and in some cases they actually pass over into the latter. Cases of religious stigmatization like that of St. Francis of Assissi and Louise Lateau, are the most extreme and pathological examples of this. For more than four years blood flowed regularly every Friday from the left side of the latter's chest, from both feet, the palms and backs of both hands, and also her forehead. According to her physician, Dr. Lefebvre, the quantity of blood lost on each occasion was about seven-eighths of a quart.¹

In many of Pres. Hall's returns a single incident was singled out of a whole situation. The very sound of the word 'nail' produced a nervous shudder in one; another, "on seeing old nails that looked antique felt a pain in her palms, and sometimes in her feet from the strength of her imagination." Still another felt them so intensely that it seems quite likely "that she is well on toward stigmata."² In all, twenty-eight were profoundly affected by nail items; others centered on the sharp thorns, the vinegar, falling under the Cross, trial before Pilate, etc.

The religious sect which has focused upon pity more, perhaps, than any other is that of the Jains of India. These believe that every object, even plants, minerals, water, fire, etc., possesses a soul, and therefore they abstain from destroying even the minutest animal, deeming the destruction of any sentient creature the most heinous of crimes. Lest they should accidentally tread upon an insect they always carry at their girdles a small broom with which they tenderly sweep aside every insect which they may observe in their path. "To so senseless a length do they carry this principle, that they will not pluck any herb or vegetable, or partake of any sort of food, which may be supposed to contain animalculæ; so that the only articles of sustenance remaining to them appear to be rice, and a few sorts of pulse, which they cook with milk. They affirm, indeed, that it is as foul a murder to kill an insect as to slay a man; and so extreme is their precaution to avoid the commission of the crime, that it is with great reluctance, and only when re-

¹ F. W. H. Meyers: *Human Personality*, Vol. 1, p. 492.

² Hall: *loc. cit.*, p. 559.

duced to the necessity by urgent thirst, that they will drink water; even then they invariably suck up the fluid through a piece of fine muslin. In like manner when they require water for ablution, or any unavoidable household purpose, they carefully strain it repeatedly before they venture to use it. The most noxious vermin and insects are also treated with the same consideration as the most harmless creatures; and if, through persevering annoyance, they are compelled to deprive certain odious insects of the asylum usually found upon their persons, they remove the tormentors with the utmost care, and tenderly place them out of harm's way."¹ This is closely paralleled by the beliefs and actions of the Doukhobors in Canada, who refuse to eat meat, and to own and work with animals, etc., by the intense pity which some women and children have for animals, insects, plants, and even inanimate objects, such as, locomotives when 'puffing,' "the moon when black clouds pass over it," etc.

Again, this sentiment becomes almost pathological among vegetarians, and in the nervous and violent crusades against vivisection, even of the most humane, painless, and scientific kind.

Fear.

"Fear is the father of religion, love her late-born daughter."—Alfred Maury. In every age and land there have been those who have held that fear is the source of all religions. King Solomon declared that, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge," and had he been speaking of the origin of religion he would have probably added, 'and of religion.' Petronius long ago sang, "Fear first made the gods," and in our own day, to mention only a few, D'Alviella and Alfred Maury regard this sentiment as one root of religion of which the other is love. The Italian anthropologist, Sergi, offers many ingenious arguments to prove that one of the main roots of all religions is irrational fear, due to man's ignorance of natural laws; and Paul Carus evidently agrees with Petronius when he writes, "Demonolatry or Devil-worship is the first stage in the evolution of religion, for we fear the bad not the good."²

These views are, of course, extreme and partial, like some of those

¹Dict. of All Religions.

²Hist. of the Devil.

concerning love. Nevertheless, it is true that fear has played and still plays, in the religion of all peoples, a rôle hardly second to that of any other emotion, and therefore merits the great importance attached to it. If it be true as Dr. Robertson Smith says, that the spirit of many primitive religions is "predominantly joyous;" it is no less true that the spirit of as many more is predominantly timid, and in few, if any, is the element of fear entirely absent. "Every bright god has his shadow, so to say; and under the influence of Dualism this shadow attained a distinct existence and personality in the popular imagination."¹

Primitive and ancient peoples have their 'kakodaimonai' as well as their 'eudaimonai,' their demons as well as their divinities, their Ahrimans as well as their Ormuzds. This holds true even of the Jews and Christians. The God of these people is at one time, a loving and merciful God, an indulgent "Father that pitieth his children;" at another time he is jealous and vindictive, a "consuming fire," who "visits the sins of the fathers upon the children, even to the third and fourth generation." The blessings promised to the obedient are indeed great, but the curses heaped upon the disobedient are even greater.² He has his glorious heaven and his burning hell, and Christian and Jew love and praise him when he is in his happy mood, and fear and dread him when he is in his angry mood. "Rejoice in the Lord, praise him with harp: sing unto him with the psaltery and an instrument of ten strings," exhorts the Psalmist; and a few lines further on he says: "Let all the earth fear the Lord; let all the inhabitants of the world stand in awe of him." This is precisely what most religious people do: they rejoice in the Lord, but they also stand in awe of him. The two emotions, love and fear, are correlative and opposite, just as heat and cold, light and darkness, good and evil, etc., and an excess of one expels the other. One of the best studies of fear from the point of view of its influence on the lives and actions of men is that of Pres. Hall.³

The following summary, taken from his article will, it is believed, be of interest to the reader. In reply to his questionnaire 1,701 per-

¹ M. D. Conway: *Demonology and Folklore*, Vol. 1, p. 14.

² Cf. Deut. 27, and Lev. 21-23 *et seq.*

³ *Amer. Jour. of Psyc.*, Vol. 8, No. 2.

sons answered, describing 6,456 fears, which he groups according to the objects feared, as follows:

TABLE 1.

CELESTIAL PHENOMENA.		ANIMALS.	
Thunder and lightning,	603	Reptiles,	483
High wind,	143	Domestic animals,	268
Cyclones,	67	Wild animals,	206
Clouds and their forms,	44	Insects,	203
Meteors,	34	Rats and mice,	196
Northern lights,	25	Cats and dogs,	79
Comets,	18	Birds,	51
			<hr/>
			1,486
Fog,	16		
Storms,	14		
Eclipses,	14	Fire,	365
Extreme hot water,	10	Water,	205
Extreme cold water,	8	Drowning,	57
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	996		627
Darkness,	432	Strange persons,	437
Ghosts,	203	Robbers,	153
			<hr/>
Dream fears,	109		589
Solitude,	55		
	<hr/>		
	799	Death,	299
		Disease,	241
			<hr/>
			540

•• This accounts for 5,037 fears, leaving 1,419 directed to many scores of objects to be discussed later. It would appear that thunderstorms are feared most, that reptiles follow, with strangers and darkness as close seconds, while fire, death, domestic animals, diseases, wild animals, water, ghosts, insects, rats, and mice, robbers, high winds, dream fears, cats and dogs, cyclones, solitude, drowning, birds, etc., represent decreasing degrees of fearfulness. When we specify reptiles, domestic animals, insects, birds, the kinds of disease, strangers,

dream fears, and add miscellaneous fears, we have in all 298 objects feared."

Here we have 298 objects feared by normal children, living in a relatively highly civilized and organized society, under the most favorable and protected conditions. The query naturally arises, how much larger the catalogue would be, and how much more intense the fears of primitive man (an adult child) who roamed about the primeval forests almost wholly unprotected from the forces of nature, and the animals about him, and to whom all natural phenomena appeared more or less mysterious and therefore terrible? The answer is readily found in the many demonolatries, and the countless demons of primitive peoples. Hunger, disease, death, dreams, darkness, ghosts, heat, cold, the elements, animals, insects, worms, trees and plants, and even inanimate objects have at one time or another been demonized and made the objects of religious worship.

What fear has meant in religion, even the highest forms of it, can be seen from the fact that no less than 518 references are made to it in the Old and New Testaments. We shall later on speak a little more fully concerning its influence on the religions of primitive and ancient peoples.

Like pity, fear is an emotion which men like Nietzsche, Ibsen, Wilde, and others regard as base and slavish. They have nothing but contempt for it and would eliminate it entirely from the soul of man. But how much smaller our lives would be were this done can be seen from Pres. Hall's study. Indeed, it would be almost as disastrous as the loss of one of our faculties. Fear is in a large sense the beginning of wisdom and prudence. "Never is the child's charm in an object," writes Pres. Hall, "so great as at the moment when he is just getting the better of his fear of it. One of the chief spurs to knowledge and science is to overcome fear, and many of the things now best known are those that used to be most feared. To feel a given fear no longer over but beneath us gives an exquisite joy of growth."¹ Fear is the result of the experiences of the race, and in a moderate degree is a means of protection. The pedagogic problem here as with pity and anger is not to eliminate the emotion, but to "gauge it to the power of proper reaction," to learn, in the words of Aristotle, "to fear in due proportion those things worthy of being feared."

¹ *Levee*, *op. cit.*

Morbid Fears.

It, as has been said, the total absence of fear is a deplorable deficiency, an excess of it is still more distressing and alienating. We need only mention the following morbid fears, and will at once appear how widespread its baneful influence may become :

- Agrophobia, or fear of open spaces ;
- Claustrophobia, or fear of enclosed spaces ;
- Clitrophobia, or fear of enclosed spaces ;
- Topophobia, or fear of all spaces or space ;
- Astrophobia, or fear of lightning ;
- Anthropophobia, or fear of crowds ;
- Monophobia, or fear of solitude ;
- Panphobia, or fear of everything ;
- Misophobia, or fear of dirt ;
- Vokophobia, or fear to return home ;
- Hypsophobia, or fear of heights ;
- Botophobia, or fear of cellars.¹

To these we may add Theophobia and Peccatiphobia, the fear of God and the fear of sinning which become genuine obsessions among very many religionists.

The cultured modern attributes his pleasures and successes, his sufferings and reverses, to natural causes, even though he be unable to say what these causes are. But these are by no means true of all moderns. The late assassination of our President, for instance, the Galveston flood, Baltimore fire, the Iroquois and Slocum disasters, and all national calamities are still looked upon by the masses as the punishments of God for national or local sins. Now this is precisely the belief of primitive, barbarous, and uncivilized men the world over. To them natural causes, in the scientific sense of the word, are, of course, unknown—the joys of life spring from the blessings of a benevolent god, its misfortunes from curses of an angry deity who has been neglected or sinned against, or else the work of a demon who takes a fiendish delight in the sufferings of man. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the peoples whose environments were unfavorable, and whose struggle for existence was therefore especially severe should have centered their thoughts upon the evil side of their deities, or upon

¹Kovalewsky: Folie du doute, Jour. Mental Science, 1887.

deities wholly evil, and exhausted their intellectual resources in endeavoring to propitiate them and gain their favor.

Again, whenever a people have strayed for some time from what happens to be considered the straight and narrow path of religion and morality, there is always an Elijah who in thundering and threatening words commands them to halt ere they rush headlong into the yawning pits of hell: who wakes them to a lively realization of their sinful and dangerous condition: points the way back, and if needs be, lashes and frightens them into it.

The best examples of this in modern times are the Great Awakening of 1740 which swept tornado-like over New England and left thousands of mental and physical wrecks in its train, and the Kentucky Revival which spread over several adjoining States and gave birth to such pathological phenomena as jerking, barking, jumping, ranting, uncontrollable laughing and shrieking, and other hysterical and convulsive performances.¹ To a less marked degree some of these phenomena are still to be seen in the revival meetings of Southern negroes and those conducted by Rev. E. Payson Hammond for little children.²

Among primitive and ancient peoples fear was, of course, the most overstimulated of all the emotions and demanded for its satisfaction nothing less than human sacrifices, often the noblest youths and virgins. This custom prevailed among almost all the peoples of the earth and persisted among a few for several centuries after the Christian era. Among the Khonds of Orissa, one of the ancient kingdoms of Hindustan, the custom was in vogue up to the year 1836, when it was suppressed by the British Government. In 1866 a terrible public sacrifice took place in Dahomey in which the king had 200 victims slaughtered in order to win the favor of the gods in the war which he was about to wage against the Aschantis. This was the third atrocity of the kind in the same year. In Kumassi there is a place said to be always wet with human blood. But the highest water-mark was reached by the Aztecs on whose altars between twenty and fifty thousand victims were yearly immolated.

The above consideration of the pathological effects resulting from

¹For full accounts of these movements see Tracy, *The Great Awakening*, S. P. Hayes, *An Historical Study of the Edwardian Revivals*, *Am. Jour. Psyc.*, Vol. 43, pp. 550-574. F. M. Davenport: *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, N. Y., 1905.

²See his two books, *Early Conversion*, and *Conversion of Children*.

an abnormal relation of the different emotions to the total religious experience justifies, in the opinion of the writer, the following generalizations.

First. Religion, like all other human products, such as art, science, philosophy, government, etc., is subject to the laws of evolution and degeneration, and is modified and colored by the general state of mental and physical health and degree of development of the individuals composing a tribe or race. Different types of individuals and different eras must of necessity give birth to different types of religion. God or nature has created a variety of types of individuals and each type has created a God in its own image.

Second. The religion of a people can never rise above its source, *i. e.*, the stage of their mental and moral development. The religion of a religious genius, though it may be accepted by the masses is rarely, if ever, their own religion in the truest sense of the word. Our meaning will be made clear when we say that after a lapse of twenty centuries of unparalleled development there are but few Christians even to-day. Also the difference between the Christianity of the third century and of the twentieth is proportional to the difference in the mental and moral development of the two centuries. Likewise, the religion of the savage and of the child of civilized parents is and always must be inferior to that of the cultured adult. It is as impossible to make them suddenly rise to the heights of a religion which has taken the most progressive nations centuries upon centuries to evolve as it is to hasten the growth of a tree by pulling it up. All attempts to do so have proven most injurious to the mental and physical health of the savage and the child. The true pedagogical method, so long ago recognized and put in use by the Buddhists and the first great and successful missionary, St. Paul¹ is, it is encouraging to note, at last being more and more appreciated by our own religious teachers and missionaries, who are now endeavoring to teach the child and the primitive peoples religions which they can understand and readily assimilate, religions which fit their stages of development and satisfy their needs.

Third. Arrested peoples have naturally enough arrested forms of religion. These religions cannot be called superstitions because superstitions as we understand them are unknown to these peoples. Their

¹See 1 Cor. 3: 1-2.

beliefs and practices, absurd and childish as they seem to us, are congruous with their stage of development and are as truly religious as are those of more advanced peoples. Unless they injure the mental, moral, and physical health of their adherents they cannot be considered pathological. But when these same beliefs and customs persist among a people who have reached a stage of development which is not compatible with them, they become, like rudimentary organs, useless and dangerous.

Fourth. We have seen to what a large extent religion draws upon the emotions. Indeed, in the light of what has preceded we have no hesitancy in saying with Jonathan Edwards that true religion consists so much in the affections that there can be no true religion without them. One may be a philosopher, critic, and even a theologian and still be non-religious: and on the other hand he may be none of these to any marked degree and be extremely religious. "And though I have the gift of prophecy," says Paul, "and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge: and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity (love, kindness, sympathy, pity, etc.), I am nothing."¹ At least, so far as religion is concerned. It is "out of his strongest feelings," as Mr. Fielding writes, that "man has built up his faiths," and a cold, intellectual religion is an anomaly.²

Fifth. While the emotions are a prime essential of religion, as rivers are of fruitful valleys, and while in every normal religious consciousness each has its own proper and harmonious expression, the most disastrous results follow when any of them is inordinately exaggerated and intensified, whenever the river, so to speak, overflows its banks and spreads over alien areas. The danger here is especially great because of the close connection between the emotions and bodily states. It is impossible, of course, to determine with mathematical accuracy beyond what point the expression of an emotion becomes abnormal: the gradations from the normal to the abnormal are imperceptible. In the above cases, however, there can be no doubt that the phenomena are positively pathological, for in every instance the intellectual, moral, or physical developments of the individual, the tribe, or the race has been seriously interfered with.

Lastly, we have seen the close relationship between the emotions

¹ I Cor. 13:1-2.

² *The Hearts of Men*, p. 308.

and conduct. Disordered religious emotions lead to grotesque and pathological deeds, and *vice versa*. Man is an organic being, no part of which can be injured or deranged without its influencing other parts and the whole. In religion, as in all things, 'sophrosune' or the harmonious subordination of the parts to the whole is the healthy and normal condition to be striven for. Modern education, secular as well as religious, has still much to learn from the ancient Greeks who considered this the foundation of every virtue, and its mission will never be fulfilled until it has taught men to be temperate in all things. For the temperate man is preëminently the normal man: in his soul and body divine harmony reigns. He is healthy and happy, moral, religious, and worldly, and for him are the Kingdoms of Heaven and Earth.

Note. This paper is a condensation of the first chapter of a work which is almost ready for publication. In the succeeding chapters the following topics are treated.

Chap. 2. Mysticism, containing an account of the different and conflicting definitions of it: a brief historical survey from the earliest times to the present: an attempt to analyze it psychologically and to differentiate between normal mysticism which favors culture and self-expansion, and morbid mysticism which is either the product of a diseased brain, or when artificially induced leads to morbid introspection, idle contemplation, abstraction, trances, hallucinations, and other mental disturbances.

Chap. 3. Fetichism, Symbolism, and Interpretation. Here the writer attempts to show that symbols are necessary and useful to certain stages of development, but as soon as they cease to be symbols and become fetiches, idols, amulets, and hollow masks they are serious obstacles to intellectual progress. The long and bitter warfare waged by science against sacred relics supposed to possess miraculous curative powers: the many degenerate symbolic rites, the slightest violation of which had to be atoned for with most painful penances: the ceaseless turning of praying-wheels and cylinders by the Buddhists of Thibet: the countless repetitions of certain phrases by Catholics and Jews: the many injurious water and fire baptismal rites: the foul and revolting scatological rites are all examples of the injurious effects of morbid symbolism. In the Talmud, Quabbalah, and writings of the early and medieval Christian Fathers we see the evils of bibliolatry, traditional-

ism, formalism, and the different kinds of interpretation such as the allegorical, tropological, anagogical, historical, etc. The intellectual energies of the best minds were for centuries wasted on these trivialities and undoubtedly retarded the progress of civilization.

Chap. 4. Asceticism and Monasticism. Here we show that asceticism obtains in almost all religions and attempt to differentiate, with the aid of illustrations, between normal asceticism, which is necessary for serious work of a high order, and morbid asceticism which drives men into deserts, marshes, caves, on pillar-tops, into narrow cells, or worse still into the unhealthy ooze of their morbid souls and is productive of nothing but disease, mental, moral, and physical. A psychological consideration of asceticism and its causes ends the chapter.

Chap. 5. The Intellectual Element in Religion. In this chapter we attempt to show the rôle of belief in religion and to discriminate between normal and necessary beliefs and those which militate against the advancement of science. Atavistic beliefs are pathological. In the same way we attempt to distinguish between normal doubt which spurs the intellect on to free itself from the errors of the past and extend the boundaries of knowledge, 'dubito ut intelligam' and morbid doubt, *folie du doute*, *Grübelnsucht*, the only fruits of which are melancholia, despair, and suicide. Pedagogic principles which the study seems to warrant are deduced.

Chap. 6. The Volitional Element in Religion. Here we consider the rôle that will plays in religious consciousness: the relations between the emotions, intellect, and will. Those pathological religious acts and practices which could not well be included in the preceding chapters are here considered. A study of fanaticism and excessive church organization ends the book.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS IN FAMOUS SUPERSTITIONS.

BY REV. CHARLES FREDERICK ROBINSON, A. M., S. T. B.

The attention paid in recent years to the subject of the Psychology of Religion has made it inevitable that inquiry would sooner or later develop regarding the Pathology of Religion. The prospectus of this magazine says: "That the religious nature has diseases both chronic and acute of its own, not only its history but many of its temporary manifestations abundantly show." Just what factors constitute such diseases will doubtless come out upon discussion. I surmise that one factor of no small importance which will attract attention will be the condition of health or unhealth in which human minds are found. Certainly history seems to indicate that the prevalence of certain nervous affections, coupled with the fears of man inspired by the dangers of his environment, have wrought out certain quasi religious systems which have gravely and injuriously affected the peace and health of society. Such are demonology, sorcery, magic, witchcraft, and spiritualism, which on closer examination reveal as their foundation certain abnormal mental states in a part of mankind. In studying them, one is almost tempted to discard their various names, finding in them indications of one self-consistent historical system. For such a system we have no adequate name, and must for the present rest content with the word superstition.

For the study of this whole subject, little material is available in English, except in scattered form. Prof. Alfred Lehmann, director of the psychophysical laboratory at the University of Copenhagen, has gathered much important material together into a book on Superstition and Sorcery, which has been translated from the original Danish into German by Dr. Petersen as "*Aberglaube und Zauberei*." ¹ Besides an invaluable discussion of every phase of the subject, Prof. Lehmann

¹ Stuttgart, 1898.

adds an exhaustive bibliography. To this should be added Soldan's monumental book on Witch-craft Trials, which has been brought down to recent date by his son-in-law Heinrich Heppe.¹

A study of the influence of the abnormal on religious thought as suggested by these and other books, cannot but convince the sober reader of the necessity for emphasizing the normal and healthy religious experience as true to the human constitution, and hence true to God in whose image man is made. Certainly the experience of the race in the past gives overwhelming evidence of the degrading influence of the terror-inspiring illusions that have always accompanied the abnormal in religion.

The origins of systems containing such features might be traced back into the thought of savage peoples. It will, however, be sufficient for our purpose to begin with the ancient peoples who dwelt in the Euphrates valley. At the dawn of history, we find their religious system highly developed, showing many features that foreshadow the later Hebrew ideas. Compare with the Fifty-first Psalm, these extracts from a Babylonian penitential psalm.²

O my god, who art angry with me,
accept my prayer!
O my goddess, who art wroth with me,
receive my supplication!
Receive my supplication, let thy liver be
at rest!
.....
May the ban be loosened, may the chains
be cast off!
May the seven winds carry away my sighs!
May I strip off my wickedness, may the
birds carry it to the heavens!
May the fish carry off my misery,
the river bear it away!
May the beasts of the field take it away from me,
may the running waters of the river
wash me clean!
Make me bright like gold ! "

This might almost be a Hebrew psalm, but for the modified view of nature; but now the tide turns, and the cankering desire to read the

¹Soldan-Heppe: *Hexenprozesse*, Stuttgart, 1880.

²Biblical World, May, 1904, p. 364 f.

future through the unusual or striking dream appears,—the true Chaldean element:

“Grant to me that I may see a favorable
dream!
May the dream which I see be favorable,
may the dream which I see come true!
The dream which I see turn to
my favor!
May the god, . . . the god of dreams, stand
at my head,
Make me to enter into Esagila, the
temple of the gods, the house of life!”

A most essential part of their religious system was the belief in the possession of every phase of nature's activities by lower spiritual powers, which may be called daemons. Such spirits, dwelling in every tree, rock, stream and hill, in the air and in the sea, had each its master word or formula, the possession of which gave a man the power to compel it to do his bidding. The knowledge of the proper formulæ with which to ward off the dangers and diseases brought on by evil spirits was the prerogative of the priests, who were busied much of the time in the work of exorcism. It even became necessary to make a division of labor, that all the work of this sort called for might be done. The priests were therefore usually specialists in the exorcism of some particular sort or family of evil spirits. It readily follows that there might be men and women who would seek the aid of these same evil spirits in order to harm those whom they hated. The code of Hammurabi shows that the very charge of such a thing was equal to a gage of mortal combat between accused and accuser, carrying with it the forfeiture of the estate of the vanquished.¹

In spite of this provision of the law, the “Black Art,” alongside the “White Magic,” developed in great luxuriance in this centre of Oriental civilization, and from thence spread all over the known world. The very name “Chaldean” came to indicate some connection with occult powers. Forms of conjuring feared by these people were the mutilation of effigies, the evil face, the evil eye, the evil tongue, the evil lip, the shameful poison, and especially, the curse.

“The shameful curse, it works upon man like an evil demon: the words of the curse float over him. . . . It is the charm which causes

¹Code of Hammurabi, § 2.

madness, . . . it strangles this man like a lamb; his god has withdrawn from the depths of his body."¹

The names of things with the master formula, in their thought, have a sort of identity with the things themselves, so that harming the name, harms the thing. This feeling, reversed, led parents to name the child for a god, that the god might protect him.

Another favorite study of the Chaldeans was an attempt to discover the connection between events on earth and the motions of the stars, which, with their belief in the spiritual possession of all things in nature, they identified with the gods. This study resulted in the so-called "science" of astrology, which has survived through the millenniums down to our day. They were also interested in different forms of augury by the actions of animals, flight of birds, etc.

However much the errors of the Chaldean system may be accounted for through faulty observation and a naïve philosophy, we cannot doubt that exorcism, at least, rested upon the existence among the people of such nerve diseases as epilepsy and insanity, which show phases in their symptoms that have almost universally caused observers to assume the presence of superhuman agencies. The discovery of the physiological basis for these diseases is a matter of comparatively recent date.

Another common belief was in witchcraft. The peasantry of old Akkad already believed that the witches gathered together for their obscene ceremonies, riding to the same on a "Stick of wood" (the modern broomstick).² I shall later attempt to show the origin of this ancient tradition in abnormal mental conditions and the use of a well-known narcotic.³

The Chaldeans also knew, apparently, of the trance state that is the basis of the capacity of spiritualistic mediums, and interpreted it, as has so often been done since, as an indication of the reality of the commerce of the living with the souls of the dead.

The complete demonology which resulted from these beliefs, brought to the West through many different channels, elevated into an occult "science" by the school-men, and spreading more obscurely among the common people, helped to incite the use of torture and the stake for

¹Lehmann: *Aberglaube und Zauberei*, p. 32.

²Soldan: *Hexenprozesse*, I, p. 29.

³The Chaldeans personified the images formed by erotic dreams as male and female demons whom they called "the night compellers, whose embraces neither married woman can avoid in sleep." Lehmann: *op. cit.*, p. 26.

thousands of hysterical women accused of witchcraft, and persists to-day in our astrology, palmistry, and fast disappearing "Black art."

The development which was meantime going on in Egypt, led to a more clearly defined spiritualism, along with the universal belief in demoniacal possession. The peculiarity of Egyptian religion was the power assumed in their magic formulas and charms, to force the god to do their bidding. This so-called theurgy rested on the theory that even the gods have their weak sides, from which one skilled in magic can approach to compel favors. This, too, had its influence upon the learned magic of the Middle Ages.¹

The early Greeks saw in nature the presence of localized spirits inhabiting forests, fountains, and trees—nymphs, dryads, satyrs. But these spirits had no ill will to men. The Greek mind was not favorable to exorcism. The help of one god or goddess was directly invoked to ward off the injury which another might try to work. Yet the prevalence of superstition among the common people is shown by the customs of the *anthesteria*, an Athenian festival, where the offerings were to the god of the under world, and the celebrators were prepared at all times for a sudden appearance of the shades of the departed. Doorposts were daubed with pitch to ward off the dreaded ghosts, and food was set forth for them, that they might be appeased from any harmful intentions.²

The early Greek acquaintance with spiritualism is shown by the Homeric poems. The proceedings of Ulysses on the Cimmerian shores show how the various acts of sacrifice tended to produce in the celebrator that abstraction and enthusiasm that leads to the partial self-hypnotization of the "medium:"

"The blood flowed dark; and thronging round me came
Souls of the dead from Erebus—young wives
And maids unwedded, men worn out with years
And toil, and virgins of a tender age
In their new grief, and many a warrior slain
In battle, mangled by the spear, and clad
In bloody armor, who about the trench
Flitted on every side, now here, now there,
With gibbering cries, and I grew pale with fear."³

The story of Orpheus and Eurydice is another case in point.

¹ Lehmann: *op. cit.*, pp. 130 f. 212.

² Ency. Brit., 2, 103. Lehmann: *op. cit.*, p. 43.

³ Bryant's *Odyssey*, Book 11, ll. 46-51, *cf.* the preceding lines.

Curiously enough, the two famous oracles of Greece, at Delphi and Dodona, both depended upon the abnormal mental condition of the priestesses who delivered the words of the god. This was well understood by the Greeks themselves, who regarded the abstraction or ecstasy in which they spoke as the direct possession of the priestess by the god Apollo, or Zeus, as the case might be. But modern criticism furnishes the physiological basis by showing that the Delphic oracle was doubtless "inspired" by some kind of natural gas proceeding from a hole in the rock, and that the priestess at Dodona was intoxicated with the water of a mineral spring.¹

Greece also made her contribution to the witchcraft tradition. This form of belief probably entered the land through Thessaly, which was long occupied by the Persians. Additions to the original demonology from the Greek mythology, and from other sources in the West, caused the later blossoming of a complete imaginary system of witchcraft, or league with the devil for evil purposes of enchantment and ghoulish revelry. It is already a fixed idea of this offspring of man's diseased imagination, that the Thessalian women who indulged in it could fly about in the air on their lustful errands.² They possessed the power of making an ointment—another fixed element in the tradition,—that would turn a man into a bird, an ass, or a stone. The ingredients of this ointment are fish entrails, lizards, wolf's hairs, toad's bones, dove's blood, snake's skeletons, owl's feathers, remains of the dead, and other disgusting objects. The use of this ointment points us, as we shall see later, to the use of a narcotic to heighten certain visions of a hysterical nature which, by their erotic form, produced the impression of a system of immoral orgies by night. The diabolical person with whom the Thessalian witches had commerce was the goddess of the under world, the fearful Hecate, who appears in the thickest darkness with torch and sword, with dragon feet and serpent hair, surrounded by bay-ing hounds, and followed by fearful phantoms. All the accompaniments of the scene, with its vague and shadowy nature, speak of the nightmare that follows digestive abuse, or the wreck of the nervous system through sexual excesses. So great was the reputation of the witches of

¹ Myers: *The Eastern Nations and Greece*, p. 179; *Ency. Brit.*, 7, p. 53; Lehmann: *op. cit.*, p. 48.

² Saldan: *Hexenprozesse* 1, p. 42 ff.; Lehmann: *op. cit.*, p. 50 ff.

Thessaly, that in Horace's time the people of Naples believed they could call the moon down out of the sky.¹

The Roman magic, spiritualism and witchcraft differed little in essentials from the Greek. Augury was more prominent, probably as a result of contact with the Etruscans, who were evidently closely related with the peoples of the East, and preserved the old forms of divination through the inspection of the entrails of sacrificed animals. Rome also had its oracle, the Sibylline priestess at Cumae. The appearance of the Sibyl is described by Vergil.² When the inspiration of the god comes over the prophetess, she changes color, tears her hair, breathes irregularly, and passes into a frenzy, appearing more majestic than mortals, as if under a divine afflation, drawing nearer to the god. In this semi-trance condition she writes prophecies on leaves of trees, which she lays in order, but which the wind disorders.

The Roman belief in witchcraft gives us the description of creatures called "*Striges*," "*Empusae*," and "*Lamiae*," nightmare-like beasts who were supposed to offer their breasts to children to poison them with their unwholesome milk, or, according to others, to suck out their blood and vitals. These creatures were once supposed to have feathers, to lay eggs, etc., but later they were identified with women who transformed themselves into feathered creatures to fly through the air on their quests.³

One can hardly look back upon these ancient systems of belief, without noting the profound influence upon men's thought of dreams, visions, trances, and the morbid conditions brought on by mental disease and the use of narcotics. Since these phenomena were striking and unusual, they caught people's attention, and held it more completely than normal conditions could. Yet, since they often resulted in evil, they were more naturally ascribed to demons than to a good God. Hence arose a complete demonology, a considerably definite spiritualism, and a peculiar system of witchcraft.

The early Christians believed that their great adversary was overcome through the power of Christ,⁴ and, that the power had been given to the missionaries of the new religion to cast out his lesser followers from those whom they afflicted.

¹ Horace: Epode 5, ll. 43-46.

² Æneid : 3, ll. 441 ff., 6, ll. 45-51.

³ Ovid : Fast., 6: 141.

⁴ I John, 3:8.

They walked through the world without fear of ghosts or witches or even of the devil himself. Their belief in Christ, had, for the first time in the world's history, completely freed men from fear of the threat of unseen harm.¹ In Genesis 6: 1-4, they found a basis for belief in the reality and activity of devils, who raged against the kingdom of Christ, stirred up the heathen to persecute the church, fomented heresies in it, wrought injury upon men and flocks through famine and plague, though their power to injure the Christian himself was forever broken.² Augustine (d. 430) taught that God created two kingdoms in the world, the *civitas Dei*, and the *civitas Diaboli*, the latter not yet overcome though closely besieged by the church. Since the devils, light in body, could do wonderful things, men worshipped them as gods, and thus originated the heathen religious systems. Even Augustine admitted the reality of the world of demons, though its power was destroyed by Christ. The singing of incantations and the wearing of amulets was strictly forbidden to the Christian as counting on the aid of devils.

The earliest Christian laws drastically forbade all forms of magic, naming auspices, augurs, "Chaldeans," magicians, invokers of the dead, interpreters of dreams and all prophets.³

In spite of this liberation of the early Christians, the Middle Ages saw a great development of superstition following several different courses. One of them was influenced by the contact of Western scholars with the Arabs and Moors, and took the form of a pseudo-science, called the "Learned Magic." The Jewish mysticism also enters here, and adds its Kabbalistic learning, with its secret codes, and its belief in the place of the letter and the number in the search after divine wisdom as manifested in the world.

The divisions of the learned magic follow the means through which the scholar hopes to penetrate the secrets of nature and of human life. Thus we have astrology, which thinks of the stars as having special sympathy with mundane persons and events; chiromancy, the sympathy of the wrinkles of the hands with the fate of the individual; the practical Kabbalah, or search for keywords of angels and devils; alchemy, the study of means to transmute baser metals into gold;

¹ Cf. The Shepherd of Hermas, § 8, 12-4, 6.

² Seldan Hexenprozesse, 1 pp. 86 ff. Cod. Theod. Lib. 9, Tit. 16, 1, 4, 5, 6.

natural magic, the "science" of the sympathy and antipathy of things in nature.

During and since the Middle Ages the vogue of this branch of superstition has encouraged in the popular mind a tendency to believe in the possibility of special occult knowledge and power. In the life of the church, both priests and laymen have come to regard the ordinary ministrations of the clergy as endowed with a supernatural—indeed, practically a magic—efficiency. The Catholic church emerged from the Middle Ages firmly established in several doctrines that partook of this superstitious character. Such is the doctrine of transubstantiation, which holds that at the tinkling of the altar bell that which has been the bread and wine actually becomes the body and blood of Christ, and is to be revered as such.¹ One may sometimes read in his morning paper, of a priest rushing through fire and smoke, at the risk of his own life, to save the consecrated host from the flames. The mass is practically an incantation, the priest a sorcerer, and the magic the mightiest ever known, the changing of the simplest elements of daily use into the body of God. When this magic is administered on the death bed, it assures one of a share in eternal joy.

Such another doctrine is that of the priestly power of absolution, in which the priest, entirely independently of any character element involved, declares that the penitent's sins are forgiven. Indeed, the whole so-called sacramentarian system of thought, which regards the sacraments as having their effect independently of the state of mind of the recipient, and of the character of the officiating priest is essentially based upon a view of religion as magic. "The sacraments produce their legitimate effect *ex opere operato*, that is, by an intrinsic efficiency."² With such views as these, it is natural to expect the sale of indulgences, and the Jesuitical belief and practice of deception to gain holy ends.

The learned magic also joined with the popular tradition in giving a fresh impetus to the ancient system of witchcraft. The best witness to this is the Faust legend. The Faust of Goethe, and the older Faust of Marlowe, is a scholar who has tried and tired of all forms of learning, and has finally turned to magic books where "Lines, circles, scenes, letters and characters,"³ upon the pages, unfold to the sorcerer

¹ Fisher: History of the Christian Church, pp. 179, 225.

² Fisher: *op. cit.*, p. 223 f.

³ Marlowe's Faustus, Act 1, Scene 1.

'A world of profit and delight,
Of power, of honor, of omnipotence.'

Using the charm which he finds in the magic book, he finds to his surprise that the spirit he calls appears.¹ It is but a step from the obedience of the spirit to an agreement with the devil, by which the scholar sells his soul for the use of the devil's power to grant him a certain number of years of enjoying the satisfaction of his desires. It is easy to see that the first part of the legend concerns the learned magic, and the second reflects the vulgar view of witchcraft, the origin of which, as I have shown, is lost in the dim mists of antiquity.

In the early years of the Christian church the dominant pagans brought the accusation of evil practices against the rising sect of Christians. These depraved people, they say, at their love-feasts, shutting out all who have not joined them in most awe-inspiring vows, surfeit upon disgusting foods, prominent among which are young children stolen from their enemies, worship an ass or some other common beast, and, finally, extinguishing the lights, indulge in most foul orgies of promiscuous sexual excess. The prosecution of such foul creatures thus became a work of public necessity. When the church came into power, Christians speedily made the same accusations against the heretical sects. At the same time they transformed the gods of the old heathen mythologies into evil spirits with certain powers which could be made use of through magic art. Yet some of the leaders objected strenuously to this renewal of belief in demons. Chrysostom (d. 407) denied from his pulpit that charms, phylacteries, etc., had any power whatever, denouncing all belief in them as foolishness.² That his view of the matter gained great power in the church is shown by the so-called *Canon Episcopi*, long supposed to date from the Synod of Ancyra (A. D. 314) but now known to belong probably to the ninth century. Some quotations from it may be illuminating as to the status of witchcraft in the Christian church.³

'Some wicked women—led by illusions and phantasies of demoniacal origin—believe and profess that they, in the night, with Diana, a goddess of the pagans, or with Herodias and an innumerable company

¹ Marlowe's *Faustus*, Act I, Scene 3. Goethe's *Faust*, Act I, Scene 1.

² Chrysostom, on Admonitions of Women, also 30th Homily on Matthew.

³ Sudan, *Hexenprozesse*, I, p. 120 ff.

of women, ride upon certain beasts over great stretches of territory in the silence of the stormy night, and obey her orders as if she were the Lord, and on certain nights are called out to worship her. A great multitude of people, deceived by this false opinion, believe these things are true, and by so believing, wander from the true faith, and are involved in the errors of the pagans in believing that there is any divinity or superhuman power except the one God. . . . Satan himself when he has captivated the mind of any woman . . . transforms himself into the appearance and likeness of various persons, and affecting in sleep the mind which he holds captive now joyfully, now sadly, and showing it persons, now known, now unknown, leads it through devious ways; and while the spirit alone experiences this, the faithless mind thinks it has happened not to the soul, but to the body. For who is there who is not led outside himself in dreams and visions of the night, and who does not see many things while asleep that he has never seen while awake? . . . Therefore whoever believes it can be brought about that any creature can be changed either into a better or worse, or transformed into another likeness or similitude except by the Creator himself who made all things and through whom all things are made, without doubt is an infidel and worse than a pagan."

This eminently sane conclusion might have held its ground, had not influences favorable to superstition set in with the ending of the first Christian millenium, which did not, as expected, mark the end of the world. The Crusades appealed to the imaginations of men with new things to be afraid of, coming out of the East. The Saracens became the instructors of the Franks in mystic and magic arts. Great wars and pestilences kept men in a state of almost constant panic. Force ruled, and lust ran riot. The times were ripe for great epidemics of nervous affections of a hysterical nature, when the dream-visions mentioned in the *Canon Episcoporum* would take on unusually vivid form, and the impressible minds of women would be open to the faintest suggestions of what it might be possible for them to experience in the darkness of the stormy night. Learned men, too, were to play their part. Thomas Aquinas gave the death blow to the *Canon Episcoporum* and established about 1265 the contrary thesis:¹ that he who did not believe witchcraft possible was wandering from the faith, and worthy of excommunication.

¹ Thomas Aquinas: Quodlib. 11 Art. 10. See Soldan: Hexenprozesse, 1, p. 142 f.

It needed only the zeal of the inquisitors, on the watch for every fall from the holy Catholic faith, to persuade a narrow-minded pope to issue a bull commanding all the clergy to assist the inquisition in searching out and punishing witchcraft, to set in motion all the machinery of the church against those regarded as witches. The opportunity was used by the Inquisition with all its well known merciless ingenuity in the art of torture, for over a century. Thousands were burned at the stake. In some provinces, whole villages were desolated: the mere accusation of witchcraft usually being sufficient to lead to an execution.

The judicial records of the "trials" of these witches, reveals a supposed system of debased worship having a universal nature that points to some common cause. The witches were said to go forth by night to worship the devil, by whom they had first been seduced, and afterward bound to himself by some fearful covenant. They practiced unnamable obscenities, mocked the rites of the church by foul imitations, and indulged in promiscuous lustful orgies. The devil revealed to them charms by which they could injure the person, the cattle, or the fields of their enemies. They anointed themselves with a narcotic ointment, and flew to the scene of the gathering on a broomstick or a black cat. The gatherings were held, when possible, on some high festival day of the church. The witches who were examined were ready to name their companions, who in turn were likely to make confession. In fact the most puzzling feature of the witchcraft trials, is that the whole disgusting system is apparently wrought out by the "confessions" of the accused—confessions, of course, wrung out by torture, or by fear of torture.

The existence of this system in the thought of men is one of the riddles of history. Its main features are very ancient, and of such a universal nature that they cannot be the result of individual fancy. It can only be the result of certain constant psychical elements, which it is our task to discover. Historically, we have to note the extreme antiquity of the superstition and its connection with the Chaldean demonology; the natural fear of the night and its dangers on the part of sensitive women; the heartrending scenes of persecution in the early days of Christianity; the contact of the West with the mystical

* Bull of Innocent VIII. A. D. 1484.

East in the Crusades : and the rigorous divisions brought about by the Reformation.¹ Psychologically, we note certain abnormal phases of experience which furnish the constant elements for which we seek, and determine the character of the tradition. They are :—(a) dreams and visions of the night, the prevailing erotic character of which show their connection with hysteria, heightened, no doubt, by the narcotic *Solanum furiosum* or *Hyoscyamus niger* used in the witch-ointment² so prevalently in evidence : (b) the working on the suggestibility of the already existing body of tradition in giving form to the dreams, and confirming the vague impressions of them as remembered in the waking hours : (c) the terror of the torture rack and the confusing accusations and cross-questioning of the inquisitors, suggesting things from previous confessions made to them, the very horror of which would naturally prove a fascination to the half-frantic mind of the accused, and in which it is easier to read the wish of the torturer than the actual experience of the tortured : (d) along with these elements we gain hints of the existence and occasional manifestation of the phenomena that accompany the spiritualistic “medium.”

Thus the pitiful system was built up out of shattered nerves, from superstition, and the fear that follows persecution. In spite of our boasted progress, we may expect to see any day in our morning paper of the breaking out of the old superstition in some remote district of Europe, culminating in an attempted execution of some unfortunate woman.

The religious result of this system was the substitution for the one God of two mighty beings, one rather colorless, though theoretically the All-powerful, and the other a very interesting and terrible being, with much power to harm men, whom they called the devil. Nothing could prove a more effectual counter belief to the Christian's trust in the love and mercy of God.

Upon the death of witchcraft, spiritualism arose with its new demonology to fill the void. The demons were replaced by spirits with all the power of their predecessors, but without their malice. The key to the whole system of spiritualism is in the one psychical peculi-

¹ A Romish bishop in 1565 declared Martin Luther to be the actual child of the devil. Soldan: Hexenprozesse. 1, p. 308.

² Lehman: *op. cit.*, p. 504 f.

arity of individuals which results in the noteworthy phenomena in connection with their presence that characterize the so-called "medium."¹ That these phenomena are caused by disembodied spirits is only one of several possible interpretations.

Historically considered, spiritualism is of very ancient origin.² Frequent references to mediumistic phenomena are found in the records of witchcraft trials. A typical case occurred in the house of one Anna Bartsckjars in 1608-9. The "medium" in this case was a boy of twelve. The phenomena noted were clucking as of a hen with chickens under the head of the bed; then a sudden seizure of the boy while he lay in bed, accompanied by a violent rocking of the bedstead. He was made temporarily dumb by the seizure. The next evening while the family were at supper, both doors were flung violently open without visible agency, and the boy lifted suddenly an ell and a half into the air, resisting the force of the united family who tried to pull him down. Upon their falling on their knees in prayer to God, he fell back to the floor.³ Here we have spirit rappings, trance, and levitation, ascribed here to witchcraft, as later to the agency of spirits.

The learned magic knew of the power to call up spirits, which were called demons rather than the souls of the dead. Abraham of Worms tells how to develop what would now be called mediumistic powers through prayer and contemplation, and promises a "materialization" as the result.⁴ The roots of spiritualism are thus seen to be in the old demonology. The difference is mainly in the direction taken by the hints to the suggestibility of those affected.

Swedenborg (1688-1772), while knowing nothing of spirit rappings, was subject to visions, and possessed the power of clairvoyance, which he ascribed to the ministration of spirits. His whole system of religious teaching rests upon the assumption that for many years he was in intimate converse with angels and with the spirits of the dead, of whose condition he gives most detailed descriptions.⁵

¹ For an excellent definition see Lehmann, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

² *Ibid. supra*, p. 251.

³ Lehmann, *op. cit.*, p. 215, quoting from Anna Bartsckjars' MSS., published by Brunsmand in 1674.

⁴ In "On the True Practice of the Ancient and Divine Magic," apparently of the 17th century.

⁵ See Swedenborg: *Heaven and Hell*, *Sub fine.*; *The True Christian Religion*, Nos. 792-851; also *Index to the Relations*, *The Heavenly Arama*, Nos. 329-327, 443-459; also White: *Life of Emanuel Swedenborg*, chs. 8 and 9.

In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, several German savants, following Swedenborg, built up a system of Pneumatology which developed still further the spiritualistic teaching. They were favored with the services of one of the most renowned mediums of modern times, Frederika Hauffe, the "Seeress of Prevorst." Her powers were developed along with severe nervous disturbances of a hysterical order, which were treated by a magnetic healer. The sad wreck of her bodily strength left her in a state of almost constant somnambulism in which she was clairvoyant and saw spirits. Physical phenomena, such as the opening and shutting of a door, a musical tone formed in the air, etc., also took place in her presence. She produced automatic writing and enjoyed great renown as a healing medium. She spoke often in a special language, which she called the language of the spirits. Her own interpretation of these phenomena was purely spiritualistic.

Certain happenings in two widely separated villages in America, about 1850, gave a great impetus to spiritualism as a system, -one almost says a religion. In Hydesville, a little hamlet of Wayne Co., New York, a house was visited by spirit rappings. The three Fox sisters, children, who soon after lived in the house, were the first to seek answers from the spirit world by a system of signals (three raps for yes, one for no, etc.). The "spirit" who answered them assured them that he was a pedlar who had been murdered in the house and buried in the cellar. On investigation a skeleton was indeed found. The phenomena was investigated by many people, including some scientific men, who declared a spiritualistic interpretation the only possible one. It should be added that the Fox sisters, later in life, confessed that they produced the knocking by a peculiar ability to snap their toe joints. Yet the psychological peculiarities of the "medium" were present, and it was their practice that originated table-tipping.

In Stratford, Conn., the "medium" was the eleven years old Harry Phelps, son of Rev. Dr. Phelps, a well-known clergyman. In his presence the furniture tumbled about in the most extraordinary manner, clothes gathered themselves together into the appearance of a human form, windows were broken, fires kindled, etc. These events were investigated by Andrew Jackson Davis, who, while confessing his discovery of certain elements of trickery, wrought out of them and his own experience a complete system of religious philosophy. Appearing

in his book "The Principles of Nature," and other works, this system became the theoretical basis of modern spiritualism. The especially popular feature of his teaching was the denial of any difference between good and wicked people except in development, the lack of which will be made up in the spirit existence.

The limits of this paper forbid a thoroughgoing discussion of these phenomena.¹ In general, they are of two classes, which may be called physical and psychical. The first class, if correctly observed, implies the existence of a force in nature, working through the brain or muscles of the medium, which is not in the category of scientifically known forces. For instance, Rev. Minot J. Savage claims to have seen with his own eyes a heavy piano raised into the air by the touch of a delicate woman's hand.² This he supposes to have been done by spirits. Similar phenomena claimed to have been observed are rappings, ringing of bells, playing of musical instruments without contact of any human hand, appearance of lights, sound of voices, appearance of human forms, direct writing without human intervention, handling of red hot coals, passing of solids through solids, etc. These have been explained as well by an occult force in nature, as by the agency of spirits: but neither assumption seems to be necessary. After an exhaustive inquiry into all forms of so-called physical forces, Lehmann concludes, "No intelligent investigator of to-day will deny *a priori* the possibility that there may be a still unknown force in man's nature. But one thing is certain: up to the present time no one has been able to give an irrefutable proof for the existence of such a force." In the first place it must be noted that most of the noted "physical mediums" have been exposed in trickery and sleight of hand, part of which may indeed be below the level of consciousness, and so unintentional. In the second place, the impossibility of accurate observation³ in the conditions of the usual séance, and the credulity of the average attendant, render most accounts of very doubtful scientific value. "What may broadly be called

See Enay, Brit., "Spiritualism," and Lehmann, *Aberglaube und Zaubererei*, pp. 211-312.

¹ In a book entitled "Can Telepathy Explain."

² Lehmann, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

³ Lehmann personally succeeded in producing writing on the inside of a slate, and convincing two scientific men that it had been closed all the time. The place conflicting reports of what took place are exceedingly significant. *Op. cit.*, p. 345 ff.

conjuring is, however, a much more probable explanation of the recorded phenomena."¹

The second class of phenomena have their convincing powers through the unusual actions and words of the medium, or may be explained by automatic vibratory movements of the hand in contact with such an object as a table, or even automatic writing—all these things usually being done or said by the medium in a state of trance. The form of these phenomena is clearly explained by recent psychological studies as the play of the sub-conscious imagination, and the control of the movements of the body by the lower nervous centres. Study of hypnotism, hysteria, double consciousness, etc., have thrown great light upon the mental states involved. The only real question now at issue is one of the contents of the medium's mind. Can sense perception account for the original acquisition of all the things that come automatically to the surface of the mind in the abnormal state of trance, or must we fall back upon one of the alternative theories of spiritual communication or telepathy, *i. e.*, direct communication between minds of living people?

The answer to this will depend partly upon one's own inclination. Lehmann says, "Among a thousand spiritualists scarcely one has seen with his own eyes what would have convinced him of the agency of spirits, if he had not brought the belief to the séance with him."²

Two comparatively recent discoveries have a vital bearing upon the question. One is that sensations may register their impression upon the memory which are never focal in consciousness until at some later time: then, while the attention is crippled by hypnotism or by some form of artificial abstraction, they spring forth as fresh as though first perceived.

A young woman who was wont to amuse herself with crystal-gazing, saw in the crystal one day, after a long walk, a house with a stone wall on which the jasmine grew in a peculiar and striking way. She was sure she had never seen the house or the jasmine. On the next day she retraced the walk of the day before, and found the house just as her crystal vision had shown it. It had been only marginal in her consciousness before, and had not attracted her attention in the least. Yet the record of it appeared in her memory. Similar mental posses-

¹ Ency. Brit., 22, p. 406.

² Lehmann: *op cit.*, p. 243.

sions of which the medium is unconscious, may play a large rôle in supposed revelations.

The second is that unconscious oral or whispered communications between persons in a peculiar state of rapport play a part hitherto hardly suspected. The study of unusual mental states through hypnotism shows a remarkable sharpening of the senses of the psychic to least sounds made by the hypnotizer. Nothing could exceed the completeness and elegance with which Lehmann has experimentally demonstrated the part this has in supposed telepathy as studied by the Society for Psychical Research. He placed two sound reflecting mirrors with their axes in the same line, in such a way that the mouth of one person could be placed in one focus, and the ear of a second person at the other. The first named person was then told to think steadily of some number. In spite of all efforts to restrain the movement of the organs of speech, a faint but definite whisper reached the ear of the second person, who then wrote down the number heard. A long series of numbers transmitted in this way showed such an astonishingly similar proportion of successes and failures, and such identical classes of mistakes, to those of Prof. and Mrs. Sidgwick, that it can safely be accepted as a demonstration that their supposed telepathy rested upon the same foundation, transmission of the sound of involuntary whispers, undoubtedly heard through a sense abnormally sharpened by a peculiar rapport resembling hypnotism.¹ This discovery at once gives the key to many otherwise unexplained phenomena of spiritualism and clairvoyance.

Sufficient has been said to show the connection of spiritualism with abnormal mental states. Indeed it rests upon such abnormality definitely in the theory and practice of its advocates. Only they believe it a mark of progress towards the state at which all men will ultimately arrive, while science sees in it evidence of mental disturbances from which all should be delivered.

The present state of popular belief show vestiges of all the ancient superstitions. Every newspaper has its long list of advertisements of astrologers, clairvoyants and mediums. Every farmer's almanac is full of forecasts of the weather based on astrology. I am gravely informed

¹ Lehmann: *op. cit.*, pp. 386 f.

that people always die on the ebb tide, and that the twelve days following Christmas are "observation days" for the coming year.

More cultivated people are eager over spiritualism, theosophy, and occultism, and gloat over the supposed secrets of the spirit world with a sort of half terrified delight. Plenty of books that pander to this appetite appear yearly, and are eagerly received. I note that the tendency of these superstitions is to give a stale appetite for the sweet commonplaces of life, and a positive distaste for the soberer phases of religious thought, and I recall that our Lord said, "Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will in no wise believe."¹

Thousands are ready to follow new religious leaders, who base their appeal upon the desire for some special or striking phenomena,—notably faith-healing. We have but to mention healing mediums, Dowie, Sanford, and Mary Baker Eddy to emphasize this. Defective philosophy, bizarre practices, brazen claims, are eagerly swallowed, if instances can be shown of cures wrought by those who are praised as having "such sweet and lovely dispositions."

Now no one can deny that many diseases of a nervous nature can be cured if one can turn the mind of the patient from his own symptoms to a new course of thought and feeling. This is the truth upon which faith-healing has hit, but to which it has no right of monopoly.

Christian Science, the most notable of such systems, numbers its adherents by the hundreds of thousands all over the world. Few can be found to explain, much less inspire with life, its confused attempt at philosophy; yet since it uses the "cures" of abnormal mental states as a witness, and advances sweeping claims of ability to cure all disease in like manner,—in fact deny all disease—it makes its way easily among those whose constitution demands an element of wonder at the mysterious.

In the *Atlantic Monthly* for April, 1904, John W. Churchman has given a most thorough discussion of this latest superstition. He declares that their claims are as arbitrary as those of the ordinary quack doctors. "You may search the 'literature' through," he says, "but you will not find a single clinical history, not the record of one careful examination, nothing, from hark away to kill, beyond the 'I say so' of laymen and laywomen who could not tell a floating cartilage from a floating kidney, or a malarial parasite from a cobra de capello."

¹ John, 4: 48.

The severest arraignment of the philosophy of Christian Science is that in denying the existence of matter, it throws over common sense. That the whole race of man should be mistaken in assuming the existence of matter, or that its existence could be disproved by a mind which, under known conditions at least, cannot think without it, is a paradox which lacks the element of appeal, as well as the element of truth.

It is to be expected that such superstitions will flourish most where character and training are ill-balanced, where people have the "little knowledge" that is "a dangerous thing," where the normal nervous life is severely disturbed by the breaking up of the healthful family life on account of the hardships of our civilization, and where men's psychical systems are wasted in excesses of amusement and dissipation or perverted through fine spun speculations. It must be the task of the religious teacher to insist upon the validity of the deliverance of the normal consciousness as revealing the will of God and the way of life. But this thought brings us to a new division of the field of Religious Psychology, upon which the limits of this article forbid our entering.

THE OUTWARD FORM OF THE ORIGINAL SIN. A NEW STUDY OF GENESIS 3.

BY REV. ARTHUR E. WHATHAM.

In a letter recently received by the author of this article from a brother clergyman, a well-known archaeologist, the writer asserted that modern scholars are pretty well agreed as to the meaning of the third chapter of Genesis, which, in their view, describes in veiled language the supposed first human physical union, and its consequence.

Feeling that my friend had expressed merely the opinion of certain specialists in archaeology and ethnology, and that the view of such on the point in question was not that of the ordinary scholar, and especially not that of the Bible scholar and teacher, I replied to this letter giving reasons for my dissenting from this opinion.

My reply brought a second letter in which the writer acknowledged that I was right. I expected this, since I know from considerable correspondence on this subject that the opinion in question is confined to a few specialists; while it is even rejected by the ordinary Bible scholar. The learned Bishop Newton in his dissertations on "Prophecy," referring to the character or form of the offence recorded in Gen. 3, wrote, "What was the particular nature of the sin of our first parents, it is not an easy matter to determine. It was plainly the violation of a divine prohibition; it was indulging in an unlawful appetite; it was aspiring after forbidden knowledge, and pretending to be wise above their condition. So much may be safely asserted in general; we bewilder and lose ourselves in search of more particulars."

Prebendary Quarry, in his "Genesis and its Authorship," writes, "there is nothing in the account to throw any light on the particular offence which was of such terrible consequence to mankind at large."

Prof. Toy, in the Jour. Bib. Lit. (1898), rejects the opinion that the fruit is connected with sexual ideas—it is *real* fruit of a *real* tree, not symbolical; while Auberlen on the First Sin (Bib. Sac. 22) is silent as to the nature of the sin.

The three most noted dictionaries of the Bible — Smith's, Hastings's, and Ency. Bib., together with McClintock and Strong's Cyclopedia, in their articles which treat of the "Fall," refrain from discussing this special point, while their general remarks appear to endorse Prof. Toy's view.

Bishop Ryle, in his "Early Narratives of Genesis," and Prof. Driver, in his recent Commentary on Genesis, both treat the offence in question as exhibited in some simple and apparently harmless act such as the plucking of actual fruit. In fact, I know of no biblical work which treats the record in Gen. 3, as dealing with a sexual act.

When we come to works dealing with archaeology, religion, and ethnology, then we have numerous references to the transgression in Gen. 3, from the standpoint of its sexual character.

Jastrow, in his Bab. Assy. Religion; Barton, in his Semitic Origins; Peters, in his "Early Hebrew Story;" Crawley, in his treatise on marriage in his Mystic Rose; Trumbull, in his Threshold Covenant; besides the numerous volumes on Sex-Worship which I refrain from mentioning because these latter are not received as of weight by scholars. There are, however, as I have shown, enough works by specialists of world wide reputation in which the view in question is held, to make it worth while to examine the matter critically from their standpoint. I shall make this attempt in the following article, an attempt which, so far as I know, is the first of its kind; the first, I mean, to examine the entire third chapter of Genesis from the accepted scientific standpoint that it records an act of sexual transgression.

I shall begin by asking certain questions which naturally present themselves upon a thoughtful résumé after a critical examination of the details in Gen. 3.

(1) Why is a serpent and not some other animal introduced into the narrative?

(2) Why is the serpent associated with the woman exclusively?

(3) Why is the serpent made to assume a creeping posture by way of punishment?

(4) Why are two trees mentioned with the inference that the fruit of neither was to be eaten except under conditions which are not mentioned.

(5) Why is eating specially made an act of offence?

(6) Why are the eyes of both represented as opened only after they had eaten in company?

(7) Why is nakedness implied as exposure only of the organs of sex?

(8) Why were fig-leaves chosen for loin-girdles in preference to other leaves?

(9) Why did they attribute their hiding themselves to the fear of being seen naked when they had already covered their nakedness?

(10) Why is the woman's physical desire represented as stronger for the man than that of the man for the woman?

(11) Why, both in this and the first chapter, is there reference made to Eve becoming a mother, when it is not until the fourth chapter that the man is said to know his wife?

(12) Why is it that in the third chapter, offspring are to be ushered in with sorrow under a curse; while in the first, they are to be begotten as the outcome of a blessing?

(13) Why did not the idea of eating of the tree of life occur to the transgressors as soon as they had eaten of the tree of knowledge?

(14) Why are cherubim mentioned as being placed to "guard the tree of life?"

Before attempting to answer these questions, it is necessary to impress upon the mind of the reader, (1) the object of the narrative in Gen. 3, (2) the character and age of the material chosen to depict it, and (3) the period when the narrative finally assumed its present form.

(1) The object of the narrative is to account for the presence of evil in the world. There is, however, another account of this origin in Gen. 6: 1-8, upon which the Book of Enoch lays more emphasis than upon the account in Gen. 3, as though the former had been more widely adopted as the better explanation. The Book of Enoch gives both accounts.

(2) In Gen. 3, we have a mixture of what I believe the authors themselves accepted as both fact and fable, by which they attempted to produce, in good faith, an account of the beginning of humanity which neither an actual historical sketch, so far as they were able to give it, nor an entirely mythical narrative would satisfy.

It is a point disputed by modern scholars how far the details have been borrowed from a Babylonian source. Some of these undoubtedly

were, others, however, I believe to have been drawn from local independent myth and folk-lore, or myth and folk-lore common to most primitive people. These variant elements fully account for the disjointed character of the narrative. There are inconsistencies and breaks in the narrative which have puzzled the general commentator, but which are perfectly natural in a record containing the elements described. With these elements combined, we have in Gen. 3, under a mask of symbolism, an account of something believed to have actually happened.

(3) The narrative as we now have it, I believe to have been produced after the Exile. Most of its elements existed from primitive times, but some have been added for the first time in later periods. Then, too, its literary style evidences that it belongs to a later stage of Hebrew literature.

With the above three points well in view, I shall now endeavor to answer the foregoing fourteen questions.

(1) No other animal but the serpent could have played the rôle in this narrative which it is the object of the record to depict. Scholars have seen in the serpent as here introduced, (a) a snake deity (Toy, *JBL*, Vol. 3); (b) a symbol of sexual passion (Jastrow, *AJSL*, Vol. 15, p. 209); (c) a mere beast of the field (Dillmann, *Genesis*, Vol. 1, p. 148; Driver, *Gen.*, p. 44, 47; Bennet, *Gen.*, p. 104).

The failure so far satisfactorily to explain the character and position of the serpent, has arisen from its separate treatment from each of these conceptions. The truth of the matter is that the rôle this creature is made to play in Gen. 3, called for a combination of all of these three conceptions.

(a) As a snake-deity the serpent represents the well known Semitic belief in serpent-jinns, supernatural beings, which, while they could appear and disappear, had nevertheless material bodies. Certain kinds of them were supposed to frequent trees, a belief which very possibly lent its weight to the association of our serpent with the tree of knowledge (W. R. Smith, *LRS.*, p. 120). Whitehouse is evidently correct in seeing in the serpent—“who tempts Eve and lures man to his doom, a demon in animal shape, analogous to the Arabic jinn which frequently resides in serpents” (*HBD*, Satan). He does not mean that these jinns took possession of serpents, but that jinns themselves assumed the shape of serpents, and that it was one of these which appears in this narrative. Under “Demon” he writes, “in the narrative of the

temptation of Eve by the serpent, there is no hint that an evil spirit resided in the serpent. The serpent is identified with it, and we have no suggestion that a demon was able to detach itself from the animal and pass into something else. This was a later development."

It was not, however, only *some* serpents that were viewed by the ancients as serpent demons, or jinns. Speaking of the serpent as representing a special class of reptiles, Dillmann says,—“it was feared as a wonderful, mysterious, demoniacal being, and, therefore, far and wide, amongst ancient and modern peoples of a lower type, honored as divine.” (Gen., Vol. 1, p. 147).

Driver informs us that Arabs believe there lurks a jinn in every serpent (Gen., p. 44): while Robertson Smith says, that when the Arabs were no longer pure savages, and had ceased to ascribe demoniac attributes to most animals, they yet continued to attribute them to jinns. (LRS., p. 128).

To the serpent of Genesis, however, Eve is represented as talking without any fear. This is because the narrative points back to a time when it was considered quite natural that men and animals should hold converse with each other. Time was when both gods and men were viewed as possessing part human and part animal forms (Mythology-Ency. Brit.: Sayce, Hib. Lec. p. 279; Jastrow, Bab.-Assy. Rel., pp. 474, 475). We must remember, also, that the narrative is describing matters as they were supposed to be before sin had entered into the world, consequently, animals, even demon-serpents, or serpent jinns, would be viewed as able to hold converse with men without arousing any dread or surprise in the latter.

Now the serpent of this narrative not only puts itself upon an equality with Yahweh as regards its knowledge, but it presumes to know better, since it denies the statement of Yahweh, attributing the prohibition not to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge to envy, lest a quality possessed by the gods should become possessed by humanity also (Driver *ib.* 45; Bennett, Gen., p. 105). A creature pitting itself in knowledge against a being whom it evidently conceded to be greater than itself, truly deserves to be spoken of as Prof. Toy calls it,—“a snake-deity.” Yahweh had said, “Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die.” This the woman told the serpent, only to be met with the astounding reply,—“Ye shall not surely die: for Yahweh doth know that in the

day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods" (ver. 3, 4, 5; cf. 22 and RV).

(b) Prof. Barton doubts that the Rabbis were correct in seeing in the serpent here a representation or symbol of sexual passion (Sem. Orig., p. 93). They undoubtedly were in error in viewing the serpent as a mere personification of sexual passion, but there was something after all in the thought, which I shall endeavor to bring out later.

Dr. Peters tells us that,—"Mingled with the story of temptation and knowledge, is the story of the hostility of the serpent." He adds that,—"The story is an answer to the question, Why is there such hostility between man and serpent?" (Early Hebrew Story, pp. 224-229.) Now all this is true, yet he neglects to point out where the hostility in question is shown in the story. His mere reference to the fact that it was by the serpent's advice that the woman first and then the man took of the fruit of the forbidden tree (*ib.*, p. 232), throws no light on the point: neither does his reference to the identification of the Hebrew serpent with the Babylonian Tiamat (*ib.*, p. 229). The serpent in Gen. 3. has but a very remote relation either to the Babylonian serpent of chaos, or the Hebrew serpent of the deep. It is not, as originally introduced, an enemy of Yahweh in the sense of the Babylonian and Hebrew narratives of the overthrow of the respective powers of evil. Indeed, it is questionable whether it can be viewed as an enemy of Yahweh in any other sense than as a member of a demon class of creatures, incapable of opposing the power of the supreme deity, except by crafty and lustful insinuations dropped into the mind of man. Thus Dillmann, Marcus Dods, Driver and Bennett in their respective commentaries on Genesis; Tulloch in the Ency. Brit.; Devil: Whitehouse, in HBD—Demon; and Cheyne in the Ency. Bib.—Serpent,—refuse to see in the serpent of Gen. 3. the Evil One of later Hebrew conception.

I cannot, however, agree with Cheyne in his description of this creature as "the friendly serpent of Gen. 3." nor yet in his statement that the serpent's offence consisted—not in ill will to God's noblest creature, man, but in exciting intellectual pride." This it undoubtedly did excite, but simply in order to further its own crafty and lustful ends, which it well knew would work mischief to man. It is true that the serpent's act was prompted not by ill will either to Yahweh or man, but in pursuance of its own selfish lust it became indifferently the enemy of both.

But if the serpent of Gen. 3, has no connection with the powers of evil, either of earlier or later ages, how does it come to figure at all in this narrative?

I have already intimated that while the object of this narrative is to describe the entrance of evil into the world, there is another and different account in Gen. 6: 1-4. This difference, however, is not in the way in which the evil was introduced, but in the persons by whom it was introduced.

I have already described Gen. 3, as a record of an act of sexual intercourse. Prof. Barton asserts that here,—“a beast is represented as urging man to union with woman.” (So., p. 94). Dr. Peters endorses this in his statement that,—“the reader of to-day scarcely takes in its true meaning. The physical union indicated escapes his notice” (EHS., p. 222).

Turning now to Gen. 6: 1-4, we find that divine beings called angels, lusted after the beautiful daughters of men, and married them. It is to this lust on the part of supernatural beings that the “Book of Enoch” attributes the entrance of evil into the world. It repeats this story, and attributes in the main the introduction of sin, not to Adam, but to these fallen angels.

The Book of Enoch describes Eve as led astray by Gadreel, the third of the four chief angels who rebelled against Yahweh (LXIX-I). In Sota 9a, and Beresh. Rabba 18, the temptation is ascribed to lustful jealousy; while Bereshith 42, ascribes the birth of Cain to the union of Satan (the leader of the fallen angels, identified with the serpent) and Eve (HBD., Satan).

I said a little while back that there was something in the view of the Rabbis which pictured the serpent as the symbol of sexual passion. We now see that they not only viewed it as this symbol, but that they also identified it with a fallen angel whom they conceived to have been the father of Cain. This later and fanciful Rabbinical thought had this much truth in it, viz., that it rightly interpreted the serpent’s presence in Gen. 3, to be based upon its erotic designs on women. How fully they were warranted by primitive belief in holding this view will be abundantly evidenced in an appeal to ethnology.

“How does it happen,”—writes Havelock Ellis, “that in all parts of the world, the snake . . . has been credited with some design, sinister or erotic, on women?” Again he says,—“There can be no doubt

that in widely different parts of the world menstruation is believed to have been originally caused by a snake, and that this conception is frequently associated with an erotic and mystic idea" (*Psy. of Sex*, pp. 237, 238). In his "Man and Woman," he again makes this statement (p. 14), further adding that, "in the Hebrew story of the Garden of Eden we trace a similar primitive connection between woman and the snake" (15).

Crawley, in his "Mystic Rose," says—"The connection of the serpent with sexual matters is very familiar, especially in European folklore, and is found all over the world." Referring to the narrative in Gen. 3, he adds, "There is an unmistakable reference to sexual relation in the story," a remark endorsed by Letourneau in his, "Evolution of Marriage" (pp. 193, 382; 6).

At the first menstruation of a Chiriguano girl, old women run about the hut with sticks striking at the snake which has wounded her (Crawley, p. 192). Female idols belonging to people of similar thought exhibit a snake in an erotic position; while in various parts of the world virgin priestesses are dedicated and married to a snake-god (Havelock Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. 11, pp. 237, 238). Even the Greeks credited Zeus as having in the form of a serpent become the father of human offspring (*Mythology, Ency. Brit.*).

With all this evidence before us, it becomes easy to answer the question,—"Why is a serpent and not some other animal introduced into the narrative in Gen. 3?" This narrative is the record of a sexual act entailing serious consequences. It was an act committed, as we shall see later, in opposition to expressed prohibition. We have already seen this, but it will appear more prominently under another heading. It appertains here to say that the authors of this narrative were not willing to ascribe the origin of the transgression of this prohibition to the newly created innocent pair, so they explained it by introducing a fully accredited belief, which must have been as well known in their folklore as in that of other peoples. Thus it is that we have the serpent introduced into this narrative, and not some other animal, since it is this creature with its erotic proclivities which is made to bear the blame as **the instigator of the transgression.**

(c) In affirming that the serpent of Gen. 3, is "merely a beast of the field which Yahweh had made," Dillmann, Bennett and others, overlook the fact of the differing elements of which the narrative is com-

posed, consequently, they not only fail to interpret correctly the various statements in the narrative touching the serpent, but they explain these in a somewhat singular manner.

Dillmann (p. 148), is correct in refusing to see with Bennett (p. 103), any connection between the serpent in Gen. 3, and the Babylonian Tiamat, but he is in error (p. 149), in refusing to see with Driver (p. 44), more than an ordinary animal. The serpent in Gen. 3, was not only wise with the wisdom of an animal, but it was subtle with the knowledge of a semi-divine being. In fact, it was a member of a demon-class of creatures known as jinns. It was a serpent-jinn. Thus it is that we find it presuming to pit its knowledge against that of the supreme deity, whom, as we have seen, it even went so far as to contradict. Prof. Bennett infers that the serpent in Gen. 3, corresponds to the Babylonian Tiamat in playing the part of the enemy of God and man (Gen., pp. 102, 103). So also does Ryle (*Early Narratives of Gen.*, p. 38). Prof. Cheyne, however, is correct in refusing to see any such correspondence (*Serpent, Ency. Bib.*), since there is not the shadow of resemblance between Yahweh and the serpent of Gen. 3, on the one hand, with Marduk and Tiamat on the other. Yahweh has no need to wage war with the serpent as Marduk had with Tiamat. The serpent of Gen. 3, represents no powers of darkness such as Tiamat represented. It is a creature entirely subservient to the commands of Yahweh. His enemy only in the sense already pointed out, an enemy of man only in the same sense.

While all this is true, the assertion of both Dillmann (p. 156) and Driver (47) that the serpent being an animal is not morally responsible for its action, shows a neglect to view this creature from the different standpoints in which it is introduced into the narrative. Here it is an animal, while it is also something more than an animal. It is a supernatural animal possessing divine attributes, and so, in using these to the hurt of man in an effort to accomplish its own selfish ends, it becomes morally responsible for its action. Dillmann, in denying its responsibility, justifies its punishment on the ground that an animal inflicting injury to man is to be punished with death, and refers to Gen. 9:5; Ex. 21:25f. Driver, on the other hand, while previously acknowledging that the serpent is a supernatural animal (p. 44), yet now, in explaining its punishment, makes no use of this acknowledgment, saying—"The serpent being an animal, is not morally responsible, it is

punished here as the representative of evil thought and suggestion. Bennett thinks it unnecessary to discuss the question, though he suggests that a beast which could talk, and tempt man, and tell lies about God, might very well be morally responsible. He adds from the remark,—"upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat,"—"these details show that the author is thinking of an animal" (p. 108). This is true, but they show something more, which all of these commentators have failed to note, and which I shall explain in my answer to question (3).

(2) We can see now, from what has been stated under section (b) of answer (1), why the serpent of Gen. 3 is associated only with the woman, the man remaining entirely outside of the circle in which the serpent and the woman move. The serpent is introduced into the narrative merely because of its well known erotic association with woman, an association in which man has no concern; consequently, there being no object in mentioning the man in connection with the serpent—the narrative deals only with the serpent in connection with the woman.

But instead of this very natural, and indeed only possible explanation, certain commentators, missing the real reason of the serpent's introduction into this narrative, have attempted to explain it, to say the least, in a very singular manner.

Cheyne (Ency. Bib.—Adam) informs us that Adam represents reason, and Eve sense. As it is sense that enslaves reason, the serpent does not venture to attack Adam except through Eve.

Both Dillmann (p. 150) and Driver (p. 44) infer that the serpent talked to the woman because she was the *weaker* vessel and more easily seduced.

(3) In the curse put upon the serpent as described in the narrative,—"Upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat," we have an indication that the serpent was considered morally responsible for the mischief it had worked. The words truly indicate that the serpent was an animal, but they indicate more: that it was, to use the words of Cheyne—"a divine, or semi-divine serpent" (Serpent—Ency. Bib.). It is in failing to view the serpent in this double aspect, that Dillmann falls into error in denying that the description of the serpent implies that before the curse it had been capable of assuming an erect posture (p. 157). He is right, however, in assuming that the description does *not* imply that before the curse the serpent had possessed some other

form than that of an ordinary snake. This is the view of Ryle (Early Narratives of Gen., p. 53); while Bennett (Gen., p. 108) and Marcus Dods (Gen., p. 17) think that the words of the curse imply that previously it did not crawl on its belly as an ordinary snake crawls. The words of the curse, however, do not go so far as this. All they imply is that previously the serpent had been able to assume an upright posture in moving about, but that from henceforth it should move about only on its belly. Cheyne is therefore only partly correct in asserting that the narrative implies that originally the serpent had been erect," and that, "this was a survival from the time when it was thought to be divine" (Serpent—Enc. Bib.). The narrative itself views the serpent as semi-divine at the very time the curse was put upon it.

The recognition of the existence of jinns or demons in later Hebrew thought, was a survival of primitive Semitic belief still accepted at the time this narrative was put in its present form (Demon-Ency. Bib.). They were not viewed as gods, but as supernatural beings (WRS-LRS, p. 119) and subject to higher power, such as in the present instance that exercised by Yahweh.

Thus the record in Gen. 3 is in keeping with contemporary thought when it not only introduces a serpent-demon or jinn into its narrative, but when, from the mischief resulting from its action, it further depicts a limitation of its powers by a higher power. This limitation was the restriction of some power hitherto enjoyed. Up to this time it had not only crawled upon its belly as an ordinary serpent crawls, and even as serpent-jinns were credited with crawling (WRS-LRS, p. 129), but just as these creatures were viewed as able, without changing their serpent form, to move about otherwise than on their bellies (*ib.*, p. 133), so the serpent of this narrative is inferred as having been able before the curse to move about otherwise than by crawling, while still retaining its natural serpent shape.

The belief expressed in this narrative that the serpent, while still retaining the ordinary form of a serpent was able to move about otherwise than by crawling, which here I believe to have been conceived as an erect movement, is illustrated in a statement of Nebuchadnezzar that,—“On the threshold of the gates I set up mighty bulls of bronze, and huge serpents that stood *erect*” (Sayce, EHH, p. 225, note; see also Serpent-Ency. Bib.). This Nebuchadnezzar reigned B. C. 604-561, and as we see the belief still existing at that period that the serpent as

a supernatural creature could stand and move in an erect posture, although possessing the ordinary snake form, we are warranted in saying that this illustration shows that the narrative in Gen. 3, as we have it to-day, is of very late origin, since at the period in which it was put in its present form, snakes were still viewed as supernatural beings, although no longer credited with possessing the power to move in an erect posture.

The curse in limiting the motion of the serpent to crawling, dealt a severe blow to the power and pride of the entire serpent-demon class, placing it on a level of the noxious creeping things. It had in its pride presumed to pit its knowledge against Yahweh, consequently, it must be humbled. It possessed the power to move in an erect posture, a posture peculiar to the gods, and to man made in their physical image (Peters-EHS, pp. 219, 227). This it must no longer be permitted to share, therefore the power to do so is withdrawn, by a greater and more fully divine power. This is done. This is the curse on the serpent. Henceforth it shall only move on its belly, a degraded and despised creeping thing.

Still, while the posture of its locomotion is limited, its lustful, hurtful nature, so dangerous to women, cannot be changed. It is its very being. To change it would be to make a new creature of it, which was impossible. It can be guarded against, however, consequently Yahweh from that time will put enmity between the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent forever.

Here then we have the answer to the question,—“Why is the serpent made to assume a creeping posture by way of punishment?” To destroy its pride, to remove it from the level of gods and men, and to make it a crawling obnoxious creature. The answer is simple enough when the various elements of which the narrative is composed are taken into account, and an explanation attempted from this combined standpoint. Had the general commentator only done this; had the serpent as an ordinary beast of the field; as a creature of folk-lore; and again of primitive belief, been explained from the standpoint of these combined elements, the real character of the serpent of this narrative would have been seen long ago. Instead of this, however, the general commentator has endeavored to explain the serpent from one or more of these standpoints separately, resulting in some curious and unnatural exegesis. Especially is this so regarding Gen. 3:15.

The second of the two clauses into which this verse is divided has been translated and explained in different ways. In the AV it runs,—“it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.” In the Vulgate it runs, “She shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt lay snares for her.” Undoubtedly the Vulgate, while not true to the literal rendering of the original Hebrew, although the same may be said of all the renderings I intend to examine, gives the best sense of any of them.

The English RV runs,—“it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.” The American RV runs,—“he shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.”

A more correct, literal, and explanatory rendering would be,—“it, *i. e.*, the woman's seed shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise *her*, *i. e.*, her seed's heel.”

In this prophecy neither the man, nor his offspring, as specially male descendants, enter into any relationship with the serpent. Dillman explains the meaning of this passage as,—“Instead of the friendly relationship between the woman and the serpent, which for the woman has been so unfortunate, an irreconcilable conflict is to be kindled between man and the accursed beast (p. 160).”

I cannot but think that a better explanation according to the more literal rendering and meaning, and one with which the Vulgate agrees, is that,—as the woman in the first instance has been outraged by the serpent, so her seed shall revenge her by a continued and successful war on its offspring, who in turn, in accordance with their still lustful nature, will carry on an unceasing attempt to *seduc*e her offspring. This interpretation is in keeping with the entire drift of the narrative, while it is more in harmony with the passage we have been considering.

It was against the woman that the serpent's attack had been directly aimed, since the man became included in the mischief only subsequently through Eve, who having first been successfully seduced by the serpent, in turn successfully seduced Adam. Thus, in *her* wrong being avenged, so far as the serpent is concerned, *she* strikes a deadly blow at its seed through *her* seed.

And here it becomes important to ask, does the narrative imply that the serpent itself had intercourse with the woman? Undoubtedly it does, if the interpretation of the entire narrative which I am giving is correct, and it is singular that not only the teaching of mythology and folklore, but even later Jewish thought as well, sustains this conclusion.

But what about the protevangelium which has been seen in this passage by so many commentators? Bennett is correct in stating with reference to the "Incarnation" that,—"There is nothing to indicate that any such ideas were in the mind of the writer" (p. 109). This is true, and with it agree both Dillmann (p. 161) and Driver (p. 48), yet there is here after all a protevangelium which Driver acknowledges with Dillmann, but which the late Samuel Davidson better expressed than either, although Cheyne comes very near it. "Man's salvation," wrote the former, "is practicable through the victory of reason over instinct, of faith over sense" (Adam, *Ency. Brit.*); while the latter writes, "Man on his part is to keep up the war against temptation to pride as vigorously as he prosecutes his war against the serpent, now become his deadly foe" (Serpent, *Ency. Bib.*).

The protevangelium of this passage is the triumph of reason over sense. The narrative in Gen. 3, is a record of pride and lust, which have ever been joint companions. The record sees in this combination the origin of all the evil of the world in which mankind is sunk. In Gen. 6:1-4, the origin of this is attributed to the pride and lust of the sons of the gods, lesser personal divine beings of the same nature as the higher deity or deities. Gen. 3 has the same distressing story to tell, but here it is based not upon the pride and lust of supernatural beings, such as the sons of the gods, but upon that of lower creatures, supernatural demon-animals, linked with the animals by bodily structure, separated from them by the possession of a supernatural knowledge and power which links them with the gods. Such, in the conception of this narrative, were serpent-jinns.

(4) I have already admitted that some of the details of this narrative belong to a Babylonian source. It will not surprise us therefore to find that a tree of life belongs to Babylonian mythology; also that the name Eden itself is the title of an exceedingly fertile part of Babylonia (Peters-EBS, p. 209). Dillmann also is but partly correct in claiming that the tree of knowledge of good and evil is peculiar to the biblical narrative (*Genesis*, Vol. 11, p. 122), since Babylonia further knew of a tree of wisdom which grew in a holy garden, upon the core or heart of which was inscribed the name of the god of wisdom (Sayce-Hib. *Lec.*, pp. 238-242).

Prof. Barton is of opinion that while we have two trees in this narrative as it now stands, originally there was but one, the tree of knowl-

edge; the tree of life being a later addition (SO., p. 95). Prof. Toy is of the same opinion (JBL., Vol. 10). I rather incline to the view of Cheyne that it is the tree of knowledge which was subsequently added to the original story. Originally the one tree represented both life and wisdom. If, however, as the authors of this narrative as we now have it undoubtedly intended, the two gifts were to be viewed as separate and distinct, then there must be a separate and distinct source of each, consequently, the tree of double quality must be divided and two trees introduced into the garden. Had this not been done, the transgressors in eating of the tree of knowledge would also have secured life, which the original tree equally possessed. Now the narrative in Gen. 3, was conceived long after the tree of life with its double miraculous quality, and as it is with its gift of wisdom that the narrative deals, it was this gift which was dissociated from the original tree and introduced into Gen. 3, as a separate and distinct tree. This was further necessary because in participating in the knowledge which the tree was able to bestow, the transgressors would have obtained life by the same act of eating at the one time. To save this, the narrators had to divide these combined gifts, leaving the original tree with its power of bestowing life, while they introduced another tree with the power of bestowing knowledge.

(5) As the serpent was introduced into the narrative of a sexual act and its consequences because of its erotic association with women, so eating was here made the act of disobedience because eating when indulged in by unmarried persons of opposite sex, has from the earliest times been viewed as the symbol of the consummation of marriage. Eve offered Adam food, and they ate together, a universal primitive proposal of marriage and the commonest of all marriage ceremonies by which bride and bridegroom become one flesh (Crawley, pp. 345, 376, 378).

(6) Dillmann asserts that Adam was in company with Eve when she ate for the first time (Vol. 1, p. 153). The drift of the narrative, however, is absolutely opposed to any such view. She ate first in company with the serpent. There was no opening of eyes here because there was no mutual transgression. It was by their eating together that the knowledge first came to them of their mutual nakedness. The words are,—‘‘She took the fruit thereof and did eat.’’ Were her eyes opened? If not—why not? Had they been opened she would have dropped the half eaten fruit in terror as soon as she had swallowed the

first mouthful, for it is ludicrous to suppose that she swallowed the whole fruit at one mouthful. But she had eaten and enjoyed the fruit, and her eyes were not opened to any serious consequences.

Having in her own person demonstrated that the fruit was good for food, or in other words, her seduction by the serpent having failed to open her eyes, she in turn seduces Adam by eating with him as she had already eaten with the serpent. Mark how the words run. "She . . . gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat. And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked." Strange that there were no eyes opened until the man had also eaten, if the mere eating of the fruit of this tree was to impart knowledge to every one who ate. The significance of the narrative is plain, viz., that it was from some act committed by joint participation that their eyes were to be opened for the first time simultaneously.

Again, it is absurd to suppose that Adam had stood by Eve all the while the serpent had been conversing with her, without saying anything; and that he had seen her put forth her hand to take of the fruit without one word of warning. Had he done so, the blame would have been his in the first instance even more than the woman's, and he never would have said,—the woman she gave me, etc. Their proximity at the first eating is only apparent from the condensation of the narrative. Of course he was with her when she gave him and he ate, for the narrative intends the eating, so far as the man and woman are concerned, to be eating in company with each other.

(7) That the exposure of the organs of sex was the nakedness at which Adam and his wife felt ashamed, is abundantly proved by their having made clothing merely to cover those parts. That they now saw themselves naked where such exposure had not been previously realized, could only follow upon personal knowledge of the natural use of what hitherto they had not understood. This explains the conception of nakedness in Gen. 3.

(8) Missing the drift of the story, and the significance of a fig-leaf in the mind of an Oriental, commentators have been led to offer some strange explanations why fig-leaves were introduced into this narrative. The fig-leaf in the East is a well understood symbol of sex, consequently, it is quite easy to understand why an Eastern narrative should choose fig-leaves when describing the making of the supposed first clothing, or loin-girdles.

(9) The guilty pair hid themselves not because they were afraid of being seen naked. They were afraid of Yahweh seeing that they themselves had discovered their own nakedness, which would have been demonstrated by the clothing they now wore over that nakedness. They were in fact more afraid now in being seen clothed than they had been before in being seen naked. The narrative shows clearly that it was not their nakedness of which they were afraid, but of the use to which they had put that nakedness.

(10) Woman's desire is expressed as stronger for the man than the man's for the woman in accordance with the drift of the narrative. Orientals credit women with greater passion than they credit men with possessing. This indeed is the conception upon which the narrative itself is based. Finally, men shall rule over women because the stronger passion of the latter will make them the slaves of the sex less moved by such desires.

There is much more truth here than most of us will like to admit upon first thought. The ordinary conception of woman to-day removes her beyond any possibility of viewing her from such a standpoint, and yet, while with us the name woman stands, and justly so, for all we mean by the terms purity and grace, Gen. 3, in its conception of woman, nevertheless, expresses not merely a profound, but also an alarming truth. All ethnologists know how lightly virtue weighs with primitive woman. The student of morals is aware that religious orgies have ever owed their continuance, and in many cases their origin, more to the influence of women than to men. The sociologist finds almost an entire absence of morals amongst women of wealth who at the same time are unencumbered with the restraints of religion. These are the facts underlying the statement of the woman's desire in Gen. 3. They are not palatable, we do not like them, yet they are profoundly true, and tend to enhance the value of the narrative we are discussing. At the same time the narrative promised women the victory over erotic enslavement. This is a truth which has not yet been grasped owing to the erroneous interpretation of Gen. 3. The symbol of eroticism, the serpent, was to have its head crushed by the seed of the woman. This, as I have already said, is the protevangelium contained in Gen. 3:15. Look at the modern woman, the modern mother, the modern housewife, the modern companion of man. With every inducement physically and socially to occupy a lower level morally than man, and here

is seen the idea of the continued biting of the heel of the woman's descendants by the serpent's descendants, she has risen *higher* than the man, until to-day we are in some danger of deifying the very name of woman.

(11) Reference is made in the first three chapters of Genesis to Eve becoming a mother, although marital relations are first definitely referred to only in the fourth chapter, because the authors have this result in mind as the pivot upon which their entire record hangs. The idea of sex is the main thread which runs through the entire narrative.

(12) The fact that in Gen. 3, offspring are viewed as being ushered in with a curse, with pains of child-bearing, while in Gen. 1, they are referred to as a blessing, is in complete harmony with the entire drift of the narrative as we have explained it, but incomprehensible otherwise. Explained our way, it further emphasizes some well-known beliefs amongst primitive people.

With primitive people marriage itself is considered sinful and theoretically forbidden. Physical relationship when lawfully exercised under the marriage contract is viewed as a sin. Sickness and the pains of childbirth are conceived as resulting from forbidden intercourse (Crawley, MR., pp. 320, 214, 74).

Trumbull, in his "Threshold Covenant," asserts that the first act of human disobedience was incontinence, in transgression of a specific command to abstain, at least for a time, from carnal intercourse" (p. 237). Crawley adds to the above that primitive people believe that temporary self-denial will obviate risks incurred in the exercise of a dangerous satisfaction; while he further refers to the habit of prayer before intercourse (*ib.*, 133).

Surely all these primitive ideas had their effect upon the making of the narrative we are discussing. They explain as nothing else will explain many deep and important points. They show why sorrow and pain followed the begetting of offspring by the guilty pair, when their increase should have been to them a blessing and a joy, as promised in the beginning.

(13) But why did not this discovery of coming evil prompt the guilty pair to eat at once of the tree of life as the correction of the death to all their bright hopes? Because there was no actual tree of life to eat from, any more than there had been an actual tree of knowledge. Commentators are fond of talking about symbolical language,

and mythical figures, and then they set to work to interpret this narrative as a page of actual history. That it contains what the narrators supposed in some cases to have been historical features, I have abundantly conceded. But the record is a mixture of varying elements, and can only be explained when all of these are made due allowance for.

Of all commentators, Quarry most clearly states that both these trees are not *real* trees, but rather symbols of conditions, or states of conditions to be entered upon through the continuance of certain relationships between man and his Creator (Genesis, pp. 112, 113). Surely he is correct, and if so, the two trees as *actual* trees may be dismissed from our minds, and with this dismissal the difficulties vanish which have presented themselves from viewing the trees as real trees.

But if the two trees are mere imaginary figures, may this not also be said of the serpent? No, because the authors are anxious to lay the blame incurred in the transgression upon an outside agent, with whom originated the intelligent and so responsible breaking of the prohibition. In Gen. 6, this is found in the person of the fallen angels, or sons of the gods. In Gen. 3, it is found in the well known erotic serpent, equally believed in with the sons of the gods themselves.

(14) Many explanations have been attempted touching the cherubim placed in the way of the tree of life to prevent the possibility of the guilty pair reaching and partaking of it. These creatures, however, were merely idealized guardians of an idealized tree, and had no more actual existence than the tree itself. The idea did not, however, originate with the authors of Gen. 3, since similar guardians are well known in Babylonian and Assyrian belief.

In bringing this examination to a close, should it be questioned why sexual intercourse was chosen by the authors of Gen. 3, to signify the act of prohibition they record, it may reasonably be asked in return, why a sexual act was chosen in Gen. 6:14 to depict the introduction of sin? Both origins are, as I previously said, of the same character, a fact which materially strengthens the accuracy of the interpretation of Gen. 3, attempted in these pages. That the narrative here recorded is based upon a sexual act is the opinion of the noted scholars to whom I have referred. Are they right? If so, the details of the narrative itself will prove it. I have endeavored to show that every detail given amply warrants their conclusion. Such an examination as I have attempted has never been undertaken before. That it was necessary,

and should be considered of great value, is shown in the extraordinary fact that not one biblical scholar or teacher in any of our schools of biblical study has ever attempted to explain this wonderful chapter of Genesis as understood by the ordinary scientist. On the contrary, the explanation usually offered in theological seminaries touching this narrative, is in direct opposition to the view of it held by the ordinary scientist. In the hope therefore of rightly adjusting this matter, I have undertaken the foregoing excursion.

THE SERMON: A STUDY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

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Studies of ethical and religious movements are by common consent considered legitimate problems for theologians, sociologists and popular essayists. Only within the last decade has the psychologist entered these fields with a view to describe and explain those mental processes aroused through the interrelation of many minds. The Psychology of "Varieties of Religious Experience," of "The Crowd," of "Public Worship," of "Religious Conversions," of "Suggestion" are among the subjects treated from his view point. "The Psychology of the Sermon" classifies with these subjects in so far as it deals with phenomena of the social mind.

Objective experimentation has absorbed the major part of mind investigation for the last two decades. This form of inquiry into mental life deals with three interrelated facts:—stimulus, consciousness, reaction. The intensity and quality of the first and third and the nature and content of the second are matters of concern to the approach and study of all experimental mind problems. In the study of those mental processes common to the social mind, it seems not only convenient to keep the three factors conspicuously in view, but, as a matter of orderly procedure, to allow them to form the leading topics of the investigation. Accordingly the nature of the consciousness addressed by the sermon will form the first topic of this paper.

The generally accepted notion of consciousness among empiricists regards it as the sum total of the mental processes from moment to moment or even in any one moment. Now, just as processes in other sciences contain differentiating qualities, for example, the processes of efflorescence and deliquescence in chemistry, so the processes forming states of consciousness from moment to moment have their determining characteristics. These give in the aggregate individuality to the states of consciousness, so it comes about that groups of congruent states may be described, explained and classified like any other natural phenomena.

It is generally agreed that the social-mind as opposed to the individual-mind is dominated by instinct-feelings, emotions and sentiments, that the critical judgment and conscious personality may disappear or be reduced to an impotent condition, and that the thoughts and feelings of the members of the community are unified and turned in a definite direction absorbed in a common purpose. The purely aggressive and critical processes may become inoperative, while the receptive, suggestive and instinctive processes may approach the reflex type of behavior. The latter resembles a simple, primitive mind, more or less homogeneous, since individual traits are suppressed. Those qualities that give distance between individuals under normal conditions are not operative in the social-mind. The philosopher and his servant, the lawyer and his clerk, the prince and his valet are for once psychologically equal. There is much evidence showing that the theological dictum which declares that all men are equal in the sight of God when they are assembled in a worshipping congregation is psychologically true. Cardinal Gibbons said "We all have divers pursuits and avocations: we occupy different grades of society, but in the house of God all these distinctions are levelled."

The causes and conditions produced by the modern church service leading to the formation of the social consciousness are many and potent. Church communicants enter their accustomed places of worship controlled practically by the same feelings, purposes and aims. The entire church service tends to unify their feelings and sentiments. They are expected to occupy the same seats throughout the service, to sing the same songs, read the same responses, repeat the same prayers and rituals, perform synchronous movements in rising, sitting down and kneeling, attend to the same scriptural reading and to give ear to the same sermon. Perhaps one of the strongest factors in suppressing the rational processes of mind and in diminishing the sense of self is the limitations imposed by church worship upon our voluntary movements. Sidis in his work on *Suggestion* remarks that "nowhere else except in solitary confinement are the voluntary movements of men so limited as they are in a crowd: and the larger the crowd is the greater is this limitation, the lower sinks the individual self. Intensity of personality is in inverse proportion to the number of aggregated men." Still and tight fitting clothes, and particularly clothes that restrain the movements of the arms and the use of the hand, contract the sense of self.

So common is this cramped feeling in the case of the hands that it has become a figure of speech. The expression "his hands are tied" describes absolute inability to act in either private or public life.

Although the limitations of voluntary movements imposed by the secular crowd and secular conditions are many and strong, those induced by the church service seem to be more intense. The individual's voluntary movements are not only limited by the number of the crowd and his Sunday apparel but by what may be termed "church manners," an unwritten code of deportment that is impressed upon us from our earliest childhood. It requires that our limbs shall be kept quiet and that our body shall be erect and stationary. The use of the voice is prohibited except when participating in the services. The observance of this unwritten code of manners exercises continual inhibition and produces monotony; conditions which highly favor the receptive state of the social consciousness.

The suggestibility of the social consciousness is a well established fact. Besides the factors already mentioned which tend to create a suggestive state in a church audience, there remains to be mentioned the place of worship and the universal respect and esteem accorded to the clergy.

Places vary markedly in their effect on the mind. The Washington monument and the tomb of Washington arouse thoughts and feelings that have but little in common. Picnic grounds provoke a hilarious, joyous mood; a cold stormy day and a fire in the open grate induce a reflective mood. And likewise the church, with its massive walls, high ceilings, mural designs, decorated windows and heavy stillness creates awe and reverence and magnifies credulity. In this connection one writer observes that church worship reduces distracting ideas to a minimum by means of the restful seclusion which the church affords from disturbing sensations and week-day interests; and this is no doubt assisted by habit, according to which certain surroundings and motions tend strongly to produce the states of mind with which they have been associated. A clergyman of some twenty years service tells me that his efforts to conduct public worship for nearly a year in an opera house were well nigh fruitless owing to the incongruous situation and its appointments.

Again there is a strong tendency to become credulous in the presence of a man of wide knowledge and of large achievements, who can

speck or catheter on a subject of some moment. Witness the reflex mental attitude of an audience to a lecturer on liquid air or wireless telegraphy or radium. The preacher, by reason of his cloth, of the traditions that cluster about the profession, of his individual worth and works, throws his audience into a suggestive or reflex mental state. With this view of the nature of the mind of a conventional church audience I turn to a consideration of the nature of the stimulus.

Psychology abundantly shows that there exists a special adaptation between the sensory apparatus on the one hand and the stimulus on the other: for example, air waves vibrating within certain numerical limits affect only the auditory sense organ, while odoriferous particles affect only the olfactory sense organ. In general, to secure a definite reaction one must have regard for the nature of the stimulus and for the peculiarities of the sensory apparatus. This principle applied to the present subject indicates that desired reactions depend on fitting the stimulus (the sermon) to the reacting organism (the church audience). The commonplace dictum, "fit the sermon to the crowd," expresses the thought provided that the term, "crowd," connotes all that is meant by social consciousness as above described. In order that the sermon may be effective, then, it must appeal to the social consciousness induced by the church service rather than to that of the individual. I anticipate a question at this point. May not the minister, if he choose, direct his remarks to an individual in the audience? This seems highly improbable for two reasons. In the first place, the minds of the several individuals merge into the social-mind to which individual remarks do not appeal. The minister who, during his discourse, attempts to establish individual relations with a member of his audience with a view of administering reproof or what not, finds to his regret that the relation was not established and that the individual in question interpreted the remarks as addressed to the audience. Booker Washington asserts that his argumentative efforts are attended with greater success if he directs them to an individual in the audience whom he feels holds views contrary to his own. He states that he has noticed the combative individual yielding to his views as the argument advanced. (See his work, "Up from Slavery.") There is no good reason for thinking that Dr. Washington is deceived in this latter particular, but, as already indicated, the conditions preclude the establishment of individual personal relations. The yielding and conversion of the combative

individual was doubtless due to his high state of suggestibility and of contagion caused by the crowd presence and crowd conversion together with the nature of the stimulus (the address), which, under the circumstances, must have been simple, popular and general rather than complex, technical and special.

Furthermore, the speaker does not speak out of an individual mind. It is evident that sensations and the simpler perceptions are individual personal experiences, and that they are not shared: while, on the other hand, emotions and sentiments are common and social, they are shared experiences and may be propagated. For example, color blindness, sensations of pain, of taste are individual matters, they are not propagated; while pride, envy, joy and enthusiasm are shared and propagated. The Russian psychologist, Losskij, observes in this connection: "Almost every lecturer, teacher or preacher has experienced moments when a whole audience listens with bated breath and becomes transformed into a single being *which is immediately connected with his own being.*" (Italics are mine.) I have been conscious of this condition in my own classroom when fortunate enough to present a point with axiomatic clearness. Getting en rapport with an audience means psychologically identifying one's self with the crowd self. It is unification of all the selves present. Tarde¹ points out, "To look at a flower or a mountain or a tree one can forget one's self in the object." But one cannot do so when one looks at an audience. I cannot see the audience without being conscious that it sees me. Furthermore, the social-mind is one of emotions, sentiments and ideals and since these are shared and propagated it follows that the speaker is influenced by them. They are echoed back to the audience in bits of inspiration common to every pulpit and platform. Quintilian² says, "There would be no eloquence in the world if we were to speak only with one person at a time." I conclude, therefore, that the minister could not if he would direct his remarks to an individual mind.

I now turn to a further consideration of the nature of the stimulus. It has been pointed out that definite reactions depend upon a specific adaptation between the stimulus and the nervous mechanism, that specific parts of the nervous mechanism demand particular stimuli to

¹ Tarde, Gabriel: *Inter-Psychology*, Intern'l Quar., Vol. 7, pp. 73-5, 1903.

² Quintilian: Monroe's *Source Book of the History of Education*, p. 464.

call forth the response. We have already described the reacting organism (the social-mind) as highly suggestible, thinking in concrete, vivid images, dominated by emotions, sentiments and prejudices, void of the critical judgment and of the faculty of logical reasoning. The social-mind, like the child-mind, steers clear of logical thinking. It will have none of it. It would seem, then, that the sermon, to be effective, must be simple, fundamental, vivid, concrete, suggesting and creating images, social, civic and religious. History justifies this inference. The essentials of the great world religions have been spiritual and philosophical in their nature and contents, and beneficent in their influence upon those who were able to appreciate their precepts. This appreciation was necessarily limited to a comparatively few learned individuals. And so long as the religion remained in this pure, spiritual, abstruse form, the number of its communicants continued small. To reach and influence the unlearned, the spiritual truths were cast into concrete tangible moulds out of which came objects of worship fashioned to the comprehension of the secular mind. The degradation of the pure religion followed. Idolatrous, materialistic and commercial practices arose. But the masses had a religion which they could appreciate and were willing to support. It appears that no religion has escaped this materializing process. It was a psychological necessity, comparable to sticks and blocks as aids to number work in the primary grades. We are not to believe that these images, symbols and other material forms constituted the essence of religion: they served as aids to the mind in picturing the real objects of worship.

The saving grace of the christian religion is the fact that its cornerstone is a personality. The common mind has ever been able to construct for itself definite images of His life and works. The secret of His marvellous power over the lives of men is due to the infinite number of concrete images and sentiments that cluster about His life: for example, feeding the five thousand, blessing little children, healing the sick, denouncing hypocrisy, overcoming temptation and finally dying on the cross. Peter, on the day of Pentecost, provoked his hearers to ask a life and death question by picturing to their minds the recent events in the Saviour's life and his heavenly dwelling place at that moment. Peter the Hermit, threw all Europe into an hysterical frenzy by picturing to his audiences the sepulchre of Jesus in the hands of his enemies.

Luther's defense of primitive christianity before the Diet at Worms will ever remain an inspiring object lesson to Protestants.

Further evidence of the effects of sentiments is seen in the response of the secular social-mind. These sentiments, prejudices and images may be touched off by a mere symbol, word or phrase. The word "union" had electrical power in the northern states during the sixties, the French crowds were converted into veritable mobs by the watch-words, "liberty, equality, fraternity." The sentiments and prejudices suggested by these words grew out of fundamental and vital issues, forged in political and social upheavals. The conditions that formed them have passed away, but their effect upon the social-mind still lingers.

The effective sermon must stimulate fundamental sentiments in human nature, formed by forces operating over a wide extent in space and a long duration in time. The great divines of the world have preached such sermons. It is related that Phillips Brooks preached a sermon with marked success to the inmates of the penitentiary of Charlestown, Mass., and on the following Sunday used the same theme with equal success as a baccalaureate sermon to the graduating class at Wellesley. Paul at Mars Hill began his sermon by an appeal to an old and fundamental sentiment of the Greek mind. He complimented them upon the many evidences of their religious spirit. The Sermon on the Mount touches only fundamental and living themes; conspicuously absent are theological dogmas and philosophical discipline. I am persuaded that a study of the world's great sermons would show that they were addressed to the universal and fundamental in man, sermons which might be translated into any language and read with profit by any people.

With this view of the nature of the sermon and of the mind to which it is addressed, I turn to consider briefly the reactions and responses of the congregation. It would seem that the reactions might be anticipated with some degree of certainty. To the extent that the preacher speaks out of a social, common, universal mind to a similar mind in the audience, to that extent may we anticipate uniform results,—uniform in the sense that any audience would have so responded. Doubtless the first mental responses in the reaction series are mostly intellectual, and these are gradually superseded by emotional, inspirational and

sentimental; while the later and final processes crystallize into a motive which issues ultimately in some form of conduct.

These somewhat *a priori* conclusions, when their verification is attempted in the concrete, are sorely tried. Securing reliable evidence and isolating it from vitiating factors is here a difficult task. One can conceive of an unprejudiced super-mundane observer seizing and teasing out from the tangle and mesh of church influence those exerted by the sermon only, setting them forth properly evaluated and duly labeled. In default of such gifts one must plod along with the crude and more or less uncertain methods of personal observation, private interviews and formal questions supplemented by the small but growing literature on the subject. The formal questions distributed by the writer were as follows:

Age? Sex? Are you a church member? How long? Please state in what ways sermons affect and benefit you?

Thirty individuals answered these questions. No count has been kept of the interviews. The answers come from all the evangelical churches; five are not church members. Attention is called to the maturity in age and to a long church membership in many cases. The returns fall into three leading classes; first, those who are indifferent toward the sermon but may attend public worship for conscience sake or even for secular reasons; second, those who are critical of the sermon and rarely if ever fuse with the social consciousness; third, those who react in an emotional way, who are caught up and form a part of the church atmosphere. Of course this small number neither affirms nor denies any of the principles discussed above: it simply serves as an introduction to this phase of the subject and creates a desire for more evidence.

Representative cases of each of the three classes are here represented.

Indifferent.

1. Male, 29 years. Non-church member. "I cannot say that sermons affect and benefit me in any way to be distinguished from the way in which I am affected by hearing or reading any other discourse or piece of composition. Sermons as a weekly performance become unbearable to me."

2. Male, 24. Non-church member. "The sermons that I hear, and hear them not very regularly, help me not morally nor spiritually to any great extent. They of course do me no harm. I think people can get a great deal more good out of reading—I mean reading of the true sort, of literature as has been handed down to us and which has lived and will live, than by listening to some of the sermons."

3. Male, 22. Non-church member. "I have been raised in a Christian family and brought up an habitual church-goer, but being associated with far different people at present, church going has almost dropped out of my life. For worldly pleasures are stronger, and sermons as a rule seem too dry to affect me. Yet for conscience sake I attend church, and while there often wish I were back again in the old Christian life and resolve to do better. But resolutions are broken when six week-days intervene and Sunday comes around with only one meeting attended and half the sermon lost."

The returns and my interviews show that there is a growing class of indifferent church goers, both men and women (probably more of the former), educated, cultured, of refined instincts, for whom the sermon has no message or appeal. I find a similar group among laboring classes, particularly those who work in factories.

Critical.

4. Female, 33. Church member, 18 years. "Whatever the minister's subject, if he is deeply interested in it himself and preaches from the heart, it seldom if ever fails to thoroughly interest me also. If a man himself is not fired with the spirit and feeling of his subject how can he impart it to others? This is often the cause of failure in ministers. They go into their pulpit in a half-hearted way trying to entertain the people and expect to see in response an enthusiasm which they, themselves, do not possess."

5. Female, 33. Church member, 21 years. "The effect of a sermon on me depends much upon the sermon itself, and upon the man behind the sermon. Sermons of a sane, sensible, wholesome type; dealing with conduct and life's practical difficulties, are helpful to me. They encourage me and stimulate me to perseverance in the spiritual life. I like sermons on spiritual themes. I care nothing for a political sermon founded upon current history, or ancient history either. The so-called "up-to-date" sermon dealing with themes furnished by the newspaper columns or by science is to me an abomination, and stirs me always to rebellion against the man in the pulpit."

6. Male, 34. Church member, 12 years. "In a majority of cases I leave the church feeling sorry for the misguided preacher that has tried to teach the people; in some instances I find that the preacher cares more for the peculiar dogma he is trying to promulgate than for the Master he claims to serve; in some cases I am strongly impressed with the evident sincerity of the preacher, my faith is made stronger in both God and man. *Good sermons do* benefit me in that they tend to hold me in the path of what my understanding calls right. They strengthen my faith in the Bible, God and the Resurrection."

7. Male, 37. Church member, 25 years. "Most sermons make me weary. Too many of them are mere words that have no concrete meaning. Most of them make statements which I do not believe. I like sermons which set forth the philosophical side of sin. One of the best I ever heard was upon the book of Job. It set forth Job's attitude toward sin as that of the Jews. Another good one which I heard twenty years ago was upon the question of conscience: Is there an absolute conscience or is conscience relative? Many sermons of this kind I can remember almost completely. But most sermons leave no thought with me that will stick."

8. Male, 39. Non-church member. "If the preacher seems charitable (liberal) in his views and is sincere, his sermons always benefit me in that they inspire and encourage, even though they may not instruct. The exhibition of sincerity and charity always strengthens my own better motives and aspirations. On the other hand if the preacher does not appear to be, or is obviously not, sincere I feel injured. Or if he be sincere and lacking in charity (as above defined) I may feel injured or disturbed and not inclined to hear him again. I prefer, of course, to listen to a cultured man, but much prefer the uncultured and sincere to the learned insincere or the learned who lacks in those human qualities of heart and mind which give a man the right to assume to help others."

"The service, the worship, appeals to me more than the preaching, ordinarily, and I often feel that the time spent in the church would have been altogether well spent but for the sermon. Being in the church with other people, all in a worshipful mood, and reverent attitude of body and mind, produces better results upon me than does the sermon. When the sermon seems a proper part of this portion of the service, as sometimes happens, the whole service is far more beneficial and approximates the ideal conditions in such matters. It causes me to feel more satisfied to be among men."

9. Male, 58. Church member. "The sermons of the present day, in great majority, are nothing more than a sort of one-half hour talk to entertain."

Both the indifferent and critical classes rarely, if ever, enter into the social consciousness of the church audience. If they do, it is through the religious atmosphere created by the church service as a whole. They may profit by the services until the sermon is reached (see case 8), which for them is a sort of signal for the critical attitude. This in turn dissolves them out from the social mind and cuts them off from its benefits. The critics, if they react at all favorably, do so to the church service as a whole and the reaction is emotional. Adverse criticism may be made against the subject of the sermon, or against its treatment or against the minister himself. And in the latter insincerity is most often mentioned as a defect.

Emotional.

10. Female, 31. Church member 17 years. "The practical side of a sermon always helps me. I have heard many of the best preachers in the country of all denominations. Sermons have been the greatest blessing in my life."

11. Female, 19. Church member 3 months. "When I come out from church after hearing a sermon I usually feel much better than I did when I went in, but sometimes I feel disappointed with myself. Listening to a good sermon brings me nearer to Christ and gives me strength and inspiration, and also makes me more determined to live for Him."

12. Female, 26. Church member 15 years. "After listening to a sermon I always resolve to try to live a more exemplary life, a life such as would influence others to become christians. Good sermons soften me and make me more charitable toward my fellow men and ashamed of my ungratefulness."

13. Female, 39. Church member 43 years. "Sometimes sermons make me feel very unworthy of the name of christian, and other times I feel like I want to strive harder for the right, and search the scriptures more diligently to satisfy my own mind."

14. Female, 36. Church member 23 years. "It gives me stronger and better ideals and acts as an inspiration. Sometimes points me to duties I had not realized before. Often brings out Bible characters in a new light, makes them alive so that their reaction on me is that of one human being on another. Occupies one hour of my time in a good and wholesome way. Rests me by taking my mind from my daily tasks, from plans for making one dollar do the work of two, from fixing over old clothes, etc."

15. Female, 27. Church member 16 years. "Sermons have encouraged me, perhaps because my inward eyes have been turned away from myself and toward God; among such sermons I remember especially one from Ps. 27:1 (The Lord is my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear?) preached when I was a little girl. Another from Luke 5:5 (Master we have toiled all the night and taken nothing; nevertheless at thy word I will let down the net). Sermons have sometimes helped me to see certain truths which I had not thought of before, have often made me feel the mean and unprofitable character of my own life as contrasted with the life I might live and have in this way been an incitement to greater earnestness. I think this result is usually due to the personality of the minister felt through his sermon."

16. Female, 34. Church member 18 years. "A thoroughly interested consecrated minister, full of the spirit and with a burning message for his people is sure to affect and benefit his hearers. I have often been fortunate in hearing such sermons as these and they have done much to make my life better and happier."

17. Male, 54. Church member 36 years. "I have no use for any sermon that fails to present the personal Christ, freed from everything that detracts from love of the Father and obedience to His will."

18. Male, 37. Church member 25 years. "The sermon makes definite and sometimes more human the spirit and atmosphere of worship. It often, and if good at all, leaves a definite thing to do after getting from the room."

19. Male, 24. Church member 7 years. "I have never before considered this subject, but as I look back over my life, I can see where sermons have benefited me. Many a time a thought that was only in the crudest form developed under the influence of a sermon which probably did not have any connection with that thought, but contained the germ of what was needed to bring it out to its fullest form, and I thereby derived a benefit in that the thought was completed, whereas, if I had not heard the sermon, it would have passed out of my life, leaving no influence behind."

Over fifty per cent. of the returns indicate an emotional response and this tallies with the results of my personal interviews. The expression "I had never thought of this subject before" (see case 19) indicates the non-critical attitude. A sermon by the emotionally disposed is accepted as a matter of course, it is something to be respected, given ear to, to be understood and applied. The critical attitude says the

worship would have been good had the sermon been omitted, the emotional attitude says the sermon makes the spirit and atmosphere of worship more human. The emotional class often lay stress upon the intellectual benefits of a sermon (see above cases on this point). Sermons remove doubts, blocks, sordid debris and inhibitions of whatever sort, and permit the free flow of mental processes; and while this sort of thinking will not classify with the profound or ultra intellectual, it is free, swift, intuitive and being accompanied with instinctive and emotional impulses, results in inspiration, encouragement and accumulated zeal. This group is uniform in testifying to the moral effect of the sermon. The effect of presenting the personality of Jesus is often dwelt upon. This squares with my theoretical discussion above. The social and common mind reacts best to concrete images and personalities. Jesus was religion in the concrete, *i. e.*, religion issuing in daily conduct and being.

SUMMARY.

I. The Psychology of the Sermon Presents Three Interrelated Factors.

(a) Nature of the consciousness addressed by the sermon. Theoretically it is social as opposed to individual. In real life it is partly social, partly individual, and even in the same person the states of consciousness may change from *individual* to *social* and back again repeatedly during the same sermon.

(b) The reaction of the consciousness, theoretically, is intellectual, dominated by emotions and sentiments culminating in a motive. In real life it may be indifferent or critical or emotional and sympathetic resulting in a motive.

(c) The stimulus (the sermon) in nature and purpose, should be common, popular, fundamental, concrete and universal, fraught with images pertinent to the larger experiences of the people.

II. Some Inferences from the Psychological Point of View.

(a) The sermon is justified as a part of church worship on the ground that the social-mind is more receptive than the individual-mind; it is more likely to be inspired, uplifted, and morally energized. The sermon is informational and directive in that it focalizes motives and intentions on concrete situations.

(b) The emotional sympathetic minds fuse more easily with the social-mind and therefore best react to the stimulus of the sermon, while the critical minds remain apart, isolated, and are easily bored and wearied.

(c) The sermon has lost and is losing much of its stimulating power. This is likely due to the lessened authority of church and clergy—thereby decreasing their suggestive and semi-hypnotic power, and also to many other rival sources of information—the church was once the only source. Its function is doubtless shifting from the polemical and didactical to that of giving comfort and exercising *rational* control over the passions of men.

THE ORIGIN OF CIRCUMCISION.

BY REV. ARTHUR E. WHITHAM.

In Smith's Dictionary of the Bible (Circumcision), we are told that circumcision was peculiarly though not exclusively, a Jewish rite, enjoined upon Abraham, the father of the nation, by God."

Nothing beyond the above is said as to the significance of this rite, except that it was a token of the covenant established between Abraham and God. In view therefore of the statements, first, in the Ency. Bib. (Circumcision), that it is a "well ascertained fact that circumcision was in no way a practice peculiar to the Israelites," and, second, in Driver's "Genesis," p. 189, "circumcision is not, as is sometimes supposed, a rite peculiar to the Jews;" we may dismiss Smith's Dic. Bib. as entirely out of date on this subject.

Schaff-Herzog-Ency. Rel. Know. (Circumcision), tells us that the probability is that the Israelites adopted the custom from the Egyptians. It adds, however, that in its adoption by the Israelites, it cannot be brought "in connection with the idea of sacrifice (as a remnant of an ancient self-sacrifice, sacrifice of the body, castration in honor of the Deity, etc.), since sacrifice means the selection of something pure for the service of God," but to the Israelites the foreskin was the token of human impurity.

These writers, however, fail to tell us what the significance of the rite actually was, beyond a religious ceremonial purity based upon the idea of bodily cleanliness. But this expresses merely a surface view of Israel's conception of circumcision, consequently, it does not go back far enough into the origin of this rite even with Israel. Thus with Smith's Dic. Bib. we may include Schaff-Herzog as out of date also on this subject.

In McClintock and Strong's Cyclo. Bib. Lit. (Circumcision), we read that "Circumcision served to separate the people of the Jews from the rest of the nations, as a people set apart to God." It was announced by God to Abraham as an obligatory continuance of a covenant sign, embracing his entire posterity. These writers argue that the opinion

that the Israelites had this rite from the same source as the nations around them, "involves no peculiar difficulty, since Jewish institutions are a selection, revision, and re-enactment of an older patriarchal religion." Respecting the meaning of circumcision with the Jews, they add that it had two significances, first, consecration to God; second, mental and spiritual purification. Finally, they adopt Ewald's opinion that circumcision was an offering to God.

Practically this is all these writers tell us of the actual origin and significance of circumcision in use among the Jews, consequently, they fail to throw any light on the origin of this rite as practiced by the Israelites.

In the *Ency. Brit.* Prof. Cheyne informs us that the most scientific theory of circumcision is that which refers it to "a religious instinct common to all nations though not always expressing itself in the same way, and this seems even to be at least obscurely indicated by the traditions of the Israelites. . . . The principle of substitution was familiar to all ancient nations, and not the least to the Israelites." Then Dr. Cheyne refers to the offering by the latter for the redemption of their first born. "On this principle," he adds, "circumcision was an economical recognition of the divine ownership of human life, a part of the body being sacrificed to preserve the remainder." Finally, he contends it was even more than this. "It can scarcely be doubted that it was a sacrifice to the awful power upon whom the fruit of the womb depended, and having once fixed itself in the minds of the people, neither priest nor prophet could eradicate it."

There can be no doubt that Dr. Cheyne approaches very near to the origin of the rite of circumcision even with Israel, yet he fails to arrive at any definite conclusion. He tells us that this rite is a religious instinct common to all nations, but he does not tell us how, or why. He asserts that with Israel it was a substitutionary sacrifice, a part of the body given in lieu of the remainder, yet he gives no hint as to the relationship of the remainder to the part sacrificed. It is true that he finally adds that circumcision was a sacrifice to the awful power upon whom the fruit of the womb depended, but he fails to inform us as to the connection between the fruit of the womb and part of the body sacrificed. We are left therefore to work out for ourselves the origin of this rite upon mere hints which any real student of the subject could have propounded equally with Dr. Cheyne, consequently, his article is not of

any particular value to the scholar, and of no value to the general reader.

Dr. Benzinger in the *Ency. Bib. (Circumcision)*, informs us that while there are indications that the Israelites practiced the rite of circumcision from very high antiquity, yet it was in no way a practice peculiar to them. As for its significance not only amongst the Jews, but also amongst most other peoples, it was regarded as a ritual tribal mark. The former attributed to it the effect of accomplishing a sacramental communion, bringing about a union with the Godhead, originally circumcision and sacrifice serving the same end. Finally, he informs us that "The receiving of the tribal mark is a condition of *conubium* (Gen. 34). Amongst the Israelites also it was the marriageable young men who were circumcised (Jos. 5:2). Thus, with the Israelites, circumcision was a token both of tribal union and marriageability.

This is practically all that we are told by this writer, so that he also fails to explain the significance of circumcision both as a tribal mark and as a sign of marriageability. Thus we are no nearer the origin of this rite as practiced either by Israel or other people.

Prof. Macalister, in *Hastings' Dic. Bib. (Circumcision)*, informs us that in this rite there was the twofold idea of a sacrifice to a tribal god, and the marking of his followers so that they may be known to him and to each other. The sacrifice is a representative one, a part given for the redemption of the rest."

This also is practically all that we are told of this rite by Dr. Macalister, so that he too fails to inform us as to the origin of circumcision as practiced by ancient Israel, or any other people. Neither does he say anything as to the significance of the redemption of the body by the offering of a part in sacrifice, nor yet anything as to the relation of the remainder to the part sacrificed.

I have now quoted from the five leading bible dictionaries, together with the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, with reference to the origin of circumcision, and I have shown that not one offers any definite opinion as to the origin of this rite either with Israel or any other ancient people. I shall, therefore, attempt this myself, but before doing so, it may be well for us to consider first, the rite of circumcision as the sign of the covenant made between Yahwe and Abraham. That the latter looked upon the phallus as peculiarly sacred to the Deity, is seen by his instructing his servant to place his hand under his thigh—literally upon

his organ of generation—when taking oath to him (Gen. 24: 2-9). “The sacredness,” says Dr. Selbie, “attached to this organ in primitive times, would give special solemnity to an oath of this kind (HDB-Thigh). That Abraham viewed this organ as especially sacred to Yahwe, is further seen in the rite of circumcision as given by Yahwe to him as a mark binding him and his posterity to Yahwe in sacramental union. Circumcision is essentially a sacrifice, and in the selection of this particular rite as a sign of the covenant entered into between Yahwe and Abraham, we see a sacrifice of a part of the body for the redemption of the remainder, as professors Cheyne and Macalister word it. But these writers, as I have said, failed to intimate the relation of the remainder of the body to the part sacrificed, leaving the reader to imagine how much of the body bore a special relationship to the part offered, whether indeed it was not the whole of the remainder. The sign of the covenant made between Yahwe and Abraham, supplies their omission, since by this episode we see plainly that the remainder of the body redeemed by the sacrifice of the foreskin was the phallus, as representing the organs of generation.

We are fortunate in possessing a complete illustration from modern primitive people of this sacrifice with its implied redemption or preservation.

Crawley, in his “Mystic Rose,” quotes from Sir A. B. Ellis, that amongst the Yorubas and Ewe peoples of Africa, circumcision is based upon the idea of sacrificing a portion of the phallus to preserve or ensure the well being of the remainder. This rite they further connect with the worship of Elegbra, a deity associated with sexual matters.

With most primitive people the phallus has been viewed as the organ specially representing deity, the reproductive life which emanates from, and is controlled by, the Creator. It was so with Abraham and his posterity for many generations. Later in their history, the origin of circumcision, the sacrifice of a useless part of the organs of reproduction for the preservation of the remainder was forgotten, and the rite survived merely as a sign of religious ceremonial purity. Prof. Cheyne was right in his statement that in the rite of circumcision we have a recognition of the awful power upon whom the fruit of the womb depended, but he did not tell us also that this rite further contained a special recognition of the owner of the male organs of genera-

tion. It is this which the rite of circumcision specially signifies, and yet we have to go behind this for the origin of this rite.

In the index of Prof. Barton's "*Semitic Origins*," one of the most suggestive of recent works on the subject, we read, "Circumcision originated in primitive Ishtar worship, 98 ff." When, however, we turn to this and the following pages, it is not easy to find the explanation of circumcision, which we are there told is to be found in certain conclusions which are themselves confirmed by the rite of circumcision. On page 98, we are further told that "Circumcision . . . is usually explained . . . as embracing the twofold idea of offering a sacrifice, . . . and furnishing a tribal mark," but there is here no explanation of this sacrifice, or why this particular tribal mark was selected. On page 100, we read that the rite of circumcision as performed in Arabia points to its origin as "a sacrifice to the goddess of fertility, by which the child was placed under her protection, and its reproductive powers consecrated to her service." On the same page we read, "Originally circumcision seems to have been a preparation for connubium. Its transfer to infancy may, as W. R. Smith suggests, have been a later development. Circumcision thus seems for the Semitic people a fitting explanation, and an explanation not out of harmony with that usually given by modern scholars for other peoples." But what is Prof. Barton's explanation? So far it is this: Circumcision is a preparation for marriage, in which the goddess of fertility is recognized by sacrificing to her the prepuce of the male organ of generation, by which sacrifice the reproductive organs of the circumcised are dedicated to her service. But how does this harmonize with the explanation of circumcision offered by modern scholars? These, as I have shown, see in circumcision the sacrifice of a part of the body to redeem the remainder. Dr. Barton, however, makes no mention of this redemptive feature of circumcision, although it is quite possible that he had it in mind, and intended it to be recognized by the reader. He is so exceedingly clear as a rule, that a careful reader of his magnificent work prefers to think that any oversight is with himself rather than with the author of "*Semitic Origins*." In the present instance, however, I must confess I am doubtful, since, on page 110, Dr. Barton tells us that "originally the spring festival of the mother-goddess was accompanied by the sacrifice of maiden virtue, out of which grew the custom described by

Herodotus, and the sacrifice of the foreskin of youths." He nowhere says anything about circumcision originating in the idea of redeeming more or less of the body of the victim by a sacrifice of a part of the same. It is here, I believe, that the origin of circumcision is to be found, and not in any outgrowth of the sacrifice of maiden virtue.

W. R. Smith informs us that,—“In later ages of antiquity there was a very general belief, that in strictness, the oldest rituals demanded a human victim, and that animal sacrifice was substituted for the life of man.”

Again, “The plan for substituting an offering which can be more readily procured, or better spared, for the more costly victim which traditional ritual demanded, was largely applied throughout antiquity.” This animal substitute for the older sacrifice of the life of man, he shows to have been adopted by the Hebrews, Phœnicians and Egyptians (*Rel. Sem.*, pp. 361, 364, 366).

In the oldest of all the cults of the Ancient World, Ishtar or Tammuz worship, is, I believe, to be found the origin of circumcision. Ishtar was the original mother earth-goddess of all the nations of the Ancient World, mother of the gods, men and vegetation. Her worship as associated with the god of vegetation, Tammuz, had for its object the renewal of the vital forces of nature. In rude society human beings have been commonly killed to secure the growth of crops, a custom extending from India to Egypt. In the annual festivals of Tammuz, Adonis, Attis, Osiris and Dionysius, gods severally impersonated by a priest-king, who originally was put to death during the festival, we have the representation of the decay and revival of vegetation, with rites which the ancients recognized as substantially the same. The men who impersonated the several gods, enjoyed the favors of women, most probably sacred harlots, who also severally impersonated Ishtar, Aphrodite, Cybele and Isis (*Frazer-Golden Bough*, Vol. 2., pp. 124, 241, 245, 258, 115, 135; Vol. 3, pp. 166, 178). All this Mr. Frazer tells us, and yet it appears to me that, in company with other scholars, he fails to see here a perfectly plain development of the original sacrifice of this nature cult as it spread west from the Euphrates valley. Let us see whether we ourselves can be more successful or whether we have set ourselves to describe a mirage whose substratum has no existence except in our imagination.

From certain facts scattered throughout a variety of writings, but

which seem never to have been gathered together under one head, it would appear that circumcision originated in a sacrifice which has undergone two important changes or modifications. In the first instance, a human being had been sacrificed at the shrine of deity. Subsequently, emasculation, the offering of the spoils of manhood, was substituted in place of the victim's life. Finally, circumcision was substituted for emasculation.

The evidence that these three stages were successive steps in one evolution, is as follows:

Primitive man very early pictured the earth as the mother goddess, the self-producer of vegetation, who, however, was not able to maintain it. Thus, the god of vegetation, who in the first instance, as produced by the earth, was her son, had to be given back to her as her husband, in an annual sacrifice for the purpose of reanimating the earth's waning vitality. It was this conception which produced the legend and worship of Ishtar and Tammuz, the original Semitic nature goddess and god, a worship, which, as I have said, underlies all forms of this myth.

With primitive man all nature was peopled with spirits, whom he viewed as gods. They were originally chthonic, *i. e.*, of the earth, identified with objects and powers belonging to the earth, while clothed with human forms and capable of exhibiting every human action in passion and appetite (Barton-Sem. Orig., p. 81; Teile-Elements in the Science of Rel., Vol. 1, p. 92).

The first deity conceived by the Semites was Ishtar, the mother earth goddess (Barton-Sem. Orig., Index, Mother-goddess). This was but natural, since man's observation must have been first aroused by the necessity of food. This he saw in the annual vegetation, apparently the natural and unaided product of the earth. To him the earth became the primitive mother, and the vegetation her son. At all events, we knew that the early Semite did view Ishtar as the mother earth goddess who produced the annual vegetation (Jastrow-Bab. Assy. Rel., p. 563). This vegetation he further viewed as her son, and also her husband, Tammuz (Barton-Sem. Orig., p. 85; Cheyne-Bible Problems, p. 74). The next step was the recognition that the mother earth while possessing inherent power to produce fertility, could not maintain it, as evidenced in the annual decay and death of vegetation

(Jastrow-BAS, p. 574). She thus became responsible for the death of her son Tammuz (*ib.*, 483).

Prof. Barton informs us that "Many scholars agree that Tammuz was in some way connected with vegetation, and that the legend of his death was a reflection of the dying of the leaves (Sem. Orig., p. 85). Tammuz was indeed connected with vegetation as he was impersonated by it, as we see in the weeping and rejoicing at his festival, which related to his death and resurrection as portrayed in the decay and revival of vegetation. As Ishtar was personified by the earth and its powers, so Tammuz was personified by vegetation and its growth (Barton-Sem. Orig., pp. 86 ff., 112 ff.).

I have said that the early Semite viewed Tammuz not only as the son of Ishtar, but also as her husband (*cf.* Sayce-Bab. Rel., p. 251; Jastrow-BAR, pp. 84, 484), and I shall now show why.

I have already referred to the belief that the earth goddess was not able to maintain her own power of fertility. This had, consequently, to be stimulated. But by what?—and how. Naturally, by contact with male powers of fertility, and these could only be given through some process by which the barren earth could literally absorb them.

Prof. Barton informs us that primitive Semitic religion was organized on the analogy of its economic and social life (Sem. Orig., p. 83; Ellis-Psy. of Sex., Vol. 2, p. 101). I have already referred to Frazer's statement that in the cult we are considering, two persons, a man and a woman, represented the god and goddess who were impersonated by the vegetation and the earth. "The operations of nature," he further tells us, "were supposed to be carried on by mythical personages very like man himself." If he could only assimilate himself to them completely, he would be able to wield all their powers (Golden Bough, Vol. 3, p. 164). Further, the sympathetic relation supposed to exist between the commerce of the sexes and the fertility of the earth, to which he alludes, explains the licentiousness accompanying the worship of Ishtar and Tammuz, since we see that it was seriously regarded as aiding to maintain the earth's fertility.

From all this we gather that by a mimic marriage of the earth goddess and god of vegetation, impersonated by two human beings, it was believed that the earth's vitality would be restored. This accounts for Tammuz being viewed as the husband as well as the child of Ishtar, for,

as the god of vegetation, which again was viewed as the offspring of the earth goddess, he was both son and husband of Ishtar.

This festival, however, included more than a mere mimic marriage. Vegetation annually decayed and died, consequently, Ishtar was viewed as causing the death of her son-husband. In the carrying out of this thought during the progress of the festival, the man who played the part of Tammuz was originally slain, and his body burnt, while his blood and ashes were mingled with the earth in token of the literal uniting of the earth goddess and the god of vegetation in marriage.

Mr. Frazer, after presenting many illustrations of the sacrifice of human beings to promote the growth of crops, tells us that there is "no improbability in the supposition that they may once have been killed for a like purpose in Phrygia" (Vol. 2, pp. 238-248). Considering that the custom of human sacrifice was common throughout Semitic heathenism (Ency. Brit., Vol. 16, p. 696; HBD, Vol. 4, p. 334), and in view of the evidence already given, it seems to me that human sacrifice lay at the root of the Ishtar cult, indeed that this cult cannot be explained apart from it. Prof. Sayce shows that the sacrifice of children in substitution for their fathers, was well understood in Babylon (Bab. Rel., p. 78; Patriarchal Palestine, p. 183), which shows that human sacrifice was known in the Euphrates valley as well as in other regions where the Semites dwelt. I believe that originally in the Ishtar cult, the man representing Tammuz was put to death. Prof. Barton thinks that Tammuz was viewed as Ishtar's son in accordance with the primitive Semitic belief that the head of the family is the mother, and the chief male her son (Sem. Orig., p. 85). I believe, however, that Tammuz was viewed as the son of Ishtar owing to the Semitic conception of the origin of the mother earth goddess, who by her self-produced vegetation appeared to them as a virgin with a child, which child was a male, since it was thought to have become the husband of Ishtar, by whom it was afterwards put to death.

In this conception, I believe, also, is to be found the origin of human sacrifice amongst Semitic and other people, a sacrifice lying at the base of circumcision and the first step in the development we are tracing.

As time advanced, many substitutes were offered in place of an adult human victim. Now it was a male child who took the place of the father, again, it was some lower animal offered as a substitute for the child, or person (Pausanias, Bk. 9, c. 8), but the victim was always to be a male

(Ex. 34: 20; Barton, *Sem. Orig.*, p. 251). This development of the original sacrifice we can already trace in the history of the Hebrews. That the early Israelites, like other divisions of the Semitic people, offered adult human sacrifice we see in the death of Jephthah's daughter, slain and offered by her father as an offering to Yahwe in accordance with an oath taken to that effect. At one time there was an effort made to deny that this incident recorded a human sacrifice, but scholars are generally agreed that this is the meaning of the narrative (*Judges* 40, Sayce-*Early His. Heb.*, p. 52, Moore-*Judges*, p. 299; Jephthah, EBD; *Ency. Bib. HBD*, Kent-*His. Heb. People*, p. 96).

W. R. Smith (*Rel. Sem.*, p. 416) is, consequently, justified in seeing in this episode a connection with an annual sacrifice, but he does not enter into the reason why a virgin should be sacrificed to Yahwe. It seems to me that here we have a similar idea to that underlying the sacrifice of male victims to goddesses, here it is a female victim to a god, a common enough episode in ancient times (Pausanias, *Bk. 4, c. 9*), and one undoubtedly connected with the sex idea underlying all the varied cults of Ishtar.

Returning to the OT, we have David uniting in offering innocent human beings in sacrifice to Yahwe, who is represented as accepting them by way of atonement (2 Sam: 21, 1-14; Kent, *His. Heb. Peo.*, p. 204; Sayce, *Early Heb. His.*, p. 440; Rizpah-HBD). Outside the Israelites we see amongst other Semites the evolution of the substitution of the child for the parent, as witnessed amongst the Babylonians (Sayce, *Bab. Rel.*, p. 78; *Patriarchal Pal.*, p. 183), a custom undoubtedly followed by the Hebrews themselves. Notwithstanding their supposed law against the sacrifice of children, the OT gives abundant evidence that such a sacrifice was of regular and common occurrence (*Eze.* 20: 26; Budde, *Rel. Israel to the Exile*, p. 62; Sayce, *EHH.*, p. 47). With the Hebrews, as with their neighbors, the first born, even of children, was claimed by the tribal deity, for Yahwe had declared that all such were his (Ex. 21: 29), but that they were to be redeemed by the payment of five shekels a head (Ex. 13: 13), although W. R. Smith says that the idea of animal sacrifice as a substitution for the life of man appears amongst the Hebrews in the story of Isaac's sacrifice (*Rel. Sem.*, p. 366).

When all the facts are borne in mind we cannot blame the Hebrew people for the sacrifice of their children, notwithstanding the law

against it (Gen. 22: 18; Lev. 20: 2). The supposed sacrifice of children to Moloch before the captivity was really an oblation to Jehovah (W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*, p. 372). Brought up from infancy in the belief that the first born of every family, if a male, was sacred to Jehovah, and to be redeemed by five shekels, they knew that he had graciously waived His right to the life of this firstling for a mere five shekels. They might well argue that God would, after all, be better pleased if they refused to take advantage of His consideration, and in place of such a paltry sum, devote, instead, their first and best beloved child (Frazer, Vol. 2, p. 46). This belief, says Sayce, "was consecrated by the Mosaic law itself" (EHH., p. 47).

Amongst the Phœnicians of later date, it was not long since discovered that the ram was a recognized substitute for a former human adult victim (Sayce, EHH., p. 52). Amongst the Hebrews, also, it was customary to offer this animal as an atonement for both priests and people, and there can be little doubt that as with the Phœnicians, so with the Hebrews, this creature was a substitute for an older human sacrifice.

But while amongst the Semites the life of the human being was redeemed in the manner described, there was still required a part of his body to be offered in sacrifice in token of what the substitution stood for, and as a continual reminder that, after all, the man himself was the property of the deity. To this end, as a substitution for the entire life, the victim surrendered his manhood by emasculation, such surrender being viewed as an equivalent to the entire life of the victim, since the life called for was the reproductive life. Had we not the witness of Lucian to the offering of the virile powers to the Syrian goddess at Hierapolis (*De Syria Dea*), together with the record of numerous similar mutilations throughout Asia Minor (*Ency. Bib., Phœnicia*), the presence of eunuch priests at the shrines of all female deities, in Egypt, Babylonia, Phœnicia, Syria, and Asia Minor, would of itself have intimated the origin of this loss of manhood.

The mutilation of the young lover ascribed in one of the versions of the Attys legend, to the furious jealousy of his divine mistress (Attys, *Ency. Brit.: HDB.*, Vol. 1, p. 695), had its origin in the surrender of the virile powers to a mother goddess, a feature in the worship of the latter which explains the presence of eunuch priests at the various shrines of the Ishtar cult.

The Galli, or eunuch priests, who served the shrine, and on public

occasions led the chorus of the devotees of Cybele, the goddess who had mutilated Attys (Ency. Brit.-Persinus; Smith's Dic. GRA-GALLI), are commonly said to have had their origin in the cult of this Phrygian deity. But castration as a feature of this worship did not originate in Asia Minor, nor yet with the Syrian Semites, as Perrot and Chipiez evidently imagine (His. Art in Phrygia, p. 212). Cybele was but another and later form of the Hittite goddess Ma, worshipped at Komana in Cappadocia, and served by 6,000 eunuch priests (Perrot and Chipiez, *ib.*, p. 30; Wright-Hittite Rel., p. 75; Sayce-Bab. Rel., p. 267). But the Hittites, like the Canaanites, imported both their deities and their worship from Babylonia. The worship of Cybele and Attys was accompanied by the rites with which Ishtar and Tammuz had been honored in Babylonia (Wright, *ib.*, pp. 73, 75). The Hittites, in their stronghold of Carchemish on the Euphrates, had adopted the Babylonian cult of Ishtar and Tammuz-Adonis, and had handed it on to the tribes of Asia Minor. The close resemblance to the story of Attys and that of Adonis was the result of a common origin. The old legends of the Semitic cult had come to the West (Ency. Brit.-Lydia). From Babylonia the Hittites had borrowed their art (Hittite-Ency. Bib.), so that we are not surprised that they borrowed their religion also. Prof. Sayce tells us that the Kali, a class of Semitic Babylonian priests, are the "Galli or eunuch priests of the Kappadokian goddess, their religious name having been borrowed along with the religious rites over which they presided (Bab. Rel., p. 62). Ishtar herself had been served by eunuch priests (*ib.*, p. 266). In fact, 'the man' or 'creature of Ishtar,' is called Kahu, *i. e.*, one of the Galli" (*ib.*, p. 225).

From all this evidence we cannot be wrong in viewing emasculation, or the surrender of virile power to the mother earth goddess, as having originated in Babylonia as a substitute for the life of the entire human victim.

I will give one more illustration, and then I will sum up as far as I have gone.

In Ex. 4: 25 ff., we read that when Moses was returning to Egypt in company with his wife Zipporah, and son Gershom, Yahwe met him and sought to kill him (because he was uncircumcised), but Zipporah saved him by circumcising their son (Moses, HDB; Ency. Bib.).

That the story represents Yahwe as seeking the life of Moses, who was only saved by his wife in the manner described, all modern scholars

admit. But how was this done? By substitutionary sacrifice, *i. e.*, Moses's son was circumcised in the place of his father (Ency. Bib. Circumcision).

The meaning of this passage, says Prof. Barton, is that Moses himself being uncircumcised, Yahwe tried to kill him, but he was saved by his wife circumcising her son in his stead, and smearing some of the blood upon Moses so as to make it appear that the blood proceeded from an incision in him, and that then Yahwe was appeased (Sem. Orig., p. 280). This make-believe is referred to by W. R. Smith as largely applied throughout antiquity (Rel. Sem., p. 364). Of course the entire episode is a legend (Peters, Early Hebrew Story, p. 191), yet it serves to show us the evolution of human sacrifice in early Israel. Here we have a substitutionary offering in a part of the body of a child being sacrificed instead of the father. This evidence, added to that already produced, shows us three stages in human sacrifice. First the man himself; next a substitution in the sacrifice of his child, or an animal; finally a second substitutionary sacrifice in the circumcision of the child, the death of an animal, or payment of five shekels.

But this is not the evolution we are directly seeking, although this is interesting, and it has necessarily been evolved in our search for the evolution of sacrifice as affecting the original victim himself. Here I have shown two stages. First, the sacrifice of the entire adult victim; second, emasculation of the adult in lieu of the entire victim. Can we show a third stage?

We are fortunate in possessing direct evidence that circumcision was a substitution for human life. Eusebius informs us that a plague having occurred, Cronos sacrificed his only son to his father the Sky, circumcised himself, and obliged his companions to do the same (Sayce, EHH., p. 46). Nothing could possibly be plainer than the inference to be gathered from this statement, *viz.*, that circumcision on the part of Cronos and his companions was offered as a substitutionary sacrifice in place of their own lives, the actual life being supplied in the sacrifice by Cronos of his own son. Of course all this is legendary, yet it serves to show an evolution in the idea of human sacrifice, and justifies those scholars who see in circumcision a sacrifice of a part of the body to preserve the remainder.

But what idea lay behind the offering of a part of the sexual organs as a substitution for the life of the victim? Surely here is a survival

of a rite once common wherever the cult of Ishtar, the mother earth goddess, was the religion of the people. That Yahwe was the author of life, who manifested himself especially in all matters of reproduction, is the belief expressed repeatedly in the early narratives of the OT. But this alone would never have suggested the idea of the phallus being his special representative organ, nor of the sacrifice of part of it to redeem the rest. I believe with Prof. Barton that Yahwe was a transformed mother goddess, which at once explains the difficulty, and brings the early Israelites into harmony with the common belief of the Semitic world in its adoption of the Ishtar cult (*Sem. Orig.*, pp. 280, 287).

In early times it had been customary to offer the whole male victim to the earth goddess. At Sparta, Lycurgus changed this idea into the practice of flogging young men before the altar of Artemis, which thus became sprinkled with human blood (*Pausanias*, Bk. 3, c. 16). The thighs of victims were specially offered to Aphrodite (*ib.*, Bk. 2, c. 10), the well-known goddess of illicit love, who is equivalent to Astarte of the Hebrews, and Ishtar of the Babylonians. The thigh is the seat of life, especially procreative or virile power, as appears very clearly in the idiom of the Semites (*W. R. Smith, Rel. Sem.*, p. 380). Male victims were offered to the Oriental Aphrodite, her favorite being the goat. Smith's suggestion that this preference was connected with the androgynous character ascribed to the Eastern goddess (*ib.*, p. 472), fails to bring out the real significance of this preference. This is to be found only in the assumed necessity of devoting to her the virile or reproductive powers. This fact recognized, we at once understand why the Ephesian Artemis is represented with many breasts, and why she was served by eunuch priests (*Smith's Class. Dic. Artemis*). This fact explains why the Celestial Aphrodite, the same goddess as the Ephesian Artemis, has one foot on a tortoise; and the Pandemian Aphrodite sits on a he goat (*Pausanias*, Bk. 6, c. 25). These two creatures are well-known symbols of virile or reproductive power, and being thus associated with Aphrodite, her reproductive character is emphasized. In Yahwe's origin as a female deity, we see all this expressed in the final offering to him of the foreskin as a representative and substitutionary part of the organs of generation, or, in other words, as a substitutionary sacrifice for the virile power of the victim. Of course all this had long since been forgotten when the stories of the nation came finally to be written, yet the hints which are so plainly given, and as plainly

not understood by the writers, are to us unmistakable survivals of a forgotten religion once practiced by their ancestors.

The sacrifice of the entire victim having been the first method of securing the benefits of fertility from the earth goddess, or rather ensuring *her* the continuance of this fertility, what was more natural than that in the process of substitutionary sacrifice, emasculation should take the place of the victim's life, to be followed subsequently and finally by circumcision. If, as it seems probable, circumcision is a substitution for the whole victim, we can well understand how it originated as a substitution for emasculation, since the very nature of the rite suggests a connection between the organ sacrificed in part or whole, and a female deity.

Thus, for the reasons advanced, it appears to me that circumcision had its origin in nature worship, the Ishtar cult, as the outcome of the evolution of a sacrifice offered in primitive times to a mother goddess, first, the whole victim, then emasculation, and finally circumcision. If I am not correct, why do modern scholars see in circumcision a sacrifice of a part of the body to preserve the rest? Why, if I am not correct, was the foreskin chosen as the part of the body to be sacrificed to redeem the remainder? The conclusion which I have come to in my research tends to explain and confirm the opinion of these scholars, whose view otherwise appears to me to be without any definite foundation.

Finally, I will add that I do not of course maintain that this evolution was orderly or consciously developed, or indeed that in any centre of worship of the mother earth goddess these three stages can be successively traced. On the contrary, it is merely by a general survey of the entire regions where, and the people by whom, this nature cult was adopted, that we can see this evolution as I have described and traced it.

LITERATURE.

Luigi Valli, Il fondamento psicologico della religione. Roma, ERMANNO LOESCHER e C, 1904.

According to its preface, it pretends to be a work of scientific psychological research based on history. The author finds three problems to solve: (1) What is the idea common to all religions? (2) How can the existence of this idea be accounted for? (3) How did it develop into the various forms to be found in the historical religions? (p. 19). After about a hundred pages of referring to, and criticising, all sorts of philosophy of religion, Valli realizes that he has to go his own "solitary way," cutting loose from all abstract conceptions and studying religion as a psychic phenomenon (p. 100). *Ut desint vires, tamen est laudanda voluntas.* He does not cut loose; he believes to have ascertained at least two facts, (1) that the idea essential and common to all religions is the idea of the good being in reality superior to the evil, and (2) that this idea, although contrary to reason, arises from the very desire which it satisfies, after the logical functions of our mind have been impaired for the time being (p. 112). At this point, he begins to generalize in his own way, from a scanty array of facts, according to the speculative method of the philosophers of religion which he so much dislikes.

The religious phenomenon is, in his opinion, made possible: (1) by the classification of all things under the heads of Good and Evil, which this psychologist tells us underlie our likes and dislikes; (2) by that two-sided arrangement of our mind according to which each painful idea (*rappresentazione*) arouses a counter idea (*controrappresentazione*) of a corresponding good (p. 126); and (3) by those four indefinite regions (?) in which the realization of those counter ideas does not seem to run counter to human reason: unknown powers, the inner character of these powers acting upon human welfare, the future time, the transcendent world (p. 131). The religious moment itself then consists, he goes on speculating, in an emotion produced by a new or a rather deep vision of pain or of existing outward evil; an emotion which is, psychologically speaking, ever the same, be it produced by fear of an imaginary evil spirit or by lack of food, by shipwreck, by oppression, by the vanity of human pleasures and so on (p. 137). This emotion disturbs the cognitive or logical function so that the difference between the actual and the possible is dimmed and the mind is enabled to assert the reality of the counter idea: that is, to have faith (p. 152). This "*salto irrazionale*" of the religious process is later on more impartially called *extrarational*, but that such a term is at all chosen, shows the author in an unsympathetic mood toward his subject-matter and bars his speculation from being benefited by an even individually limited knowledge of the cognitive character of the religious moment; which is first of all the expression of the restored health of the psychophysical constitution and a reasoning from analogy to personality which re-interprets life at least to the satisfaction of the reasoning individual concerned.

But to return to Valli's argument! The *salto irrazionale* of the religious process appears in four forms according to the four reasons mentioned above: (1) By "*contraposition*" the evil is thought a power which is weaker than another kind power. (2) By "*mitigation*" the evil is thought the aversive mood of a superior being which may be overcome by the kind disposition of the same being. (3) By "*aspettazione*" (a certain way of looking at things) the evil is thought a transitory state followed by a just and happy future; and (4) by "*irrealizzazione*" the evil is thought an illusion, a negligible quantity hiding an eternal kind reality (p. 151).

This is all the psychology there is; the very language used by the author is the opposite of concise—I tried to improve that part of it—and shows his innocence regarding things psychological. And yet he all the time scratches the surface of big veins of gold. He sees that religion is best studied when focused in a psychic

is not that the religious is a content which can be grasped by sweeping the field of consciousness, but that the religious is a content which is grasped by the religious act itself. It is important, but not a part of the study of religious psychology, to grasp all religious, doctrinaire and scientific ideas in this manner, as people do when they go on to say that the religious is a content which can be grasped by the religious act itself. When he, for instance, fights Schleiermacher the originator of religious psychology (p. 100), regarding his feeling of absolute dependence.

To show what I expected him to do, I will here sketch in a few words the results that the analysis of the religious moments of various individuals yielded to me and which are partly verified by the work under the auspices of Clark University. The results are here given as I formulated them for my lectures on the Psychology of Religion delivered before Meadville, Pa., Theological School, November, 1906.

Lecture I: The spiritual vision as basic Experience for religious thoughts, emotions, and volitions.

1. The comparative method is indispensable for the Psychology of Religion, but must be complemented by the most thoroughgoing individual analysis.

2. The spiritual vision appears after the crisis of puberty at about 16. It is to unify the psychophysical constitution by producing faith in the ideals subliminally formed; it completes its growth during the second half of adolescence when attempts at life's work are made.

3. The spiritual vision presupposes the birth of self during boyhood and girlhood: Fits of abstraction and systematization, characteristic of that stage, lead up to the consciousness of individuality and refractory conduct. The number of these cognitive moments seems to decrease inasmuch as the spiritual visions increase.

4. Conditions favorable for the functioning of the vision are those that paralyze the primitive impulses: religious intoxication, religious symbols, religious thoughts, misfortune, coming in touch with nature, etc.

(5) The unifying restoration of the psychophysical constitution, which appears psychically as a degree of satisfaction, precipitates into consciousness as an optimistic view of life, which may be indicative of the most active or the most passive conduct of life. (*Cf.* the Teutonic and Russian ways.)

(6) The visionary perceives himself as illumined space with nature sharing the same immateriality; he identifies the perception of unity between himself and nature in various degrees with God, and deduces either Pantheism or Panpsychism by automatic reasoning from analogy to personality.

(7) This cosmic emotion, which involves a paralysis of the selective functions of selfhood, merges into the emotion of humbleness, that is, of being but a part of, and absolutely dependent on, the majestic and sublime universe of the omnipotence back of it, which is perceived as a more or less purposeful God.

(8) The selective emotional function of likes and dislikes being paralyzed, love appears as the communistic emotion of an individuality that awaits being fitted into the work of the universe of spirits; where, however, it will be either impaired (Mediterranean, Mongolian races) or regulated (Northern European).

(9) The selective volitional function, that is, the will to acquire individual power and to reject that of others, is deadened during the vision and replaced by the impulse to self-sacrifice. In the reorganization of life it appears either impaired as communistic will (Russian and Latin monks, Nirvana), or regulated as society-centered individuality (the Anglo-Saxon, New Thought movement).

(10) The fact that there are people with small degrees of the spiritual vision, or even with none at all, suggests to the evolutionist the task of educating the race into a complete possession of the function. The pedagogical method to be employed is to be established by Ethics and Practical Theology.

E. TAUSCH.

NOTE ON RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN SPANISH RELIGION.

The American Review of Reviews of last April gives the sum of an article in the Revista Contemporanea (Madrid), by Dr. Emilio Ribera, under the heading "Greek Types Preserved in Spain." The people of Denia, Sagunto, and Burriana, in the former kingdom of Valencia, are said to be physically and mentally different from the people of other communities close by, which the author considers to be the

results of a mixture of the Arab, Castilian, Aragonese and Moorish elements left by successive conquests. Up to quite recent years, they would not intermarry with these neighbors. The isolation is also manifest in their pronounced dissenting religious views. Until lately, Burriana had but one church while Villa Real had many. Masonry, almost unknown elsewhere in the region, has flourished there, and protestantism, introduced by the English, has only in these towns gained a relatively large number of adherents. Dr. R. thinks inquiry would disclose other similar centres on the east coast of Spain.

But why should Greek descendants be more prone than other Spaniards to accept protestantism, to favor democratic brotherhoods, to believe in religious individualism and guard against degeneration by intermarriage with neighbors considered to be inferior? Were the Greeks so very particular in these respects after the Persian and Peloponnesian wars had eliminated the northern stock of the older society of European Greece? Or are the Greeks of to-day differentiated from the rest of the Mediterranean peoples by the traits credited to that anthropological isle in Spain? Surely not! Thus the label "Greek" does not account for the differences mentioned above, but the notice goes a long way to verify an interpretation of them which has been of late attempted by anthropologists as F. Ratzel, L. Wilser, Gustav Ratzenhofer, O. Ammon, M. Much, Houston Chamberlain and others. The Northern European, whose relatively pure type is described in the *Germania* of Tacitus, and is still extant on the Scandinavian peninsula, in some parts of England and on the northern coast of Germany, has in some way or other, may be through natural selection exercised by the stern demands of glacial periods in prehistoric times, reached a greater psychophysical perfectibility than either the smaller Mediterranean or the round-headed type who later crowded in between the two former. By greater perfectibility I like to understand possibilities of growth beyond those of lower races in two directions.

(1) The Northern European is better able to adjust the environment to his ideals of self-assertion, or, what is the same, his biological needs. The Dorian, Æolian, Ionian in Greece, the Latin in Italy, the Teuton of 400 A. D. in Italy, France and Spain, they all were able to advance the civilizations they had found; it is true, indeed, not before they had in the slow course of centuries assimilated these civilizations. Or look at the portraits of the leaders of the Renaissance in Southern Europe! You will easily recognize their anatomical relationship to the Teutonic type and understand the interpretation that the revival of learning about 1500 and modern science came into existence because at that time the northern stock, settled in those latitudes, had finally assimilated all the civilization or assistance toward a happy life that Rome could offer. Then a thousand more perfectible brains busied themselves with observing the environment in which man strives to be comfortable, with discovering and inventing more such devices helpful to increase the length and contents of life. This modern civilization of ours has been in the main created and is still being created in the northern latitudes because the Teuton has been almost eliminated from among the Mediterranean and round-headed stock of Southern and Middle Europe. Witness the centre of industry moving from France to England and Northern Germany at about 1850.

And (2) the original Northern European is better able to adjust his personal conduct to his ideals of self-assertion or biological needs. The Mediterranean believes in ethical dualism, in beggary and poverty, in the asceticism of the monk, in the natural unholiness of the married estate, in the necessity of a celibate life for any one who wants to be on intimate terms with a holy God; he believes in all that because he is not able to regulate his primary impulses or functions of self-assertion, so that they may serve as a means to their biological end, without becoming themselves the purpose of life. The Northern European, on the contrary, believes in ethical monism, in the holiness of labor and industry, of civilization and the comforts it offers, in the holiness of matrimony, in the spiritual worth of all biological functions and of the whole individuality; he believes in all that because he is able to regulate his impulses and activities so that they are always contributing to the physical and spiritual increase of his own life and to the outward realization of the spiritual universe. For instance, he is able to organize his sexual life without degrading himself and his wife; he does not need to deaden like a celibate any of his functions to live a holy life; he does not impair the individuality of a man or woman to fit them

for holy service within society. Witness the ideals of Luther, the Greek ideal of the golden mean, the individualism of the Anglo-Saxon, the abolition of a superior priesthood, the consequent freedom of thought and conscience, and the New Thought movement.

If this is a possible interpretation, we understand psychologically why in those Spanish villages, protestantism has gained a large number of adherents, why heretics have always been numerous, why the villagers did not intermarry with their neighbors; it is because they belong to that northern stock that was still dominating Spain before the inventors of a higher civilization were burned up by the fires of the Inquisition down to 1650.

Now if there are more such anthropological isles in Spain, then the practical conclusion for the Anglo-Saxon missionary must be that he is to begin the evangelization of the country at these points. This would be just as necessary a conclusion as the other that no Spanish statesman can hope to advance his people to the lines reached by nations that are still being led by a dominating number of Northern men as the United States, England, Germany, Austria, France; even Russia has a better chance to catch up with modern civilization, as long as she has not completely eliminated by war or revolution the Teutonic stock.

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Preliminary to the Study of the Greek Religion. By JANE ELLEN HARRISON. Cambridge (Engl.) University Press, 1903. pp. 680.

The author urges that Greek religion is not mythology nor seen in the literature of that country as is popularly supposed. As what people do is more important than what they think, we must turn to ritual which no English work has yet attempted to examine thoroughly. Homer is wrongly thought primitive. He is, especially in religion, the apex of a long development of which we are given few traces of origins. Below his splendid surface lies a stratum of rites of purification, once atonement, which show that the Olympians were not primitive and which reappeared in the dramatists later.

1. Of the two Greek rituals the Olympian or Homeric follows the principle *do ut des*, I give that you may give. Sacrifices to the gods are to obtain their favor. The banquets to which they were bidden are shared by the worshippers. There is no fasting or cleansing. Thucydides, the old oligarch, identified piety with games. Even Eurycleia, who believed piety was giving and asking or transacting a *quid pro quo* business with the gods, giving each his due, would not represent the Homeric view point. In such transactions man obtains the best because the gods are greatest, but toward the Olympians there was no fear, no skepticism, no sense of sin. The sacrifice was roasted to make it palatable and because the gods were in heaven.

2. The Chthonic rites were very different. Here the holocaust was devoted entirely to the gods, was not shared. These services were gloomy and were on the principle *do ut abeas*, I give that you may go away. If in these festivals garlands were worn the face was pale. The ceremonies were thus of riddance, exorcism, and to avert evil. The Ouranians looked up, the Chthonians looked down. The first was Archaean, the last the faith of the primitive Mediterranean folk, perhaps the Pelasgi. Thus Ruskin, who said the Greeks knew no fear but were calm before fate; and Thucydides, who defined religion as rest from toil, were both less representative than Plutarch who, in his fear of the supernatural, would say nothing unless good of the gods and declared he would rather people should say that Plutarch never existed than that he was bad.

The old Chthonian rituals were chiefly three, or may be grouped about three, which were typical, as follows:

(a) The Dasia. These were originally collective sacrifices and constituted a spring festival. They later purported to be to Zeus Meilichios the Avenger. But this is a superposition of cults and the service itself was far older. Its spirit is chilly Stygian gloom. Figs as the cheapest animals, and sometimes sheep, were sacrificed to the under world as whole burnt offerings symbolizing complete renunciation. Angry ghosts demanded placation and must have all or nothing. The service was nocturnal, without the need of temple or grove, was sometimes used after wars to purify from the stain of kindred blood. In these rites Zeus is often figured as a snake or has some serpentine attribute or symbol. In fact, Zeus had expelled an

ancient snake god with a widely scattered cult in many a parish and precinct and had appropriated the rite to himself. In Mr. Ferguson's "Tree and Serpent Worship" the dead hero often takes the form of a snake. Sometimes those purified by these rites preserved or stood upon the skin of their victims. The service was always downward, suggesting Hades or Plutos.

(b) The Anthesteria. This was also a spring festival named from the month which corresponds to the last of our February and the first of March in the Greek calendar. It was a ritual of ghosts and sprites. New wine was broached and the first poured as a libation with a prayer that it might do good and not harm. There were revels for two days, like the Pardon in Brittany, where servants and children were free from restraint for a time. This was, perhaps, before Dionysos. The gloomy side of this festival, however, was both larger and more ancient. It was to lay ghosts and sprites, a kind of all souls' day when the mental and moral house-cleaning was done. Afterward the shades were thrice bidden to depart as in Russian festivals now ghosts are told to go. They hie to clefts, chasms, old wells, or graves, to taste dead men's food and suggest Hecate. It was a *diez nefas tus*, and the precautions were apotropaic or warding off. Buckthorn was chewed as a purgative to make clean within. Walls were smeared with pitch to keep off ghosts and there were many later etiological stories invented to give reasons for customs older and more persistent than their rationale. Out of grave jars as well as wine jars souls often fly on old friezes and paterae, etc. The rhabdos was first the magic wand of the enchanter of the dead and signified the rule of the manes and only later became a royal scepter. The root of purification is the ghosts' desire for vengeance and blood for blood. Probably these rites were not all those of aversion but there is some tendence. In one cut the head of Teiresias rises out of the earth to the conjuror, revived and recalled by the blood of a black ram. Sacrifices at heroes' tombs were often of blood rather than wine, or trenches were dug for wine and honey in which a dead ram was placed. The vindictiveness of ghosts surges up by night to avenge false oaths, and especially bloodshed, as later they were developed into erynys that woke for ravine. It was all a ritual of fear. The bodies of enemies were mutilated to weaken the power of their ghosts. Perhaps their blood was taken in the mouth and spat out. Euripides vainly tried to see in these ghosts only bad conscience. It remained for Orpheus to accomplish this development. Ordinary winds needed no explanation, but peculiar or strong ones were the breath of the under world gods, came from tombs, and perhaps called for expiation. The entrails of men were best for the mantic art, and those races who neglected the sacred office of dance and feast had no other purpose to meet than for fighting, and sank to barbarism. Oaths were taken perhaps standing on slices of killed animals and praying down to low altars, or in the dark that the sun see not. In murder, the next of kin to the dead could slay the next of kin to the slayer that the ghost of the dead man might drink blood and thus be laid. These altars, perhaps primitively caves or pits, were often subterranean or perhaps omphalos shaped. The ghost wanted blood to slake a spiritual thirst but later, as customs grew mild, could be fooled with foul water. In early days the victim's blood was poured on the suppliant. Later fillets of wool worn by the victim were symbolic of his sacrifice. To name the dead stirs their wraith. Taboo was what was sacred to gods but forbidden to man. They became, therefore, holy. Thus the anthesteria was originally a feast of all souls and involved fasting, but later was developed as a Dionysian revel.

(c) The Thargelia were more primitive and plain, in the early summer, and intended to purify in order to receive the first fruits. The pharmikos stood for physical and moral purgation in order to promote and conserve fertility. In classic times this was sacred to Apollo. It was the first harvest home, held in May or June, but was more anxious than the festivals of seed time. The first fruits or first loaf very often among primitive people must be taken only after elaborate ceremony. It is a critical time. The main body of the harvest may yet not be gathered. The Calceдонian boar was sent because men forgot it. There were many mummeries pantomiming the increase of flocks and crops by sympathetic magic. It was close time and taboo could not yet be entirely removed. The gods might be jealous. This was one of the Eleusinian mysteries. Sometimes only grass or soft wool were offered, but the gods should not be cheated. But the first fruits of the trees, acorns, leaves, barley, corn, cakes, water, honey, oil and wine were their due. Salted meat,

before set was known, and long after, was appropriate, as intervened bread to the Hymns. A kind of honey porridge, thickened with oil, took rarely with milk, was common at the service. The Pharmikos was a white-robed one. In the Phrygian sacrifice the pharmikos was sometimes the human victim laid out, once actually killed, ideally a noble man but often later a degenerate, one of the offscouring of the race, and not a criminal. He was perhaps fed with olives and figs and then even later in times of plague or dire stress, burned with wild wood or fruitless trees and his ashes scattered to the wind and sea. He was often insulted, beaten, and a human scapegoat doomed to utter destruction, not a sacrifice offered to an angry god, not vicarious, but so taboo and infected that he was pollution incarnate. Perhaps he was led through the city, beaten with a cathartic plant or with leather (shoes thrown at newly married pairs). Those who abused him must feel real resentment, and this perhaps led to using criminals, or else the ceremony was not efficacious. He was sacer = argos = sacred, too good, or evil. Later the pharmikos became a magic man presiding over the expulsion of physical evil with drugs. In early days he was sometimes made drunk when killed, perhaps poisoned, but always solesome. Men and animals stood very near, and the latter was soon substituted by man in doing his own moral housecleaning. Oxen were driven about an altar on which lay a great cake and the ox that stepped up to eat it was doomed. Women held the ax and knife, others sharpened the latter. When the butchers slew the ox they fled but were captured and accused. The women declared their innocence, the sharpeners theirs; the butchers accused the knife and ax of guilt and these latter were solemnly condemned and cast into the sea. The skin of this sacrilegious ox was stuffed and put to the plow in the field and it was pretended that he was not dead but had come to life. Boys who killed snakes fled as did Apollo after slaying the Python. Our Indians sometimes refused to eat green corn until the busk festival freeze it. Bakers and millers have required ceremonies to use it. In May the Romans threw images from the bridge into the Tiber. Once they threw men. Marriage in May was forbidden. The image of Pallas was stripped, washed till it shone, temples and sacred places cleansed, and this housecleaning was all preparatory to bringing in the first fruits, figs leading.

In the Thesmophoria Athenian women, conservative as is their sex, conserved the custom pre-Dorian perhaps Pelasgian, of sacrificing young pigs each fall and bringing up from the snaky chasm the remains of those thrown there the year before to mingle with the seed to ensure a good crop. Very akin were other ancient rites, the amephora in which maidens went down at night taking down bundles and bringing others of content unknown but really snakes, the haloa, skira.

All these were germs of the Eleusinian mysteries, a cult almost incongruous to the Olympians. In their old form they recognized evil and sought to avert it by apotropaic ceremonials. There were certain insignificant and magic sacra, which only those who were purified could handle, which helped bring rain and crops, a group of little vessels like muffin cups connected in a circular way, one cup each containing vetch, poppy, lintels, pulse, spelt, oats, barley, beans, wheat, honey, oil, wool, milk, which entered into the festivities of Cybele, the good mother. The mystics who were to celebrate these rites left Athens for the sea with many interdicts to "fence the tables," and celebrated thus a kind of communion, at first purely purgative of evil, but later, under Dionysiac influence penetrated with the new idea that man can become a god by eating a man's body which were these crops and wine. Everything was enormously fluid, fusive, purgative, involving the allayment of baleful influences. Diseases are bad spirits always seeking entrance through mouth, nose, eyes, every natural avenue. They are noisome keries. There were keries of old age and death which could eat the very soul and must be kept at bay, snatchers, harpies, gorgons, wild demons, fates, furies, avengers, euminides, often compounded of keries, while others had passed from ghosts to goddesses or from the dark world to the bright one above, always this background of fear like the Accadian maskim, a sentiment that made those falsely thought to be dead unwellcome. Æschylus first dared to present and form the Erinys from Homer which to his day had been a formless horror. Slowly other abstractions arose, Dike, justice; Tyche, fortune; Erme, peace; Agathe, goodness. Perhaps these goddesses were made under matriarch influences.

Dionysos was the first great reformer. The Olympians had little influence over

men's lives. Greek orthodoxy made its gods in man's image but kept the two apart. To strive to become even like God was insolence, hubris. Man must think thoughts befitting his own estate and not even aspire to the life of the Olympians.

Dionysos was a Thracian immigrant from the north, the home of spiritual impulses, perhaps, first expelled, then welcomed. It may be after several epiphanies and recessions. On the old worship of gods of the vegetable world he grafted a worship of the spirits of vegetation, typifying by wine and enthusiasm in which physical intoxication, never excessive because the Greek motto was "Never too much," and they always mingled their wine with water, led to spiritual ecstasy. Thus man could pass from the human to the divine. Thus the *moenad* was converted into the muse. Thus the sacramental mystery was felt. Thus a mild abandonment first, perhaps, was some recrudescence of animality, orgiastic and debauch, with Bacchic halleluiahs, with satire, orgies of Thracian origin were developed. The cups from which they drank at the Eleusinian mysteries as reformed by Dionysos were smaller. Perhaps they still tore their kid in two. Their ideals were a return to nature, to the mountain, to a kind of transcendental prophetic state of inspiration of which intoxication was the symbol. All this might have lapsed had it not been for Orpheus and the second new impulse which he very early gave to this movement. To him it was better to be drunk with new ideas, with the madness of the muses, with the inward ecstasy of the ascetic, with the magic of other personalities, and to feel a sacramental mystery accomplished in us all day by day, to fast enough to feel that breaking bread and drinking wine renew spiritual strength, that even the relation of the sexes is better typified by Eros than by Eros. The oath of the Orphic celebrant was, "I fast and am clean from all that makes unclean and from intercourse with——." Perhaps there was mimetic marriage which the church fathers so condemned in these rites. As Dionysos gave the guerdon of tragedy, Orpheus set up the *liknon*, the harvest basket, as a symbol of the cradle and new birth of the child Eros. The initiate declared he had carried the *liknon*. Perhaps a torch was put out and the hierophant and priestess "did a saving act in darkness." Marriage and birth were focal acts, symbolic of union with the divine, and perhaps refined from the story of the rape of Persephone. Demeter impelled to the great step from the *epos* to the drama in the sixth century B. C. The worshipper can now not merely adore but be the god by completely assuming his rôle. It is not strange, then, that the Eleusinian mysteries were often described in the language of the stage.

The Orphic eschatology is seen on the eight thin golden tablets exhumed in lower Italy giving instructions to the dead about their conduct in the lower world. They are incomplete and hard to read. A candidate avows his divine origin. He drinks of the well of memory, not of Lethe. One says, "Bad have I fled, better have I found;" one, to the gods, "I am of your race, I am pure;" one, "I have escaped the wheel," suggesting Buddhism; one, "I was a bush, bird, fish with gleaming scales," and so on. "Death may be life and life may be death." The Orphic cosmogony develops Eros from an egg. The Orphics cared for the past and the future, the Olympians only for the present. They said the last word of Greek religion, and strangely modern it is. They gave us a further determination of the absolute, to love. Bacchus and Eros are the only real Greek gods, just as ecstasy and love are the most potent personages. These things haunt us a little. They are the things forgotten, like the charmed sleepers of romance. If Orpheus hated women, he loved "the boy." The chime of the dancers' feet meant the orderly motion of the stars. It is the real gods that gave our life. Orpheus felt fear but he could worship. The powers above and those below reason thus: non human and perhaps non moral may give us bliss or tear our lives to shreds, while their own serenity remains unruffled. Orpheus's music could stay the torments of hell but he could not have fetched Eurydice for she was not real. He longed back to simple days and ways. He insisted for the irascible on angerless days and ways. It was he and his rite that were parodied in "the clouds." "I walk on air, I contemplate the sun high above earthly mixtures." This meant the Orphic initiation. So does *Strepsades*, who sits on a stool to commune with God. A thinker waits and wanders. He invokes the gods from the clouds and sky, and so on, to appear wherever they are, naming their haunts.

He made the *hosioi* and order of Delphic priests whose duty it was to test the

liness of every animal sacrifice. Their prayer was, "Sacrifice these creatures to our use, and us to thy service."

Early magical crosses men revert to primitive simple ways. Perhaps, thus, as Del'pht there was sometimes the eating of raw and bloody flesh, and animals born with teeth, living or dead, and a gradual amelioration. There was daubing with white clay, "eating of the bull god atreish" (egyptian imprecations), strange commingling of old and new strata, the snake, bull, child, satyr, minataur, horned snake, in ways we cannot trace.

Orpheus seems to have been a real man. He has no birth tales, but when a boy was frightened and perhaps bitten by a serpent, but found cure in a temple of the sun. He came, perhaps, from Crete, although more likely from Thrace. His cult suggests Egypt, but the rude and vigorous North is a more probable origin than the more fashionable one of the Orient. Numbers and music belong together, and Orpheus, whose Thracian origin gave him musical proclivities, is depicted as striking his lyre and looking up in an absorbed way. Rocks moved, trees bowed, wild things came, lions, panthers, cattle and sheep as to a good shepherd. He was a vegetarian, abhorred the flute, that makes men mad, and the clashing cymbals. He reformed music or the arts of the muses which Plato thought more fundamental than laws. The Orphic hymns, although less known now, were probably more influential than Homer. He was a great Protestant reformer, hardly separable from Apollo, his work a little like that of Gregory. According to tradition he was killed by Thracian moenads who later became the muses. He did not marry, perhaps abhorred women were not allowed in the precincts where his service was celebrated. Women were conservative and the proprietors of religions, and to be excluded from mysteries designed solely for men may have angered them. They tore him to pieces but his head went to Lesbos, always singing of gods and not like Homer, of men. Sometimes he was only a voice. While he left the sun, tradition sends him to Hades for Eurydice so that he has Chthonic attributes. Nature lamented him most as over the midnight sea the voice came that great Pan was dead. According to one tradition, Zeus slew him. According to another, the men had laid down their arms to attend his service when the women killed him, who were tattooed and tabooed as a punishment therefor later. A lost play of Æschylus describes his death and may have told how the moenads were converted into muses. His cult started not at his birthplace but at his grave, as the blood of martyrs is the seed of the church. His tomb was nautic and here women were debarred. Plato is full of Orpheus as is Euripides whom the church called the prototype of Christ. He no doubt repelled some and attracted others; had a rare charm and magnetism of personality; may have been a solecist, but he brought into order a riotous ritual.

G. S. H.

The Religion of a Mature Mind, by GEORGE ALBERT COE. Fleming H. Revell Company, Chicago, 1903. pp. 128.

Religion as a Factor in Individual and Social Development, by GEORGE ALBERT COE, published in *The Biblical World* of January, 1904, Chicago.

Professor Coe's now well-known book, *The Religion of a Mature Mind*, has undoubtedly a real contribution to make in the solution of difficulties that are more or less consciously felt by very many thoughtful men and women. The scope of the book is well indicated by the titles of the chapters: "Modern Manhood;" "The Scientific Spirit in Matters of Religion;" "Authority in Religion;" "Some Things That We Know;" "Moral Foundations of Spirituality;" "The Chief End of Man;" "The Right to be Called a Child of God;" "The Breadth of Religious Experience;" "Are Conversions Going out of Date?" "Salvation by Education;" "The Life of Prayer;" "The Consciousness of Sin;" "The Christ of Personal Experience." It will be seen that while the chapters are logically arranged and supplement each other, they still stand in considerable degree each by itself. And each chapter has its own peculiar value, especially in giving reality to the religious experience in terms of the hour, and thus performs a vital service. The whole discussion is characteristically clear, definite, and constructive. The key of the thought of the book is found in this part of the dedication: "A youth complained to his mother that his prayers contained no sure sense that God heard or would answer. The mother replied: 'May not your impulse to pray be God's manifestation of himself to you?'"

As the youth grew to manhood, this hint unfolded into an interpretation of life as a whole. This book is a product thereof." This key Professor Coe uses throughout his discussion. The two chapters that perhaps particularly concern the aims of this *Journal* are Chapters 8 and 10, dealing with "the breadth of religious experience," and "salvation by education."

In Chapter 8, Professor Coe, while recognizing the contribution of mysticism, protests earnestly against the common misconceptions which have arisen from it; in the overestimation of ecstatic states; "in separating the religious faculty from the rest of the mind;" in regarding religious experiences as merely occasional events; that are thus thought of as luxuries rather than as the staple of religious living; and in forgetting the specific dangers which are involved in merely extraordinary phenomena. As over against this whole purely mystical conception of religious experience, Professor Coe sets a contrasting type of religious life, which he thus summarizes: "We have thus traced the sense of God's presence all the way up from ecstasy, through special experiences, to the every day employments of the faculties. The moral feelings, the social feelings, the æsthetic feelings, all appear to reveal God. So does the moral will, and so, finally, does the intellect, in its reverential joy in the truth. This is not speculation, but a description of actual experience. The sense of a divine presence can and does penetrate all human faculties." . . . "In a word, the religious experience is what we should expect it to be if the doctrine of the immanence of God is true." He expresses the same thought in different language, when he says: "Our invitation is rather this: 'Be your whole self! Be completely in earnest with your intellectual sincerity, with your conscientiousness, with your love of fellowmen, with your aspiration for all that is true and beautiful and good, and you will find that a sense of God is the moving spring of the whole!' . . . The religious experience is not something different from living a good life, but is just living it more abundantly." The whole chapter is thus plainly a valuable and needed supplement to the merely mystical conception of religious experience.

In Chapter 10, *Salvation by Education*, "the weak place in the Church's campaign" is felt to be that it has no clear theory and practice of "how God and man co-operate in the education of a soul." It holds that when both are properly understood, modern Christianity and modern education have moved toward each other, and that in this whole movement Horace Bushnell, in his *Christian Nurture*, was the chief forerunner. "This reform centres about the thought that the child is a developing life, whose internal laws of growth prescribe the principles and methods of education." "The present strategic necessity" is said to be centred in this conception: "Salvation by education is a possibility and a fact because education is not merely something that we do to and for the child, and not merely this united with the child's own efforts for himself. God is the central reality of the whole. He is the moving force, the giver of the inner law, and the goal of all human development. Through education he extends his saving grace to the child. This implies that we understand education in no shallow sense." "In all real education, the soul is being unfolded toward God, its source, and its inmost reality." The emphasis of this chapter, too, is a wholesome and needed emphasis.

Professor Coe's article in the *Biblical World*, "Religion as a Factor in Individual and Social Development," is a very solid piece of work, and requires more careful thinking for its appreciation than any of the discussions in the book just referred to. There is very much packed away here in little, for the argument is fundamental, though religion is taken in the broadest and most abstract sense. But so considered, the article shows satisfactorily and most suggestively the unity of religious education and individual and social development. The argument is based directly on present ruling conceptions, and seems to the reviewer thoroughly justified. The fundamental points in the development of Professor Coe's thought may perhaps be summarized as follows: The notion of education in religion presupposes that religion is a normal and vital factor in both individual and social development. If this is true, then not only can there be true education in religion, but any education that leaves religion out is essentially fragmentary and distorted. The test of history shows that religion is a part of culture at every stage of development. And this creates "a presumption that it has a meaning for humanity as such." "The child, the youth, the man responds to environment as though life were more than a

series of relations to visible things and persons. "The child's first notion of the world as a world of persons is a genuine analogue of infant worship among native men." In the development of the child there gradually springs up "a threefold conception of personality—the self, the parents and other visible persons, and an ideal or standard personality possessed of power, of wisdom, and of moral authority. This moralizing of the ideal answers to the evolution of ethical religions out of nature religions." "Thus, at every stage of the growing life from infancy to manhood, natural desires and impulses, when brought together in consciousness with actual experience, create an ideal conception of personality. We cannot help idealizing life, and the ideal grows with our growth." "This idealization of life is what makes religious education both possible and natural." "Belief in divinity is natural, then, because the idealizing process is a part of man's spontaneous response to his environment," and also because "it merely mirrors back to us what is experienced in our own personality." "From all this it appears that the ideal civilization of human life that begins in infancy and grows with our growth is essentially a religious development." "Religion, then, is a normal fact in the developing of both the individual and the race. But in what sense is it a factor in that development?" "Possibly there is no God, but certainly the reality of things, whatever it is, that manifests itself in our conscious life constrains us to feel and act and think as though there were a God." "Be it nature, or be it God, it forms us individually and collectively; it energizes within us so as to mould us upon the idea of a divine being. In ways both simple and involved, the idealizing impulse is a power in our life. It sets a standard, first for others, and then for the self; and it makes us restless whenever the standard is ignored." The ideal is, thus, "not a mere dream; it is the engine of human progress." "The profound impulses of our nature whence belief derives its power, being the source of our personal and social ideals, are the very starting-point of social and individual aspiration." "Take away the real basis of belief, then, and you take away the very organizing principle of society." "Any reasonable scheme of education, therefore, must have a place for religion. Nay, since religion is the very organizing principle of both the individual and society, it demands the first and controlling position in education."

The Trend in the Higher Education, by W. R. HARPER. Chicago, UNIVERSITY Press, 1906. pp. 390.

President Harper here reprints twenty-three papers, many of which are addresses he has given on various occasions within the last few years. We do not forget the many volumes lately published by distinguished presidents of colleges and universities older and younger than this author, in saying that nothing in the field of higher education that has appeared in this country is so progressive or so abounds in new and fruitful suggestions. The papers here used are of very uneven merit, from rather perfunctory and congratulatory addresses up to the radically new papers. They are actually attempted or advised concerning the academic secretion of the sexes or the business side of university waste in higher education or the proposed reconstruction of theological education. In the latter subject he points out that in the decade ending 1904 the number of students in permanent theological schools in the North declined from fifteen per cent.; in the Inter-denominational institutes the loss has been four per cent.; in the Congregational Seminaries, forty-three per cent.; among the Presbyterians, thirty-three per cent.; about twelve thousand men who graduated in 1904 from Yale, Harvard, Columbia and Princeton less than thirty planned to enter the ministry. Dr. Harper could name fifty young men of his own acquaintance who within five years have abandoned their original purpose to enter the ministry, because convinced that their work would not be acceptable to the churches. This one factor of uncertainty has in a single year deterred more men from entering the ministry than have actually entered it. "Their educational training has taught them to think and they have experienced the intense satisfaction that comes from thinking. Can they be blamed for refusing it to enter upon a profession in which the great majority of those who have undertaken are forbidden to think except within the narrowest limits?" Again, men cannot look forward to the possibility of educating even the smallest family in the present day upon the average salary of the minister. The world has come "to estimate individual men as well as the profession in forms of commercial

character. It is outrageous that it should be so, but it is so." Again, the dignity of the office has been impaired by the practice of certain denominations who admit without adequate preparation. There is now no adequate presentation of the world's profession from a modern point of view. "Our seminaries are more or less exclusive in their spirit and are thus perpetuating the old priestly ideal which has so often brought ruin both to individuals and nations." They are still too mediæval and remote from modern life. There is a remnant of the old pride strongly mingled with almost craven sense of dependence. "Of Psychology in its modern aspects and of the elementary practice of economic structure, the average theological student is almost entirely ignorant." "To-day many of our ministers and teachers do not even know of the existence of these problems and yet they enter upon their mission with the belief that God is directing their work." Denominations have to-day nothing to separate them and the seminaries should inculcate new doctrine of the church. "Psychology takes the central place in the thought of our time and overflows into the thought and channels of our life."

Very many students for the ministry are now asking if there is not some way of preparing for it other than through the seminary which instead of being what it now is, the place where men are to learn certain views and adopt certain ways to repeat and amplify them, should be a place in which men are taught to think. The man not modern in science "cannot speak effectively on any topic, least of all the subject of religion, to men who have had such training." The ordinary preacher cannot impress the lower class and "the evidence would seem to be quite conclusive that he is equally unable to influence the higher class, this manner increasing rapidly but the church cannot reach them and the seminary cultivates a narrow and exclusive spirit. It is sometimes even located in the country isolated from the activities of human life. The student cannot do good work in the classroom and preach on Sundays, neither should he be deadheaded by free tuitions. "Nothing is more noticeable or more despicable than the utter lack of independence exhibited by a great proportion of the ministerial class." "The specific mission of laboratory work in science is not so necessary for the prospective student as the knowledge of Greek" and if the college does not furnish this equipment the seminary must do so. "The work in psychology provided that the smaller institutions from which the largest proportion of candidates for the ministry came is essentially that which was done fifty years ago." "Modern psychology is to them as yet largely unknown, this system as to psychology applies likewise to pedagogy, the subject, which in its recent application is of vital interest to the minister. Child study is as directly connected with the work of the minister as with that of the teacher, for it is in the transitional age from twelve to eighteen that the work of the church must be done." The new method of studying the Bible must be adopted. For most theological students the time spent in Hebrew is thought wasteful and injurious. The requirement of Hebrew has worked incalculable injury to the morale of many students." Hebrew should be elective in the English Bible and for many be sufficient. Where pupils are required to take Hebrew the quality of instruction is often wretched.

Dr. Harper would encourage specialism; some are practical and cannot be scholarly and for the latter there are many lines of interest and it would be far better for each to give particular attention to a similar group of topics. Sometime courses will be laid out to fit for professorships, for presidencies, for secretaryships of mission societies, for medical preparation, etc. Not more than one-third or one-half the curriculum should be common to all students. Theological clinics should be held for investigating the slums and this work needs medical knowledge. Some time should be set apart for the students to work under the direction of a pastor, just as law students spend some time in office and medical students in the hospital. There should be opportunities for those who desire to spend four years instead of three in the seminary. The first year alone being devoted to a common field. Others might specialize more or less in the Old Testament, in sociology, in music, history, homiletics, etc. Perhaps each pupil selecting a subordinate topic. Hebrew should be required only of those who specialize in the Old Testament or the New Testament, and Greek only for those who are to be preachers or teachers. The latter should give a liberal portion of their time to natural science, psychology and English Literature. All those who are to be pastors and administrators, the

English Bible, psalms 25, psalm 25 should be two distinct subjects and each new or Greek should be repeated. Sunday School and visitation work should be specialties. There should be alternation between not only sermons but of different denominations.

Lessons in Eastern Christianity. St. Margaret's Lectures, 1904, on the Syriac-speaking Church, by F. CRAWFORD BURKITT. E. P. Dutton & Co., 1904. pp. 228.

These very scholarly lectures describe the early bishops of Edessa and present an early Eastern development of the Christian church, somewhat gnostic in its character, but very different from that of Western orthodoxy. This church believed itself to have had an apostolic origin, but its theory of life and doctrine is as distinct from ours as is the blood of the race who developed it. This church, as tradition ascribes it, dates back to the putative letter of Christ to King Abgar. The ancient religion of Edessa was a worship of the heavenly bodies. Upon this recent studies have shed much light. We have no time here to epitomize the very interesting and new story set forth in these lectures. The radicalism; the symbolic explanation of certain facts generally, believed in the life of our Lord, from the Immaculate Conception down; the views of baptism and celibacy; the rancor against matrimony as a church office; the peculiar interest attaching to the city itself, and especially to the two great columns on the citadel; the story of Judas Thomas and of Bardaisan; the many colloquies and incidents; and perhaps crowning all, the wondrous hymn which Saint Thomas sang in prison:—all this together opens up a most fascinating new department of early Christian history. The hymn itself, to which no exact date can be assigned, is perhaps the high water mark of gnosticism. It is as follows:

THE HYMN OF THE SOUL.

I.

While I was yet but a little child in the House of my Father,
Brought up in luxury, well content with the life of the Palace,
Far from the East, our home, my Parents sent me to travel,
And from the royal Hoard they prepared me a load for the journey,
Precious it was yet light, that alone I carried the burden.

II.

Median gold it contained and silver from Atropatene,
Garnet and ruby from Hindostan and Bactrian agate,
Adamant harness was girded upon me stronger than iron;
But my Robe they took off wherewith their love had adorned me,
And the bright Tunic woven of scarlet and wrought to my stature.

III.

For they decreed, and wrote on my heart that I should not forget it:
"If thou go down and bring from Egypt the Pearl, the unique one,
Guarded there in the Sec that envelopes the loud-hissing Serpent,
Thou shalt be clothed again with thy Robe and the Tunic of scarlet,
And with thy Brother, the Prince, shalt thou inherit the Kingdom."

IV.

So I quitted the East, two Guardians guiding me downwards,
Hard was the way for a child and a dangerous journey to travel,
Soon I had passed Marshan, the mart of the Eastern merchants,
Over the soil of Babylon then I hurried my footsteps,
And my companions left me within the borders of Egypt.

V.

Straight to the Serpent I went and near him settled my dwelling,
Till he should slumber and sleep, and the Pearl I could snatch from his
keeping.
I was alone, an exile under a foreign dominion,
None did I see of the free-born race of the Easterns,
Save one youth, a son of Marshan, who became my companion.

VI.

He was my friend to whom I told the tale of my venture,
Warned him against the Egyptians and all their ways of uncleanness;
Yet in their dress I clothed myself to escape recognition,
Being afraid lest when they saw that I was a stranger
Come from afar for the Pearl, they should rouse the Serpent against me.

VII.

It was from him perchance they learnt I was none of their kindred,
And in their guile they gave me to eat of their unclean dainties;
Thus I forgot my race and I served the King of the country,
Nay, I forgot the Pearl for which my parents had sent me,
While from their poisonous food I sank into slumber unconscious.

VIII.

All that had chanced my Parents knew and they grieved for me sorely,
Through the land they proclaimed for all at our Gate to assemble—
Parthian Princes and Kings, and all the Eastern Chieftains—
There they devised an escape that I should not perish in Egypt,
Writing a letter signed in the name of each of the Chieftains.

IX.

"From thy Father, the King of Kings,—from the Queen, thy Mother,—
And from thy Brother,—to thee, our Son in Egypt, be greeting!
Up and arise from sleep, and hear the words of our Letter!
Thou art a son of Kings: by whom art thou held in bondage?
Think of the Pearl for which thou wast sent to sojourn in Egypt.

X.

"Think of thy shining Robe and remember thy glorious Tunic;
These thou shalt wear when thy name is enrolled in the list of the heroes,
And with thy Brother Viceroy thou shalt be in the Kingdom."
This was my Letter, sealed with the King's own Seal on the cover,
Lest it should fall in the hands of the fierce Babylonian demons.

XI.

High it flew as the Eagle, King of the birds of the heaven,
Flew and alighted beside me, and spoke in the speech of my country,
Then at the sound of its tones I started and rose from my slumber;
Taking it up I kissed and broke the Seal that was on it,
And like the words engraved on my heart were the words of the Letter.

XII.

So I remembered my Royal race and my free-born nature,
So I remembered the Pearl, for which they had sent me to Egypt,
And I began to charm the terrible loud-hissing Serpent:
Down he sank into sleep at the sound of the Name of my Father,
And at my Brother's Name, and the Name of the Queen, my Mother.

XIII.

Then I seized the Pearl and homewards started to journey,
Leaving the unclean garb I had worn in Egypt behind me;
Straight for the East I set my course, to the light of the home-land,
And on the way in front I found the Letter that roused me—
Once it awakened me, now it became a Light to my pathway.

XIV.

For with its silken folds it shone on the road I must travel,
And with its voice and leading cheered my hurrying footsteps,
Drawing me on in love across the perilous passage,
Till I had left the land of Babylon safely behind me
And I had reached Maishán, the sea-washed haven of merchants.

XII.

What I had worn of old, my Robe with its Tunic I scatter;
 That too my Parents sent from the far Hyrcanian mountains,
 Brought by the hand of the faithful warders who had it in keeping;
 I was a child when I left it, nor could its fashion remember
 But when I looked, the Robe had received my form and my likeness.

XIII.

It was myself that I saw before me as in a mirror;
 Two in number we stood, yet only one in appearance;
 Not less alike than the strange twin gundlan fugitives
 Bringing my Robe, each marked with the royal I scutcheon
 Servants both of the King whose troth restored me my Treasure.

XVII.

Truly a royal Treasure appeared my Robe in its glory,
 Gay it shone with beryl and gold, sardonyx and ruby,
 Over its varied hues there flashed the color of sapphire,
 All its seams with stones of adamant firmly were fastened,
 And upon all the King of Kings Himself was depicted.

XVIII.

While I gazed it sprang into life as a sentient creature,
 Even as if endowed with speech and hearing I saw it,
 Then I heard the tones of its voice as it cried to the keepers;
 "He, the Champion, he for whom I was reared by the father—
 Hast thou not marked me, how my stature grew with his labors?"

XIX.

All the while with a kingly mien my Robe was advancing,
 Flowing towards me as if impatient with those who bore it;
 I too longed for it, ran to it, grasped it, put it upon me,
 Once again I was clothed in my Robe and adorned with its beauty,
 And the bright many-hued Tunic again was gathered about me.

XX.

Clad in the Robe I betook me up to the Gate of the Palace,
 Bowing my head to the glorious Sign of my Father that sent it,
 I had performed His behest and He had fulfilled what He promised,
 So in the Satraps' Court I joined the throng of the Chieftains—
 He with favor received me and near Him I dwell in the Kingdom.

The meaning is plain. The soul is sent from its heavenly home, there forgets its origin and mission till aroused by a revelation; whereupon it performs the task, returns to the upper region, is reunited to the heavenly robe, its ideal counterpart, and enters the presence of the highest celestial powers. The King, Queen and Viceroy seem to represent the Trinity. Paul earnestly desired to be clothed upon with a house from heaven. The word "robe" stands for "body." This shows us the true heart of gnosticism in its struggle with early Christianity.

In the Acts of Thomas the Apostle, he is represented as coming to India to build a palace for the king. He was welcomed, shown where to place it, drew its plan, was sent successive installments by the king. He always reported progress and at last only the roof was wanting. Meanwhile all the funds were devoted to healing the sick, casting out demons and doing good works. Thus he was really building a palace. When the inevitable exposure came he was condemned to be burned and flayed alive, but fortunately the king's brother, God, died and his soul, after visiting heaven, was able to return and beg the king to assign him the lowest chamber to his splendid palace. This was finally described to the king and was so magnificent that all his anger departed. Thomas was released and he prayed him only that he might be worthy to enter this palace.

See Krishna, the Lord of Love, by BĀBĀ PREMĀNAND BHĀRATI. Published by The Krishna Samāj, New York, 1904. pp. 226.

We have here a remarkable book by an oriental pundit, who has spent some time in this country. It is dedicated to his Goo-roo, "to whom my soul, mind and body are irrevocably sold, in payment of the grace of his illumination which lighted my path to the lotus feet of Krishna, my beloved." The worst of all superstitions is that our life begins with the birth of the physical body and ends with its death. To believe that we never had greater powers than we now possess is the saddest of all mistakes, while the most inspiring of all creeds is that we were once great as the deities and can recover that greatness. This faith in the potentialities of the human mind can make life a long ecstatic song. Krishna and the author have always loved each other, for both came from the primeval ocean of love when all was one essence. Our forgetfulness and separation is the cause of all trouble and pain. We must struggle back to full, complete, absolute satisfaction, from the original source of which the universe has sprung. This original abode of joy the Hindu calls "Krishna," which means "to draw." Krishna draws us to itself by spiritual gravitation. Thus, true pleasure cannot be found in material objects or in anything outside ourselves. We yearn for this lost state of the soul. There are really twenty-four steps down from Krishna to earth, and twenty-four back, beginning with the senses. Every particle of this cosmos is conscious in every point of bliss it has once left. God is formless, and yet has a form. Thus, the writer goes on to discuss the concrete and abstract God, the science and steps of creation, the golden, silver, copper, iron age, the caste system, the stages of life, the deluge, the kalpa cycle. Dissolution shows us how science upholds the shastras and describes the physical and astral body, karma, the atom's return journey, Yoga, etc. Part second is devoted to Cree Krishna, the Lord of Love. This is almost dithyrambic and shows a passion of devotion that seems strange and intense to the western world.

Some of the oriental sages who visit the new world come with high moral and religious purpose, are vegetarians, devoted to the ascetic life, perhaps have never tasted meat. These are the best. Some of them, however, gradually lapse to luxury. Instead of the rough garb of their ascetic sect, they come to wear fine robes, perhaps of silk of diverse colors. They succumb to the temptations of the western table, and some of them have lost their lives in yielding to the pleasures of sense. Others have been recalled, and yet others expelled from their orders. Some, too, have not been able to withstand the blandishments, adulations, flattery of men, and especially women, who have hung upon their words. Thus the temptations in this country of the missionary from the east are unique and insidious. It is greatly to be desired that they maintain the prestige of the pure and simple life which they preach.

New America. An organ of New Departure in Politics, Religion, Science, History and Literature, with special reference to new books and new knowledge. Edited by Rev. Edward C. Towne, Cambridge, Mass. Vol. 1, No. 1, January, 1905, pp. 128.

This initial number reveals clearly the editor's laudable ambition to lead the van of human progress in the new world. Electricity is the mother science of all. Its domain extends over all nature. Every blaze is an electrical phenomena. We now know the universal spirit of nature, the enormous electric power of each particle or atom, either is diffused electricity, there is no other energy or cause of motion, etc.

The ideal university, according to the editor, should bring man face to face with the practical problems of health, business, labor, society and politics. Divinity "faces backward toward traditions, which are more of superstition than they are of reason." Medicine does not make physicians "wise or learned in the causes and conditions of health and life." This is all due to superficial and inadequate scholarship. The new education will have no lesson getting, but require wide reading, with spoken and written digests. History will cover science and literature. In place of ancient, the modern languages will stand. Religion and law will be prominent. "There is no university in Christendom with anything like adequate study of the life and teaching of Christ."

From Wallace's new book, "Man's place in the Universe," the editor violently dissents. "This earth is not the centre of a limited society, surrounded by empty space. Man is not the only sentient inhabitant of the universe in whom God deigned the entire system to culminate. The earth is not approximately in the special centre. With Moffatt's 'The Historical New Testament' the author is more in sympathy. According to this view, the New Testament was being developed from 20 to 120 A. D. The first of all writings was Paul's First Thessalonians, 51 A. D.; then came Galatians and First Corinthians, about 53; Romans, 55 or 56; Colossians and Ephesians, 61; Mark, 65 to 75, and last came James, Jude, and Second Peter. Thus, there was nothing except Paul in the field until Mark. Paul colors, determines, pervades everything, and has given us our Jesus and radically transformed him. He was first the hero of atrocious massacre. The Christ of the apostles "got in ahead of" the Jesus of history. Paul's preparation for his important rôle was 718 slaughter of almost the whole body of the out and out disciples of Christ whose memories were the living report of the teacher's words. This made the great silence of more than twenty years from 20 to 51 A. D., and cleared the way for Paul's unique interpretations. He worked Jesus into his own scheme and it was his own Christianity that was launched upon the world. It was Paul who made the Resurrection and expected the return of Jesus. It was he who altered the traditions and suggested and started the relations to the Old Testament. Jesus made little use of the Hebrew scriptures. Paul had much to do in making it a missionary religion. He had been "a moral monster," had "come into a habit of transvisions." He is as important for Christianity as Moses was thought to be for the Jewish faith and record. The true Jesus was simply a teacher and master, and, when thoroughly reconstructed, will shine forth for his moral virtues.

The Religions of India, by EDWARD WASHBURN HOPKINS. Handbooks on the History of Religions, Ginn & Co., Boston, 1902. pp. 612.

The author aims to make his reader know the religions of India rather than, as Barth does, to make them know all about them. He shows the lines on which the theological and moral conceptions of the Hindus developed, and takes the reader step by step through the literature. His work is rich in illustrative matter. Hopkins's book does not claim to add very much that is new to the expert Indologist. The author first describes the people and the land, then sets forth the Rig Veda, with the upper, middle and lower gods, and describes the pantheism and eschatology of the system. The Atharva Veda represents a religion with the features all its own. The early Hindu deities are compared with those of other Aryans. He then considers Brahmanism and its pantheism set forth in Rupanashad and the popular Brahmanic faith. A chapter is devoted to Jainism; others each to Buddhism, early Hinduism, the Puranas, the modern Hindu sects, the religious traits of the wild tribes, and finally the relations to India and the West. On the whole we have here a very admirable and convenient compend, perhaps addressed especially to the novice.

The Teaching of Jesus Concerning the Scriptures, by DAVID JAMES BURRELL, D. D., LL. D. The American Tract Society, New York, 1904. pp. 211.

The writer begins with the antecedent as to the attitude of Jesus toward the scriptures. He then sets forth his actual attitude toward them and his scientific teaching concerning them, the provision he made for writing the New Testament, his silence as to alleged errors in the scriptures. The divinity of the Bible is shown by its history as compared to other great books. It has been printed in 500 languages and dialects. The Oxford version was issued in 2,500,000 copies, all disposed of within 48 hours after it came from the press. The telegraphic wires were kept busy to the exclusion of everything else in transmitting the gospels across the sea in a telegram of more than 100,000 words. Its truths are capable of codification, while Islam and Confucius have never been able to develop a system of dogmatic theology. "Aye, the written word and the incarnate word stand together. Neither can fall, but man will fall from either when he lets go the other. Blessed Bible, old-fashioned but not obsolete," etc.

The Revising of the New Testament, von BERNARD WEISS. Berlin, 1905. p. 321.

This venerable former professor has so revised the work which only the

ideas it contains were first made popular in his Habilitation address in 1852 attracted much attention. Now, although it has been somewhat revised in his new edition, the best that can be said of it is that it is a solid piece of old school thinking which, no doubt, will probably fail to receive all the attention it deserves. The work is divided into three parts. The presupposition of salvation. The salvation in Christ and the realization of salvation. Before these comes an introduction treating the essence of christianity of the revelation of Scripture, and the relation between religion and physiology. In the first of the above parts, the writer treats the Being of God, world and man; sin and its results; the Divine order of the world; the preparation for salvation. In the second part he deals with the sin of God and man, the life and purpose of Jesus, the soteriological meaning of Jesus' death, the exalted Christ and the Holy Spirit, the word and sacrament. The third part deals with calling and election, faith and the state of salvation, regeneration, sanctification, perseverance and perfection, the church and the kingdom of God and the last things.

The Messianic Hope in the New Testament, by SHAILER MATTHEWS. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1905. pp. 338.

The author first describes the Messianism of the ancient Jews and their revolutionary programme. This really culminated in Zealotism and the fall of the Jewish state. The Messianism of Jesus when compared with that of Judaism shows really an essential identity of general scheme. In both there were two ages, the two kingdoms of God and Satan, the coming of the latter by a cataclysm, a day of judgment and resurrection and a personal Christ. The facts of Jesus' life have placed the resurrection on a very different basis, but in many respects the older part is not affected by the new one. Thus Christian Messianism is distinctly controlled by that of the ancient Jews. To be sure, the new life resulted from faith in Jesus and the interpenetration of the human and divine personalities, but even in Christian communities this was greatly checked by survivals of the ancient Jewish ideal. The latter furnished mediating concepts which were a great aid to new converts. These interpretative notions are historic and not theological, and prepare the way for a religious psychology. We may use any world view we please as the modern equivalent of Messianism.

The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia. The Gifford Lectures on Ancient Egyptian and Babylonian Conceptions of the Divine, delivered in Aberdeen by A. H. SAYCE. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1903. pp. 509.

The subject of these lectures was originally the conception of the divine among the ancient Egyptians and Babylonians. The time has not yet come for a systematic history of Babylonian religion, whatever may be the case in Egypt. Little advance has been made in grasping the real nature and characteristics of the Babylonian religion. The material found in the author's previous Hibbert lectures is presupposed. For Egypt Maspero's great work summarizes the foundations of all our knowledge and adds to them. It is extraordinary how the new studies of old religions show continuity of thought. Egypt and Babylonia are the background for Judaism and Christianity. Indeed, the latter fulfills what was in all of these. In it the beliefs and aspirations of Egypt and Babylonia have found their explanation and fulfillment. On the other hand, between Judaism and the coarse pantheism of Babylonia, as between Christianity and the old Egyptian faith, despite its high morality and spiritual insight, there lies an impassable gulf. The division, the author thinks, is between revealed and unrevealed religion. It is like that something, hard to define, yet impossible to deny, which separates man from ape, although the ape may be man's ancestor. The author then proceeds to discuss the Egyptian view of the imperishable part of man and the other world, the sun god, and the Enead, animal worship, the gods of Egypt, Osiris, the sacred books, the popular religion, the place of Egyptian religion in the history of theology. Of Babylonia he treats the primitive animism which was the background of all the gods, especially the sun god and Istar, the Sumerian and Semitic conceptions of the divine, Assur and monotheism, cosmologies, the sacred books, myths and epics, the ritual and the temple, astro theology, and the moral element in Babylonian religion.

The Religion of Duty, by FELIX ADLER. McClure, Phillips & Co., New York, 1903. pp. 291.

These addresses are the central principles of the author's thought. Some have been published before, and another volume presenting a more practical side of his teachings is contemplated. For twenty-eight years he has been addressing large audiences regularly on Sunday. These, although delivered extemporaneously, have been recorded by capable stenographers. Those which express the central principles are here presented, although without the author's personal supervision. The topics treated here are the first steps toward religion; changes in the conception of God; teachings of Jesus in the modern world; the religion of duty; the essential difference between ethical societies and churches. We cannot regard the author as an original mind, but as a very earnest preacher of righteousness. His scholarship has not added to the sum of the world's knowledge, but he has borrowed from scholars and applied to life in a most fruitful way, and has bent his energies toward showing the supreme character of moral obligation and its essential independence from religion.

The History of Modern Revivals, by FRANK GRENVILLE BEARDSLEY, S. T. D. American Tract Society, New York, 1904. pp. 524.

After preliminary chapters on the Genesis of Revivals and the Religious Declension, and Attempts to Reform, the author devotes fifty pages to the Great Awakening, then passes to the Revolutionary period, the Revival of 1800, the Denominational Movements, Finney, the Great Revival of 1858, the Lay movement in Revivals, Organized Movements. The work is very plain and pragmatic and the writer gives no sign even in his index that he has ever heard of any one of the score of recent new writers upon revival phenomena. The standpoint is pragmatic; the authorities are all conservative; the points of view orthodox. The author has, however, done service in going over this literature again and collecting its data afresh from his standpoint, but he has added nothing to our knowledge.

The Growth of the Kingdom of God, by SIDNEY L. GUTICK. Fleming H. Revell Co., New York, pp. 320.

This is one of those books which one does not quite like to call dishonest, but which only certain publishers will issue. Every indication of the time in which it is written is carefully scored away. In turning over the pages there is little to tell us whether the book is fresh from the press or a decade or two old. The volume that has just come to hand looks shopworn, and probably journals who limit their reviews to books within the last very few years will exclude this.

The Web of Indian Life, by the SISTER NIVEDITA (Margaret E. Noble) of Ramakrishna-Vive-Kananda. William Heinemann, London, 1904. pp. 301.

This is a unique and very interesting work by a native, and describes the eastern mother, the Hindu woman as wife, love strong as death, the place of woman in the national life, the immediate problem of the oriental woman, the Indian sagas, a study of Indian caste, synthesis of Indian thought, the wheel of birth and death, the story of the Great God, the gospel of the blessed one, Islam in India, and Indian pilgrimage, the web of Indian life on the loom of time.

Ideals of Science and Faith. Essays by various authors. Ed. by J. E. Hand. Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1904. pp. 333.

Addresses or articles by Oliver Lodge, Professors J. A. Thompson, J. H. Muirhead, V. V. Branford, Bertrand Russell, and Patrick Geddes illustrate the approaches through science and education, while four clergymen of different denominations write articles of rapprochement on the side of faith.

Sacrificial Worship, by WM. J. GOLD. Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1903. pp. 112.

These three lectures were delivered in Chicago in 1902, and constitute an attempt to express in untechnical language the basal principles of Christian worship as derived from scripture itself. The treatment is constructive and uncontroversial, and little account is taken of critical questions. It may perhaps be best described as a compilation, but is interesting and so well done as to be valuable.

Education in Religion and Morals, by GEORGE ALBERT COE. Fleming H. Revell Co., New York, 1904. pp. 434.

The writer here gathers together and amplifies previous papers and includes others not previously published. The first treats of theory, the place of character, need of religious training, Christian view of childhood, education as development, punishment and play, reality and symbol, personal and social forces. The second part treats of the child, the religious impulse and its development, infancy, childhood and adolescence. The third part treats of the family, the Sunday School, societies, clubs, Christian academies and college, state schools; and the fourth part entitled "Perspective," treats of the church and child, a glance backward, education and present religious problems. A selected and classified bibliography is appended.

Das Wesen des Christentums und die moderne historische Denkweise, von KARL BETH. A. Deichert, Leipzig, 1904. pp. 135.

The writer first attempts a deductive and inductive exposition of the essence of Christianity. A purely historic method does not satisfy him. Primitive Christianity is not an all-sufficient source, and religious history needs to be supplemented by a larger view point.

Otto Weininger. Sein Werk und sein Persönlichkeit, von EMIL LUCKA. Wilhelm Braumüller, Leipzig, 1905. pp. 158.

In the last number of this *Journal* appeared a review of a volume largely devoted to a characterization of this extraordinary but certainly abnormal man. Here he is made the subject of a psychological analysis by another admirer who also publishes both abstracts and extracts from other unpublished papers which he left behind when he committed suicide in October, 1903.

Two Thousand Years of Missions Before Carey, by LEMUEL CALL BARNES. The Christian Culture Press, Chicago, 1902. pp. 504. 4th ed.

The writer first treats the genesis of missions, then their distribution in several Asiatic, African, European, South American, and other communities, and lastly their continuity. The book has a number of interesting illustrations and on the whole it is a work of much value despite the fact that Mr. Beach has in some respects transcended it. It is to be hoped that it will have a new edition.

God and My Neighbor, by ROBERT BLATCHFORD. Charles H. Kerr & Co., Chicago, 1904. pp. 197.

This writer is known for his "Merry England" and "Britain for the British." He is editor of "The Clarion," the best known English socialist newspaper. In this volume he states very frankly his conceptions of what he cannot believe, first with regard to the Old Testament, then the New, and finally of Christian apologies. His programme is to eliminate from the world poverty, ignorance, crime, idleness, war, slavery, hate, envy, pride, greed, gluttony and vice. He thinks he finds much that illustrates or supports these hated things in Christianity and so rejects it.

The Relations of the Advanced and the Backward Races of Mankind, by JAMES BRYCE. (The Romanes Lecture, 1902.) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1903. 2d ed. pp. 47.

This discourse has become somewhat memorable. The author attempts to glance over the countries in which higher races come into contact with or dominate lower races, and to draw certain conclusions. Sound as the author's opinion in general seems to us to be in insisting that backward races should have all the private and civil rights they can use for their own benefit, and any doubt whether any further admixture of higher and lower races is desirable, the author's view is essentially that of an advanced Englishman and of a politician rather than of an anthropologist. Races have been greatly reduced in number by extinction, absorption and admixture, and are being merged in a few great ones. The author's solution of the problem what can be done to mitigate antagonism, is, he confesses, vague.

Über das Wesen des Christentums und seine modernen Darstellungen, von ERICH SCHAEFER. E. Bertelsmann, Gütersloh, 1904. pp. 78.

- Sachverhältnisse und Tugend. Naturwissenschaft und Religion*, von WILHELM HAMMER. Paul Ratz, Berlin, pp. 48.
- Die Seelischen Wirkungen Jesu*, von W. HERMANN. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1904, pp. 66. Preis. 3.20m.
- The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, by MAX MÜLLER. New Ed. Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1905, pp. 478.
- Science and Immortality*, by WILLIAM OSLER. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1904, pp. 54.
- The Supremacy of Jesus*, by JOSEPH HENRY CROOKER. American Antiquarian Society, Boston, 1904, pp. 186.
- Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, by FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEARBODY. The Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1901, pp. 374.
- The Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, by JOHN CAMPBELL OMAN. T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1903, pp. 291.
- Zion and Anti-Semitism*, by MAX NORDAU and GUSTAV GOTTHEIL. (Contemporary Thought Ser.) Scott-Thaw Co., New York, 1904, pp. 76.
- Korea*, by ANGUS HAMILTON. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1904, pp. 315.
- The City of Refuge*, by HENRY TURNER BAILEY. The Davis Press, Worcester, Mass., 1903, pp. 15.
- Spiritual Experience and Theological Science. A Reconciliation*. By CHARLES CUTHBERT HALL. New York, 1904. The De Vinne Press, pp. 42.
- The Ethical Teaching of Jesus*, by CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1904, pp. 293.
- The Death of Christ*, by JAMES DENNEY. 4th ed. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York, 1903, pp. 334.
- Le Cénie Religieux*. Association Chrétienne Suisse d'Étudiants. pp. 47.
- The Sunday School in the Development of the American Church*, by OSCAR S. MICHAEL. The Young Churchman Co., Milwaukee, 1904, pp. 293.
- Kalender der Weltanschauung in der Bibel*, von PAUL HAEPF. J. C. Hinrichs, Leipzig, 1905, pp. 36.
- New Christianity and Literature*. Essai de Psychologie Contemporaine, par HENRY D'ALFENS. J. Granie, Montauban, 1904, pp. 128.
- A Sketch of Semitic Origins Social and Religious*, by GEORGE AARON BARTON. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1902, pp. 342.

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